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Abstract 
Previous research upon European integration has observed that Britain has an 
I awkward partnership' with the rest of the EU. However, these analyses have not 
addressed how this awkward relationship reflects a difference in political and 
governmental discourse between Britain and the other Continental European 
member states. This thesis will examine this divergence. To this end, it applies the 
discourse-theoretical approach developed by Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, and 
Slavoj Zi2ek. By applying the discourse-theoretical concept of social antagonism, it 
will seek to explain why these discourses are different and opposed. Possible 
solutions to this conflict will then be identified and explored. Inspired by Laclau 
and Mouffe's vision of a 'radical plural democracy', this research concludes by 
advancing a project for a universal European identity that embraces the liberal 
democratic principles of 'freedom and equality for all' and transcends the national 
antagonisms that have plagued Europe's past. 
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Preface 
In this thesis, the term 'Britain' is used as a convenient and instantly recognisable 
abbreviation for 'the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland'. In 
addition, although Britain is often described in this research as if it is an actor, it is 
acknowledged that 'acts' are only literally made by individuals and not states. 
Thus, references to Britain doing something or other are shorthand for an action 
2 taken on behalf of Britain by an authorised individual . 
Moreover, although the 'European Community' is now the 'European Union, the 
former term is retained for discussion of the period before the Treaty on European 
Union (TEU) came into force on 1 November 1993. From this date onwards, it has 
become normal practice to refer to the organisation as a whole as the 'European 
Union' (or 'EU'). However, as this thesis emphasises, and was previously 
I observed by the European Court of Justice in 1975 , it is not yet clear what the 
,3 expression ('the European Union') imports . Indeed, it should be noted that the 
TEU is a treaty on rather than of European union. The TEU is rather opaque and 
takes the form of a treaty within a treaty. An entity styled 'European Union' is 
created and sketchily described with no legal personality, no institutions of its own 
2 George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. 
ýOxford: Oxford University Press). p. v. 
Suggestion of the Court of Justice on European Union (1975) Bulletin Supplement, No. 9, p. 17. 
and no legal powers. 4 Hence, the ensuing problems relating to its legitimacy and 
democratic deficit. In relation to the phrase 'European Union', it is also important 
to distinguish the organisation, the 'European Union', from the process of 
'European union'. 
Furthermore, the term 'European Community' (or 'EC') is used throughout the 
discussion of the pre-EU period, although the three communities (the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC)) were not formally 
merged until 1967. The term 'European Community' is used except where specific 
reference is made to one of the three communities or to the period prior to the 
merger. 
Nicoll, W. and T. C. Salmon. (1994) Understanding the New European Community. (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf). p. 281. 
Introduction 
The British do not like 'Frogs', 'Krautsor'Spics', and therefore, we certainly do not 
like the 'Eurocrats' or the idea of a 'European federal superstate' that they 
represent. We do not want them to interfere with our traditional British way of life. 
We do not want them to tell us what currency to use, how long we should work 
each week, or what we can eat or drink. Moreover, how dare they try? We are the 
British, and we have proved ourselves to be superior to them. After all, we 
defeated them in two world wars. So why should we surrender to them now? If we 
begin to concede to their wishes, it won't be long until we are once again under 
the threat of communists or Nazis. 
Contemporary British discourse is full of such depictions of Europe', an image that 
is reflected in the words of such politicians as Patrick Nicholls: 
In short, I have no great liking for a Continent dominated by two 
countries, the unique contribution of one of which has been to plunge 
Europe into two world wars in living memory, and another which proved 
itself incapable of winning any war unless it is fought by the French 
Foreign Legion ... 
(and which) ... had the nerve to represent itself as a 
1 For example, on such Eurosceptic images in the British press, see: Anderson, P. J. and A. 
Weymouth (1999) (1999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European Union. (London, 
New York: Longman), and Wilkes, G. and D. Wring (1998) 'The British Press and European 
Integration: 1948 to 1996', in D. Baker and D. Seawright (eds) Britain for and Against Europe: 
British Politics and the Question of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 185-205. 
On the response of the British Eurosceptic press to the draft EU constitution published on Monday 
26 May 2003, see: Singleton, T. (2003) (2003) 'War of Words over Europe', The Observer, Sunday 
1June. (http: //politics. guardian. co. uk/eu/story/0,9061,968128,00. html). 
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nation of resistance fighters in the second World War when, in fact, it 
was a nation of collaborators. 2 
Moreover, Euroscepticism is not confined to the right of British politics because 
the British left has also fiercely defended our sovereignty against this Continental 
th reat. 3 As this thesis demonstrates, Euroscepticism is a political phenomenon 
that reflects a longstanding British national antagonism with Continental Europe. 
1.0. Aims 
The thesis has two research aims. First, to improve our understanding of the 
phenomenon of British Euroscepticism that has obstructed European political 
integration, and second, to explore the possibility of developing a common 
European identity and democratic citizenship. These aims are interrelated in that 
the former has been a crucial impediment to the development of the latter. Hence, 
the second aim requires the thesis to locate ways of overcoming the problems 
identified in the examination of the first aim. 
However, this thesis also seeks to assess the applicability of the 'metatheoretical' 
character of discourse theory to concrete political research. It also hopes to 
contribute to the further development of discourse theory, not only in terms of the 
theoretical argument, but also in terms of widening the analytical focus and the 
2 Nicholls, P. (1994) 'Why Britain Ought to Remain the Sceptical Man of Europe', The Western 
Morning News, 23 November. p. 4. 
3 For example, opposition to membership of the EC made odd allies of Tony Benn and Enoch 
Powell, and the 1975 campaign for a 'no' vote in the referendum on this issue was supported by the 
British Communist Party, Trotskyist and Maoist Groups, as well as the National Front. (See: 
George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press) p. 94. On Euroscepticism and the British left, see for example: Baker, D. 
and D. Seawright (1998)'A'Rosy' Map of Europe? Labour Parliamentarians and European 
Integration', in D. Baker and D. Seawright (eds) Britain for and Against Europe: British Politics and 
the Question of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 57-87; Forster, A. (2002) 
Euroscepticism in Contemporary British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the British Conservative 
and Labour Patties Since 1945. (London, New York: Routledge); Holmes, M. (ed -) 
(1996) The 
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development of critical reflections on methodology. It will extend the related 
theoretical and methodological debates upon this theory by evaluating what 
further insights it can provide to our understanding of British Euroscepticism and 
British-European relations. As yet, there have been few practical research 
applications of discourse theory to specific political events and issues. 4 Thus, this 
thesis will serve to unite a key and contentious political issue with a new research 
application. 
1.1. British Euroscepticism 
In its analysis of British Euroscepticism, this thesis will examine the persistent 
British obstruction to the process of European political integration that culminated 
in the ratification crisis of the Maastricht Treaty (or 'Treaty on European Union I 
(TEU)) in 1992-3. It is generally accepted that Britain is perceived as an 
I awkward 5 partner of the EU by the other member states, and that this reputation 
has been consolidated because Britain has continued to be at odds with the major 
initiatives for European integration since it acquired membership of the EC in 
6 1973 . 
As will be demonstrated in the first part of this thesis, the acceptance and 
significance of Britain's reputation as an awkward partner of the EU has been the 
subject of much political research. However, such analyses do not adequately 
Eurosceptical Reader. (London: Macmillan). pp. 13-71; George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 71-106, and 
Wilde, L. (1994) Modem European Socialism. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). pp. 31-3. 
4 Examples are: Howarth, D., A. J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds) (2000) Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. (Manchester, New York: Manchester 
University Press); Laclau, E. (ed. ) (1994) The Making of Political Identities. (London; Verso); 
Norval, A. J. (1996) Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. (London: Verso); Smith, A. M. (11994) 
New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), and 
Torfing, J. (1998) Politics, Regulation and the Modem Welfare State. (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
5 See: George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
3 
explain the phenomenon of British Euroscepticism. British Euroscepticism is 
reflected in the British obstruction to European integration rather than defined by 
it. It cannot be reduced to an anti-integrationary stance based upon a difference in 
economic, social, and political interests. Rather, as this thesis proposes, British 
Euroscepticism reflects a long-standing British antagonism with Continental 
Europe and its political ideas. The thesis argues that a discourse-theoretical 
approach provides a new and constructive way of examining the notion of 
antagonism in this context. Thus, it can help explain the British antagonism with 
Continental Europe and its consequent antagonism with the institutions and 
initiatives of the EU. It will be proposed that Britain has opposed European 
integration because it has been negated as equivalent to the threat posed by 
Continental Europe to its discursive system of identity. 
This thesis illustrates how Britain's awkward partnership with the EU is linked to 
the phenomena of British nationalism and racism. Previous research on British 
Euroscepticism has not examined its intrinsic link with nationalism and racism. As 
observed in the second part of this thesis, research upon racism and nationalism 
in Britain has also neglected this link. This chapter argues that developing this link 
will help provide a more complete understanding of these phenomena. 
Moreover, this analysis demonstrates that Britain's awkward partnership with the 
EU has not developed within the same theoretical and methodological discourse 
as that of nationalism and racism. Hence, the ways that nationalism and racism 
have been analysed have not had a significant impact upon the way that the 
British relationship with Europe has been understood. This thesis will illustrate 
how a discourse-theoretical approach can combine these research foci to improve 
Ibid. p. 1. 
our understanding of British Euroscepticism. In addition, it is proposed that 
orthodox essentialist and functionalist conceptions of nationalism and racism are 
problematic. This thesis holds that a discourse-theoretical approach can provide a 
new and more productive framework for analysing such phenomena as well as 
that of British Euroscepticism. 
The discourse-theoretical approach will also be applied to illustrate how the British 
antagonism with Continental Europe is reflected in a conflict in (hegemonic 
discourse. It is observed that previous research has not acknowledged that 
British-European integration has been obstructed by a divergence in discourse 
between Britain and Continental Europe, and thus, by conflicting understandings 
of the same key words and principles of the European debate. 
This thesis also illustrates that British-European integration has been obstructed 
because this conflict in discourse reflects conflicting ideas and interests. As 
European initiatives have tended to embody Continental European ideas and 
interests, they have conflicted with those of British discourse. Hence, Britain has 
opposed the process and achieved a reputation as an awkward partner. It is 
illustrated that this conflict in discourse is also reflected in conflicting perceptions 
of the future shape of the EU. In accordance with the British discourse of 
'parliamentary liberalism', the EU can only be a liberal economic market based 
upon intergovernmental co-operation. However, in accordance with the 
Continental European discourse of republican democracy/social democracy, the 
EU can be a broader economic, social and political union based upon notions of 
supranational integration and federalism. Thus, Britain has obstructed the process 
This thesis focuses upon hegemonic discourse, that is, ruling ideas, meanings and options. This 
discourse-theoretical concept of hegemony is explained in Chapter 3, Section 3. 
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per se because its political and governmental discourse is not amenable to such 
Continental European principles. 
The thesis argues that British-European integration has been problematic 
because it has invoked a hegemonic struggle over meaning in Europe, and thus, 
over the meaning of 'European Union' itself. The extent to which European 
initiatives tend to embody Continental European ideas and interests, is that to 
which Britain has opposed European integration, since it would represent a 
Continental European victory in this hegemonic struggle. 
1.2. A universal European identity and democratic citizenship 
In relation to the second aim of this thesis, it is observed that the process of 
European integration is dislocating the discourses of Europe. Hence, this process 
provides us with an opportunity for progressive democratic change in Europe. As 
this thesis argues, British-European integration could be a positive goal if it came 
to represent the pursuit of democracy and 'freedom and equality for all' rather than 
the present focus upon effective competition in the global capitalist economy. It is 
claimed by this thesis that British Euroscepticism is a negative phenomenon in the 
sense that it has obstructed this potential. 
As the thesis claims that there is an intrinsic link between Euroscepticism and 
nationalism, it is also emphasized that the EU project should not be based upon 
the nation. It will be argued that the present national foundation of European 
discourse is obstructing the development of a supranational European political 
community and is responsible for the continuing threat of national antagonisms 
6 
and totalitarianism in Europe. It is also instructive that the European project was 
initially conceived as a way to prevent the destructive consequences of 
nationalism from ever rising again, and to develop and maintain peace, unity, 
democracy and freedom. Thus, with the rise again of nationalist sentiment in 
contemporary Europe, combined with existing deficits in democracy, the 
importance of these previous goals is re-established by this thesis. 
It is also argued that orthodox theories on European integration have been part of 
the problem rather than part of the solution because they reflect the same 
nationalist and capitalist hegemonic discourses that have obstructed such 
progressive change. However, as examined below, the discourse-theoretical 
approach applied by this research radically challenges the foundation of these 
discourses, and thus, makes it possible to identify alternative and more credible 
discourses. In pursuit of such credible alternatives, it is proposed that Laclau and 
Mouffe's project for a 'radical and plural democracy' may hold the key to the 
development of a European universal identity and democratic citizenship. 
2.0. Theoretical approach 
As indicated above, a discourse-theoretical approach will be applied to the aims of 
8 this thesis. Combined with the original works of Laclau, Mouffe, and 2i2ek , the 
account of discourse theory by Jacob Torfing9 is also deemed to be particularly 
instructive. 
8 The insights and arguments advanced by the psych oan alytica I theory developed by Slavoj 2i±ek 
will be invoked where they are considered to directly contribute to developing the discourse- 
theoretical approach in relation to this research focus. A strictly 2i2ekean approach to this research 
focus would require another thesis, since the significance of the psych oan alytical theory of 2i2ek 
extends far beyond any affinity with the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. 9 See: Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and 2i2ek. (Oxford, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell). 
7 
This thesis argues that discourse theory has wide-ranging implications for social 
science and political research because it represents a powerful challenge to the 
traditional theories of modernity and makes conceivable a new range of political 
projects. At a theoretical level, discourse theory offers solutions to the problems 
associated with the declared limits of modernity. It claims that the modernist 
project is limited by its aim to ground knowledge, ethical beliefs and judgements 
on 'objective' and 'essential' foundations. The questioning of such foundations and 
recognition of their limitations has led to what has been described as a 
I postmodern' perspective. Thus, discourse theory can be considered a 
postmodern approach because it questions the essentialist and foundational 
assumptions of the traditions and disciplines of modernity. 
This thesis holds that previous research upon British-European relations has 
reflected the problems associated with the limits of modernity. Traditional theories 
of British-European relations are I essentialist' because they assume the existence 
of an underlying essential principle that structures the social totality. 10 That is, a 
force or region within the social totality is conceived as the essentialist principle 
that makes intelligible social phenomena and their mutual relationships. For 
example, Marxist analyses of British-European relations frequently reflect a form 
of essentialism described as 'economism', confering explanatory primacy to the 
basic contradiction and the endogenous economic laws of capitalism. However, it 
will be illustrated how a discourse-theoretical approach can examine various 
elements, and their inter-relationship, without the assumption of a single and 
predetermined essential principle. 
10 See: Derrida, J. (1978) [1967] Writing and Difference. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). pp. 
278-9. 
8 
In addition, classical Marxist approaches to ideology are limited in their grounding 
in an essentialist conception of society and social agency. They thus assume that 
ideology masks an objective, true and 'real' world. However, as will be explained, 
the extra-ideological reality is already ideological: without an objective world of 
'real' essences against which we can demask ideological forms of representation, 
the Marxist theory of ideology has no meaning. " Hence, this thesis proposes that 
an anti-essentialist conception of ideology better facilitates our understanding of 
the phenomenon of British Euroscepticism. In contrast to previous analyses of 
British-European integration, it is argued that it is more instructive to apply the 
psychoanalytical approach developed by 2i2ek, and thus conceive British 
Euroscepticism as an 'ideological fantasy. 
It must be emphasized that the discourse-theoretical critique of modernity and 
essentialist theory should not be considered as an abstract or negative pursuit. 
The anti-essentialist theory of Laclau and Mouffe provides new theoretical 
arguments and insights as well as instructive empirical analyses. Moreover, the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe has important political implications and is 
shaped by their commitment to 'radical plural democracy'. Although discourse 
theory itself is politically indeterminate, the Marxist ambition to change the world is 
affirmed by Laclau, Mouffe and Zi2ek. Thus, they have been described as 
'affirmative' rather than as 'sceptical' postmodernists. 12 Rather than providing a 
pessimistic assessment of the possibility of a social revolution in our time, they 
believe postmodernity makes a whole range of new political projects conceivable. 
" Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 114. 
12 Rosenau, 1. R. (1992) Post-modernism and the Social Sciences: Insights, Inroads, and 
Intrusions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). pp. 14-17. 
9 
The 'Phronesis' of Laclau and Mouffe acknowledges wide agreement that the left- 
wing project is in crisis. New antagonisms have emerged that require the 
reformulation of the socialist ideal in terms of an extension and deepening of 
democracy. The critique of essentialism is the necessary condition for 
understanding the widening of the field of social struggles characteristic of the 
present stage of democratic politics. Thus, the objective is to establish a dialogue 
between these theoretical developments and left-wing politics. An anti-essentialist 
stand is the sine qua non of a new vision for the Left conceived in terms of a 
radical plural democracy. 
13 
For Laclau and Mouffe, a radical democratic politics is made possible because 
postmodernity is a crisis of the self-foundation of modernity and not a crisis of its 
political project. This thesis shares the aim of Laclau and Mouffe to disentangle 
liberal democracy from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and also to free it 
from its association with capitalism and its correlate of economic liberalism. 14 
To this end, the first stage is achieved through the conception of democratic 
citizenship that goes beyond liberalism and communitarianism. The second stage 
is realized through the advancement of the concept of 9 radical plural democracy'. 
In sum, Laclau and Mouffe aim to help overcome the crisis of the Left by 
developing a new hegemonic project that articulates liberal and communitarian 
values with traditional socialist goals. In due course, this thesis examines the 
possibility of a radical plural democracy and citizenship in Europe. However, the 
13 The 'Phronesis' is the series of work edited by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, and this 
description of its goals is given at the beginning of its texts. See, for example, the first page of: 
Laclau, E. (11990) New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. (London, New York: Verso). 14 Mouffe, C. (11987) 'Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
Volume 13, No. 2, pp. 105-6; Mouffe, C. (1 992a) 'Preface: Democratic Politics Today', in C. Mouffe 
(ed. ) Dimensions of Radical Democracy., Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. (London: Verso). pp. 
2-3. 
10 
problems posed for these developments by the 'British anti-democratic offensive' 
are also examined. 
The discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe, responds to the practical concern that 
essentialist theory tends to construct a political horizon in which authoritarian 
practices are legitimised and radical democratic pluralist negotiations of difference 
15 
are foreclosed . It is thus proposed that the radical democratic project, to which 
this research hopes to contribute, must be based upon anti-foundationalist 
epistemological and ontological assumptions. Democracy should be 'radically 
pluralist' in the sense that the plurality of different identities is not grounded in any 
transcendent or underlying positive foundation . 
16 However, anti-essentialism is not 
in itself a panacea against authoritarianism because it is politically indeterminate. 
Thus, a discourse-theoretical approach responds to the problem of the unfulfilled 
potential of liberal democracy in Europe. The liberal democratic values of 'freedom 
and equality for all' have not swept Europe, and they have largely been ignored in 
the process of European integration. The commonly acknowledged 'democratic 
deficit' 17 of the political institutions of the EU has not been resolved, and the EU 
project so far has focused primarily upon economic integration and the completion 
of the single market. Moreover, a European social dimension was advanced 
relatively late (and implemented even later) in the process of European 
integration, and it was advanced and accepted primarily as a necessary 
15 Smith, A. M. (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary. (London, New York: 
Routledge). pp. 42-43. 
16 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 256. 
17 See, for example: Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. 
(London, New York: Longman). pp. 26-9,59-93; Boyce, B. (1993) 'The Democratic Deficit of the 
European Community', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 46, No. 4, October, pp. 458-477; Dinan, D. 
(1994) Ever Closer Union? (London: Macmillan). pp. 288-292; Featherstone, K. (1 994)'Jean 
Monnet and the 'Democratic Deficit'of the EU, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 32, 
No. 2, June, pp. 149-170, and Neunreither, K. (1994) 'The Democratic Deficit of the European 
11 
requirement for economic progress rather than as a initiative to remedy social and 
economic inequality in Europe. Thus, as this thesis advocates, the goals of 
socialism need to be reinscribed within the framework of a radical pluralist 
democracy and articulated within the institutions of political liberalism. 18 
Fundamental principles and essentialist identities are inherently anti-democratic 
and reactionary because they obstruct the 'rules of the game' of liberal 
democracy. Moreover, the conflicting fundamental principles and essentialist 
identities of Britain and Continental Europe have obstructed the process of 
European integration and the development of a European universal identity and 
democratic citizenship. Thus, one way to help undermine this obstruction is to 
question the whole idea of fundamental principles and essentialist identities. As 
discourse theory is radically anti-essentialist, it can make an important contribution 
in this respect. 
Indeed, in relation to the secular eschatologies of liberalism and Marxism, it is 
proposed by this thesis that an anti-essentialist approach is much better equipped 
to analyse the politics of identity flourishing in the contemporary era. It can help 
explain the plurality of identities, conflicts, struggles and social movements that 
cannot be made intelligible by a single essential principle such as the nation or 
class. Thus, it can elucidate upon the plurality of identities, conflicts, struggles and 
social movements that traverse the national and class divisions of Europe. 
Furthermore, it can help make intelligible the plurality of national identities, 
conflicts and interests that have obstructed the process of supranational European 
Union: Towards Closer Cooperation between the European Parliament and the National 
Parliaments', Govemment and Opposition, Volume 29, No. 3, pp. 299-314. 
18 Smith, C. (1993)'Towards a Liberal Socialism', in C. Mouffe (ed. ) The Return of the Political. 
(London: Verso). p. 90. 
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integration and the development of a European universal identity and democratic 
citizenship. 
3.0. Structure 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part (Chapters 1-2) examines the 
existing theory and literature upon European integration and British-European 
relations, and subsequently, the discourse-theoretical approach employed here 
(Chapter 3). The second part (Chapters 4-5) will apply the discourse-theoretical 
approach to British-European relations, and the final part (Chapters 6-7) will 
examine the possibility of a European universal identity and democratic 
citizenship. 
In Part /, Chapters 1-2 provide a review of previous literature and theories, which 
are examined in detail for two reasons: first, to establish the subject and context 
of this thesis, and second, to illustrate the different ways in which this subject has 
been conceived prior to this discourse-theoretical analysis. Chapter 1 relates to 
the research aim of examining the possibility of the development of a universal 
European identity, and thus, it examines the orthodox theories of international 
relations that have dominated the study of European integration. With regard to 
the research aim of improving our understanding of British Euroscepticism, 
Chapter 2 examines previous accounts of the British relationship with the EC/EU 
from its membership in 1973 to the ratification of the TEU in 1993. Chapter 3 
provides an account of the discourse-theoretical approach, which is directed 
towards its application to these specific research aims. 
13 
Part /I relates to the first aim of this research, to develop our understanding of the 
British obstruction to European integration. In an examination of the debate upon 
the TEU, Chapter 4 focuses predominantly upon the concept of 'discourse' to 
illustrate that the process of European integration has been obstructed because 
Britain and Continental Europe have different discourses, and thus, conflicting 
understandings of the same concepts and principles. It is also observed that 
successful European integration depends upon the way that EU initiatives 
resonate with these different discourses. In this sense, Britain can be perceived 
as an 'awkward' or'irrational' partner because the ideas, meanings and options of 
its hegemonic discourse conflict with those of Continental Europe which tend to 
be embodied within EU initiatives. In all, this chapter illustrates that Britain and 
Continental Europe have different political and governmental discourses, and then 
examines how this conflict obstructed the Maastricht debate upon the principle of 
4 subsidiarity', and thus, progress towards 'an ever closer union'. 
Chapter 5 focuses more upon the discourse-theoretical principle of 'social 
antagonism' to explain why these discourses are different and opposed. It is 
argued that this conflict in discourse reflects a British antagonism with Continental 
Europe, and that this antagonism is a discursive response to dislocation. This 
chapter explores why dislocation in Britain was responded to by the construction 
of this antagonism, that is, why Continental Europe was identified as the cause of 
dislocation in Britain. 
In addition, this chapter investigates why sovereignty has been such an 
obstructing issue for Britain and certainly more so than for the other member 
states. It also observes that the growing implications of European integration, as 
14 
particularly expressed by the TEU, invoked a tension within the articulation of 
British economic liberalism and parliamentary sovereignty. Hence, the process of 
European integration exposed the 'contingency' and 'mythical' status of this 
discursive articulation, and this played a significant role in the demise of Thatcher 
in 1990 and the Major Government in 1997. 
It is illustrated that British-European integration has been obstructed because 
Continental Europe and Continental European discourse represent the 'radical 
and threatening otherness' (or constitutive outside) for the British identity. That is, 
the construction of the limits of the British discursive system of identity has 
involved the construction of a social antagonism with Continental Europe. Here, it 
is also observed that British Eurocentricism is intrinsically linked to nationalism 
and racism, which also represent the dislocating antagonistic threat of 'the Other'. 
Part /// relates to the second aim of this research, the possibility of developing a 
common European identity and democratic citizenship. Thus, it explores ways of 
overcoming the problem of British Euroscepticism, as examined in Part //. 
Therefore, it is also assessed whether the discourse-theoretical approach holds 
the key to the questions and criticisms that it has invoked. 
Chapter 6 presents the discourse-theoretical critique of the modernist discourse 
that is reflected in orthodox approaches to European integration, as described in 
Chapters 1-2. It is argued that these modernist approaches are limited by their 
essentialist and Eurocentric foundations. Previous chapters argue that British 
discourse has obstructed British-European integration, and that Continental 
European discourse is more amenable to supranational European integration and 
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the development of a democratic European political community. However, this 
does not mean that the ideas and interests of Continental European modernist 
discourse should be presented as universal truths or can be universally applied. 
Indeed, the Continental European discourse of modernity has also obstructed the 
development of a supranational and democratic European community because its 
conception of democracy is intrinsically linked to capitalism and nationalism. 
Chapter 6 also observes that the tension between neo-fu nctional/su pra national 
and neo-real ist/i ntergovern mental approaches to European integration (as 
examined in Chapter 1) reflects the dilemma posed by the conceptual dyad of the 
universal and the particular. That is, neo-fu nctional ism/su pra nationalism prioritizes 
the development of a universal European identity, while neo- 
real ist/intergovern mentalism privileges the particularities of the member states. 
From a different perspective, it can also be argued that the particularities of 
member states undermine the universal assumptions advanced by both these 
approaches. In direct contrast, approaches to British-European (as examined in 
Chapter 2) tend to produce a false particularisation of Britain. However, it is 
demonstrated that a discourse-theoretical approach can help overcome the 
problems posed by the universal/particular dyad, and thus, it can provide a new 
path for the development of a European universal identity and citizenship. 
To complete this thesis, Chapter 8 examines whether Laclau and Mouffe's project 
for a radical plural democracy could provide a credible project for the development 
of a universal European identity and democratic citizenship. It is assessed 
whether the radical plural democratic pursuit of 'freedom and equality for ail' can 
16 
help overcome the democratic deficits and national antagonisms of Europe, and 
thus, the obstruction caused by British Euroscepticism. 
The conclusion of thesis will present an evaluation of the contribution made by this 
discourse-theoretical approach to our understanding of the British obstruction to 
European integration. In addition, with specific regard to the problem posed British 
Euroscepticism, it will assess whether a discourse-theoretical approach holds the 
key to the development of a universal European identity and democratic 
citizenship. 
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Part I 
Literature and Method 
Chapter 1 
Theories of International Relations and 
the Process of European Integration 
Introduction 
This chapter relates to the research aim of exploring the possibility of developing 
a European identity. It examines the orthodox theories of international relations 
that have dominated the theory and practice of the process of European 
integration. These theories have advanced competing universal assumptions to 
explain the international actions of states, and consequently, they advance 
conflicting visions of the future form of the EU. As will be illustrated, the two major 
theories are 'neo-functionalism' and '(neo-) realism' I, and respectively, these 
conflicting approaches have reflected the supranational and intergovernmental 
possibilities for Europe. 
1.0. The possibility of a collective European identit 
Attempts to theorise the relationship between EC/EU identity, legitimacy and 
institutional development have marked important milestones in the intellectual 
history of European integration. Theories have tended to emphasise the 
importance of developing a collective European identity. Even a minimalist 
1 This thesis does not distinguish between 'realism' and 'neo-realism' because there is no 
difference between them that is relevant or significant to the specifics of this research project. See: 
Grieco, J. M. (1988) 'Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
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definition of integration - the 'dependable expectations' that political change would 
only occur by peaceful means - was seen to require a 'sense of commun 
ity, 
. 
However, when it came to the more difficult challenge of integrating separate 
European states into a single political system, the early post-war federalist 
movement foundered on the objection that such an institutional order could not be 
3 
willed into existence in a single moment. In the absence of a sense of a shared 
political identity, a European supranational government would be ignored and lack 
authority. 4 
Hence, the problem was passed on to those who were prepared to consider how 
European identity, legitimacy and institutions might develop incrementally and 
interactively. As examined below, neo-functionalists have sought to demonstrate 
how European integration could 'spill-over' from one policy area to another, and 
how a supranational European political identity could, correspondingly, spill-over 
from one elite to another before embracing a wider public. For Ernst Haas, 
integration is defined as a process in which organised 'political actors' would be 
gradually persuaded to shift their 'loyalties and expectations' towards a new 
centre. 5 In the same genre, later reflections presented elites as diffusing the new 
identity across classes and social groups through pluralistic political activities of 
parties and interest grou PS. 
6 
Liberal Institutionalism', International Organization, Volume 42, No. 3, p. 485. 
2 Deutsch, K., S. Burrell, R. Kann, M. Lee, M. Lichtermann, F. Loewenheim and R. Van Wagenen 
(1957) Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press). 
?. 36 
Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. (London, New York: 
Addison Wesley). p. 34. 4 Harrison, R. (1974) Europe in Question: Theories of Regional International Integration. (London: 
Allen and Unwin). 5 Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. (Stanford: Stanford University Press). pp. 12-13. 6 Schmitter, P. (1971) 'A Revised Theory of Regional Integration', in L. N- Lindberg and S. A. 
Scheingold (eds) Regional Integration: Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press). pp. 232-264. 
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In contrast, intergovernmental ists insisted that European integration must be 
rethought because political identities would, and should, remain national in 
character. For example, De Gaulle was concerned that supranational 
constructions would produce a legitimacy vacuum. States that were of diminishing 
importance to their physical and economic success would simply lose public 
loyalty rather than it being transferred to supranational institutions, which lacked 
public support. As a consequence, Europe would be all the more easily dominated 
7 from the outside . 
The prominent intergovernmental ist, Stanley Hoffman, has argued that patterns of 
international co-operation would adapt to obstinately national patterns of identity, 
rather than vice versa. 8 More recently, another intergovernmental ist, Andrew 
Moravcsik, proposed that preferences on major issues of European integration 
would continue to be formed in the 'domestic' arena. 9 Since only domestic 
institutions correspond to relatively uncontested identities, only national 
democracies have the capacity to settle arguments authoritatively and 
legitimately. Hence, i ntergovern mental ists propose that major measures of 
integration have to be theorised as a two-stage bargaining process in which EU 
negotiations begin from - and are always constrained by - the interests of 
legitimately formed majorities in the major member states. 
7 Kolodziej, E. (1974) French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou. (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press). 
8 Hoffman, S. (1966) 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of 
Western Europe'. Daedalus, Volume 95, pp. 862-915, Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991)'Neo- 
functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the EC', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 20, Part 1, p. 8. 9 Moravcsik, A. (1991) 'Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft in the European Community', International Organisation, Volume 45, No. 1, pp. 19-56; 
Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmental ist Approach', Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, No. 4, pp. 473- 
524; Moravcsik, A. (1993) 'Introduction', in Evans, P., H. Jacobson and R. D. Putnam (eds) Double- 
edged Diplomacy. International Bargaining and Domestic Politics. (Berkeley: University of California 
Press). 
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In sum, an important distinction between the two contending theories of European 
integration lies in the different assumptions that they make in relation to the 
possibility and validity of European identity formation. Neo-functionalists are 
optimistic about the possibility of developing a valid supranational collective 
European identity; neo-realists are pessimistic about this possibility and refute its 
validity. Reflecting their opposing positions, neo-functionalism has proved to be 
credible in times of progress in the development of a collective Europe, while 
intergovernmental ism has dominated in times of paralysis. However, there is an 
observable overlap between the two theories in the sense that even neo- 
functionalists have anticipated that European identity would be tenuous at the 
beginning of the integration process, and thus, that the EC/EU would have to 
i piggy-back' for a time on the legitimating force of the state. 10 Both seem to agree 
that identity is likely to be the weakest link for the EU, and new solutions to this 
problem are explored in Part ///. 
2.0. Neo-functionalism and reqional intewation 
Neo-functionalism has been described as a harnessing of functional methods to 
federalist goals. " However, the most prominent functionalist, David Mitrany, 
disapproved of this 'misapplication'. Mitrany was concerned about peace rather 
than regionalism or federalism, and he feared that the attempts to achieve 
European unity would simply create the follies of nationalism on a larger scale. 12 
By contrast, other important functionalists, such as Jean Monnet, believed that 
West European unity was crucial for post-war European economic 
10 Wallace, W. and J. Smith (11995) 'Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the 
Problem of Popular Consent', Western European Politics, Volume 18, No. 3, p. 139. 11 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) Op. Cit. p. 3. 
12 See: Mitrany, D. (1943) A Working Peace System. (Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Press. 
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redevelopment. To this end, the aim of this unity was 'to create a huge continental 
market on the European scale ,. 
13 
The original formulations of neo-functionalism can be found in the work of Haas 14 
and Lindberg. 15 They studied 'regional integration) in general and European 
integration in particular. They both developed a theory of regional integration on 
the basis of studies of the early experiences of the EC. 16 Haas and Lindberg 
defined 'integration' as a process rather than as a condition. This process involves 
a degree of institution-building in the new centre. They emphasize that integration 
changes the expectations and activities of political actors, that is, of a wide range 
of societal elites within parties, bureaucracies and interest groups. 
Haas and Lindberg developed a comprehensive body of theory on regional 
integration, the aim of which was to describe, explain, and pred iCt. 
17 However, 
their work reflects a sympathy with the project of European integration and thus, 
neo-functionalism may also be viewed as a strategy and a prescription. Therefore, 
the fate of neo-functionalism has been linked to the success of the integration 
process. This link is also apparent because neo-functionalism was developed in 
direct response to the emergence of the EC. 
13 See: Monnet, J- (1962) 'A Ferment of Change', Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 1, p. 
205. 
14 Haas, E. B. (1958) Op. Cit. 
15 Lindberg, L. N. (1963) The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press). 
16 Lindberg confined his analysis to the European Economic Community (EEC), while Haas based 
his study upon the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, Haas extended his 
conclusions to both the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). 
17 Haas, E. B. (1971) 'The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing', in L. N. Lindberg and S. A. Scheingold (eds) Op. Cit. p. 6. 
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2.1. The logic of spill-over 
The main thesis of neo-functionalism is that integration within one sector will tend 
to beget its own impetus and spread to other sectors. The establishment of 
supranational institutions designed to deal with functionally specific tasks will set 
in motion economic, social and political processes which generate pressures 
towards further integration. This snowball effect is described as the logic of 'spill- 
over' 
18 
, and has three aspects: 
(i) Functional spill-over: This arises from the inherent technical characteristics of 
the functional tasks themselves. It is held that some sectors within industrial 
economies are so interdependent that it is impossible to treat them in isolation. 
Hence, as envisaged by Jean Monnet, attempts to integrate certain functional 
tasks will inevitably lead to problems that can only be resolved by integrating yet 
more tasks. 19 
(ii) Political spill-over: This occurs from the assumed pluralist nature of West 
European societies and from a conception of politics that owes much to early 
I, 20 group theorists . In such pluralist societies, politics is based upon conflict 
between (governmental and non-govern mental) 'elites' pursuing their own aims. 
These elites will undergo a learning process and develop the perception that their 
interests are better served by seeking supranational rather than national solutions. 
Hence, they will refocus their activities, expectations, and loyalties to the new 
centre. This reorientation will lead to calls for further integration. 
18 See: Haas, E. B. (1958) Op. Cit. pp. 283-31; Lindberg, L. N. (1963) Op. Cit. pp. 10-11. 19 See: Haas, E. B. (1958) Op. Cit. p. 297; Lindberg, L. N. (1963) Op. Cit. p. 10. 
20 See: Lindberg, L. N. (1963) Op. Cit. p. 9. 
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(iii) Cultivated spill-over: This emphasizes the role of central institutions, 
especially the European Commission, in providing the pressure for further 
integration. Such institutions were to embody the 'common interest' and function 
as 'midwives' for the integration process . 
21 Thus, it is proposed that the outcome 
of the integration process is to a degree dependent upon the ability of the 
Commission to perform these roles. Cultivated spill-over, therefore, constitutes the 
voluntaristic element in the otherwise deterministic theory of neo-functionalism. 
In sum, derived from their observations of the early experiences of the EC, Haas 
and Lindberg proposed that sectoral integration is inherently expansive, that 
integration of some functional tasks tends to spill over into integration of other 
tasks. Haas further argued that an acceleration of the integration process could 
be 'safely predicted' and that it might lead to a 'political community of Europe' 
22 
within a decade . Lindberg shared his optimism, although he did acknowledge 
that, 'there are a number of ways in which the process of political integration might 
be interrupted'. 23 
2.2. Failures and denunciations 
Ensuing EC development led to a number of criticisms of the original formulations 
of neo-functionalism by i ntergovern mental ists and independence theorists. 
Conflicting with the bold and optimistic predictions of neo-functionalism, by the 
beginning of the 1980s, such critics observed that intergovernmental elements 
had been strengthened at the expense of the supranational, that the EC was 
24 increasingly paralysed, and that the prospects of major spill-overs had waned . 
21 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) Op. Cit. p. 6. 
22 Haas, E. B. (1958) Op. Cit. p. 311. 
23 Lindberg, L. N. (1963) Op. Cit. p. 293. 
24 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) Op. Cit. p. 8. 
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Unexpected empirical developments and theoretical criticisms led to the revision 
and finally, the almost complete abandonment of the original formulation of neo- 
functionalism. First, responding to the advent of de Gaulle and the 
i ntergovern mental ist objections raised by Hoffman, the automaticity of spill-over 
was abandoned. Second, the resistance displayed by De Gaulle made it 
necessary for Haas to specify the conditions under which the theory was applied. 
He contended that the functioning of the logic of integration depended upon the 
goals of statesmen and non-govern mental elites being 'incremental-economic$ 
rather than 'dramatic-political'. Relying upon this assumption, neo-functionalism 
25 became based upon pragmatism and technocratic policy-making . 
Following David Easton's systems model of 'domestic politics I, Lindberg went on 
to develop a more comprehensive framework in which spill-over was reduced to 
one mechanism among others . 
26 Similarly, Haas downgraded neo-functionalism 
as a whole to one 'pre-theory' among others. 27 In direct reference to the 
interdependence theory of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, examined below, 
I Haas conceded that the study of regional integration should be , included in and 
subordinated to the study of changing patterns of interdependence ,. 28 
25 Haas, E. B. (1967) 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common 
Market Studies. Volume 5, No. 4, pp. 315-43. 
26 See: Lindberg, L. N. (1967) 'The European Community as a Political System: Notes Toward the 
Construction of a Model', Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 5, No. 4, pp. 344-87, 
Lindberg, L. N. and S. A. Scheingold (1970) Europe's Would-Be Polity. (Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall). On David's Easton's systems model, see: Easton, D. (1971) [1953] The 
Political System: An Inquiry into the State of Political Science. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf). 
27 Haas, E. B. (1971) Op. Cit. pp. 18-26. 
28 Haas, E. B. (1975) The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. (Research Series, No. 25, 
Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkley, California). p. 86. 
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2.3. A re-emergence of neo-functionalism? 
Thus, the fate of neo-functionalism has reflected the fate of the EC project. 
Initially, the developments of the EC seemed to vindicate neo-functionalism: when 
neo-functionalism was first formulated, the ECSC had already 'spilled-over' into 
the Euratom and the EEC, both established by the Treaties of Rome (1957). In 
the following years, the EC was embedded in much optimism. However, by the 
mid-1970s, neo-functionalism had not been able to explain or predict EC 
developments. Nevertheless, after more than a decade of Euro-pessimism, 
European integration seemed to gain pace in the second half of the 1980s: a 
settlement was finally reached on the British budgetary contribution at the 
Fontainebleau Summit in June 1984, and in the following year, the White Paper 
on the internal market was adopted and agreement upon the Single European Act 
was secured - 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen argued that this new dynamism of the EC reflected a re- 
emergence of neo-functionalism and the logic of spill-over. He observed a 
significant increase in the pace of European integration from 1985 onwards, and 
he claimed that neo-functionalist pressures were at least as much in evidence 
then as they had been in the early years of the EC. He concluded that these 
pressures had played an important role in speeding up integration and that since 
1985, there had been a re-emergence of the neo-functionalist logic. 29 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen nevertheless acknowledges various limitations of neo- 
functionalism. Most apparent, the logic of spill-over has been more evident in 
some periods than others: it prevailed until the mid-1960s and was considered to 
play a significant role in the wake of the adoption of the White Paper on the 
27 
internal market in 1985. As both these phases relied upon a strategy of economic 
liberalisation underpinned by legal commitments to specific measures and a fixed 
timetable, he deduces that these circumstances are the most conductive to the 
logic of 'spill-over ,. 
30 
2.4. Prevailing limitations: the problems of nationalism and diversity 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen acknowledges the limitations of neo-functionalism. He 
recognises that, even in the dynamic phase after 1985, neo-functionalism does 
not provide an all-encompassing framework for an understanding of the 
integration process. He believes that some of the earlier criticisms are still valid 
and that i ntergovern mentalism and interdependence theory contain important 
insights which cannot be ignored . 
31 Moreover, as the focus of neo-functionalism is 
the dynamics of integration, Tranholm-Mikkelsen argues that the other side of the 
equation has been under-emphasised. Countervailing forces, assumed to be 
always implicit in neo-functionalism, were never subjected to the same degree of 
scrutiny. As will now be examined, Tranholm-Mikkelsen believes there are two 
countervailing forces that limit the effects of the logic of spill-over. 
The first is 'nationalism, as reflected in the continued adherence to the symbols of 
sovereignty by so-called 'dramatic-political' actors. This force was epitomised by 
de Gaulle between 1958 and 1969, and by Thatcher between 1979 and 1990. 
However, such resistance cannot be simply reduced to the personal preferences 
of individual leaders. Both de Gaulle and Thatcher had a constituency for 
nationalist ideas among the public at large. Their success exposes the limitations 
of a framework confined to the perceptions and activities of elites. Thus, although 
29 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) Op. Cit. P. 16. 30 Ibid. 
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Tranholm-Mikkelsen argues that integration is propelled by the pragmatic pursuit 
of group interests that are represented by a very small layer of people, he also 
proposes that this cannot continue without some degree of European community 
('Gemeinschaft') among the wider people. Hence, in conflict with its acceptance of 
early group theory's focus upon the actions of a plurality of eliteS32 , he concedes 
that neo-functionalism cannot entirely ignore the role of popular attitudes. 
The second countervailing force is 'diversity'. Member states have significant 
administrative, economic, political and social differences, and this impedes 
agreement upon common substantive policies. 33 For example, common social 
policies have proved difficult because of the different traditions of employee co- 
determination in management34 ; and regional policies have created conflicts of 
economic interests between the rich northern states and the poorer southern 
sa es. 
35 
In the EU decision-making process, these two countervailing forces are 
represented by the individual governments and are channelled through the 
Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) 
and the system of sub-committees. That is, these forces are represented by the 
intergovernmental rather than supranational frameworks of the EU, and thus, they 
affirm realism and interdependence theory rather than neo-functionalism. 
For Tranholm-Mikkelsen, such limitations do not suggest that neo-functionalism 
should be abandoned. He argues that the important role played by the logic of 
31 Ibid. 
32 See: Lindberg, L. N. (1963) Op. Cit. p. 9. 
33 See, for example: Wallace, H. (1985) Europe: The Challenge of Diversity. (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul). 
34 See, for example: Huelshoff, M. G. (1993) 'European Integration After the SEA: The Case of the 
Social Charter', Political Research Quarterly, Volume 46, No. 3, pp. 619-640. 
35 Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) Op. Cit. P. 17. 
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spill-over during the new dynamic period of the EC confirms that neo- 
36 functionalism is indispensable to the understanding of European integration. 
Rather, he concludes that the three major approaches are 'partial' theories, and 
37 thus, theoretical attempts are required to integrate insights from all of them . 
As explained in Chapter 6, this thesis argues that the above countervailing forces 
reflect the problem that the particular poses for the universal assumptions 
advanced by any theory of international relations. Universal assumptions cannot 
adequately explain the diverse particularities of individual member states. For 
example, particular member states may have a particular adherence to the 
symbols of nationalism and national sovereignty, and related to this proposition, 
they may have political and governmental discourses that make them more 
Eurosceptic than others. For example, as the literature examined in Chapter 2 
suggests, British particularities have made it relatively more 'Eurosceptic' than 
other member states. Hence, as this thesis emphasizes, such particularities make 
different member states act and behave in accordance to different theories of 
international relations. For example, the international action of Britain is closer to 
the assumptions of realism and interdependence theory, while the international 
actions of Continental European member states have tended to be closer to the 
assumptions of neo-functionalism. 
3.0. Interdependence theo 
Interdependence theory and neo-functionalism share a number of assumptions 
and concerns commonly associated with the so-called 9 pluralist' image of 
36 See: Ibid. p. 19. 37 Ibid. 
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international relations. 38 First, they downplay the significance of formal state 
boundaries; second, they emphasise the importance of non-govern mental actors 
in world politics, and third, they emphasise the prevalence of non-military issues in 
the dealings among non-socialist so-called 'developed' states. 
Such a common ground is evidenced by the use of the term 'interdependence' by 
39 Haas to describe the relationship among the EC member states. Similarly, the 
most prominent interdependence theorists, Keohane and Nye, explicitly and 
repeatedly acknowledge their indebtedness to the neo-functional iStS. 
40 However, 
similar to this thesis, interdependence theory is critical of the teleological 
orientation of neo-functionalism .41 That is, the implicit or explicit predilection that 
the EC will inevitably develop into a new political unit centred around the 
European Commission. By contrast, interdependence theory does not necessarily 
imply integration and, where integration does occur, it does not profess 
predilections for any particular institutional outcome. Interdependence is a 
condition rather than a process, and its possible integrative consequences are 
based upon political acts that are not predicted by the theory. 
Interdependence theory is also critical of the regional orientation of neo- 
functionalism. 42 Interdependence is a global phenomenon, not just a regional one. 
The 'optimal area' for co-operation may encompass more countries than the other 
EC member states and thus, governments may prefer other fora than the EC 
38 Webb, C. (1983) 'Theoretical Perspectives and Problems', in H. Wallace, W. Wallace and C. 
Webb (eds) Policy-Making in the European Community. (Chichester: John Wiley). pp. 1-41. 
39 See, for example: Haas, E. B. (11968) 'Technology, Pluralism and the New Europe', in J. S. Nye 
ýed. ) International Regionalism. (Boston, Little Brown). 
0 See, for example: Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (1975) 'International Interdependence and 
Integration', in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science. Volume 8, Chapter 
5. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley). p. 365.; Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (1977) 
Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. (Boston: Little Brown). pp. 247-48. 
41 Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (1975) Op. Cit. pp. 363-414. 
42 Ibid. 
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machinery. This global perspective gives interdependence theory the added 
advantage of setting integration theory into general international relations theory. 43 
4.0.1 ntergovern mentalism and its critique of neo-functionalism 
44 Intergovernmental analyses are founded upon traditional realist assumptions . 
I ntergovern mentalism is an application of the realist image of international 
relations to the analysis of the EC. It emphasises the coherence and adaptive 
capacity of nation-states; it tends to envisage EC policy-making as zero-sum 
bargaining on the basis of national interests, and it stresses the importance of 
global power political considerations. 
The most fervent intergovernmental ist critic of neo-functionalism is Stanley 
Hoffman. His objections played a significant part in the revision, and almost 
complete abandonment, of neo-functionalism. It was Hoffman who posited the 
'logic of diversity' as a countervailing force to the 'logic of integration', a force 
based upon differences in 'domestic determinants, geo-historical situations and 
outside aims . 
45 In accordance with the logic of diversity, neo-functionalism is 
limited by its neglect of the external environment of the EC. Hoffman upheld the 
logic of diversity as the fundamental dynamic principle of the global international 
system and rejected the neo-functionalist notion that it would be possible to 
insulate a particular region from its effects. Hence, the external environment 
would tend to provoke diverse responses from the member states, which in turn 
would create divisions and prove disintegrative. 46 
43 Ibid. pp. 394-95. 44 Cameron, D. R. (1992)'The 1992 Initiative: Causes and Consequences, in A. Sbragia (ed. ) 
Euro-politics: Institutions and Policy-Making in the Wew'European Community. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings). 
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In addition, Hoffman criticised neo-functionalism for failing to acknowledge the 
difference between 'high' and 'low' politics. Although it was later conceded that the 
labels 'high' and 'low' cannot be permanently attached to particular issues 
because they are a matter of momentary salienCY47, it was initially assumed that 
the former included issues such as defence and foreign policy while the latter 
concerned relatively 'u n controversial' welfare issues. It was argued that the logic 
of integration might be stronger in low politics, the logic of diversity would 
predominate in high politics. Hence, the possibility of spill-over from economic to 
political integration was rejected - the hard core of sovereignty would remain 
intaCt. 48 
5.0. The realist critique of liberal institutionalism 
Joseph Grieco provides a realist critique of both neo-functionalism and 
interdependence theory within his analysis of 'liberal institutionalism'. As he 
explains, prior to the 1980s, liberal institutionalism appeared in three successive 
presentations: first, in the functionalist integration theory of the 1940s and early 
1950s; second, in the neo-functionalist regional integration theory in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and third, in the interdependence theory of the 1970s . 
49Representing 
the major challenge to realism, these three versions of liberal institutionalism 
offered a more optimistic prognosis than realism for international co-operation and 
a more optimistic assessment of the capacity of institutions to help states achieve 
it. 
45 Hoffman, S. (1966) Op. Cit. p. 864. 46 Ibid. pp. 864-65. 47 Hoffman, S. (1982) 'Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 21, Nos. 1-2, pp. 29-30. 
48 Hoffman, S (1966) Op. Cit. p. 882. 
49 Grieco, J. M. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 486. 
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In contrast, realism presents a more pessimistic analysis of the prospects for 
international co-operation and of the capabilities of international institutions. 
International anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits 
their willingness to co-operate even when they share common interests. In 
addition, international institutions cannot mitigate the constraining effects of 
anarchy upon inter-state co-operation. 
Although realism accepts that the EC has become a prominent feature of 
European affairs, it is largely perceived as a by-product of a particular distribution 
of global power in the post-war period . 
50 Before the Second World War, realists 
argue that European great powers avoided close co-operation among themselves 
lest some might gain more than others. However, bipolarity ended this problem: 
Not all impediments to cooperation were removed, but one important 
one was - the fear that the greater advantage of one would be 
translated into military force to be used against the others ... 
Living in 
the superpowers' shadow, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy quickly 
saw that war among them would be fruitless and soon began to believe 
it impossible. Because the security of all them came to depend 
ultimately on the policies of others rather than their own, unity could 
51 effectively be worked for, although not easily achieved . 
Hence, to a significant extent, EC co-operation rested upon Soviet-American 
bipolarity. It is from such a perception of the emergence and development of the 
EC that realism derives its pessimistic assessment of the interest of EC member 
states in pursuing additional regional institutionalisation. That is, if US-Soviet 
bipolar competition was a necessary condition for European integration, and if 
that competition has now ended and the international system is moving back 
toward multipolarity, then it is expected that member states will return to their 
50 Grieco, J. M. (1995) 'The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo-Realist 
Research Programme', Review of Intemational Studies, Volume 21, p. 27. 
51 Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of Intemational Politics. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley). 
pp. 70-1. 
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traditional concerns about one another and thus, become less attracted to co- 
operation through the EC. 
52 
In sum, realism encompasses five main propositions. First, states are the key 
actors in world politics. Second, the international environment severely penalises 
states that fail to protect their vital interests or pursue objectives beyond their 
means. Hence, states are 'sensitive to costs' and behave as unitary-rational 
agents. Third, international anarchy is the principal force shaping motives and 
actions of states. Fourth, states are preoccupied with power and security, are 
predisposed towards conflict and competition, and often fail to co-operate even in 
the face of common interests. Fifth, international institutions only marginally affect 
the prospects for co-operation. 
Liberal institutionalism rejects these propositions. First, the centrality of states is 
rejected: for functionalism, the key new actors in world politics were the 
specialised international agencies and their technical experts; for neo- 
functionalism, they were labour unions, political parties, trade associations, and 
supranational bureaucracies; and for interdependence theory, they were the 
53 
multinational corporations and transnational and transgovern mental coalitions . 
Second, liberal institutionalism rejected the realist assumption that states are 
unitary or rational agents: functionalist accounts claimed that authority was 
already decentralised within modern states and was experiencing the same 
52 Grieco, J. M. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 28. See also: Mearsheimer, J. J. (1991) 'Back to the Future: 
Instability in Europe After the Cold War', in S. M. Lynn-Jones (ed. ) The Cold War and After 
Prospects for Peace. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press). pp. 141-192 (especially: pp. 182-4). 53 See: Haas, E. B. (11964) Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press), pp. 32-40; Haas, E. B. (1958) Op. Cit. pp. 16-31, 
113-239,283-340; Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. pp. 17,85-87,133-34; Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye 
(1972) 'Introduction' and 'Conclusion', in Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (eds) Transnational 
Relations and World Politics. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). pp. ix-xxix, 371-98; Nye, J. S. 
(11971) 'Comparing Common Markets: A Revised Neo-Functional Model', in L. N. Lindberg and S. 
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process international ly. 
54 Interdependence theorists claimed that modern states 
are increasingly characterised by 'multiple channels of access' which, in turn, 
progressively loosened the grip on foreign policy previously held by central 
decision-makers. 55 
Third and fourth, the realist emphasis upon international anarchy was countered 
by the proposition that states were increasingly perceiving one another as 
necessary partners for securing greater comfort and well-being for their home 
publics. Congruent to the Continental European liberal democratic understanding 
of a 'collective will', neo-functionalists suggested that, for Western European 
states: 
... 
the argument is no longer over the slice of the pie to go to each; it is 
increasingly over the means for increasing the overall size of the 
pastry. 56 
Neo-functionalists claimed that states are becoming more inclined to co-operate 
because they were becoming less concerned about power and security. At an 
international level, nuclear weapons and mobilised national populations were 
rendering war prohibitively CoStly. 
57 Increases in inter-nation economic contacts 
had left states increasingly dependent upon one another for the attainment of 
national goals such as growth, full employment, and price stabil ity. 
58 At a domestic 
level, industrialisation had brought the 'social century': the advanced democracies 
(and, more slowly, communist and developing countries) were becoming welfare 
A. Scheingold (eds) Op. Cit. pp. 195-206. 
54 See: Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. pp. 54-55,63,69-73,88,134-38. 
55 See: Cooper, R. C. (1972)Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policies in the 1970's', World 
Politics, Volume 24, No. 2, January, pp. 177-179; Haas, E. B. (1968) Op. Cit. pp. 152-56; Mitrany, D. 
(1943) Op. Cit. pp. 20,32-38; Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (1972) 'Introduction' and 'Conclusion', 
in R. 0. Keohane and J. S. Nye (eds) Op. Cit. pp. xxv, 375-78; Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye 
Q977) Op. Cit. pp. 33-35,226-29. 
6 Haas, E. B (1968) Op. Cit. p. 158. 
57 See: Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. p. 13. 
58 See: Haas, E. B. (1968) Op. Cit. pp. 161-62; Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. pp. 131-37. 
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states more oriented towards economic growth and social security than towards 
power and prestige. 
59 
Fifth, liberal institutionalism rejected the realist pessimism with regard to 
international institutions: for functionalism, specialised agencies, such as the 
International Labour Organisation, could promote co-operation because they 
perform valuable tasks without frontally challenging state sovereignty. 60 Neo- 
functionalism held that supranational bodies, such as the European Economic 
Community, were: 
"- the appropriate regional counterpart to the national state which no longer feels capable of realizing welfare goals within its own borders. 61 
Finally, interdependence theory proposed that: 
... in a world of multiple issues imperfectly linked, in which coalitions 
are formed transnationally and transgovern mentally, the potential role 
. 62 of international institutions in political bargaining is greatly increased. - 
However, Grieco observes that international tensions and conflict during the 
1970s undermined liberal institutionalism and reconfirmed realism. Indeed, 
congruent to the observations made by Tranholm-Mikkelsen above, Grieco affirms 
that the fate of liberal institutionalism and realism have reflected the successes 
and failures of initiatives for international co-operation, such as the EC project, 
respectively. 
Accordingly, Grieco acknowledges that the international system survived the crisis 
period of the 1970s. As states achieved co-operation through institutions even in 
this harsh period, this set the stage for a renewed (albeit truncated) liberal 
59 See: Haas, E. B. (1968) Op. Cit. pp. 155-58; Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. pp. 41-2,95-6,136-7. 60 See: Mitrany, D. (1943) Op. Cit. pp. 133-7,198-211; Haas, E. B. (1964) Op. Cit. pp. 32-40; 61 Haas, E. B. (1968) Op. Cit. P. 159. 62 Keohane, R. 0. and J. S. Nye (1977) Op. Cit. p. 35. 
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challenge to realism . 
63 Thus, similar to Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Grieco observes that 
continuing (although from a realist perspective, I modest') levels of inter-state co- 
operation were reflected in the development of a new liberal institutionalist 
challenge to realism during the 1980s. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the different ways that orthodox theories of 
international relations have explained the process of European integration, and 
the different assumptions and hypotheses that they hold about the present and 
future form of the EU. In sum, as reflected in the conflicting theories of neo- 
functionalism and realism respectively, it is apparent that Europe has been 
confronted with a choice between the contradictory principles of su pra nationalism 
and i ntergovern mentalism. 
In contrast to realism, neo-functionalism offers a more optimistic prognosis for 
international co-operation and for the capacity of European institutions to help 
states achieve it. Hence, neo-functionalism is more optimistic about the possibility 
of developing a supranational European identity. Neo-functionalism predicts that 
economic integration will inevitably lead to political integration, and thus, that the 
EU will have a supranational political framework. In contrast, realism argues that 
the EU reflects an intergovernmental political framework based upon co-operation 
between sovereign member states. 
It is also evident that, although realism assumes that Europe will continue to 
develop upon an intergovernmental basis, neo-functionalism differs because of its 
determinism and teleological predictions about the future supranational form of 
63 Grieco, J. M. (1988). Op. Cit. p. 492.38 
Europe. In this respect, neo-functionalism reflects its structuralist heritage, and 
thus, its commonality with the Marxist tradition. However, as this chapter has 
indicated, such determinism and teleological predictions are undermined by the 
many changes in the direction and form of Europe. Moreover, as explained in 
Chapter 3, this thesis challenges the theoretical assumptions of such orthodox 
structuralist approaches. In sum, this thesis argues that the 'undecidable' nature 
of the process of European integration demands a discourse-theoretical 
approach. 
It should also be acknowledged that both neo-functionalism and 
intergovern mentalism have political agendas: they represent a praxis of theory 
and action. Post-war, i ntergovern mental ists and functionalists set out to change 
the political discourse of Europe, and the present form of the EU still reflects the 
ensuing battle between these two conflicting political forces. Thus, these are not 
merely descriptive and reactive theories examining the process of European 
integration from 'outside', they are proactive and reactive political forces of this 
process. That is, they both effect and reflect the international discourse that they 
describe as internal and active forces. 
Hence, the changing fate of different theories has been linked to the changing fate 
of the EU. This reflects the problem that the particular poses for the universal 
assumptions of both these theories of international relations. All are partial 
theories better at explaining different forces and periods of the integration 
process. Thus, the assumptions of any of these theories cannot be universally 
applied. Their claim to universality is also undermined by their failure to account 
for the particularities of all member states. As this thesis argues in Chapter 2, the 
actions of particular member states have reflected the assumptions of neo- 
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functionalism, and the actions of others have reflected the assumptions of realism, 
and thus, the claim to universality of both theories is undermined. As illustrated 
above, in contrast to neo-functionalist propositions, certain member states may 
have a particular adherence to the symbols of national sovereignty, and related to 
this proposition, they may have particular political and governmental discourses 
that make them more Eurosceptic than others. For example, as the literature 
examined in Chapter 2 suggests, British particularities have made it relatively 
more 'Eurosceptic' than other member states. Hence, as this thesis emphasizes, 
such particularities make different member states act and behave in accordance 
to different theories of international relations. For example, the international action 
of Britain is closer to the assumptions of realism and interdependence theory, 
while the international action of a majority of Continental European member states 
has tended to be closer to the assumptions of neo-functionalism. 
The tension between these conflicting approaches to European integration also 
reflects the problem posed by the conceptual dyad of the universal and the 
particular. That is, neo-fu nctional ism/su pranational ism reflects the assumed 
development of a universal European identity, while neo- 
real ist/intergovern mentalism privileges the particularities of member states. As 
Chapter 6 argues, we can only resolve this tension through deconstruction, that is, 
by problematizing the underlying assumptions that makes such principles 
contradictory. It then becomes possible to inscribe them within an 'undecidable' 
logic that incorporates both without privileging one or the other. 
In all, it is evident that the tension between the theoretical assumptions of neo- 
functionalism and realism reflects the tension in the EU political framework 
between supranationalism and intergovernmental ism. Moreover, the tension 
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between these theoretical assumptions reflects a tension between the different 
preferences of different member states, which reflects a conflicting difference in 
domestic political and governmental discourse, as examined in Chapter 4. For 
example, this thesis argues that British political and governmental discourse 
supports intergovernmental preferences, while the discourses of Continental 
Europe tend to support supranational preferences. Thus, we need to examine the 
domestic politics of particular member states in order to understand the process of 
European integration. Moreover, to address the specific aims of this thesis, we 
need to examine the particular aspects of British 'domestic politics' that have 
opposed and obstructed the political integration of Europe. To this end, the 
analysis now turns to Chapter 2 and a literature review of previous accounts of 
this subject. 
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Chapter 2 
The British Relationship with Europe 
Introduction 
In contrast to the universal theories of European (political) integration described in 
Chapter 1, this chapter examines previous analyses that have focussed upon 
Britain's particular response to EC/EU political initiatives in the period that 
culminated in the TEU ratification crisis in 1992-3. These analyses of British- 
European integration have different aims and theoretical approaches, but they all 
acknowledge, to varying degrees, that Britain had been a relatively awkward 
partner of the EC/EU. Although other member states opposed EC/EU particular 
political initiatives at certain times, they all argue that Britain had posed the most 
consistent obstruction to the process of European political integration. As the most 
awkward partner, these accounts consider Britain to have been the most 
Eurosceptic member state. This chapter begins by examining a major study edited 
by Stephen George that applies a 'domestic politics' approach to the British 
relationship with the EC in the period 1973-1990.1 This is followed by an 
examination of the key text by George that also serves to update his previous 
1 George, S. (ed. ) (1992) Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). pp. 1-29. 
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work. 2 Finally, an account by Peter Preston is presented that reflects a Marxist 
'structure/agency' approach to the subject. 
1.0. The domestic politics approach to British European policy 
George et al apply a domestic politics approach 4 in an attempt to overcome the 
failure of orthodox analyses to give primacy to domestic politics. George et al 
claim that this focus is crucial for explaining the policy preferences of member 
states .5 Thus, neo-functionalism is criticized for its simple focus upon the EC level. 
With regard to the intergovernmental countervailing forces that limit neo- 
functionalism, George et al propose that a domestic politics approach can provide 
a broader explanation of politics and policy in the EC because it can incorporate 
6 the continuing extent of diversity in national practices . Although the EC exists as 
a framework for achieving common solutions to shared problems, such diversity 
had continued. EC membership had not led to, or imposed, uniform political and 
economic structures. Indeed, the continued importance of national governments in 
EC policy-making ensured the continued importance of divergent national policies. 
Different economic structures, political traditions, institutional forms all culminated 
in different patterns of European policy. Hence, EC questions concerning, for 
example, the conflict between national sovereignty and supranational integration, 
elicited a different combination of responses in particular member states. 
2 George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. 
ýOxford: Oxford University Press). 
Preston, P. W. (1994) Europe, Democracy, and the Dissolution of Britain: An Essay on the Issue 
of Europe in UK Public Discourse. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). 
4 See also: Bulmer, S. (1983)'Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-Making', Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Volume 21, No. 4, pp. 349-363. 
5 See also: Ibid. 
6 Bulmer, S. (1992) 'Britain and European Integration: of Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation, and Semi- 
Detachment', in S. George (ed. ) Op. Cit. p. 25. 
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Furthermore, the nature of responses could also vary between policy sectors 
within each member state. 
Similar to realist propositions, George et al argue that EC policy-making was 
dominated by the member states. However, they criticize the realist 
characterisation of the national interests of the states. Contrary to realism, 
member states did not simply pursue rationally chosen national interests. Adopting 
a pluralist critique of realism, they claim that the behaviour of states was 
determined by domestic politics in the sense that policy was the outcome of a 
political process rather than the result of a rational calculation. 
George et al claim that the realist representation of British European policy as a 
simple rational and calculated strategy ignores the complexities of the political 
process: 
.. 
The 'realist' assumptions that underlay much of the analysis of the 
EC based upon intergovernmental perspectives, such as frequently 
appear in the Press, give the impression that national negotiating 
positions represent a unified and reasoned calculation of what 
constitutes the national interest, and that the various positions taken up 
in negotiations are all part of a well-worked-out strategy. This ... 
is far 
too simple an explanation, and therefore necessarily misleading. 
Governments have a vested interest in presenting their positions as 
coherent and rational, but the truth is that they represent the outcome 
of a domestic political process more than they do the outcome of a 
8 process of reasoning . 
George at al argue that a domestic politics approach is a necessary starting point 
for establishing a broader understanding of politics and policy in the EC. Thus, the 
aim is to examine British European policy in the hope that it will contribute to the 
cumulative understanding of the policies of all member states. To achieve this 
7 Ibid. 
8 George, S. (1992a) 'Conclusion', in S. George (1992) Op. Cit. pp 206-207. 
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broader understanding, a comparative analysis is required, and thus, the domestic 
politics approach needs to be applied to all other member states. 9 
Rather than assuming that government policy is the simple result of important 
exogenous European and international developments, it is held that Britain's 
i particular' economic and political relationship with the world system was mediated 
by its national political system. 10 As Bulmer asserts: 
Britain's role in the EC cannot be understood fully by a mere account of 
the activities of successive governments. The forces underlying 
government policy must also be examined. British politics matters. " 
In many respects, Bulmer believes that this was a standard interpretation for 
Britain because of the history of party-political differences over European policy. 
However, two points are emphasised. First, Britain was unique in relation to the 
other larger member states because of its continued aversion or scepticism 
towards integration. This contrasted with continental member states: for example, 
in the former Federal Republic of Germany, a broad consensus had existed 
amongst the two major party blocks for thirty years. Second, the party political 
debate had a close relationship with other political forces, such as public opinion 
and interest groups. 
As a consequence of these two factors, Bulmer claims that the British government 
12 had sought to play a 'gatekeeping role' in controlling British relations with the EC . 
However, it is also emphasised that such a centralising role was not always 
possible because policy was also affected by the attitudes of interests groups, 
public opinion, political parties, and local government, as well as the interests of 
9 Ibid. p. 207. 10 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 2. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. p. 3. 
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Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. Furthermore, Bulmer argues that the 
policy of central government could not be assumed to be a coherent and 
integrated whole: the policies of both Labour and Conservative governments had 
reflected different ministerial responsibilities and interest group sensitivities. 
1.1. The historical context of British -E u ropean relations 
Bulmer emphasises the importance of the historical context of the British 
relationship with the EC. As he observes, many analysts regard British European 
policies to have been the product of a failure to adjust to the changed 
circumstances of the post-war period. Most historical interpretations suggest that, 
even if British economic decline was established at the turn of the Century, it was 
not until much later that attention was given to its causes. For example, Hanreider 
and Auton observe a 'cognitive lag' in the British foreign policy elite: policy-makers 
had failed to recognise the new post-war era of two superpowers, nuclear 
arsenals, and realigned world economic forces. 13 They argue that this failure was 
expressed in the continuity in policy through both Labour and Conservative 
governments. 
As examined below, Tom Nairn and Preston argue that such attention to national 
economic decline was not forthcoming because the British ruling class was 
outward-looking, and thus, its success within the global system was perfectly 
compatible with national decline. Indeed, similar to Nairn and Preston, many 
historical accounts suggest that the British response to economic decline was not 
13 Hanrieder, W. and G. Auton (1980) The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain. 
(Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey). pp. 179-80. See also: Blank, S. (1978) 'Britain: The Politics of 
Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation', in P. 
J. Katzenstein (ed. ) Between Power and Plenty., Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial 
States. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press). pp. 89-137. 
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only slow, but also flawed in terms of addressing the British national interest. Such 
historical accounts have argued that Britain's aberrant European policy reflected 
this aberrant and flawed economic strategy. For example, Stephen Blank argues 
that Britain's failure to become involved in the process of European integration 
was the result of a form of 'imperial overstretch,. 14 To retain the British standing in 
international politics, and despite adverse economic circumstances, such policies 
as maintaining extensive military commitments were pursued which exacerbated 
pre-existing relative economic decline. By contrast, participation in the process of 
European integration would have confirmed Britain's 'descent from power I. 
Such arguments support Christopher Hill's proposition that 'Britain is a society in 
which historical thinking is particularly important and prominent'. 15 However, 
Bulmer emphasizes that'historical determinism' should not be overstated because 
there had been changes in British European policy, 16 even though they had 
tended to be reactive. 17 In due course, Bulmer develops a more refined, 
discriminating approach to the impact of historical influences upon the British 
relationship with the EC. Following the differentiation developed by H i1118 , he 
attempts to avoid historical determinism by differentiating between various 
historical influences that he identifies as having a significant impact upon the 
British European policy. In due course, and as will now be described, he 
differentiates between major elements of continuity and influences that had given 
way to change. 
14 Blank, S. (1978) Op. Cit. p. 89. 
15 Hill, C. (1988) 'The Historical Background: Past and Present in British Foreign Policy', in M. 
Smith, S. Smith, and B. White (eds) British Foreign Policy. ý Tradition, Change and Transformation. 
ýLondon: Unwin Hyman). pp. 24-5. 
6 See: Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 5. 
17 See: Ibid. 
18 See: Hill, C. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 33. 
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1.1.1. Continuity in British European policy 
As will now be examined, Bulmer identifies four British 'continuities"9: First, 
national sovereignty, second, pragmatic foreign policy and opposition to political 
integration, third, the perception of the US relationship to European security, and 
fourth, broader economic and political interests. 
(i) National sovereignty 
Bulmer observes that discussions of the relationship between Britain and the other 
member states of the EC in the post-war period have identified two recurring and 
interrelated themes: the British preoccupation with the issue of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty, and thus, its preference for intergovernmental co- 
operation rather than supranational integration. He observes that the greatest 
continuity in British views could be found on the question of national sovereignty. 
Before 1973, Bulmer asserts that British involvement in European organisations 
20 
can be judged by this criterion alone . With regard to central government, 
Geoffrey Edwards observes that both major British political parties had been 
preoccupied with national sovereignty as a principle to be cherished or as an 
instrument of control. Moreover, civil servants - whatever their own views - had 
been long-attuned to the sensitivity of the issue for their political masters. 21 
Bulmer identifies many historical explanations for why the question of sovereignty 
had been of such importance to Britain: first, the continuity of institutions since the 
English Civil War; second, former world-power status; third, the successful 
19 See: Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 8-14. 
20 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 8. 
21 Edwards, G. (1992) 'Central Government', in S. George (ed. ) (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 66-7. 
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avoidance, as an island, of full-scale invasion; fourth, the position of having 'stood 
alone' in 1940 together with the prestige gained as a victor; fifth, the myth of 
parliamentary sovereignty; sixth, pride in national identity as an aversion to 
'homogenization' by European social integration, and seventh, popular loyalty to 
22 
the Crown. Such a diversity of origins may help explain why sovereignty was so 
important to Britain. 
(ii) Pragmatic foreign policy and opposition to political integration 
Closely related to this British defence of sovereignty was the pragmatism of British 
foreign policy. Due in part to isolation from the upheavals of continental history in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, successive British governments failed to 
recognise the powerful political attractions of European integration experienced by 
other continental states. Hence, Britain displayed an aversion to the perception of 
European integration as a political process. For Britain, national interests and 
political integration were perceived as opposites. In contrast, the other large EC 
member states made much of the grand ideals of European union and still 
managed successfully to incorporate national interests in their vision. 23 
Indeed, Britain was assertive and proactive about economic benefits but defensive 
and reactive about political costs. For example, the Thatcher Government 
influenced the EC agenda towards the deregulation and liberalization of the 
internal market in the SEA, and then attacked the aspects of the programme that 
had political implications. This strategy had been evident ever since the debates 
about membership. 
22 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. P. 9. 23 Ibid. p. 11. 
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(iii) The perception of the US relationship to European security 
In 1950, Churchill declared that Britain's interests lay in being the point of 
intersection of three separate circles of influence: the relationship with the US, the 
Commonwealth, and Europe. This 'three circle doctrine' has been described as 
'the last explicit conceptual framework for British foreign PoliCy,. 
24 However, it is 
evident that the British 'special relationship' with the US and the relations with 
25 Europe were intertwined . Britain aimed to guarantee its own security in a 
European context by ensuring US involvement, for example, in NATO. Thus, for 
Britain, participation in European integration might have risked decoupling the US 
defence guarantees by demonstrating European self-sufficiency. Regardless of 
the validity of this fear - and it must be noted that, in the 1950s, the US 
themselves wanted British participation in European integration in order to 
promote European unity - it meant that Britain consistently conflicted with French 
conceptions of European integration because it envisaged a more active role for 
the US in defence PojiCY. 26 
(iv) Broader economic and political interests 
Related to the previous point, Britain was not willing to confine itself to a European 
sphere of economic and political interests. Although the extent of global influence 
had declined since the 1940s and early 1950s when Britain was still a major force, 
traditional maritime concerns and imperial interests were slow to 
24 Tugendhat, C. and W. Wallace (11988) Options for British Foreign Policy in the 1990s. (London: 
Routledge). p. 2. 25 On the British 'special relationship' with the US, see for example: Aldrich, R. J. (11998) 'British 
intelligence and the Anglo-American "special relationship" during the Cold War'. Review of 
Intemational Studies, Volume 24, No. 3. pp. 331-51. 
26 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 11-12. 
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disappear. 27 Broader international interests included nuclear arms, the role of 
sterling, and the defence of the Bretton Woods monetary system. As Hill asserted 
as late as 1988: 
Britain's own demography, financial system, trading needs and political 
contracts are now so diversified that a falling back into European 
parochialism is hardly an option. 28 
Similar to Britain's broader foreign and security concerns, Bulmer argues that 
Britain's broader economic and political interests obstructed its commitment to 
European integration throughout the post-war period, whether it was its refusal to 
participate in supranational integration in the 1950s or its rejection of the notion of 
'fortress Europe' in the context of the completion of the internal market. 29 
1.1.2. Change in British European policy 
(i) British defence policy 
Traditionally British European policy had attempted to maintain domestic security 
by playing the continental powers off against each other. However, at the end of 
the Second World War, Britain rapidly adapted to the two-bloc system and 
involved the US in assuring peace on the continent. Although this change was to 
become a new continuity in the form of transatlantic defence arrangements, it 
represented a rapid change in policy that undermines any generalizations of 
ocognitive lack ,. 30 
27 Ibid. p. 12. 28 Hill, C. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 29. 29 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 12. 30 Ibid. p. 14. 
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(ii) British-commonwealth relations 
Until the 1960s, British relations with the Commonwealth had a significant impact 
upon British European policy. However, they gradually declined to a residual level. 
Thus, whilst Britain still did not confine its interests to the European sphere, its 
relationship with the commonwealth rarely constrained its European PoliCY. 
31 
In sum, Bulmer argues that British European policy had comprised elements of 
continuity and change. The 'givens' had constrained the British role in Europe 
since 1945, whilst other factors had declined in importance. In addition, Bulmer 
emphasises that, although global circumstances were continually changing, a 
number of continuing features of Britain's EC membership originated in its pre- 
history: first, the reluctance or aversion to relinquishing national sovereignty 
despite the 'realities' of economic interdependence, second, Britain's slow 
adaptation to EC membership, and third, the unwillingness to confine foreign 
policy to the European arena. For Bulmer, these themes collectively amounted to 
British 'semi-detachment' in the context of the EC. 32 
1.2. The British 'semi -detachment' from Europe 
Simon Bulmer identifies a succession of difficulties in the post-war period that 
reflected a 'fraught' relationship between Britain and the process of European 
integration. 33 First, Britain refused to join the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). Second, Britain failed to take seriously the negotiations leading to the 
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). Third, a belated 
31 id. pp. 14-15. 32 Ibid. p. 16. 33 Ibid. pp. 1-29. 
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conversion to European integration culminated in two unsuccessful British 
applications for membership in the 1960s. Fourth, major political divisions 
concerning accession which followed the third successful application under the 
Conservative Government of Heath. Fifth, the terms of entry were renegotiated by 
the Labour Government in 1975, which culminated in their approval by 67 per cent 
of voters in the June 1975 referendum following a hotly contested campaign. 
Sixth, there was continual wrangling, especially from 1979 to 1984, between 
Thatcher's Conservative Government and the other member states over the high 
level of British net contributions to the EC budget. Seventh, following the EC's 
approval of important reforms in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), Thatcher 
gave outspoken opposition to the development of a 'European super-state', 
especially if it was to further challenge British sovereignty. Eighth, four Cabinet 
34 
ministers resigned over European issues in the period 1986-90 . Finally, there 
were the circumstances surrounding the replacement of Thatcher as Prime 
Minister at the end of 1990.35 As Bulmer asserts, '(A)gainst this background it is 
scarcely surprising that the United Kingdom continues to be regarded as a 'semi- 
36 detached member of the European Community' . 
Bulmer claims that the initial group of members of the EC, and most of those who 
became members later, had clear positive political reasons for establishing or 
joining the EC. In contrast, Britain was a late and opportunistic member with a 
European policy based upon pragmatism rather than principle. Every other 
member state (except perhaps Denmark) had fundamental political needs that 
were satisfied by participation in supranational integration. However, Britain was 
reluctant to participate in this process because it lacked any equivalent political 
34 These were Michael Heseltine (1986), Nigel Lawson (1989), Nicholas Ridley (1990), and Sir 
Geoffrey Howe (1990). 
35 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 1-2. 
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motivation. Moreover, the motives of the original six member states were regarded 
with suspicion as seeking to re-establish some form of Holy Roman Empire, 
recalling religious divisions of the past. 37 
However, although reservations continued in relation to supranational integration, 
Bulmer emphasizes that Britain had to support European integration, but only 
because its independent capabilities had declined. Thus, participation was 
perceived negatively as an expression of the failure of its independent line. That 
is, Britain viewed participation as a defeat. As Bulmer explains, Britain was no 
longer able to play the role of a superpower, much of the British-US 'special 
relationship' was upheld to continue the public impression of Britain's greatness. 
Britain had also experienced a decline in its share of world trade in manufacturers 
and in its relative position in Western Europe in terms of GDP. The value of the 
Commonwealth as a diplomatic resource had also declined. Moreover, Britain's 
international standing was diminished by changes in the international arena that 
had affected its key diplomatic resource, its defence commitment. Changes in 
superpower relations and the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe led to 
the questioning of the level of conventional commitments and, more 
fundamentally, suggested a re-evaluation of the reliance upon defence 
38 
commitment as a diplomatic resource . 
Bulmer also observes that British objectives had included achieving European 
security and outlets for trade - both of which proved possible in the short term 
without supranational integration. An idealistic political commitment would have 
been conceived as a negative step: a questioning of British independence in 
36 d. 2. 
37 Ibid. p. 17. 38 Ibid. pp. 17-18. 
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international politics. In the early years, there was also a reluctance to participate 
in what Britain conceived as a Catholic or Christian Democratic based movement 
towards integration. 
39 
Thus, despite European integration assuming a core position in the international 
role of Britain, Bulmer argues that there was a reluctance to embrace this within 
the innermost circles of the Thatcher Government and within its Labour 
predecessor. As a result, governmental policy gave little rhetorical support for 
European integration. Nonetheless, Bulmer claims that it is important to 
distinguish between rhetoric and reality: European integration had become 
important to Britain because many of the other reference points of British policy 
were in doubt and, with the moves towards global regionalism in the international 
system, a policy of isolation was unreal iStiC. 
40 This observed 'reality' of global 
regional pressure for British-European integration is congruent with the predictions 
of neo-functionalism and those advanced by Preston below. However, in contrast 
to these positive predictions, Bulmer also observes that the continuing influence of 
historical negative factors was reflected in the failure of the Thatcher government 
to embrace European integration. 
In general, Bulmer asserts that successive British governments had found it 
difficult to engage effectively with the EC. The disposition to 'semi-detachment ) 
was the product of a strong institutional logic permeating the political system, 
economic markets, and public administration . 
41 During the post-war period, this 
was expressed by the British preference for intergovernmental solutions rather 
than federal or supranational strategies, a position affirmed by Margaret 
39 This is reflected in the Conservative Party's failure to work with the European People's Party in 
the European Parliament. (Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 17. ) 
40 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 18. 
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42 Thatcher's 'Bruges speech. The consequence was a British pragmatism 
towards the development of the EC that conflicted with the expectations of the 
mainland members. 
1.2.1. The policy preferences of British Central Government 
Edward S43 claims that, although EC integration was generally advancing smoothly 
at the level of the machinery of central government, the British government 
remained reactive and nationalistic. He also argues that, with varying degrees of 
intensity, both major political parties in Britain were divided over Britain's 
participation in the EC. An extension of the competence of the EC and/or an 
increase in its authority tended to be viewed as a zero sum game: what 'they' had 
won, 'we' had IoSt. 
44 
Moreover, Britain was rarely able to set the agenda, to provide long-term 
blueprints and shorter-term leadership that could have won support from others. 
Edwards observes that Britain was a 'good' European on a range of issueS45 , and 
he argues that it is perhaps beside the point that such issues were close to its own 
interests. For Edwards, the overall impression is that Britain reacted negatively to 
the initiatives of others, with agreement usually only at the last minute. However, 
he emphasizes that such a negative characterisation of British policy should not 
be exaggerated: 
41 Ibid. p. 29. 42 See: George, S. (11 992b) 'The European Community in the New Europe', in C. Crouch and D. 
Marquand (eds) Towards Greater Europe: A Continent without an Iron Curtain. (Oxford: Blackwell). 
4pj 
53; George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 254. 
44 
Edwards, G. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 64-90. 
45 
Ibid. p. 67. 
See: Ibid. 
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... the point is less that Britain has its own national interests to pursue - 
all members have their own interests to pursue and do so with vigour - but that British Governments seem to have such a strong tendency to 
misjudge the policies and objectives of their partners in the Community, 46 
especially their commitment to political integration . 
This thesis argues that such 'misjudgements' were the consequence of a 
divergence in political and governmental discourse between Britain and 
Continental Europe, as developed in Chapter 4. 
1.2.2. The policy preferences of British political parties 
Nigel Ashford 47 claims that the two major political parties in Britain responded to 
European integration in a way that reinforced the semi-detached image. Three 
factors explained this response. The first factor was the adversarial nature of 
British politics: the convention was for opposition parties to oppose the policies of 
the government, even while behaviour in government may have reflected a high 
degree of continuity. This contrasted with the more consensual nature of politics 
evident in Continental countries such as Germany. Second, there were 
considerable intra-party divisions on the issue that hindered the articulation of 
48 
clear positions . Third, European integration posed a threat to the 
'ideological 
self-images' of these parties. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ashford, N. (1992) 'The Political Parties', in S. George (ed. ) (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 119-148. 
48 With regard to the divisive impact of the issue of European integration upon the Labour Party, see 
also: Baker, D. and D. Seawright (1998) A'Rosy' Map of Europe? Labour Parliamentarians and 
European Integration', in: Baker, D. and D. Seawright (eds) Britain For and Against Europe: British 
Politics and the Question of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 57-87; Wilde, L. 
(1994) Modem European Socialism. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). pp. 31-33. In relation to the 
Conservative Party, see also: Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994) 'The Parliamentary Siege 
of Maastricht 1993: Conservative Divisions and British Ratification', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 
47, No. 1, pp. 37-60; Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (11993) 'Whips or Scorpions? The 
Maastricht Vote and Conservative MPs', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 46, No. 2. pp. 151-166; 
Baker, D., 1. Fountain, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1995) 'Backbench Conservative Attitudes to 
Europe', The Political Quarterly, Volume 66, No. 2, pp. 221-233, and Ludlam, S. (11998) 'The 
Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration', in: Baker, D. and D. Seawright 
(eds) Op. Cit. pp. 31-56. 
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According to Ashford, the Conservative Party presented itself as the embodiment 
of the national interest and claimed that Conservative governments helped 
maintain Britain as a significant world power. Advocacy of European integration 
would undermine these claims because it required acceptance that some short- 
term national interests would have to be sacrificed for broader and more long-term 
interests. It would also require an acceptance that, even under the Conservative 
Governments, the British capacity to maintain sovereignty in global affairs was 
49 
now severely diminished . In contrast, the basic theme of the Labour Party had 
been the national and parliamentary road to socialism. The EC was perceived to 
threaten both the goal, socialism, and the means, parliamentary sovereignty. 
Thus, full acceptance of the EC required a re-examination of the ideological 
principles of both main parties. 
1.3. The European perception of Britain 50 
As a consequence of its broader global interests, George et al indicate that the 
rest of the EC had a negative perception of Britain. In political terms, it was 
perceived that Britain had put the US before the EC, and thus, that it attempted to 
51 
use its position in the EC to increase US involvement in political matters . 
Similarly, in economic terms, Britain wanted to serve its broader global economic 
interests by trying to involve external forces, such as the US and Japan. 52 As 
observed below, Preston describes this aberrant British position as 'dual 
parasitism'. 
49 Ashford, N. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 120. 
50 See also: Pappamikail, P. B. (1998)'Britain Viewed from Europe', in: Baker, D. And D. Seawright 
Op. Cit. pp. 206-221. 51 Bulmer, s. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 21-2, George, S. (1 992a) Op. Cit. p. 61. 52 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 12-3, George, S. (1 992a) Op. Cit. p. 32,59-60. 
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The study also observes that Britain's reputation of semi-detachment reflected its 
aberrant defence of national and parliamentary sovereignty, and thus, of an 
intergovernmental approach to European integration. In addition, the British 
political culture supported a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. Moreover, 
differences in political culture exacerbated the tension between Britain and the 
rest of the EC because they led to misjudgements, misinterpretations, and thus, 
suspicion from both sides. It is a principal aim of Part // of this thesis to improve 
our understanding of this obstructing conflict in political and governmental 
discourse. 
Furthermore, it is emphasized that Britain joined a European Community that had 
already been in existence for over twenty years. The original members had 
developed rules and ways of working together during that period, and both these 
factors contributed to Britain's reputation for being an 'awkward partner'. The rules 
were not favourable to Britain as a new member 53 , and Britain had much to learn 
about the existing methods of working together. 54 Additionally, the European 
perception of Britain as a semi-detached member was heightened by the tone 
adopted in negotiations, particularly under Wilson and Thatcher. For example, 
adversarial and nationalistic rhetoric was used in the re-negotiation of the terms of 
British entry (1974-5) and in the negotiations over the size of British contributions 
to the Community budget (1979-1984). As George suggests: 
Both Wilson and Thatcher spoke as though the issues under discussion 
were not problems for the EC as a whole, to be mutually and amicably 
resolved, but as though there was a battle between Britain and the 
'Europeans', who were trying to cheat the British and who had to be put 
in their 
_place 
by firmness and determination to protect the national 
interest. 55 
53 For example, Britain was disadvantaged by both the domination of the budget by the CAP and the 
ystem devised for funding the budget. s 5 See: George, S. (1 992a) Op. Cit. p. 202. 55 Ibid. 
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For George et al, such behaviour cannot be explained merely as the reflection of 
the personal dispositions of such Prime Ministers. Rather, it was the result of a 
British political process that reflected a plurality of influences. This chapter will 
now turn to the two general conclusions of their examination of this process. 
Variations in 
membership 
adaptation within British domestic politics to EC 
The study by George et al concludes that Britain did adapt to EC membership. A 
learning process was experienced at all levels of British government and politics. 
However, this adaptation varied between actors. Against the steady adaptation at 
the technical administrative level, politics adapted more slowly. As George 
asserts: 
The whole basis for British political debate has rested on the ideas of 
national sovereignty and the superiority of British political institutions. It 
took tremendous effort to get the British public to approve membership 
of the EC, because of a lack of any sentiment of 'Europeanism'; and 
the leaders of the main parties (with the exception of the Liberals) made 
no effort to inculcate such attitudes. The evolution of opinion was 
therefore SIOW. 56 
Neill Nugent observes that public opinion gradually became more favourable to 
the EC over a long period of time 57 . However, Ashford observes that the process 
caused much friction within the political parties. 58 Party leaders moved carefully to 
hold their parties together. The slow evolution of opinion within major parties and 
the public constrained party leaders and contributed to their rather negative and 
anti-EC tone within EC policy debate. Adaptation also varied according to policy 
56 Ibid. p. 203. 57 See: Nugent, N. 
ý1992) Op. Cit. pp 8 See: Ashford, N 
(1992) 'British Public Opinion and the European Community', in S. George (ed. ) 
172-201. 
(11992) Op. Cit. 
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area; the less high-profile and politically sensitive the sector, the more smoothly 
British policy adapted to working in a Community manner. 59 
1.5. British domestic politics as a plural and complex process 
The second conclusion is that British European policy was the result of a political 
process reflecting a plurality of influences upon domestic politics. Thus, the image 
of a 'semi-detachment' can only be explained by disaggregating the concept of 
'Britain'. For example, there was an active process of bureaucratic politics before 
policy was formulated 60 which decided the British government's stance on an 
issue. In this process, the view of the Foreign Office may have prevailed or 
sometimes the less 'synoptic' view of the Treasury. 61 During Thatcher's 
premiership, the Treasury prevailed more frequently because she suspected that 
62 the Foreign Office was too 'pro-EC' . 
This second conclusion counters the image presented by the British Government 
that it had tight control over British relations with the EC. This study suggests that 
it proved increasingly difficult for successive governments to play the 'gatekeeper' 
role and prevent the process of European integration from dissolving their control. 
For example, various local authority associations, and some individual local 
authorities, had developed direct links with Brussels, 63 and there were increasing 
links between British pressure groups and their European counterparts. 64 Within 
political parties, direct links were forged with European counterparts below the 
59 See: George, S. (1 992a) Op. Cit. p. 204. 60 See: Edwards, G. (1992) Op. Cit. 
61 See: George, S. (1992a) Op. Cit. pp. 30-63,205. 62 Ibid. p. 205. 63 See: Preston, J. (1992) 'Local Government and the European Community', in S. George (ed. ) 
ý1992) Op. Cit. pp. 104-118. 4 Philip, A. B. (1992)'British Pressure Groups and the European Community', in S. George (ed. ) 
(1992) Op. Cit. pp. 149-171. 
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level of leadership. This led to a distinct evolution of opinion in some parts of each 
of the two major parties, while other sections remained relatively insulated. This 
made party management much more d iffiCUlt. 
65 British public opinion also evolved, 
which owed little to any strong leadership by political parties. Thus, both within 
their parties and the electorate, party leaders found that the European issue had 
66 
come to bind them rather than being controlled by them . 
Moreover, the study observes that Parliament became increasingly concerned 
about its lack of control over EC legislation and demanded more effective scrutiny 
procedures. The increasing amount of EC law also significantly eroded sovereign 
parliamentary control over national law. Without increased powers over the 
increasing body of EC law, Parliament could become marginalised in its primary 
legislative function. 
2.0. A re-assessment of Britain's 'awkward partnership' with Europe 
In 1998, George 67 provided a re-assessment of Britain's reputation as an 
i awkward partner' that extended his previous (independent) studies through to the 
68 defeat of the Major Government in the 1997 General Election . These studies 
aimed to provide an 6 overview of the field' or 'presentation of the record'. That is, 
in contrast to his previous domestic politics approach, they attempted to provide a 
basic narrative account of Britain Is awkwardness rather than a detailed analytical 
explanation. However, George accepts that is not possible to completely separate 
65 See: Ashford, N. (1992) Op. Cit. 
66 See: Nugent, N. (1992) Op. Cit. 
67 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. 
68 The previous study (his second edition) examined the period leading up to the beginning of 1994. 
See: George, S. (1994) An Awkward Partner* Britain in the European Community. Second Edition 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
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I account' from 'explanation I, and he informs us that the elements of explanation 
that he emphasizes are 'political'. 
69 
George also indicates that this re-assessment would be his definitive account of 
this subject because it might not be accurate to describe Britain as an 'awkward 
partner' in the future. Despite such optimism, this re-assessment confirmed his 
previous conclusion that Britain had an aberrant 'pragmatic' approach to European 
integration, and was conceived as an awkward partner by other members because 
it put practical achievements and policy before institutional questions: 
For Britain institutional questions are secondary and get in the way of 
practical achievements. Institutions and procedures should be modified 70 
pragmatically as they prove unequal to the tasks required of them . 
For example, as John Pinder observes, the British Stresa paper 'was seen as a 
j 71 model of British pragmatism . As for the British Fountainebleau Paper, the 
emphasis was very much upon practical achievements rather than institutional 
reform. 72 Moreover, Britain conceived that such practical achievements required 
an emphasis upon policy. Thus, whilst for the other member states, institutional 
reform was the central issue in giving impetus to the Community, for Britain, 
institutional reform would amount to no practical achievement. Rather, practical 
73 
achievement required institutions to be subservient to policies . 
George also argues that little changed in the relationship between the British 
Government and the rest of the EC as a result of Major's premiersh ip. 
74 He 
69 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. P. 1- 70 Ibid. p. 176. 
71 See: Pinder, J. (1985)'Pragmatikos and Federalis: Reflections on a Conference', Government 
and Opposition, Volume 20, No. 4, pp. 473-4; George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 179-180. 
72 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 177. See also: pp. 155-59,177. For a published copy of this paper, 
see: H. M. Government (1 984)'Europe - The Future', Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 
23, No. 1, September, pp. 73-81. 
73 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 177. 
74 Ibid. p. 272,274. 
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observes that John Major began his premiership with the aim of putting Britain at 
the heart of Europe, but it ended with his government as isolated as Thatcher's 
had ever been. The most common explanation for Major's failure is that, with a 
small majority in Parliament75 , he chose to accommodate the Eurosceptic 
elements within his party rather than confront them. 76 With a diminishing 
parliamentary majority77' Major made concessions to the Eurosceptic position, 
such as fighting the 1994 elections to the European Parliament (EP) on a similar 
I anti-Brussels' platform as Thatcher had employed in 1989. 
George acknowledges the significant effect that internal party management had 
upon the Major Government. The scale and intensity of rebel Conservative activity 
between 1992 and 1997 78 was very significant in terms of parliamentary behaviour 
and publicity, and it increased in salience as his majority diminished. However, he 
argues that it was a combination of factors that frustrated John Major's aim of 
putting Britain at the heart of Europe. One significant was the 'personal factor'. 
Here, George claims that Major's positive attitude towards the EU was gradually 
eroded by what he perceived as the 'bad faith' of other European leaders. Major 
felt that he was frequently let down by the other leaders (especially the German 
Chancellor), and he became increasingly disillusioned with the political games that 
they were prepared to play. 
79 Another significant factor was the British 
Government's view of the nature of the EU. Here, George observes continuity 
between Thatcher's and Major's vision of the EU. For example, this continuity is 
75 John Major came to power in June 1992 with a majority in Parliament of 21. See: Rallings, C. and 
M. Thrasher (2000) British Electoral Facts 1832-1999. (Aldershot: Ashgate). Table 2.01, pp. 67-8. 
76 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 272. 
77 See, for example: Wood, S. (1999) 'The British General Election of 1997', Election Studies, 
Volume 18, No. 1, pp. 142-147. 78 See: Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994); Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1993) 
Op. Cit, and Baker, D., 1. Fountain, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1995) Op. Cit., Ludlam. S. (1998) 
'The Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration', in D. Baker and D. 
Seawright (eds) Britain For and Against Europe: British Politics and the Question of European 
Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 31-56. 
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evidenced by a comparison of Major's article in The Economis(O with Thatcher's 
Bruges speech. 81 George claims that it is possible that the Major government did 
have a coherent and positive vision for the future of Europe, and that this vision, 
rather than short-term considerations of party management, informed the 
positions that it adopted in EU negotiations. 
In this sense, Britain's awkwardness had reflected the differences between British 
and Franco-German visions of Europe. As George observes, Britain's 
awkwardness could be differently interpreted as the result of a conflict between 
British economic liberalism and Franco-German state-i ntervention ism. 82 Hence, 
George suggests that European integration was obstructed by differences in vision 
between Britain and Continental Europe rather than by British shortcomings. From 
such a perspective, it can be observed that the British position became more 
central to the EU throughout the Major premiership. 83 That is, the project of 
European union was becoming increasingly closer to the British liberal-economic 
vision. Relatedly, it was evident that the British Government was having an 
increasingly significant impact upon the shape of the European union. 
Similar to the neo-functionalist approach examined in Chapter 1, and the 
'structure-agency' approach by Preston examined below, George also examines 
the structures underlying the British relationship with Europe. Despite the 
appearance of little change in the British relationship with the rest of Europe, 
George emphasizes that changes did take place in the underlying fundamentals of 
the relationship. As he explains, deep structures were changing, even if the 
79 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 273. 
80 Major, J. (1993) 'Raise Your Eyes, there is a Land Beyond, The Economist, 25 September, 
Volume 328, No. 7830, pp. 23-4. 81 See: George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 254-255. 82 Ibid. p. 273. 
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surface relations remained static. 84 For George, these changes suggested that 
Britain's awkwardness might not be inevitable - that Britain had at least the 
opportunity to be perceived as a less awkward partner. 85 
With regard to European political integration, George claims that such underlying 
changes affected three factors that contributed to Britain's reputation an as 
awkward partner. The first factor was the domestic political constraints on the 
positions that British Governments could adopt. 
86 Here, George observes a 
vicious cycle of British Euroscepticism. As British governments had not made any 
significant attempt to convert the public to Europeanisation, the result was a 
Eurosceptic political culture. As a consequence, both leading parties were easily 
led into anti-EC rhetoric in the pursuit of votes. In turn, this use of anti-EC rhetoric 
tended to reinforce attitudes - based upon generations of imperialism - of Britain 
looking to the wider world and treating Europe with disdain, of negative attitudes to 
the French that became embodied in popular culture, and, since the early 
Twentieth Century, of fear and mistrust of the German S. 
87 
Second, British negotiators demonstrated an awkwardness in handling the 
terminology of the political debate that had already developed among the original 
members. 88 As George argues, British politicians and officials experienced 
difficulties in adjusting to the ways of the EC. For example, one difficulty was the 
difference between the British adversarial political system, in which the 
government could usually get its own way, and the system of compromise to 
which European politicians are accustomed. Coalition governments are the norm 
83 Ibid.. 
84 Ibid. p. 275. 85 Ibid. 
86 See: Ibid. pp. 275-277. 87 Ibid. pp. 275-6. 
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in most continental member states, and thus, their politicians expect to have to 
compromise and are adept at it. Thatcher never adapted her approach to this way 
of working, and Major found the cutting of deals increasingly tiresome and 
frustrating. 89 Moreover, George argues that British politicians and officials had 
difficulty in presenting the British national interest in a way that did not seem to be 
against the common EC interest, whereas the French were adept at wrapping 
pursuit of their national interest in a 'communautaire' vocabulary. 90 George claims 
that the British adoption of the term 'subsidiarity' in 1990 was evidence of some 
adjustment. 
Third, the natural instinct of many leading British political figures was to look first 
to the US for partnership, and to regard with suspicion what were perceived as the 
federalist designs of Continental Europe. 91 For George, although often overstated, 
92 this factor should not be ignored . 
George claims that federalism was seen not 
only as a threat to British sovereignty, but also as an attempt to undermine US 
hegemony in the capitalist world, and as part of an overall conception of the EC 
93 
that was inherently protectionist against the rest of the world . 
2.1. A less awkward future? 
George also examines changes in the other side of the British-EU relationship, 
that is, changes in the EC. For George, although an obviously awkward 
relationship with the EC/EU could be observed in later years of the Major 
88 See: Ibid. pp. 278-279. 
89 Ibid. p. 278. 
90 Ibid. 
91 See: Ibid. pp. 279-280. 
92 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 279. To help prevent such an overstatement, George emphasizes 
that Heath deviated from this tradition. (See: George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 137-165,280. ) 
93 See: George, S. (11989) 'Nationalism, Liberalism and the National Interest: Britain, France, and 
the European Community', Strathclyde Papers on Government and Politics, No. 67, (Glasgow). 
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Government, developments in the EU suggested that the British position would 
not need to change too much to become central to the European debate in the 
future. 94 These developments also suggested that Britain was no longer as 
awkward as previously conceived. As observed above, at the behest of the British 
Government, the EU project was becoming increasingly intergovernmental and 
liberal-economic rather than 'functionalist/federalist' and social democratic. For 
example, the problems for ratification of the TEU throughout Europe exposed 
public scepticism about the federalist aspirations of some leaders; Mitterrand's 
European project seemed to have failed, and Gaullist nationalism was beginning 
to reassert itself. 
95 
Moreover, enlargement increased the number of states that held positions upon 
European integration that were close in many respects to that of Britain. 
Enlargement also complicated alliance formation, which had already become 
more complex as a result of the increase in qualified majority voting (QMV) to 
more areas of policy. Although the Franco-German alliance remained powerful, it 
could no longer dominate proceedings. As other members were often unhappy 
about the extent to which the French and Germans attempted to dominate, they 
96 
would have welcomed a more co-operative tone from Britain . 
With the electoral defeat of Major in 1997, the Labour Party returned to power with 
a large majority in Parliament. 97 For a Government that was not hindered by the 
problems that afflicted Major, such as small and decreasing majority in Parliament, 
94 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 276. 
95 Ibid. p. 281. 
96 Ibid. 
97 In 1997, the Labour Party returned to power and won its biggest majority in Parliament ever (178, 
or 179 if the Speaker is counted) and with a record number of seats (419 out of 659). In direct 
contrast, the Conservative Party was reduced to their lowest number of seats since 1906. See: 
Rallings, C. and M. Thrasher (2000) Op. Cit. Table 2.01, pp. 67-8, and Wood, S. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 
142. 
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George argues that the underlying situation was now promising for putting Britain 
at the heart of the debate about the future of Europe. 98 However, as will now be 
examined, Preston is less confident that such British agents could successfully 
crack the British mould from within (or would even want to). 
3.0. Global structural change and British aqent response 
Preston99 develops a 'structure-agency' approach to examine the British response 
to global structural change, and in particular, to the consequent pressure for 
European integration. 100 That is, he examines global structural change and British 
agent response. He predicts that British-European integration is inevitable as a 
consequence of the 'complex change' defined by major global events in 1989-91. 
In turn, British-European integration would invoke a more progressive approach to 
national development in Britain. 
Over the centuries, Preston argues that the British 'official' ideology, and the 
liberal-individualist political culture that it occasioned, consistently obscured the 
'reality' of the ruling class pursuing its own trans-national interests rather than 
progressive national economic and democratic development. Since British 'public 
discourse' reflected this distortion of reality, no effective demands for change were 
made. Therefore, the British public had not demanded a more positive approach 
to European integration, which Preston argues would represent such progressive 
political change. Moreover, following David Marquand, Preston argues that liberal- 
individualism does not provide a space for a genuinely social sphere or community 
98 George, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 281. 
99 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. Preston describes his text as an 'essay' to indicate that it is 'rather 
more speculative than the conventions of academic discourse usually allow'. (Ibid. p. vii. ) 100 Ibid. p. 202. 
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that would be the natural public arena for developing a more progressive 
discourse. 101 
Adopting a humanist Marxist approach, Preston's analysis incorporates the work 
of such political theorists as Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn who have attempted 
to move away from classical Marxism and its economic determinism, economistic 
notion of class, and 'class struggle' foCUS. 
102 His analysis also incorporates 
development theory and the theories of international relations developed by 
Andrew Linklaterl 03 and Susan Strange. 104 In accordance with these theories, 
Preston argues that we must examine the actions of any particular agent group, 
such as a state-regime, by examining the wider sets of structures within which 
they operate. 105 Any holistic analysis of the actions of a nation-state must examine 
the trans-national structures within which it is located. That is, we must focus upon 
the dynamic interaction of structures and agents. 106 
3.1. British obstructions to development and change 
As will now be described, Preston identifies a number of interrelated explanations 
for the British failure to develop progressive political-economic and political- 
cultural structures and respond effectively to change. 
101 Ibid, p. 35. See also: Marquand, D. (1991 a) The Progressive Dilemma. (London: Heineman). pp. 
216-220. 
102 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 6. 
103 See: Strange, S. (11988) States and Markets. (London: Pinter). 
104 See: Lin klater, A. (1990) Beyond Marxism and Realism: Critical theory and International 
Relations. (London: Macmillan). 
105 See: Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 19,84,130-1,180,203,208. 
106 Ibid. p. 131. 
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3.1.1. The British political culture 
Preston describes how the phases of development in Britain had produced 
particular political cultural structures in its PolitY107 , and how these established 
patterns of structures obstructed endogenous change in Britain. 108 Incorporating 
the structural analyses of Nairn'09 and Marquand"O in particular, Preston claims 
that the existing structures of the British polity were fixed in place in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century. He argues that this pattern of structures 
still shaped the political experience in Britain. The underlying form of this pattern 
of structures had never been questioned or overturned by crisis, revolution or war, 
and thus, there had been a failure to achieve the political breakthrough that may 
have established a progressive 'European-style' social democratic developmental 
state. "' He emphasizes that such development in Britain was necessary to arrest 
long term relative national decline, and his essay contributes to the existing 
Marxist literature upon this issue. ' 12 
3.1.2. The ideology of liberal institutionalism 
Preston describes 'official' ideology as the way in which a political-cultural system 
presents itself. ' 13 It is the ideology of the elite that is employed to legitimate and 
order extant social patterns. It is expressed in particular concrete institutional 
107 See: Ibid. pp. 7-20. 108 See: Ibid. pp. 20-32. 
109 See: Nairn, T. (1988) The Enchanted Glass. (London: Hutchison Radius). 
110 See: Marquand, D. (1988) The Unprincipled Society. (London: Fontana), and Marquand, D. 
Q991 a) Op. Cit. 
11 See: Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 21,31-33. 
112 See, for example: Gamble, A. (1990) Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and 
the British State. (London: Macmillan); Hirst, P. Q. (1989) After Thatcher. (London: Collins); Leys, 
C. (1989) Politics in Britain: From Labourism to Thatcherism. (London: Verso); Marquand, D. (1988) 
Op. Cit.; Pollard, S. (1982) The Wasting of the British Economy. (London: Croom Helm), and Smith, 
K. (1987) The British Economic Class. (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
113 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 2 1. 
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arrangements and carried by the distinctive patterns of the life of the elite. Preston 
argues that the British official ideology had obstructed the endogeneous change 
necessary to overcome relative national decline because it celebrated continuity, 
duty and obedience, as well as the 'particularity' of Britain. ' 14 In sum, it was a 
strategy of deep dissimulation that kept Britain lodged within early times. ' 15 
16 17 Following Alastair Maclntyrel and Marquand' Preston plays particular 
attention to the role played by the ideology of liberal-individualism in obstructing 
change in Britain. As a result of this liberal-individualist position, Preston claims 
that the British political class ensured relative economic decline and democratic 
deficiencies by 'choking off the European social-democracy informed by the 
modernist project. ' 18 In place of the liberal celebration of the market by the British 
political classes, Germany and Northwestern Europe successfully secured 
extensive development by establishing the type of developmental state that was 
theorized via social democracy. 119 In sum, the liberal-individualist posture is 
advanced as the root cause of Britain's relative economic decline and democratic 
deficit because it obstructed such social democratic development in Britain. For 
Marquand, Nairn and Preston, Britain required a developmental state to arrest its 
long-term relative decline 120 , and European social 
democracy, informed by the 
modernist project, is advanced as the necessary basis for this developmental 
state. "' 
114 Ibid. pp. 21-22. 115 See also: Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. pp. 93-8. 116 See: Macl ntyre, A. (198 1) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. (London: Duckworth). 117 See: Marquand, D (1988) Op. Cit. 
118 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 31. 119 id. p. 18. 120 Ibid. p. 20. 121 See, for example: Ibid. p. 15,20, and Nairn, T (1988) Op. Cit. pp. 373-391. 
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In accordance with (Perry) Anderson 122 , Preston claims that the project of 
European integration embodied the ideas and options of European social 
democracy. Thus, as a consequence of its liberal stance, the failure of the British 
class to respond to the European social democratic project was reflected in its 
failure to embrace European integration. Henceforth, Preston assumes that British 
relative economic decline would have been reversed if Britain had embraced 
European integration because this would reflect an acceptance of the European 
project of social democracy. 
3.1.3. The strategies of the major political parties 
Preston claims that Britain failed to develop progressive political parties as a result 
of its political culture of liberal-individualism. Following Marquand, he argues that 
liberal-ind ivid ual ism advances a sphere of sovereign individuals where order is a 
matter of political hierarchy or economic marketplace. 123 In due course, the neo- 
liberalism of the British Right and the top-down statism of British labourism 
became the only options, neither of which are considered to be effective, 
progressive, or able to respond to change - as reflected in their failure to embrace 
European integration. 
In the 1980s, Preston describes how the regressive use of liberal principles 
resurfaced when it was invoked to support the New Right project in response to 
the collapse of the post-war social democratic compromise (and against 
Habermasian schemes of democraCyl 24) . For Preston, the British New Right 
project was as an authoritarian, intolerant, substantively anti-democratic and failed 
122 See: Anderson, P. (1992) English Questions. (London: Verso). 
123 Marquand, D. (1991 a) Op. Cit. pp. 216-20. 
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attempt to adjust to continuing British relative decline within the global system. 125 
This attempt was made by adopting a project of 'dual parasitism , politically on the 
USA via the 'special relationship', and economically on the European Community 
conceived as a loose free trade area. 126 As described below, Preston argues that 
this project was increasingly challenged by the process of complex change in the 
global system, and by the process of European integration in particular. 
127 Hence, 
a strategy of 'dilute and delay' was the only available strategy to keep the EC as a 
mere free-trade area. 
128 
Preston argues that the political ascendancy of the British New Right was aided by 
the parlous state of the British Left. 129The Labour Party is judged as an historical 
failure, a failure that allowed the British Conservative Party to become the most 
successful right-wing party in Europe. With reference to the work of Nairn and 
Marquand, Preston claims that the Labour Party failed because it offered a 
specific reading of the modernist project rooted in the late nineteenth century 
expectations of elite led mass working class action. He also argues that the 
Labour Party prevented the development of a more progressive alternative party 
to liberal-individualism by blocking any contribution to political discourse and 
action from the non-Labour Centre and Left. For Preston: 
The Labour Party's deeply conservative labourist ethos has remained 
intact and with it their ingrained little Englander suspicion of Europe, 
and the system has continued to marginalize the contribution of other 
parties. These essentially defensive stances are unlikely to prove 
adequate to the challenges of the 1990S. 130 
124 See: Preston, P. W. (11994) Op. Cit. pp. 29-30,37,58,187-88,205. See also: R. C. Holub (1991) 
Argen Habermas: Critic in the Public Sphere. (London: Routledge). 
125 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 207. 
126 See: Ibid. pp. 133,196,207. 127 bid. pp. 130-5,196-7. 128 id. p. 197. 129 Ibid. p 207. 130 Ibid. pp. vi-vii. 
74 
This argument may explain why the proliferation of new social movements 
apparent in Continental Europe was absent in Britain. This theme is discussed in 
Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
3.1.4. National and parliamentary sovereignty 
As also identified by George et al above, Preston observes that both British 
Conservative and Labour governments had obstructed European integration in 
defence of British national and parliamentary sovereignty. 131 With reference to the 
work of Nairn, Preston describes the historical episodes that lodged such 
principles into British political and public discourse. He describes the pre-modern 
phase of parliamentary absolutism that was established in the English Civil War 
(1640-88) in the seventeenth century; the invention of the 'official' nationalism by 
the British political classes in response to the demands of republican democracy 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and finally, the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century period of 'high Victorian ism/Edward ian ism' that 
established the institutional arrangements and political and public discourse of 
contemporary Britain. 132 The significance of these key principles, and their 
development, are discussed further in Part // of this thesis. 
3.1.6. 'Official' British nationalism and the trans-national interests of the 
British ruling class 
Relevant to this thesis, Preston examines the significance of British nationalism in 
the British obstruction to European integration. Similar to this thesis, Preston 
131 Ibid. pp. 8-9,23-27,115,130-133. 132 See: Ibid. pp. 6-18. 
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argues that British nationalism was 'constructed' in opposition to Continental 
Europe, and the threat it posed to British economic and political stability. Following 
Benedict Anderson 133 , Preston holds that British nationalism is an invented 'official 
nationalism' that was constructed and imposed from above. That is, 'Britain'was a 
ruling class project occasioned by long hostility to the mainland, and fuelled by the 
expectations of enhanced material wealth - particularly within the integrated British 
market and via overseas trade and empire. According to Nairn, in Continental 
Europe, nationalism was forged to express the conditions of modernity. In 
contrast, nationalism in Britain was forged to pre-empt and politically arrest these 
conditions. 
134 
Thus, in contrast to Continental Europe, Preston argues that the British ruling 
class invented the 'British nation' to further its own economic interests rather than 
to pursue the modernist project and national development. Rather than focussing 
upon national development, Preston argues that the British State read and 
controlled trans-state flows to maximize the advantages, external and internal, of 
the British ruling class. 
135 
In Britain, Preston emphasizes that British national development had been 
obstructed because the prevailing archaic and regressive liberal-individualist 
tradition successfully served the interests of the British ruling class. For Preston, 
the British political-economy was as an archaic and outward-looking mercantile 
capitalism dominated by a south-eastern trading/commercial/financial bourgeoisie 
133 See: Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities. (London: Verso). The term 'official 
nationalism'was first employed by Hugh Seton-Watson to describe the nationalism invoked by the 
policies of Eastern European regimes. See: Seton-Watson, H. (1977) Nations and States. An 
Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press). p. 148. 134 Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 135. 135 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 19. 
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that regarded Britain generally as 'provinces' which were available for exploitation 
136 137 but not crucial to their world-system role. Thus, following Tom Nairn , Preston 
argues that all diagnoses of British decline which were cast in national terms 138 
were missing a crucial point: the British ruling class was outward-looking and its 
success within the global system was perfectly compatible with the decline of the 
'national unit ,. 
139 
As a consequence of the success of the official nationalism, Preston argues that 
British public discourse on European integration had been cast in terms of 
'gain/loss' and 'problem/opportunity'. This is similar to the proposition of George et 
al above that Britain had perceived any move towards further European 
integration as a defeat of 'us' and a victory for 'them'. Preston argues that this 
'gain/loss' and 'problem/opportunity' perception became common in British public 
discourse for two reasons. First, it reflected the 'personal ised-national ism' of the 
British ruling class whereby 'we' were taken as one mind, and one set of interests, 
all of which had to be necessarily, inevitably and obviously asserted against 
'them', in this case, the rest of the EC. Second, British public discourse perceived 
the world through the 'distorting frame' of the ideology of liberal-individualism, 
which obscured the 'reality' of the ruling class pursuing its own trans-national 
interests rather than national development. 140 
In all, following Nairn, Preston argues that, since the late nineteenth century, the 
official liberal-individualist ideology of the British ruling class had successfully 
obstructed any change to the British polity in order to preserve its own 
136 Ibid. p. 18. 137 See: Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. 
138 See, for example: Leys, C. (1989) Op. Cit., and Pollard, S. (1982) Op. Cit. 139 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 18. 140 Ibid. p. 19,130,135. 
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transnational interests. As a consequence of its success, the underlying form of 
British political discourse had never been questioned. It had survived the crisis of 
the First World War; the crisis in the 1930s when it was rescued by Keynes; the 
crisis of the Second World War, as well as the extensive social welfare reforms of 
the post-war period. 
141 
3.2. Overcoming the British obstructions to change 142 
Preston conceives Twentieth Century Britain as an archaic, pre-democratic and 
'half-modern 143 liberal oligarchy. Following Nairn and Marquand, he argues that 
the necessary condition for British modernization is the pursuit of republican 
democracy and the establishment of a developmental state. Thus, Preston looks 
for ways to develop such progressive change in Britain. To this end, he adopts the 
approach to structurally occasioned 'stasis/decline' developed by Nairn. In 
contrast to the work of many other Centre/Left critics of extant circumstances, 144 
Nairn argues that it is not recipes that are needed but changes in power 
structures. This argument strongly recalls the conclusion of development theory 
that 'exhortation plus recipes' are useless. 145 Rather, the dynamics of structural 
change must be examined and the possibilities for progressive agent response 
identified. Indeed, previous work in developmental theory by Preston has come to 
141 Ibid. p. 21. 
142 Here, it must be emphasized that, since the time of Preston's analysis and the period examined 
by this thesis, there have been changes in Britain that affect this problem, and thus, its possible 
solution. As discussed in Chapter 7 and the conclusion of this thesis, changes in British political and 
government discourse have been invoked 'from within'since the electoral defeat of the 
Conservative Party by'New' Labour in 1997. For instance, New Labour has demonstrated a 
relatively more positive approach to European integration, and its provision of a 1997 referendum 
upon Welsh and Scottish devolution led to the establishment of the Welsh and Scottish assemblies, 
and thus, to regional constraints upon the power of national government and parliament. 143 See: Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. P. 154. 
144 Those identified are: Hirst, P. Q. (1989) Op. Cit.; Marquand, D (1988) Op. Cit.; Pollard, S. (1982) 
Op. Cit., and Smith, K. (1987) Op. Cit. 14; Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. P. 19. 
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this conclusion 146 , and thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that it is advanced and 
confirmed by his analyses of British-European relations. 
Following this conclusion, Preston searches for sources of power that might 
change the British systern-configu ration. For Preston, this exploration concerns 
two problems. First, and with particular regard to the extant labourist 
incompetence and democratic deficits in Britain, there is the question of how to 
take power away from the ruling class in order to usher in a group with a 
developmental strategy. Second, there is the problem of the existing theoretical 
focus on Britain as a 'bounded unit'. How Preston addresses these two problems 
will now be examined. 
3.2.1. Potential agents of change 
With regard to the first problem, as Preston and his commentators have argued 
above, the British liberal minimum state is incapable of acting as an agent of 
economic and political development. In addition, as for Nairn, the Labour Party is 
written off as a possible agent of change. The labourist Left, which dominated the 
Centre/Left in Britain, is viewed as both imaginatively and practically crippled. 147 
Moreover, Preston claims that the Labour Party has actually obstructed change. 
Both the liberal-individualist political culture, and the labourism it occasions, has 
blocked the development of a more progressive Centre/Left politics that could 
produce the necessary political and economic change in Britain. 
Furthermore, as Nairn observes, the British ruling class is outward looking and its 
success within the global system is perfectly compatible with the decline of the 
146 See, for example: Preston, P. W- (1987) Rethinking Development. (London: Routledge). 
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ination unit'. As the British ruling class has never been focused on British 
development in the past, Preston does not believe that they will suddenly begin to 
now. Preston and his commentators also emphasize that this problem is made 
worse because the ruling class is very entrenched in Britain: 'The ruling class is 
, 148 not declining, it adjusts, and the already secondary do the declining . 
Preston concludes that we should stop searching for agents of change within 
Britain. Rather, he predicts that the modernist project will be inevitably imposed 
upon the British political classes from 'outside'. Citing Sarah Baxtor, Preston is 
confident that 'The mould is more likely to crack from without, than to be broken 
from within' . 
149 He argues that the dynamics of European change has advanced 
the modernist project in the shape of the project of European integration. It is 
proposed that this European project is the only potential agent of change in view 
for Britain. 
3.3. Complex change and British agent response 
Despite all the obstructions to change in Britain that he observes, and despite his 
proposition that the British ruling class has successfully contained any demands 
for change since the late nineteenth century, Preston predicts that change in 
Britain is now inevitable as a consequence of the contemporary process of global 
structural change. To elucidate upon this global structural change, Preston 
develops an analysis of complex change that owes much to his reading of 
development theory in the light of the neo-episoclic theory of Gellner. 150 Following 
147 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 19-20. 
148 Ibid. p. 18. 149 Baxter, S. (1991) New Statesman and Society. 1 November. Volume 4, No. 175, p. 23. 
150 See: Gellner, E. (1964) Thought and Change. (London: Routledge). 
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Gellner, Preston approaches the analysis of the contemporary developments in 
Europe as: 
... an episode of complex change to received structures and discourses which we can attempt to elucidate by deploying the methods 
of classical social science in the expectation that we have a rough idea 
of its endpoint; that is, some sort of unification. 151 
From such an analysis of complex change, Preston argues that 'we can 
understand those periods when inter-related change takes place in the economy, 
) 152 society, polity and culture of a people . 
In his analysis of complex change, Preston claims that the political-economic and 
political-cultural structures of the post-Second World War were overthrown by 
events that took place between May 1989 and December 1991. He proposes that 
the crucial task of social science is the elucidation of these ongoing complex 
dynamics of political-economic and cultural change that are believed to be 
remaking Europe. 
153 
For Preston, this complex change was defined by a sequence of four events. First, 
the EC was moving towards a more integrated political economy (with the notion 
of federalism variously invoked). Second, the EFTA periphery of the EC was 
rapidly moving to establish eventual membership. Third, East Central Europe was 
quickly embracing mainstream European ideas. Fourth, the USSR/CIS was in the 
154 
process of both internal reform and bi-polar withdrawal . This complex change 
replaced the Cold War statis that had previously been governed in Western 
Europe by the US ideology of 'Atlanticism'. 
151 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. P. 179. 152 id. p. 178 153 Ibid. p. 208. 154 Ibid. p. 20. 
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Preston believes that this complex dynamic of change is invoking extensive and 
far-reaching changes to Europe and the global system. As a result of this complex 
change, he argues that the present pattern of states in Europe is clearly in the 
process of dissolution. 155 With reference to the key structures of power in the 
global system identified by Strange, Preston argues that, in Europe: 
", the pattern of inter-group relations constructed with reference to these structures over the post-war period is now changing rapidly. New 
configurations of these structures are being made. New relationships of 
agent groups are being made. New patterns of understanding might 
thereafter be expected to emerge. 156 
3.3.1. Responses to complex change in Europe 
Preston believes that the Continental European project of European integration is 
a positive and effective response to global structural change. In contrast to Britain, 
Preston describes how the rest of Western Europe gave a rapid, coherent and 
rational response to the sequence of changes of 1989-91 that defined such 
complex change. This response took the form of a re-affirmation of the ideal of 
European unity, a 're-emphasis' of the drive towards an 'ever closer union' which 
had animated its founding fathers, and which had found partial expression in the 
1985 SEA. 157 
However, Preston describes how the British state-regime reacted in horror as their 
very convenient enemy, and with it their 'Altanticist' sense of their world and their 
domestic legitimating ideology were undermined, to be replaced by such notions 
of 'European union'. Preston argues that European integration was a threat to the 
British state-regime because it required a re-ordering of British power structures 
155 bid. p. 180. 156 Ibid. pp. 179-80. 157 Ibid. p. 3. 
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that entailed an ideological reorientation from Atlanticism and US hegemony to 
'Europeanism'. Furthermore, British agents feared that the new EC settlement 
would have an increasingly German image because Germany is the major 
economic power of Europe and for many Continental members, the model of a 
successful political economy. 
158 
Moreover, following William Wallace 159 , Preston observes that members of both 
major British political parties were concerned that European integration would 
threaten parliamentary sovereignty, and thus, open up some fundamental 
questions about the quality of British democracy and the structure of the British 
state - 
160 Wallace argues that these questions would challenge most sections of 
mainstream British political opinion because: 
... insistence on Westminster sovereignty 
became the fundamental 
principle of ... Unionism, conservatism, and nationhood ... 
(and) most of 
Labour's leaders share the same sense of 'English exceptional ism', of 
unquestionin faith in the democratic character of the British 
parliament. ' 6Y 
For Wallace, the questioning of these assumptions would result in the unravelling 
of the whole construct, and thus, the British state-regime would be faced with not 
only a constitutional crisis, but also a crisis of national identity. 162 
Hence, the British state-regime feared that further European integration would 
invoke a constitutional crisis that would destabilize its position of power and 
undermine its liberal ideas and interests. As Preston argues: 
158 Ibid. p. 146. 159 Wallace, W. (1990) 'Europe: Cry Havoc', New Statesman and Society, 9 November, Volume 3, 
No. 126, pp. 16-17. 160 Ibid. p. 17. 161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid. 
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... whilst the programme of European Community union is clearly a 
coherent and rational response to structural change () it is one which 
threatens quite directly the grip on power of the UK ruling groups who 
would be faced with democratizing their essentially pre-democratic 
oligarchic polity. 163 
In addition, it was also evident that global structural change, and the further 
European integration that it occasioned, would also threaten the British official 
nationalism that has also served to maintain the position and interests of the 
British ruling class. As a consequence of changes to the trans-system, the idea of 
'Europe' would come to challenge the idea of the 'nation 164 , and thus, the official 
construct of 'Britishness'. 
As a result of these fears, Preston claims that a new British State posture on 
Europe began to be discerned which found its first formulation at Maastricht. This 
was the posture of 'dilute and delay' in the hope of arriving at what in effect would 
be nothing more than a loose free-trade area. 165 Thus, the British state-regime 
could continue to pursue its liberal economic interests without incurring any 
threats to its political stability. 
In sum, Preston claims that the British state-regime and its interests were 
threatened by the process of complex change and the European project that it 
invoked. However, the success of its anti-European stance was aided by the 
success of the official British liberal-individualist ideology that fooled the British 
public into supporting this position which was contrary to its own political and 
economic interests. That is, this position served the transnational interests of the 
ruling class but obstructed national development. This ideology successfully 
obstructed the development of a more positive political discourse that could 
163 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 203. 
164 Ibid. p. 186. 165 Ibid. p. 3,203. 
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replace the strategy of denial that plagued the major political parties as well as 
public discourse. Furthermore, Preston's examination of British historical 
development suggests that the British ruling class will fight hard to maintain the 
official nationalism that secures its status and its interests. 
3.3.2. The inevitability of change in Britain 
Nevertheless, for Preston, it is clear that the dynamics of change in Europe will 
have a major impact upon the British polity. As Britain is absorbed into the 
European community, the construction of a new British political discourse is 
deemed inevitable. Preston finds it impossible to believe that the British ruling 
class can contain the new pressures for change, and thus, he predicts that British 
political structures and discourses will have change impressed upon them in the 
future. 166 He makes this prediction despite his observation that the official ideology 
of the British ruling class has successfully contained pressures for change in the 
past, and that, as a result, the underlying form of the present British political 
discourse has never been questioned before. 
However, Preston predicts that recent global structural change will transform the 
patterns of power that flow through Britain. 'Institutionally embodied power' will 
move upwards to the new trans-national EC system, and downwards to the newly 
empowered British regions. 167 As Marquand suggests, Britain can expect power to 
shift away from Westminster and towards Brussels and the British regions. 168 In 
due course, power will be taken away from the British ruling class and given to 
166 Ibid. p. 175. 167 Ibid. p. 144. 168 See: Marquand, D. (1991 b) 'The Fudge Manufacturers of Maastricht. Why its Time to Switch 
from Economics to Politics, from Technocracy to Democracy', The Guardian, 3 December. p. 19. 
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agents that can usher in a more progressive developmental strategy and 
discourse in Britain. 
Preston argues that it is the new trans-national EC system that holds the key to 
positive change within Britain. He predicts that the global dynamics of change will 
necessarily occasion a positive response to European integration within Britain. As 
a consequence, he argues that Britain will have finally embraced the Continental 
European modernist project and its social democratic goals that are deemed 
necessary for effective British development. 
169 Still 
, Preston emphasizes that the 
final outcome, or new position of relative stability, of this particular episode of 
complex change will take many years to achieve. He argues that the 
establishment of new identities and compromises is likely to be a difficult and 
lengthy process. 
170 
4.0. Summa 
All the accounts examined in this chapter are similar in the sense that they all 
observe that British-European political integration in the post-war period was 
obstructed by a British preoccupation with national and parliamentary sovereignty, 
as well as its broader global political interests and its 'special relationship' with the 
US. As a consequence of these factors, they argue that there was a strong British 
preference for intergovernmental ism. They all observe the British tendency to 
support initiatives for European economic integration but oppose initiatives for 
political integration. Additionally, they all observe the Continental European 
preference for the supranational (or trans-national) integration of Europe, and 
169 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 208. 
170 Ibid. pp. 186-7. 
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thus, for economic and political integration. It is also implied that this divergence in 
interests between Britain and Continental Europe reflected a divergence in 
political culture. For example, the accounts by George and Preston observe a 
divergence between British liberalism and Continental European social 
democracy. Thus, it is suggested that Britain opposed initiatives for European 
integration that embodied the conflicting social democratic ideas and interests of 
Continental Europe. 
George et al suggest that British political culture supported a more pragmatic 
approach to foreign policy than Continental Europe. Moreover, they suggest that 
such differences in political culture exacerbated the tension between Britain and 
the rest of the EC because they led to misjudgements, misinterpretations, and 
thus, suspicion from both sides. As indicated, a principal aim of Patt I/ of this 
thesis is to develop our understanding of this obstructing conflict in political and 
governmental discourse. 
To different degrees, all accounts also suggest that there were significant 
historical reasons for Britain's aberrant European policy. They observe such 
reflects Britain's historical failure to respond to change and develop an effective 
strategy for national development in response to the consequent national 
economic decline. For example, Bulmer argues that British government policy 
remained outdated and was slow to adapt to changing circumstances because 
British government still acted as if Britain held its former position of grandeur. He 
also argues that British foreign policy tends to be reactive in nature. Preston also 
accepts that British government upheld an outdated position, but argues that the 
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British ruling class did not want to adapt this stance because it benefited their 
trans-nationa nterests that were perfectly compatible with national decline. 
It is therefore apparent that the accounts of Britain's particular relationship with 
Europe undermine the universal assumptions of the different theories of 
international relations examined in Chapter 1. That is, they all suggest that 
different member states conceive international relations in different ways. More 
precisely, they all imply that Britain confirmed realist propositions because it 
demonstrated an intergovernmental conception of European integration, but that 
Continental European member states confirmed neo-functionalist assumptions 
because they held a supranational conception. 
Despite the many similar observations and arguments made by these accounts of 
British-European integration, there are also many differences between them that 
reflects a difference in analytical approach. For example, although both Bulmer 
and Preston argue that it is important to develop a historical context for their 
analyses, in contrast to Preston, Bulmer makes a significant attempt to avoid 
overstating historical determinism. 
In contrast to Preston, George et al 171 examine both sides of the British-EC/EU 
relationship. Thus, although both Preston and George suggest that Britain was 
becoming increasingly closer to the heart of Europe, for George, this is because of 
changes on each side. He argues that the British position did not need to change 
too much to become central to the European debate in the future because this 
position had become more central to the EU throughout the Major premiership. As 
also proposed by this thesis, George suggests that the EU was moving away from 
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the broader political, supranational and social democratic project that was 
originally instigated by Continental Europe and becoming increasingly narrower, 
liberal-economic and intergovernmental. Nevertheless, he argues that European 
integration continued to be obstructed by the broad contrast in political styles and 
languages of Britain and Continental Europe. Thus, in contrast to Preston, George 
suggests that European integration had been obstructed by differences between 
Britain and Continental Europe rather than by British shortcomings in relation to a 
superior Continental European ideal. This will be supported in this thesis. 
Although this change in vision of the EU was predominantly the result of 
developments in the EU, George also suggests that the British Government was 
having a significant impact upon the form of the European union. That is, the EU 
was moving away from its original goals to meet the Thatcherite liberal-economic 
and intergovernmental preferences of Britain. In sum, contrary to the assumptions 
of Preston, George suggests that the project of European union could not be 
upheld as a social democratic ideal that Britain should pursue. He also suggests 
that Britain could no longer be described as the aberrant and awkward partner of 
Europe. 
In contrast to George, Preston is less confident that the New Labour Government, 
even with its vast majority, could successfully crack the mould from within, or 
would even want to. Rather, Preston predicts that change in Britain will only be 
externally occasioned as a consequence of ongoing global structural change. 
George et al also recognise that these external structural changes and pressures 
were undermining Britain's awkward position, but emphasize that various intemal 
agents in Britain were already responding to such external developments, and as 
171 That is: George, S. (1998) Op. Cit., and all the contributors to: George, S. (ed. ) (1992) Op. Cit. 
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a consequence, Britain had already begun to accept European integration. In 
contrast to Preston, internal British agents are seen by George et al as having 
been slowly adapting to European integration rather than maintaining a complete 
opposition to it. 
In his analysis, Preston argues that the British official ideology and liberal- 
individualist political culture obstructed the development of the social democratic 
ideas and options upheld in Continental Europe. In due course, similar to George, 
he suggests that Britain opposed the project of European integration because it 
was perceived to embody these Continental European social democratic 
conceptions. For Preston et al 172 , British relative decline was caused by the British 
obstruction to the social democratic ideas of the modernist project of Continental 
Europe. As the project of European integration embodied these ideas, then it is 
predicted that British-European integration will overcome Britain's flagging 
development. 173 However, as described above, George's observations suggest 
that, at the behest of Britain, the project of European union no longer embodies 
this modernist project of social-democratic development. If this is the case, then 
Preston is misguided in his support for this project. 
To elucidate, the Marxist-structural accounts by Preston et al tend to equate the 
project of European integration with the Continental European modernist project of 
social democratic development. However, at the behest of the British Government, 
and as George observes, the project of European integration is moving closer to 
the position advanced by British liberal-individualism. In due course, in contrast to 
the original goals of the Continental European project of European integration, the 
EU has remained more intergovernmental than supranational, and thus, closer to 
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the assumptions of realism than the predictions of neo-functionalism. Moreover, in 
contrast to the original project, it is also evident that the EU has remained more 
economic than political. This economic position has satisfied the British liberal- 
individualist stance that objects to the political integration of Europe in three 
interrelated senses. First, in accordance with the British defence of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty, the development of an open economic market must not 
spill-over into the development of a supranational political community. Second, in 
accordance with the British liberal-individualist principle of the minimum state, the 
EU must not develop a supranational social democratic state apparatus that would 
infringe upon individual liberty and freedom. Third, even on an intergovernmental 
basis, British liberal-individualism rejects the social democratic tendencies of the 
political initiatives of the EU. 
Conclusion 
With regard to the theories of international relations examined in Chapter 1, it is 
apparent that the assumptions and predictions of neo-functionalism are similar to 
those advanced by Preston. As illustrated, Preston develops a 'structure-agency I 
approach to examine the trans-national context of British-European relations and 
the dynamics of complex change. As functionalism is the alter ego of 
structural iSM174 , then it seems logical that Preston's structural approach would 
advance similar structural-deterministic and teleological assumptions as neo- 
functionalism. Indeed, congruent with the deterministic and teleological scriptures 
of functionalism and neo-functionalism, Preston assumes that the actions of 
agents are determined by structural dynamics, and thus, that he can determine 
172 That is, Perry Anderson, David Marquand, Tom Nairn, and Peter Preston. 
173 See: Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 5. 
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and predict 'agent response' to structural change. In addition, it seems logical that 
these two approaches would arrive at similar conclusions. Thus, in contrast to 
realism, and congruent to the neo-functionalist prediction of the supranational 
integration of Europe and the decline in the significance of the sovereign nation- 
state (and thus, the preference for intergovernmental ism), Preston concludes that 
a positive British agent response to European integration is now inevitable. 
However, the structural approach developed by Preston also incorporates those of 
Linklater and Strange, and thus, in contrast to neo-functionalism, Preston locates 
Britain within global rather than regional structures. He thus argues that British- 
European integration is an inevitable response to global structural change. 
Following the structuralist propositions of Strange, Preston claims that analysis of 
international relations must focus upon the dialectic of structure and agency: 
received structures shape the actions of agents, and in turn, the actions of agents 
modify structures. However, despite this proposition, Preston's analysis of 
'structural change, agent response' only examines one side of the coin: how global 
structures shape the actions of agents. He fails to examine how the actions of 
agents (and in particular, British agents) have affected received structures. For 
example, as observed above, George suggests that British agents were affecting 
the direction and form of the European union. Thus, in contrast to Preston, 
George illustrates that (British) agents affect structure and not just vice versa. 
It is also evident that the domestic politics approach by George et al is similar to 
realism because it emphasizes that member states rather than supranational 
institutions dominate the process of European integration. However, contrary to 
realism, George et al argue that the behaviour of member states is not determined 
174 Hay, C. (1995) 'Structure and Agency', in D. Marsh and G- Stoker (eds) Theories and Methods in 
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by simple rational and calculated strategies, but rather, policy is the outcome of a 
complex political process that reflects a plurality of influences upon domestic 
politics. Thus, the image of a 'semi-detachment' can only be explained by 
disaggregating the concept of 'Britain Their examination of British domestic 
politics is hoped to contribute to the cumulative understanding of the policies of 
the leading member states. Consequently, they emphasize that a domestic politics 
approach needs to be applied to the other member states in order to achieve a 
broader understanding of politics and policy in the EC. 
In contrast to all the theoretical approaches examined in Chapter I and Chapter 2, 
this thesis examines the significance of the construction of the British identity in 
the development of the phenomenon of British Euroscepticism. It is argued that 
the construction of the British identity has involved the negation of Continental 
Europe and its meanings and options. As this thesis also aims to convince, the 
discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe provides an instructive theoretical 
framework for such an approach. 
In Chapter 6, this discourse-theoretical framework will also be employed to 
overcome the false universalization of orthodox approaches to international 
relations and the false particularisation of previous accounts of British-European 
integration. As observed in Chapter 1, and as indicated by the domestic politics 
approach by George et al above, universal theories of international relations are 
assumed to be universally true and fail to consider the individual differences or 
particularities of member states. 
Political Science. (London: Macmillan). p. 193. 
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The opposite problem affects accounts of British-European integration. As Richard 
Rose claims, 'The tradition of writing about British (or more properly, English) 
politics is to assed uniquenesss through false particularisation'. 175 However, this 
false particularisation of Britain is often produced against a false universalistion of 
Continental Europe. That is, there is a 'Eurocentric 176 tendency to describe 
'Continental Europe' as a superior and universal identity. For example, Preston 
follows the approach developed by Nairn and Anderson, despite acknowledging 
the criticism by Edward Thompson 177 and others that they 'relentlessly denigrate' 
British culture in relation to an ideal-typical characterization of the French 
Revolution 178 , and employ a 'bourgeois paradigm'which acts to impose the 
French 
experience upon all of Continental Europe and against which British development 
is compared. 
179 
Of course, this perception of a monolithic and superior Continental Europe directly 
contrasts with the British Eurosceptic perception of it as a monolithic and 
threatening 'Other', as examined in Chapter 5. However, there is a concern that 
such an image of Europe can not only be misleading, but that, similar to British 
Euroscepticism, it can serve to reinforce the discursive divide between 'us' and 
'thern'that is presently obstructing European integration. As explained in Chapters 
175 Rose, R. (1991) 'Comparing Forms of Comparative Analysis', Political Studies, Volume 39, pp. 
446-62. p. 450. 176 See, for example: Young, R. J. C. (1996) Tom Halves: Political Conflict in Literary and Cultural 
Theory. (Manchester: Manchester University Press), and Young, R. J. C. (1990) White Mythologies: 
Writing History and the West. (London: Routledge). This term is explained and examined further in 
Chapter 6. 
177 See: Thompson, E. P. (1978) [1965] 'The Peculiarities of the English, The Poverty of Theory, 
? p. 35-91. Previously published in The Socialist Register, 1965. 8 8 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 16. On this debate, see also: Nairn, T. (1988) The Enchanted 
Glass. (London: Hutchison Radius). pp. 378-81; Anderson, P. (1987) 'The Figures of Descent', New 
Left Review, No. 161, January-February, pp. 20-21, and Anderson, P. (1992) English Questions. 
Foreword. (London: Verso). 
179 See: Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 16, and Meiskins-Wood, E. (1991) The Pristine Culture of 
Capitalism. (London: Verso). Similarly, Colin Mooers describes anormative theory of bourgeois 
Revolution'. See: Mooers, C. (1991) The Making of Bourgeois Europe. (London: Verso). 
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5, it could reinforce the discursive construction of the limits of the British identity 
against a Continental European 'constitutive outside'. 
The problem that the universal/particular dyad poses for the analysis of 
international relations is addressed in Part /// of this thesis. However, the specific 
focus of Part // is the British obstruction to political integration. With regard to this 
focus, as well as to considerations of space, the particularities of other member 
states are recognised but not examined. Thus, without comparing this part with 
research upon the other member states, it must be accepted that the reader will 
inevitably gain an 'unbalanced' conception of European political relations. 
However, similar to previous accounts of British-European relations, this thesis 
argues that Britain has been a relatively awkward partner of Europe, and it is 
precisely this observation that prompted this research in the first place. 
In sum, Part // does not imply that other states, such as Denmark, have not been 
awkward, but rather, that such observations are outside the confines of this 
research project. As such, they demonstrate the need for further research in order 
to produce a comparative analysis that can provide a more balanced picture of 
180 European political relations. Therefore, similar to George et al ., this thesis 
argues that such problems of ethnocentricity can be avoided by developing a 
comparative approach. 
It is also acknowledged that Continental European member states to do not have 
identical political and governmental discourses. For instance, similar to the British 
tradition of responsible and centralized government, French central government 
180 See, for example: George, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p 207. This particular reason for a comparative 
approach is also emphazised by: Dogan, M. and D. Pelsay (1984) 'Comparing to Escape from 
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'dirigism' indicates a principle of government as custodian of the Rousseauesque 
'General Will'. Thus, both Britain and France contrast with the federal system of 
Germany in which the influence of the Lander indicates a more responsive and 
decentralized notion of government. (However, in contrast to Britain, France is 
similar to Germany in that even what we might think of as 'colonial territories' were 
represented within the French parliament, and certainly the idea of 'Deputies' 
implies a more popular and responsive notions of representation. ) 
Despite such differences, and with the exception of Denmark, Continental 
European member states are equivalent in the sense that they all have expressed 
a desire for European political integration and Britain has not, whether their 
systems of government are federal (for example, Germany), decentralized (for 
example, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain), or centralized (for example, 
France). Indeed, although other members have parliamentary traditions as well as 
strong nationalist identities, and despite the many disagreements between them 
on specific European policies, the important point is that they still have been 
willing to 'surrender' these principles to the higher common good expressed by'an 
ever closer union', or have not perceived such a unity as a significant threat to 
them. (It also instructive that it was the Continental European states of Belgium, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
that inaugurated the supranational project of European integration in the first 
place 
181 
, bolstered by the anti-fascist Continental European resistance 
Ethnocentrism', in How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics. (Chatham, New 
Jersey: Chatham House), pp. 5-12. 
181 On this Continental European vision of a European political community, see also: Tassin, E. 
(1 992)'Europe: A Political CommunityT, in C. Mouffe (ed. ) Dimensions of Radical Democracy: 
Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. (London: Verso). pp. 169-192. 
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movements. 
182 
Indeed, it is this difference between Britain and Continental 
Europe that is of great interest to this thesis. 
In sum, in contrast to Britain, these Continental European member states are 
equivalent in that they are republican and participatory democracies, and thus, 
they uphold an equivalent primary concern for the defence of popular rather than 
parliamentary sovereignty. As examined further in Chapter 4, in contrast to Britain, 
and reflecting their equivalent republican notions of citizenship and civil rights, the 
role of government in these Continental European member states is to defend and 
respond to the national interest as determined by the majority of their citizens. It is 
this democratic equivalence between Continental European member states that is 
signified by such terms as 'Continental European political and governmental 
discourse' in this thesis. 
182 For example, representatives from nine European countries, excluding Britain, formulated the 
Declaration of European Resistance Movements in July 1994. See: Ibid. p. 182. 
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Chapter 3 
A Discourse-Theoretical Approach to 
Political Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe to be applied within this thesis. This approach combines post- 
structuralism and post-Marxism' with Lacanian Subject theory. 2 With regard to the 
theory of the Subject in particular, the political philosophy of Slavoj 2i2ek has had 
a significant impact upon the development of discourse theory. 3 2i2ek combines 
Lacanian psychoanalytical theory with an anti-essentialist interpretation of Hegel 
and other classical philosophers to develop a contemporary critique of ideology. 4 
He also draws upon some recent trends in critical philosophy. 5 However, the 
significance of the work of 2i2ek extends far beyond its affinity with discourse 
theory. Indeed, an application of the psychoanalytical insights of 2i2ek to the 
hypotheses of this research project would require another thesis. Hence, the work 
1 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1 987)'Post-Marxism Without Apologies', New Left Review, 
Volume 166, pp. 79-106. 2 See: Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Revolutions of Our Time. (London, New York: 
Verso). pp. 5-41,93-96. 
3 See: Ibid. p. xvi. For further study of the work of ? _i2ek, see 
for example: ? _i2ek, 
S. (1989) The 
Sublime Object of Ideology. (London: Verso); 2i2ek, S. (1 990a) 'Beyond Discourse Analysis', in E. 
Laclau (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 249-260; 2i2ek, S. (1990b) 'East 
- 
European's Republic of Gilead'. New 
Left Review. Volume 183, September-October, pp. 50-62, Zi2ek, S. (1994) Mapping /deo/ogK. 
(London: Verso). See also: Butler, J., E. Laclau and S. 2i2ek (2000) Op. Cit.; Kay, S. (2003) Zi2ek: 
A Critical Introduction. (Cambridge: Polity Press); Smith, A. M. (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The 
Radical Democratic Imaginary. (London, New York: Routledge). pp. 88,74-83; Torfing, J. (1999) 
New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and 2ifek. (Oxford, Massachusetts: Blackwell), and 
Wright, E. and E. Wright (eds) (1999) The 2i2ek Reader. (Oxford: Blackwell). 4 See, for example: ? _i2ek, 
S. (1989) Op. Cit., 2i2ek, S. (1994) Op. Cit. 
5 Especially the 'anti-descriptivism'of Saul Kripke, as examined below in Sections 2.3-4. 
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of ZiZ'ek will only be invoked when it directly contributes to the development of a 
discourse-theoretical approach to this specific application. 
It is apparent that the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe emerged from the 
fragmentation of various fields of analysis. The structuralist paradigm - that 
incorporates much of the literature upon British-European (political) integration - 
was problernatized by the post-structuralist critique of the notion of closed and 
centred structures. Indeed, the growing emphasis on the 'play of meaning' within 
'decentred' structures led directly to Laclau and Mouffe's concept of 'discourse'. 
Within the Marxist tradition, orthodox notions of structure and structural 
determination, combined with the crisis of its Leninist legacy, encouraged interest 
in the open and flexible Marxism of Antonio Gramsci. The consequent 
development and radicalization of elements of Gramscian theory contributed to 
the formation of 'post-marxism ,. 
Post-structuralism and post-Marxism have both tended to focus upon the question 
of the construction of political and social identity. Here, the rejection of the 
possibility of a fully constituted and self-enclosed Subject led to the adoption of 
fundamental psychoanalytical insights from Lacan, emphasising the multi-layered 
7 
and fragmented character of the Subject at the level of symbolic signification . At 
this juncture 2i2ek's reading of Lacan played a significant part in the development 
of a coherent and instructive theory of discourse. Thus, as this chapter aims to 
demonstrate, the combination of post-structuralism, post-marxism and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis should not be considered as strange or accidental: clear lines of 
affinity exist between them in theoretical viewpoints and analytical foci. 
6 See, for example: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. - Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. (London: Verso), Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1987) Op. Cit. 
7 See, for example: Laclau, E. (1987) 'Psychoanalysis and Marxism', Critical Enquiry, Winter, pp. 
330-3. 
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1.0. What is discourse 
The 'discourse theory' applied by this thesis is a context-dependent, historical and 
non-objective framework for analysing discourses (or discursive formations). 8 
Here, 'discourses' constitute symbolic systems and social orders, and the aim of 
discourse theory is to examine their historical and political construction. 
Such basic definitions from the outset are particularly important because of the 
common misconceptions regarding these terms. 9 As Jonathon Potter observes, 'it 
is perfectly possible to have two books on discourse analysis which have no 
overlap in content at allf. 10 Indeed, in accordance to the arguments of the 
discourse theory of Laclau, Mouffe, and 2i2ek, the signifier (sound-image or 
expression) 'discourse theory' can assume a variety of different and competing 
signifieds (concepts or contents). For example, JOrgen Habermas" uses this 
signifier to describe his own project, reflecting a position opposed to that of Laclau 
et al. Indeed, the discourse theory of Laclau et al provides a critical response to 
the Habermasian attempt to ground liberal democracy, modern emancipation and 
8 Torfing, J. (11999) Op. Cit. p. 12. On this specific definition of 'discourse theory', see for example: 
Howarth, D. (11995) 'Discourse Theory', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theory and Methods in 
Political Science. (London: Macmillan). pp. 115-33; Howarth, D. (2000) Discourse. (Buckingham, 
Philadelphia: Open University Press) pp. 4-5,101-25; Laclau, E. (1993a) 'Discourse', in R. E. 
Gooding and P. Pettit (eds) The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy. 
(Oxford: Blackwell). pp. 431-7, and Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 11 -12,54-77. Here, 'discursive 
formations' are the articulation of various discourses into a relatively unified whole. For example, 
liberal democracy is a discursive formation because it consists of a various different discourses that 
have been articulated in and through hegemonic practices. (Ibid. p. 300). 
9 Due to concerns for space and focus, a detailed discussion of the many different discourse 
theories and definitions of discourse cannot be developed here. See for example: Howarth, D. 
(2000) Op. Cit. pp. 1-14; Laclau, E. (1993a) Op. Cit. pp. 431-5, Meinhoff, U. (1993) 'Discourse', in 
W. Outhwaite (ed. ) The Blackwell Dictionary of Modem Social Thought. (Oxford, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell). pp. 164-6; Potter, J. (1996) 'Discourse Analysis', in A. Kuper and J. Kuper (eds) The 
Social Science Encyclopedia. (London, New York: Routledge). pp. 188-9, and Torfing, J. (1999) 
Op. Cit. pp. 2-4. 10 Potter, J. (1996) Op. Cit. p. 188. 
11 See, for example: Habermas, J- (1984-1987) The Theory of Communicative Action: Vols 14/. 
(Cambridge: Polity Press), Habermas, J. (11990) [1985] The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity., 
Twelve Lectures. (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
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the reconciling power of reason in the ideal of unconstrained communication. 12 
The essay by Peter Preston, examined in Chapter 2, pursues this opposing 
Habermasian position. 13 He argues that the Habermasian model of an open and 
unconstrained democratic 'discourse-politics' is possible, but that it has been 
closed to British 'public discourse' because it has been blocked by New Right 
ideology14 as well as by British governmental discourse upon societal decision- 
making. 
15 
However, an alternative signifier, 'discourse analysis', is also problematic, being 
commonly applied to the linguistic techniques utilized in descriptions of the 
different discursive forms used in communication. For example, the account by 
Peter Anderson and Tony Weymouth that examines 'media discourse' adopts the 
16 linguistic techniques of the 'critical discourse analysis' of Norman Fairclough . 
Although the work of Laclau and Mouffe, may encourage such techniques in 
empirical studies, it is important to emphasize the distinction between such formal 
linguistic studies and the theoretical propositions of their work. 17 
Confronted with this complication, the different status of the theoretical 
propositions of Laclau and Mouffe can be determined which also make this 
12 As 2i2ek argues, the problem with Habermas is that he claims that reason, ethics and democracy 
can be grounded in an ideal speech-act situation. As a consequence, he resorts to an ideological 
masking of the ultimate failure of the social to constitute an al I-encom passing space of 
representation. (See: 2iz'-ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 1-7; 2i2ek, S. (1990a) p. 259. ) In contrast, Laclau 
and Mouffe propose that the social is structured by an unrepresentable kernel of negativity, and as 
a consequence, it fails to provide an ultimate grounding for the forms of reason, ethics and 
democracy associated with modernity. Hence, rather than giving way to irrationality, nihilism and 
totalitarianism, Laclau and Mouffe believe that the openness of the social is the very condition for 
formulating democracy based upon contingent forms of reason and ethics hitherto restrained by the 
rationalist 'dictatorship' of the Enlightenment. (Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 3-4. ) 13 See: Preston, P. W. (1994) Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain: Essay on the 
Issue of Europe in UK Public Discourse. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). pp. 29-30,58,205. 14 See, for example: Ibid. p. 205. 15 See, for example. Ibid. p. 58. 16 Anderson, P. J. and T. Weymouth (1999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and the 
European Union. (London, New York: Longman) On the critical discourse analysis of Norman 
Fairclough, see: Fairclough, N- (1995) Media Discourse. (London: Edward Arnold), Fairclough, N. 
(1997) Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language. (Reading, Massachusetts: 
Addison-Wesley). 
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research project different to those described in Chapter I and Chapter 2. As 
Torfing explains, the discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe is neither a theory in 
the strict sense of a more or less formal set of deductively derived and empirically 
testable hypotheses, nor a method in the strict sense of an instrument for 
representing a given field from a point outside it. 
18 However, this does not mean 
that it is devoid of theoretical categories or rigorous techniques. Rather, it means 
that its theoretical propositions are substantively empty in that they are not 
organized around a set of substantiated claims. In accordance with the 
propositions of Jacques Derrida, it means that we should conceive of ourselves as 
'bricoleurs' in the sense that we are willing to use existing analytical tools, and 
prepared to store them for the future if their'truth value' is seriously questioned. 19 
Hence, as indicated above and applied by this thesis, the theoretical propositions 
of Laclau and Mouffe constitute a 'theoretical analytic' in the Foucaultian sense of 
a context-dependent, historical and non-objective framework for analysing 
discourses. 20 First, they are 'context-dependent' because they are grafted onto 
other discursive surfaces in terms of theoretical debates in Britain, Europe and the 
United States. Second, they are 'historical' in the sense that they recognise the 
I unmasterable temporality' of the history of which they are set. Finally, they are 
'non-objective' because they do not pursue the discovery of a universal truth. 
Rather, they aim to expose strictly local truths by questioning the totalizing 
ideological horizons that deny the 'contingen CY, 21 of the criteria for truth and 
17 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 12. 18 Torfing, J. (199 1) 'A Hegemony Approach to Capitalist Regulation', in R. Bertramsen, J. 
Thomsen and J. Torfing (eds) State, Economy and Society. (London: Unwin Hyman), pp. 35-93. 19 Derrida, J. (1978) [1967] Writing and Difference. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). p. 285. 20 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 12. See also: Dreyfus, H. L. and P. Rainbow (1986) [1982] Michel 
Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. (Brighton: Harvester). p. 184. 21 The concept of 'contingency' describes the impossibility of making an object intelligible through 
the determination of its causes, as well as the notion of 'incompletion' - that is, as if through an 
accidental event there was a failure to constitute a full identity. Thus, with regard to identity, a social 
identity is contingent in so far as its conditions of possibility are also its conditions of 'finitude'. 
(Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 299. ) To elucidate, a being or object is contingent in the sense that its 
essence does not involve its existence. Hence, as social antagonism is constitutive of social 
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fal Sity. 221t is such a 'discourse-theoretical analytics' in the Foucaultian sense that 
is signified by the signifier, 'discourse theory' in this research. 
Similar to term 'discourse theory', it is also important to attend to some common 
misconceptions regarding 'postmodernism,. 23 Preston is sceptical of alternative 
'postmodern approaches'to the British relationship with Europe: 
... postmodernists rest content with the gestural non-discourse of non- 
progress ... 
(and) much of the material of postmodernism is expressive 
of the disheartened intellectuals over the 1980s period of New Right 
political-institutional dominance. Notwithstanding that many of the 
particular ideas advanced are thoroughly interesting, the material 
overall is nonsense. In particular the analyses they would offer in 
24 respect of the contemporary British polity are deeply implausible . 
Moreover, the term 'postmodernism' is something of a misnomer. 25 Those against 
it have been irritated by the way that it has slipped into every imaginable 
theoretical discussion 26 , and even supporters of the idea have voiced reservations 
27 
about the way that it has been used . As David Howarth explains, these doubts 
are a consequence of the misleading connotations that postmodernism has 
engendered: 
For some, it is seen as a complete break with modern ideas such as 
'autonomy', 'freedom' and 'reason' that emerged during the European 
Enlightenment. For others, it represents a historical period that comes 
after modernity. Still others equate post-modernism with the end of 
epistemology - the theory of knowledge - and thus a relativistic nihilism 
that rejects all knowled_qe claims and renders political and ethical 
commitments redundant. 2" 
identity, as there is always a 'constitutive outside'that is both the condition of possibility and the 
condition of impossibility of any identity, there is a certain 'accidentalness' that is constitutive of 
identity. See: Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 18-19, Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 51-2. 22 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 12. 23 For a broader discussion of the concept of 'postmodernity', see: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 59- 
61. 
24 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 206. 25 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 116. 26 Callinicos, A. (1989) Against Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique. (Polity Press: Cambridge). p. 1. 27 Rorty, R. (1991) Essays on Heideggar and Others. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). p. 
1. 
28 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 119. 
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Moreover, there is a tendency among those broadly unsympathetic to theories 
which attempt to assess the consequences of postmodernity to dismiss 
poststructuralist, post-marxist and psychoanalytical theories of discourse as mere 
theoretical sophistry, having no relevance to the analysis of concrete phenomena. 
However, this research project aims to demonstrate that discourse theory can 
provide a new and productive framework for analysing concrete phenomena, 
events and developments. 
1.1. Discourse theory and political analysis 
The work of Laclau and Mouffe does not attempt 'system-building', but rather, 
they develop their theoretical propositions in and through interventions in specific 
political and theoretical debates. Hence, they provide a guide to 'postmodern 
29 theorizing' rather than an all-purpose instrumentalism for social analysis . 
Nevertheless, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, the advancement of a new type 
of 'postmodern theorizing' is of great relevance to political research. For instance, 
discourse theory addresses the fundamental problem of political research that 
relates to the epistemological underpinnings of social science in general. 
Traditionally, most political research implicitly operated within a positivist position, 
emphasizing that through systematic observation, and the generation and testing 
of hypotheses, it was possible to establish results that were consistent and 
generalisable across time and space. This was particularly the case for 
quantitative research given that this approach was strongly associated with the 
behaviourist position, itself inherently positivistic. 
However, the positivist position has become increasingly questioned. As will be 
explained below, political scientists taking discourse-theoretical positions have 
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argued that our understanding of the world is discursively constructed. Hence, 
political concepts and phenomena are discursive constructions, and thus, they 
can have different meanings in different discourses. For example, previous 
analyses of British-European integration ignore that member states have different 
political discourses, and thus, different understandings of democracy and 
economic development. As this thesis proposes, such differences are pivotal to 
the explanation of Britain's reputation as an awkward partner of Europe. 
A discourse-theoretical approach is also appropriate for this research project 
because it focuses upon the question of the construction of identity. It can help us 
understand the tension between the British national identity and the possibility of 
constructing a new supranational European identity. In sum, as examined below, 
a discourse-theoretical approach can elucidate how identities are disrupted by 
dislocation, rearticulated in and through hegemonic struggles, harnessed through 
the construction of social antagonisms, and 'naturalized' by their claim to 
universality. 
The key analytical and conceptual tools of a discourse-theoretical approach to 
political research are its three inter-related and mutually conditioned concepts of 
'discourse', 'hegemony' and 'social antagonism'. Thus, these concepts as well as 
their implications for this particular research focus, will now be examined. 
2.0. The concept of discourse 
Within discourse theory, the concept of 'discourse' tends to substitute for the more 
traditional concept of 'structure'. Similar to structure, discourse has an explanatory 
role since it is assumed that social interaction can only be explained in relation to 
29 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 13.105 
its discursive context. However, discourse does not possess the same 
determining power as the concept of 'structure' because it rejects the idea of an 
'organizing centre' that arrests and grounds the play of meaning. In this sense, 
discourse informs rather than guides social interaction. Discourse also differs from 
structure in the way that it affects social interaction. As Torfing explains, it 
influences the cognitive scripts, categories and rationalities that are indispensable 
for social action, whereas structure merely operates through prescriptive norms of 
conduct and specific resource allocations - both of which are discursively 
30 
constructed . 
Congruent to classical transcendentalism, discourse theory assumes that the very 
possibility of perception, thought and action depends upon the structuration of a 
certain meaningful field that pre-exists any factual immediaCy. 31 However, in 
contrast to classical transcendentalism, discourse theory assumes the 'historicity' 
and 'variability' of discourse. That is, transcendental conditions are not purely 
transcendental, but continuously changed by empirical events. In addition, while 
the idealist conception of the Subject as the creator of the world is maintained 
within classical transcendentalism, discourse theory utilizes the notion of structure 
upheld by Saussurean 
32 
and post-Saussurean lingu iStiCS. 
33 The fundamental 
claim of discourse theory can now be stated: cognitions and speech-acts only 
become meaningful within certain pre-established discourses, which have 
34 different structurations that change over time . 
30 Ibid. p. 82. 31 Laclau, E. (1 993a) Op. Cit. p. 431. 32 See: Saussure, F. (1981) [1959] Course in General Linguistics. (Suffolk: Fontana). 
33 Laclau, E. (1 993a) Op. Cit. p. 431. For further discussion of Saussurean and post-Saussurean 
linguistics, see: Culler, J. (1986) Ferdinand de Saussure. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University 
Press); Culler, J. (1988) Framing the Sign: Criticism and its Institutions. (Norman, Oklahoma: 
University of Oklahoma Press); Howarth, D. (2000) Op. Cit. pp. 16-47; Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. 
pp. 120-1; Laclau, E. (1988) 'Metaphor and Social Antagonisms, in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg 
(eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education). p. 249-57; 
Laclau, E. (1993a) Op. Cit. pp. 431-5; Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 84-103, and Torfing, J. 
Q999) Op. Cit. pp. 87-99. 4 Torfing, J. (1999) Ibid. pp. 84-5. 
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2.1. Discourse and dislocation 
A discourse-theoretical approach rejects the orthodox Marxist belief in the 
possibility of structural determinism. That is, the concept of discourse (or 
discursive structure) replaces the notion of structure that was conceived as a fully 
constituted and objective whole with calculable and predictable effects. As this 
thesis emphasizes, it is such a concept of structure that undermines the functional 
accounts of international relations, as well the structural accounts of British- 
European integration as developed by Preston. 
The whole idea of structural determinism is problematized by the discourse- 
theoretical concept of dislocation. 'Dislocation' refers to the disruption of a 
discourse by events that it cannot domesticate, symbolize or integrate. 35 It is such 
dislocation that deprives structure of its determining capacity. In contrast to the 
Althusserian conception 36 , dislocation is a permanent phenomenon 
in the sense 
that there is always something that resists symbolization and domestication, and 
thereby reveals the limits, incapacity and contingency of a discourse. Hence, 
dislocation continuously prevents the full structuration of the structure. Dislocation 
is the traumatic event of chaos, crisis, and disorder that ensures the 
incompleteness and lack of objectivity of the structure. That is, dislocation is the 
concept of the impossibility of structural determinism. As such, it is the very form 
37 
of temporality, possibility and freedom . 
35 Ibid. p. 301. 36 See, for example: Althusser, L. (1971) [1969] 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses', in: L. 
Althusser (ed. ) Lenin and Philosophy. (New York: Monthly Review Press), pp. 158-83. 37 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 41-3. 
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2.2. The analysis of concrete discourses 
There are three focal points that are crucial to the analysis of concrete discourses: 
the relations of 'difference' and 'equivalence 38; the workings of different kinds of 
'overdetermi nation 
39 
, and the unifying effects of 'nodal 
pointS, 
40. 
2.2.1. The relations of difference and equivalence 
In their theory of equivalence and difference, Laclau and Mouffe claim that the 
rule of the logic of difference is limited by the absence of a fixed centre, which 
renders complete totalization, and thus, closure, impossible. The partial fixation of 
meaning within discourse produces an irreducible 'surplus of meaning' which 
escapes the differential logic of the discourse in question. The expansion of the 
'logic of difference' is prevented by the lack of a deep foundation in a fixed centre 
capable of revealing the full essence of all identities. However, it is also prevented 
by the presence of an alternative 'logic of equivalence' which collapses the 
differential character of social identity by means of expanding a signifying 'chain of 
equivalencel. 
Ferdinand de Saussure had previously distinguished between 'syntagmatic' and 
'associative' (or paradigmatic') relations: a syntagmatic relationship between 
linguistic units is established by the linear combination of linguistic units into 
sentences. An associative or paradigmatic relationship is established by the 
substitution of one word in the sentence for another word with the same meaning 
or function. Hence, as illustrated in Figure I below, for the British hegemonic 
discourse of neo-liberalism, the following line of words, 'Britain is under threat 
38 See: Laclau. E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 127-134. 39 See: Ibid. pp. 97-105. 
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from European integration', is an example of a syntagmatic combination of words. 
However, the substitution of 'European integration' for 'bureaucracy', 'collectivism', 
'corporatism', 'federalism', 'national isation', 'protectionism', 'regulation', 'socialism' 7 
'statism', 'trade unionism', and so forth, is an example of a paradigmatic 
relationship between different words that share an 'identical something' or 
sameness in the sense that they are all considered to represent 'social 
democracy'. That is, they can be substituted for one another because they have 
the same meaning or function within the British hegemonic discourse of neo- 
liberalism. Hence, difference exists in the diachronic succession of the 
syntagmatic pole and equivalence exists at the paradigmatic pole. 41 
syntagmatic pole 'Britain is under threat from European integration 
(difference) 
bureaucracy 
collectivism 
corporatism 
federalism 
nationalisation 
protectionism 
regulation 
socialism 
statism 
trade unionism 
paradigmatic pole 
(equivalence) 
Figure 1: The syntagmatic and paradigmatic relations of words 
Here, there is no simple identity between the equivalential identities because they 
42 
are only the same in one respect while being different in others . Hence, the 
, 43 relation between equivalence and difference is 'undecidable . The discursive 
40 See: Ibid. pp. 112-3. 41 Laclau E. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 256. 42 Laclau: E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 128. 43 In accordance with the Derridean notion of deconstruction, Laclau and Mouffe expose the 
'undecidable' terrain of non-totalization that the decidable inscription of discursive forms must 
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identities are inscribed both in signifying chains that emphasize their differential 
44 
value, and in signifying chains that emphasize their equivalence . There exists an 
unresolvable tension between the differential and equivalential aspects of 
discursive identities, although political struggles can succeed in emphasizing one 
of the two aspects. Here, emphasis upon the equivalential aspect simplifies the 
social and political space by delimiting the play of difference. The collapse of 
difference into equivalence will produce a loss of meaning because meaning is 
intrinsically linked to the differential character of identity. As demonstrated below 
with regard to social antagonism, and Chapter 5 upon 'Europe, the Other', the 
result is that the expansion of chains of equivalence is always related to the 
construction of a 'constitutive outside'. 
2.2.2. The workings of different kinds of overdeterm i nation 
The workings of different kinds of 'overdetermination' are related to the distinction 
between relations of difference and equivalence. The concept of 
overd eterm i nation originates from psychoanalysis and The Interpretation of 
Dreams by Sigmund Freud . 
45 In political situations, identity is always 
presuppose. 'Undecidability' is the name for the unresolvable dilemmas that occur under 
determinate circumstances. However, it refers not only to the fundamental aporias within discourse, 
but also to the call for a constitutive decision that articulates social meaning in one way rather than 
another. (Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 307. ) Laclau and Mouffe's reading of Derrida and the 
postmodern condition also leads them to insist upon the 'the structural undecidability of the social'. 
That is, the ground of social meaning and action is destabilized, divided and disorganized to the 
extent that it takes the form of 'an abyss of infinite play', which turns all attempts to ground social 
identity into provisional and precarious ways of trying to 'naturalize' or'objectivize' politically 
constructed identities. (Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 62. ) See: Derrida, J. (1988) [1977] Limited Inc. 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press). pp. 21,116,141-50, Derrida, J. (1992) 'Force of Law: 
The Mystical Foundation of Authority', in D. Cornell, M. Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (eds) 
Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. (London: Routledge), pp. 3-67; Laclau, E. (11990) Op. 
Cit. pp. 28-30,171-4, and Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 62-9. The Derridean notion of 
'deconstruction' describes the destabilization of essential identities which derives from the premise 
that the attempt to determine the essence of things always fails because of ambiguities and 
undecidables that resist ultimate fixation. (Torfing, J. (1999) Ibid. p. 300). See: Derrida, J. (1988) 
ý1977] Op. Cit. p. 21,116,141-50, and Derrida, J. (1992) Op. Cit. 4 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 97. 45 Freud, S. (11986) [1900] The Interpretation of Dreams. (Harmondsworth: Penguin). See also: 
Laplanche, J. and J. B. Pontalis (1973) The Language of Psycho-analysis. (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co. ) 
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overdetermined in the psychological sense. Overdetermination entails not only a 
plurality, but also a certain degree of 'irreducibility'. For example, a dream is the 
product of 'condensation' whereby various different unconscious elements are 
merged to produce a single manifest sequence. 
In sum, overdetermi nation occurs at the symbolic level and takes the form of 
either 'condensation' or 'displacement'. 'Condensation' involves the fusion of a 
variety of significations and meanings into the unity. For example, the process of 
European integration condenses a variety of demands into a single unity, 'the 
European Union'. 'Displacement' involves the transferral of the signification of 
meaning of one particular moment to another moment. For example, this thesis 
argues that the hegemonic project of Thatcherism transferred the signification of 
social democracy to the project of European integration. That is, this project 
became a symbol of the threat posed by social democracy to the British national 
identity. 
For Lacanian psychoanalysis, condensation occurs when a particular moment 
receives and concentrates other meanings, and displacement occurs when a 
46 
relation of contiguity is constructed . Thus, condensation is equivalent to 
metaphor and displacement is equivalent to metonymy. It is here that an important 
connection can be made to the distinction between difference and equivalence: 
relations of difference have neither metaphor nor metonymy. However 
metonymical relations of contiguity are produced by the equivalential disruption of 
relations of difference, and metaphors are constructed by the full realization of the 
47 
paradigmatic sameness of contiguous elements . 
46 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 98. 47 Ibid. 
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2.2.3. The unifying effects of nodal points 
Crucial to the theory of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe explain how the identity of a 
discourse is created and sustained beyond all possible variations of its positive 
content. They claim that a multitude of 'floating signifiers' is structured into a 
unified discursive field through the intervention of a certain 'nodal point' which 
48 
stops their sliding and fixes their meaning . Here, a 'floating signifier' is a signifier 
that is overdetermined or underdetermined with meaning because it is articulated 
differently within different discourses . 
49That is, it is a signifier that has an excess 
or deficiency of signification because it is simultaneously attached to different 
signifieds. Thus, it is an ambiguous signifier in the sense that this 
overd eterm i nation or u nderd eterm i nation of signifieds prevents it from becoming 
50 1 fully fixed 
.. As Chapter 4 of this thesis illustrates, 'subsidiarity' and 'federalism 
are floating signifiers because they are overflowed with meaning as they are 
articulated differently within the different discourses of the member states of the 
EU. 
For Laclau and Mouffe, any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate 
the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre, by 
expanding signifying chains which partially fix the meaning of the floating signifier. 
The concept of 'nodal points' here becomes significant. 'Nodal points' are the 
privileged discursive points that partially fix meaning within signifying chains. 
Lacan insisted on these partial fixations through his concept of 'points de capiton' 
(literally: 'quilting points'), that is, of privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a 
48 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 112; 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 87. 49 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 301. 50 Laclau, E. (1 994b) 'Why do Empty Signifiers Matter to PoliticsT, in J. Weeks (ed. ) The Lesser 
Evil and the Greater Good. (London: Rivers Oram Press). p. 167. 
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signifying chain . 
51 This limitation of the productivity of the signifying chain 
establishes the positions that make predication possible. 
The nodal point creates and sustains identity of a given discourse by constructing 
a knot of definite meanings. This does not imply that it is simply the word in which 
is condensed all the richness of meaning of the field it 'quilts'. Rather, it is the 
word that, as a word, on the level of the signifier itself, unifies a given field, 
constitutes its identity. 
52 It is an 'empty signifier 
53 
,a pure signifier without a 
signified, that can fix the content of a range of floating signifiers by articulating 
54 1 them within a chain of equivalence . As such, nodal points such as 'God and 
'nation' are not characterized by a supreme density of meaning, but by an 
emptying of their content, which facilitates their structural role of unifying a 
discursive terrain. 
To elucidate, a variety of signifiers may be floating within the field of discursivity 
(because their traditional meaning has been lost or their signification has not yet 
been fixed), then a certain 'master-signifier' intervenes as a nodal point and 
constitutes their identity by fixing them within a paradigmatic chain of equivalence. 
Hence, this nodal point fixes the meaning of the chain, sews the meaning to the 
51 aclau, E. and C. Mouffe (11985) Op. Cit. p. 112. 52 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 95. 53 An empty signifier is a signifier emptied of any precise content, that is, it is a signifier without a 
signified. (Laclau, E. (1 994b) Op. Cit. p. 167. ) It is not attached to any signified because of the 
incessant sliding of the signifieds under the signifier. For example, 'democracy' is an empty signifier 
because it is so over-coded that it means everything and nothing. (Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 
301 .) As this chapter explains, empty signifiers can be nodal points that fix the content of floating signifiers by articulating them within a chain of equivalence. Hence, relevant to the construction of a 
European political community, as examined in Chapter 6-7, different empty signifiers (such as 
I citizenship''the common good', 'democracy', 'liberty', 'peace, 'freedom', 'the nation', 'the people', 
'revolution', etc) can signify the absence of a community of fully achieved identities. Why one 
signifier rather than another assumes the function of signifying this absent communitarian fullness 
is determined in and through political struggles for hegemony. For further explanation of 'empty 
signifiers', see: Laclau, E. (1994b) Op. Cit. pp. 167-171, Laclau, E. (1993b)'The Signifiers of 
Democracy', in J. H. Carens (ed) Democracy and Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy 
of C. B. Macpherson. (New York: State University of New York Press) pp. 221-33. 
'542i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 97. 
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floating signifiers, halts the sliding of the meaning. 55 For example, when we 'quilt' 
floating signifiers (such as 'democracy', 'freedom', 'liberty', 'the state', 'justice', 
'peace', etc) through the nodal point 'neo-liberall, it determines a neo-liberal chain 
56 
of meaning . Thus, for example, 'the state' becomes a means by which individual 
'liberty' and 'freedom' are curtailed. As this thesis argues, in Britain, such a neo- 
liberal quilting has produced an articulation of meaning that conflicts with the 
meaning produced by the nodal point 'liberal democracy' in Continental Europe. 
As a consequence, Britain is perceived as an awkward partnership by the rest of 
Europe. 
Indeed, as this thesis aims to demonstrate, the discourse-theoretical conception 
of the nodal point is instructive to our understanding of contemporary British- 
European relations. For example, in Europe, there exists an ideological struggle 
over which 'nodal point' will totalize, include in its series of equivalences, the free- 
floating elements of a new supranational European discourse. For example, there 
is an ideological battle between British 'liberal-individualism' and Continental 
European 'liberal democracy' over the meaning of 'freedom'. British liberal- 
individualism argues that republican and social democracy, believed to be 
embodied in the political and social initiatives for European integration, 
necessarily leads to new forms of serfdom, to the dependency of the individual 
upon a supranational totalitarian Isuper-statel. In contrast, proponents of 
Continental European liberal democracy argue that individual freedom, to have 
any meaning at all, must be based upon civil rights, democratic social life, 
economic equal opportunity, and so forth (all requiring a state guarantor). 
55 Ibid. pp. 101-2. 56 Ibid. pp. 87-8,102. 
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2.3. Beyond descriptivism and antidescriptivism: the radical contingency of 
naming 
In all, the nodal point is the point through which the Subject is sewn to the 
57 
signifier. It is the point of subjectivation of the signifying chain . This concept of 
'nodal points' is important because it helps us understand how discursively 
constructed forms relate to the external world of objects. This is a crucial question 
for this thesis, particularly because post-structuralism has been accused of 
presupposing the external existence of objects whose meaning is discursively 
constructed, and thus, of failing to provide an account of the role played by these 
objects in the process of signification. 58 To answer this question, Zi±ek looks to 
the anticlescriptivism of Saul Kripke . 
59 As 2i2ek illustrates below, the Kripkean 
theory of the 'rigid designator' helps explain the Lacanian concept of the point de 
capiton as a pure signifier that simultaneously designates and constitutes the 
identity of an object beyond the variable cluster of its descriptive properties. 
However, his Lacanian psychoanalytical approach takes him beyond both 
60 descriptivism and antidescriptivism . 
ZiZ'ek begins this discussion by suggesting that we can call the basic experience 
upon which antidescriptivism is founded, 'Invasion of the Body Snatchers', after 
the science-fiction film in which an invasion of aliens assume human form . 
61 The 
fact that these aliens look like humans, and have all the same properties, makes 
them all the more strange. ? -i2ek argues that this problem is the same as anti- 
Semitism: 'the Other' - the Jews - are 'like us'; it is difficult to recognize them, to 
determine at the level of positive reality, that 'surplus', that evasive feature, which 
57 bid. p. 101. 58 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 48. 59 Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 60 See: 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 87-129. 
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differentiates them from us. This problem is also the same as British 
Euroscepticism: 'the Other' - the Europeans - are 'like us'; it is difficult to 
determine that surplus which differentiates them from us. 
There is a crucial theoretical debate between descri PtiViSM62 and 
antidescriptivi SM63 regarding how names refer to the objects that they denote. For 
example, why does the word 'table' refer to a table? 64 The descriptivist account of 
the relation between the object and its discursively constructed form emphasizes 
the meaning of the words we use to refer to the external world of objects. A word 
(or signifier) is the bearer of a particular meaning (or signified), which is defined by 
a cluster of descriptive features ('table' means an object of a certain shape, 
serving particular purposes). Subsequently, a word refers to an object in reality in 
so far it possess properties designated by the cluster of descriptions ('table' 
means a table because a table has properties comprised in the meaning of the 
65 
signifier, 'table') . 
In contrast, for antidescriptivism, a word is connected to an Object through an act 
of 'primal baptism' that establishes a connection between an object and its name. 
This link is maintained even if the descriptive features that initially determined the 
66 
meaning of the word change . 
For example, we will continue to call what we 
identify as gold by that name even if it is discovered that we have been mistaken 
in our description of gold. Similarly, significant to this thesis, we will continue to 
call what we identify as democracy by that name even if it is discovered that we 
have been mistaken in our description of democracy. Indeed, democracy was 
61 Ibid. p. 89. 62 For example, Searle, J. (1984) Intentionality. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 63 For example: Kripke, S. (11980) Op. Cit. 64 - 
65 
Zi2ek, S. (11989) Op. Cit. pp. 89. 
66 
Ibid. pp. 89-90. 
Ibid. p. 90. 
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initially identified with 'mob rule' and carried a pejorative meaning, but later 
emerged as a discourse of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage and equal ity. 
67 
Thus, in contrast to descriptivism, antidescriptivism allows for the way that the 
meaning of a word (or the signified of signifier) can vary with time within a 
particular discourse. Moreover, it can allow for the way that the meaning of a word 
can vary between particular discourses. For example, what is signified by 
democracy can vary between discourses. As 2iz'ek asserts: 
:" 
is there - on the level of positive, descriptive features - really anything 
in common between the liberal-individualist notion of democracy and 
the real-socialist theory, according to which the basic feature of 'real 
democracy' is the leading role of the Party representing the true 
interests of the people and thus assuring effective rule? 68 
As examined in Chapter 4, 'democracy' has a parliamentary-liberalist signified in 
British (hegernonic) discourse, but a republican democratic signified in Continental 
European (hegemonic) discourse. It is also emphasized that such conflicting 
signifieds of key principles has been a crucial impediment to the process of 
European political integration. 
Returning to the debate between descriptivism and antidesriptivism, the core of 
the dispute is that the former emphasizes the immanent, internal 'intentional 
contents' of a word, whilst the latter regards as decisive the external link, the way 
a word has been transmitted from subject to subject in a chain of tradition. 69 
However, Ziz-ek claims that both descriptivism and antidescriptivism miss the 
v 70 same crucial point of the 'radical contingency of naming . He argues that 
descriptivism fails to recognize the circularity of the process of signification that 
follows from the fact that each name refers to a certain object because this is the 
67 Laclau, E. (1993b) Op-Cit- p. 222. 68 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 98. 69 Ibid. p. 90. 
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name. For Ziz'ek, it is precisely this tautological character of the process of 
signification that is explained by the Lacanian conception of the point de capiton, 
the signifier without a signified to which things themselves refer to recognize 
themselves in their un ity. 
72 
Zi2ek also claims that the Lacanian concept of the nodal point provides an answer 
to the basic problem of antidescriptivism, which is to determine: 
... what constitutes the identity of the designated object beyond the 
ever-changing cluster of descriptive features - what makes an object 
identical to itself even if all its properties have changed. In other words, 
how to conceive the objective correlative to the 'rigid designator', to the 
name in so far as it denotes the same object in all possible worlds, in 
73 all counterfactual situations . 
As a remedy, antidescriptivism constructs a 'myth' of an 'omniscient observer of 
history 74 who can reconstruct the causal chain back to the act of primal baptism in 
order to establish the 'surplus' in the object which remains the same in all 
counterfactual situations. However, 2i2ek argues that antidescriptivists search in 
vain for this objective correlative to the name. There are no permanent, objective 
features to be named by the name in question because the object only exists as 
the retroactive effect of the act of naming itself . 
75 It is the name itself, the signifier, 
which supports the identity of the object. It is this signifier, which invokes the 
retroactive constitution of the object to which it refers, that is the Lacanian nodal 
point. 
70 bid. p. 92. 71 id. p. 93. 72 Ibid. pp. 95-6. 73 Ibid. p. 94. 74 See: Donnellan, K. (1 974)'Speaking of Nothing', The Philosophical Review, Volume 83, pp. 3-32. 
Reprinted in: S. P. Schwartz (ed. ) (1977) Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds. (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press). See also: Searle, J-R. (1984) Op. Cit. p. 234-242,252-3, and 
Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 92,94. 75 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 95. 
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Indeed, for Z'iZ-ek, the main achievement of antidescriptivism - albeit unknowingly- 
is that its concept of the 'rigid designator' helps us understand Lacan's conception 
of the nodal point. More precisely, in contrast to descriptivism, antidescriptivism 
enables us to conceive 'objet petit a 76 as the real-impossible correlative of the 
rigid designator, that is, of the nodal point as 'pure' signifier. 77 As 2i2ek explains, 
the surplus in the object that stays the same in all possible worlds is 'something in 
it more than itself, the Lacanian 'objet petit a': 
... we search in vain for it in positive reality because it has no positive 
consistency - because it is just an objectification of a void, of a 
discontinuity opened up in reality by the emergence of the signifier. 78 
It is the same for gold and, as Marx illustrated, it is the same for commodity: we 
search in vain among its positive properties for the feature that constitutes its 
value (and not only its use-value). Thus: 
What is missed by the antidescriptivist idea of an external chain of 
communication through which reference is transmitted is therefore the 
radical contingency of naming, the fact that naming itself retroactively 
constitutes its reference. Naming is necessary but it is, so to speak, 
necessary afterwards, retroactively, once we are already'in it,. 79 
Hence, 2i2ek claims that the nodal point quilts the signifying chain in a retroactive 
direction: the effect of meaning is always produced backwards. To elucidate, 
when a master-signifier intervenes within a field of discursivity, it retroactively 
constitutes the identity of floating signifiers by fixing them within a paradigmatic 
chain of equivalence. That is, this nodal point fixes retroactively the meaning of 
76 On the concept of the 'objet petit a', see: Lacan, J- (1979) [1977] The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. Translated by Alan Sheridan. Chapters 6-9, pp. 67-119,263-282. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin). See also: Fink, B. (1995) The Lacanian Subject: Between Language 
and Jouissance. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press); Kay, S. (2003) Op. Cit. pp. 158-172; 
Stavrakakis, Y. (1999) Lacan and the Political. (London: Routledge), and Wright, E. and E. Wright 
ýedS) (1999) Op. Cit. 
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Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 95. 
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the chain . 
80Thus, when we 'quilt' floating signifiers through the nodal point 'neo- 
liberalism I, it retroactively determines a neo-liberal chain of meaning. 81 
Here, it is important to acknowledge that the retroactive constitution of meaning is 
not an effect of the nodal point giving the floating signifiers their meaning. Rather, 
the signification of the floating elements within a paradigmatic chain of 
equivalence is a consequence of their reference to a certain symbolic code (for 
example, the code that regulates the discourse of British liberal-individualism or 
the social democratic discourses of Continental Europe). 82 The significance of the 
nodal point is that it retroactively submits these floating elements to this code. As 
such, the conception of nodal points reveals the secret of metaphors: their 
capacity to unify a certain discourse by partially fixing the identity of its 
momen s. 
83 
With regard to the retroactive constitution of meaning, it is also important to 
observe the 'logic of transference', the basic mechanism that produces the illusion 
proper to the phenomena of 'transference': 
... transference is the obverse of the staying 
behind of the signified 
with respect to the stream of the signifiers; it consists of the illusion that 
the meaning of a certain element (which was retroactively fixed by the 
intervention of the master-signifier L was present in it from the very 
beginning as its immanent essence. 
Hence, for example, the British are in transference when it appears to them that 
'real' freedom is 'in its very nature' opposed to social democracy and the political 
integration of Europe, that the state is 'in its very nature' totalitarian, and so forth. 
The paradox lies in the fact that this transferential illusion is necessary - it is the 
80 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 99; 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. pp. 101 -2. 81 See: 2i±ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. pp. 87-8,102. 82 Ibid. p. 103. 83 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 99. 
84 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. P. 102. 
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very measure of success of the operation of ideological 'quilting': the 'capitonnage' 
85 is successful only in so far as it effaces its own traces . 
In sum , Zi2ek argues that both clescriptivism and anticlescriptivism fail to observe 
that a rigid designator aims at an impossible kernel, at what is in an object more 
than the object, at the surplus produced by the signifying operation. Here, the 
crucial point is the connection between the radical contingency of naming and the 
logic of emergence of the rigid designator through which a given object achieves it 
identity. The radical contingency of naming implies an irreducible gap between 
'the Real'86 and modes of symbolization: a certain constellation can be symbolized 
in different ways, but the Real itself contains no necessary mode of 
symbolization. 
87 
This premise is significant to this thesis with regard to the development of a 
common European identity, as obstructed by the British national identity. It is 
because the Real itself offers no support for its direct symbolization - because 
every symbolization is in the last resort contingent - that the only way that Europe 
can achieve its unity is through the agency of a signifier, through reference to a 
nodal point as a 'pure' signifier. As 2i2ek explains, it is not the real object that 
guarantees, as the point of reference, the unity and identity of a certain ideological 
experience. On the contrary, it is the reference to a 'pure' signifier that gives unity 
and identity to our experience of reality itself. It is a common phenomenological 
assumption that 'reality' is always symbolized, and that the way it is experienced is 
always mediated through different modes of symbolization. However, what Lacan 
contributes to our understanding of phenomenology is that the unity of a given 
85 Ibid. 
86 See: Lacan, J. [1977] (1979) Op. Cit. (especially pp. 42-64); Fink, B. (11995). Op. Cit; Kay, S. 
(2003) Op. Cit. (particularly pp. 1-16,168); Stavrakakis, Y. (11999) Op. Cit; 2i2ek, S. (11989) Op. Cit. 
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'experience of meaning', itself the horizon of an ideological field of meaning, is 
supported by a 'pure', meaningless and empty signifier, a 'signifier without a 
, 88 signified . That is, a nodal point. 
The emphasis upon the radical contingency of naming is important to political 
science and to the aims of this thesis. For example, as indicated above, it is 
apparent that the signifier 'democracy' has many different meanings and is used 
as a name for many different and even opposing political-institutional 
arrangements. As identified in Chapter 4, this generates the need to find a 
minimal definition of democracy that captures the essential features of the object 
so that we all know precisely what we are talking about. Similarly, as evident 
within the process of European integration, signifiers such as 'subsidiarity 17 
'federalism', and 'European Union' have different and opposing meanings in 
different national discourses, and thus, there is a strong need to find a minimal 
and universal definition of such terms so that it is possible to know precisely what 
is being negotiated. However, according to the radical contingency of naming, we 
search in vain to determine the positive features of such objects against which we 
can assess the various candidates for a minimal definition. As ? -i2ek 
implies, this 
is because such objects only exist as an objectified void created and maintained 
by the name that names them. For example, this is reflected in the general feeling 
that we all know what democracy is, but that it just keeps escaping attempts to 
rigorously define it. This feeling suggests that the object of democracy is nothing 
v 89 but 'the unrepresentable kernel of the Lacanian Real . As such, the object is 
what cannot be fully conceptualized, and all definitions will appear, in the absence 
(particularly Chapter 5 and especially pp. 161-73), 2i2ek, S. (2001) On Befief (London, New York: 
Routledge). pp. 100-4), and Wright, E. and E. Wright (eds) (1999) Op. Cit. (especially: pp. 11-36). 87 Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 97. 88 Ibid. p. 98. 89 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 50. 
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of a pre-established object, as political constructions than can change with time 
within discourse, and can differ between discourses. 
2.4. Towards an anti -essentialist concept of discourse and hegemonic 
struggle 
As Laclau and Mouffe explain, the nodal point in a given formation increasingly 
acts as one of several discursive centres. 90 As described in Section 2.2.3. above, 
it exercises a totalizing effect on contiguous positions such that they partially lose 
their floating character and become parts of the structured network of meaning. 91 
1 92 In essentialist theory, an 'essence plays this totalizing role . For example, 
essentialist Marxist class theory defines all struggles in terms of their structural 
class position. In contrast, for Laclau and Mouffe's delineated project of radical 
democracy, as advocated by this thesis (see Chapter 7), there exists an 
articulation of particular struggles, none of which claims to be 'the Truth', the last 
signifier, the 'true meaning' of all struggles. 
Nevertheless, the title 'radical democracy' itself indicates how the very possibility 
of their articulation implies the 'nodal', determining role of a certain struggle which, 
precisely as a particular struggle, outlines the horizon of all the other struggles. 
For the project of radical democracy, this determining role belongs to democracy: 
all other struggles could be conceived as the gradual radicalization and extension 
of the democratic project to new domains. 93 Here, there exists a 'dialectic paradox' 
because the particular struggle that plays a hegemonic role, far from enforcing a 
violent suppression of the differences, opens the very space for the relative 
90 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 112. 91 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 87. 92 Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 98. 
93 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 88. 
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autonomy of the particular struggles. Hence, all struggles are made possible only 
94 through reference to democratic-egalitarian discourse . 
Therefore, for a given discursive field, it is important to isolate the particular 
struggle that at the same time determines the horizon of its totality. However, this 
is held by Zi2ek to be the crucial theoretical problem: how does this determining, 
totalizing role of a particular struggle differ from the traditionally conceived 
'hegemony' by which a certain struggle appears as the Truth of all others, so that 
all other struggles are in the last resort are only forms of its expression, and 
victory in this struggle offers us the key to victory in all other domains? That is, 
how do we formulate the determining role of a particular domain without falling 
into a trap of essential iSM? 
95 Indeed, as described in Chapter 2, Marxist 
approaches to British-European integration have fallen into this trap by suggesting 
that the Continental European project of European integration represents the 
possibility of true economic and democratic development. These accounts also 
suggest that such development has been obstructed in Britain because of the 
success of an ideology that represents a false consciousness that serves the 
opposing interests of its ruling class. However, as will now be examined, the 
critical philosophy of Kripke 96 provides the conceptual tools that make it possible 
to avoid this problem of essentialism. 
2.4.1. Kripkean theory and anti -essential ism 
Zi2ek argues that the Kripkean concept of the 'rigid designator' offers a conceptual 
apparatus enabling us to conceive the status of the anti-essentialism Of Laclau 
and Mouffe. The traditional essentialist illusion consists in the belief that it is 
94 Ibid. pp. 88-9. 95 Ibid. pp. 89. 
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possible to determine a definite cluster of features, of positive properties, which 
defines the permanent essence of a notion such as 'democracy '. Every 
phenomenon that pretends to be classified as 'democratic' should fulfil the 
condition of possessing this cluster of features. 97 Such is exemplified by the 
Marxist accounts of British-European integration in Chapter 2, which uphold an 
essentialist and ethnocentric conception of Continental European democratic 
development. In contrast, the anti-essentialism of Laclau and Mouffe, applied by 
this thesis, asserts that it is impossible to define any such essence, any cluster of 
positive properties which would remain the same in 'all possible worlds', in all 
counterfactual situations. Thus, as 2i2ek explains: 
In the last resort, the only way to define 'democracy' is to say that it 
contains all political movements and organizations which legitimize, 
designate themselves as 'democratic'; the only way to define 'Marxism' 
is to say that this term designates all movements and theories which 
legitimize themselves through Marx, and so on. In other words, the only 
possible definition of an object in its identity is that this is the object 
which is always designated by the same signifier - tied to the same 
signifier. It is the signifier which constitutes the kernel of the object's 
'identity'. 98 
Relevant to this thesis, the traditional essentialist illusion is evident within both the 
political debate as well as orthodox academic analyses of the process of 
European integration. Both have ignored that a definite cluster of features cannot 
be determined which defines the permanent essence of such notions as 
'democracy', 'European union', 'subsidiarity', 'federalism', and so forth. However, 
in accordance with the anti-essentialism of Laclau, Mouffe, and ? _i2ek, 
this thesis 
argues that - on the level of positive, descriptive features - such notions contain a 
different and even opposing cluster of features within the different discourses of 
Britain and Continent Europe. 
96 Kripke, S. (1980) Op. Cit. 97 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 98- 98 Ibid. 
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Moreover, as illustrated in Chapter 2, orthodox approaches to British-European 
integration have tended to describe the British conception of democracy and other 
terms as flawed and underdeveloped in relation to those upheld in Continental 
Europe which are conceived in essentialist terms as the true conceptions. 
Conversely, British Eurosceptics have upheld British conceptions as superior and 
as the Truth. However, in contrast, and following ? -i2ek, this thesis argues that it is 
unproductive to uphold either British or Continental European conceptions as true 
or false, particularly if the process of European integration is to be successful. 
Indeed, by advancing either as the Truth, politicians and theorists alike can only 
serve to reaffirm the antagonism between Britain and Continental Europe that has 
obstructed this process so far. Rather, such terms should not be defined by their 
positive content, but only by their 'position al-relational identity'. For example, 
'democracy' should not be defined by the positive content of any conception (its 
signified), but only by its positional-relational identity - by its opposition, its 
differential relation to 'non-democratic' - whereas the concrete content can vary 
significantly: to mutual exclusion (for Continental European social democracy, the 
term 'democratic' signifies the very phenomena that represent 'anti-democratic 
totalitarianism' for British liberalism). 
Thus, we arrive at the fundamental paradox of the nodal point: 
... the rigid designator, which totalizes an 
ideology by halting the 
metonymic sliding of its signified, is not a point of supreme density of 
Meaning, a kind of Guarantee which, by being itself excepted from the 
differential interplay of elements, would serve as a stable and fixed 
point of reference. On the contrary, it is the element which represents 
the agency of the signifier within the field of the signified. In itself it is 
nothing but a 'pure difference': its role is purely structural, its nature is 
purely performative - its signification coincides with its own act of nn enunciation; in short, it is a 'signifier without the signified'.. -2,7 
99 Ibid. p. 99. 
126 
Hence, in the analysis of a given discourse it is important to detect, behind the 
element that holds it together (for example, 'the nation'), this self-referential, 
tautological, performative operation. 
Therefore, the discursive dimension is the effect of a certain 'error of perspective': 
within the field of meaning, the element which represents the agency of pure 
signifier, is perceived as the point which 'gives meaning' to all others and thus, 
totalizes the field of meaning. Here, the element that represents the immanence 
of its own process of enunciation is experienced as a type of 'transcendent 
guarantee'; the element that only holds the place of a certain lack is perceived as 
a point of supreme plenitude. That is, pure difference is perceived as identity 
exempted from the relational-differential interplay and guaranteeing its 
homogeneity. 100 
In all, the Kripkean concept of the 'rigid designator' is significant because it makes 
it possible to avoid essential meanings. In addition, 2i2ek argues that the meaning 
of words is regulated by the symbolic code of a given discourse, and thus, 
meanings can vary between different discourses. Here, the psychoanalytical 
insights of ZiZ-ek are significant because this thesis aims to show that the 
discourses of Britain and Continental Europe uphold different meanings of words, 
and that this divergence in meaning has obstructed the process of European 
integration. Moreover, overcoming these divergences becomes difficult if we 
accept the anti-essentialist position that we cannot advance particular meanings 
as the Truth. That is, how can we agree upon the meaning of words if there is no 
higher ground of truth from which to advance them? 
100 Ibid. 
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This exposes a problem for Laclau and Mouffe's delineated project of radical 
democracy: struggles outside the democratic-egalitarian discourse will not pursue 
the same democratic-egalitarian horizon. Thus, without falling into the essentialist 
trap, how can struggles outside the democratic-egalitarian discourse be 
persuaded to join in the fight for these democratic and egalitarian ideals? This 
problem is significant to this thesis because Britain is outside the democratic- 
egalitarian discourse that has developed in Continental Europe since the 
Democratic Revolution. 101 Hence, Britain does not pursue the same democratic- 
egalitarian horizon as Continental Europe. Moreover, this divergence in discourse 
is reflected in the British awkward relationship with Europe: as Britain is outside 
this Continental European democratic-egalitarian discourse, it has diverging 
ideas, meanings and interests. Thus, how can we establish the same horizon in 
Britain? How can Britain be persuaded to accept democratic egalitarian initiatives 
if there is no way of demonstrating the truth or superiority of these ideas? Without 
any claim to truth, on what grounds can we even argue that Britain should be 
persuaded to? In sum, how is it decided which meanings, ideas and interests we 
should follow in pursuit of a unified and democratic Europe? Such questions will 
be addressed in Part ///, and they relate to the concept of 'hegemony' examined 
below. 
2.5. The unity and limits of discourse 
Finally, it is important to consider how a discourse is unified and how its limits are 
established. With regard to the unity of discourse, Michel Foucault proposed that 
a discourse cannot find any principle of unity in reference to the same object, in a 
common style in the production of meaning; in the constancy of its concepts, or in 
101 On the 'Democratic Revolution', see Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. 
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reference to a common theme. 102 The coherence of a discourse is given only in 
the shape of a 'regularity in dispersion,. 103 Following Foucault, Laclau and Mouffe 
argue that there is no essential principle of coherence and that discourses are to 
be conceived as regulated systems of dispersion. 104 As they explain, although the 
discursive moments are dispersed, the ordering effects of the relations of 
difference and equivalence, the workings of different kinds of overdeterm i nation, 
and the unifying effects of nodal points, all create a certain regularity which can be 
signified as a 'totality i. 
105 
Thus, the unity of discourse is provided in terms of a 'regularity in dispersion'. 
Laclau and Mouffe account for the construction of the regularity in dispersion of 
discourses by developing a theory of 'hegemony'. 
3.0. The concept of heqemony 
In discourse theory, hegemony tends to substitute for the more traditional concept 
of 'politics'. As Torfing asserts, similar to hegemony, politics is often conceived in 
terms of the pursuit of individual or collective interests and as a matter of 
choosing a policy option that maximizes or satisfies a pregiven hierarchy of 
preferences. 106 However, hegemony emphasizes the construction of identity, for 
which values and beliefs are an integral part. Identity is not the starting point of 
politics, but something that is constructed, maintained and transformed in and 
through political struggles. 
102 Foucault, M. (11985) [1969] The Archaeology of Knowledge. (London: Tavistock). pp. 21-39. 103 See: Laclau , E. and C. Mouffe 
(1985) Op. Cit. pp. 105-6. 104 bid. p. 106. 105 Torfing, J. (11999) Op. Cit. P. 99. 106 Ibid. p. 82. 
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Struggles for hegemony and its establishment by political projects are important to 
discourse theory because hegemonic practices are crucial to political processes, 
and because political processes are vital for the formation, functioning and 
dissolution of discourses. That is, hegemony is achieved if and when a political 
project or force determines the rules and meanings in a particular social 
formation. Thus, the concept of hegemony concerns who is going to be 'master': 
which political force will decide the dominant forms of conduct and meaning in a 
given social context. ' 
07 
For Laclau and Mouffe, hegemonic operations are a special type of articulatory 
practice as they determine the dominant rules that structure the identities of 
discourses and social formations. This exemplary type of political practice 
presupposes two further conditions. First, hegemonic practices require the 
drawing of political frontiers - the struggle between opposing forces and the 
exclusion of certain possibilities in the establishment of hegemony. Thus, 
hegemonic practices always involve the exercise of power as one political project 
attempts to impose its will on another. Second, this practice requires the 
availability of floating signifiers not fixed by existing discourses. Due to the 
availability of contingent elements, hegemonic practices then aim to articulate 
those elements into an expanding political project, thereby conferring a partial 
meaning upon them. 
108 
Hegemony concerns political and moral-intellectual leadership'09, but discourse 
theory emphasizes that it also has an important constructivist aspect. The political 
and moral-intellectual leadership of a hegemonic force hinges upon the 
construction of a discursive formation that provides a surface of inscription for a 
107 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 124. 108 Ibid. 
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wide range of demands, views and 
introduces the concept of 'articulationo. 
3.1. Hegemony and articulation 
attitudes. 110 This constructivist aspect 
The construction of hegemonic discourse is the result of articulation. In relation to 
this concept, Laclau and Mouffe advance the following definitional propositions: 
.... we will call articulation any practice establishing a relation among 
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the 
articulatory practice. The structural totality resulting from the articulatory 
practice, we call discourse. The differential positions, insofar as they 
appear articulated within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, 
we will call element any difference that is not discursively articulated. "' 
The articulation of discursive elements into contingent moments within a 
hegemonic discourse occurs in a conflictual terrain of power and resistance and 
thus, always includes an element of force or repression. Hence, hegemony is 
defined as the expansion of a discourse (or set of discourses) into a dominant 
horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements 
into partially fixed moments in a context criss-crossed by antagonistic forces. ' 12 
This definition of hegemony is valid for the analysis of processes of disarticulation 
and rearticulation that establish and maintain political as well as moral-intellectual 
leadership. Hence, hegemony refers not only to the privileged position of a nation- 
state in a group of nation-states, but more generally to the construction of a 
predominant discursive formation. For example, as examined in Chapter 5, neo- 
liberalism became a hegemonic discourse in Britain to the extent that it has 
109 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 66-7. 110 See: Torfing, J (1999) Op - Cit. pp - 10 1- ill Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 105. 112 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 101 - 131 
redefined the terms of political debate and restored the traditional British liberal- 
individualist agenda. 
Moreover, the discourse-theoretical concept of hegemony is instructive for the 
analysis of the processes of disarticulation and rearticulation that may redefine 
the political debate and agenda of Europe as a result of a supranational process 
of European integration. That is, it makes it possible to examine the construction 
and form of the new hegemonic supranational discursive formation that would 
result from this process. For example, would supranational European integration 
lead to the articulation of the different discursive formations of Britain and 
Continental Europe, or would one existing discursive formation predominate and 
define the terms of the political debate and agenda of the EU? Would either 
existing discursive formation be disarticulated and rearticulated with the other? 
Could a different and more progressive discursive formation be established? 
3.2. The genealogy of the concept of hegemony 
Laclau and Mouffe demonstrate how the concept of hegemony was introduced 
into Marxist discourse to supplement 'the economistic logic of necessity' with a 
I, 113 political logic of contingency . From 
its first appearance in the writings of Pavel 
Axelrod' 14 and Giorgi Plekhanovl 
15 
, through to Lenin' 
16 
and Trotsky' 
17 
, the initial 
113 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 7-92. 114 See: Ascher, A. [alias Pavel Axelrod] (11972) Pavel Axelrod and the Development of 
Menshevism. Russian Research Center Studies. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press). For other published and unpublished work by Pavel Axelrod, see: Sterling Memorial Library, 
Leaders of the Russian Revolution. Microtext Reading Room, fiche call number: Fiche B2506: 4. 
With Giorgio Plekhanov, Vera Zasulich, Lenin, Trotsky and Julius Martov, Pavel Axelrod was an 
important Menshevik and he was an original editor of 'Iskra' (Spark), a paper first published by the 
Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) in December, 1900. See: Lynch, M. (2000) Reaction and 
Revolutions: Russia 1881-1924. (London: Hodder and Stoughton Educational). 
115 See: Plekhanov, G. V. (11969) [1947] Fundamental Problems of Marxism. Translated into English 
by Julius Katzer. (London: Lawrence & Wishart). p. 23. Originally published in 1947 as'Le Question 
Fondamentali del Marxismo', Milan. 
116 See, for example: Lenin, V. 1. (1964) [1917] Letters from Afar. First Letter: 'The First Stage of the 
First Revolution', Collected Works, Volume 23, August 1916-March 1917. pp. 297,302. (pp. 297- 
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and rather authoritarian notion of hegemony was conceived as an alliance of 
separate identities held together by the tactical manipulations of leadership within 
the communist vanguard party. ' 18 However, Gramsci developed a more 
democratic concept that embraced both political and moral-intellectual leadership 
and aimed to articulate a collective will with a more national-popular character. 1191t 
is at this point that hegemony becomes no longer defined as an alliance of 
preconstituted identities, but as a process of production of a new collective 
identity. As for Georges Sorel 120 , the contingent articulation of social forces and 
political tasks is emphasized. 
Gramsci also acknowledges the significance of ideology, symbols and myths. 
However, in direct contrast to Sorel, Gramsci contends that the articulation of 
collective wills occurs at the level of democratic politics. It is the political struggles 
within state, economy and civil society that determine the fate of competing 
308) Translated from Russian by M. S. Levin, J. Fineberg and others, and edited by M. S. Levin. 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart). pp. 297,302. First published in Pravda, Nos 14-15, March 21-22, 
1917; Lenin, V. 1. (1964) [1916] 'Imperialism and the Split of Socialism', Collected Works, Volume 
23, Ibid. pp. 117-8. (pp. 105-120) First published in Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata, No. 2, December, 
1916. 
117 See, for example: Trotsky, L. (1971) [1922] 1905: The First Russian Revolution. Translated from 
Russian by Tysiacha Deviatot Piatyi. (New York: Random House). pp. 333,339. 118 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 49-65. 119 See: Gramsci, A. (1971) [1948-51 ] Quaderni del Carcere (Prison Notebooks). (Turin: Editori 
Riuniti). Volumes 2-3. p. 349,1058,1875. This first definitive Italian Variorum version was edited by 
Valentino Gerratana. The English translation, entitled 'Selections from the Prison Notebooks', was 
first published in 1971 and was edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith 
(London: Lawrence & Wishart). However, Gramsci first employed the concept of hegemony in a 
Leninist sense in: Gramsci, A. (1926) [1874) Que/ques Th6mes sur la Question Meridionale ('Some 
Aspects of the Southern Question'). First published in appendix of: M. A. Macciochi (1874) Pour 
Gramsci. (Paris: Seuil). p. 316. Edited and translated into English by Q. Hoare in: Gramsci, A. 
(1978) Selections from Political Writings (1921-26). (London: Lawrence & Wishart). p. 443. (pp. 
441-462). It is only later in Prison Notebooks that it becomes the indissoluble union of political, 
intellectual, and moral leadership, which goes beyond the Leninist idea of a simple class alliance. 
(Mouffe, C. (11979) 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci', in C. Mouffe (ed. ) Gramsci and Marxist 
Theory. (London, Boston and Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul). pp. 178-179). On Gramsci's 
concept of hegemony, see: Mouffe, C. (1979) Ibid. pp. 168-204, Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) 
Ibid. pp. 65-7, and Simon, R. (1982) Gramsci's Political Thought: An Introduction. (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart). pp. 21-28. 120 Sorel, G. (1976) [1902] Critical Essays on Marxism. Translated by J. Stanley and C. Stanley. 
Originally published in 1902 as'Saggi di Critica del Maxismo'. (Palermo, Sandron), and Sorel, G. 
[1908] (1950) Reflections on Violence. (London, New York: Macmillan). Translated by T. E. Hume. 
Originally published in 1950 as 'R6flections sur la Violence'. (Rivi6re). See also: Stanley, J. L. (ed. ) 
(1976) From Georges Sorel. - Essays in Socialism and Philosophy. (New York: Oxford University 
Press). On significance of Sorel to the development of the concept of hegemony, see: Laclau, E. 
and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 37-42,44-5. 
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hegemonic projects. For Laclau and Mouffe, the problem of the Gramscian 
conception is that it still maintains that the social classes have an ontologically 
privileged role in the struggle for hegemony (because of their structural position at 
the level of the relations of production). 121 By removing this last economistic 
residue, Laclau and Mouffe expose how the contingent logic of hegemonic 
articulation can develop its theoretical and political potentialities. 122 Hence, 
hegemony becomes defined as an articulatory practice instituting nodal points that 
partially fix the meaning of the social in an organized system of differences. 123 
The discursive system articulated by a hegemonic project is delimited by specific 
political frontiers resulting from the expansion of chains of equivalence. 
3.3. Hegemony, the Subject and identification 
The impossibility of the objectivity and determining capacity of the (discursive) 
structure, as explained in Section 2.1, is reflected in the impossibility of the 
objectivity and determining capacity of social agency. As Laclau explains, social 
agency cannot be conceived as a structurally determined subject position that is 
inscribed upon the Subject through the process of social determination and 
ideological interpellation because the incompleteness of the structure prevents 
structural determination of objective positions within the structure. 124 Nor can 
social agency be conceived as an objective essence that is liberated by the 
dislocation of the structure. 
125 
121 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 69-71. 122 Ibid. p. 69. 123 See: Ibid. pp. 134-7. 124 Laclau E. (1990a) Op. Cit. pp. 43-4. 125 Ibid. p. 
'44. 
134 
To elucidate, the dislocation of the structure prevents the Subject from being 
determined by the structure. Thus, the Subject has a failed structural identity. 126 
The incompleteness of the structural identity constitutes the Subject as the locus 
of a decision about how to establish itself as a concrete subjectivity with a fully 
fledged identity. Hence, the Subject is partially self-determined in that it 
constitutes the locus of a decision that is not determined by the structure, which is 
already dislocated. 
127 
Following 2iZ'ek, it is at this point in the analysis that it is instructive to examine the 
Subject before its subjectivation, which is penetrated by a constitutive lack. 128 This 
lack is constitutive precisely because the Subject is this lack in the sense that it 
only exists in the attempt to overcome it. 
129 The lack itself provides an anti- 
essentialist conception of the Subject because nothing determinate can follow 
from a lack, which is defined by the very absence of a positive essence. 
The process of subjectivation takes the form of an attempt to fill the empty space 
of this lack through identification. The split and divided subject seeks a fully 
achieved identity through acts of identification . 
130 However, these acts take place 
within an undecidable terrain exposed by the dislocation in the structure. 
Consequently, the Subject seeks to identify with a hegemonic project that can 
offer a credible solution to the crisis or disorder of the dislocated structure. 131 
Thus, the Subject is nothing but the gap between the undecidable structure and 
the decision of how to resolve the rift in the social, which has been caused by 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid. R. 30. 128 See: Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. 169-82. 
129 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 295. 
130 Laclau, E. (1 990a) Op. Cit. p. 60; 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 181. 
131 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 151-4. 
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dislocation. As Chapter 6 illustrates, this proposition is particularly significant to 
our understanding of the role of hegemony and representation in the EU. 132 
In contrast to essentialist conceptions, the absence of a single and privileged 
foundation means that there are many possible points of identification for the split 
and divided Subject. Indeed, as argued in Part /// of this thesis, there exists a 
plurality of identifications and subject positions in contemporary Europe. The 
Subject may identify with many different things, and thus, may have many 
different 'subject positions'. Hence, a subjectivated individual is a masquerading 
void. 133 There might be many inconsistencies between the different identifications 
of the Subject, but a 'minimal consistency, 134 between subject positions is 
produced by hegemonic strategies (or myths) that aim to articulate different 
struggles and identities around a nodal point. As demonstrated in Chapter 5, such 
hegemonic strategies tend to produce social antagonisms, as evidenced by the 
British antagonism with Continental Europe. 
The acceptance of this Lacanian conception of the Subject before it subjectivation 
represents a significant break from the orthodox Marxist tradition. In their earlier 
work, Laclau and Mouffe had applied the Althusserian theory of subject positions 
rather than developing such a theory of the Subject. 135 Here, subject positions 
were articulated into relatively unified ensembles through hegemonic struggles, 
and the limits of their different hegemonic projects were established by social 
antagonism. In addition, social antagonism also negated the identities of the 
articulated subjectivities by confronting them with an enemy force. However, as 
explained further in Section 4.4., Laclau and Mouffe came to accept 2i2ek's 
132 See also: Laclau, E. (1995) 'Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject', Differences, Volume 7, 
No. 1. p. 155-6; 2i2ek, S. (1991) For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political 
Factor. (Verso: London). pp. 42-6,121-2. 
133 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 150. 
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argument that this Althusserian approach failed to acknowledge that what is 
negated in social antagonism is always-already negated. That is, they had not 
theorized the constitutive lack of the Subject before its subjectivation at the level 
of subject positions. 
136 
The analysis will now turn to the concept of social antagonism, which is developed 
by Laclau and Mouffe to explain how the limits of discourse are constructed. 
4.0. Social antagonism 
'Social antagonism' tends to substitute for the more traditional concept of 'conflict'. 
The fundamental state of society is often conceived to be characterized by conflict 
because of the absence of a substantive common good and the failure of the 
mechanisms of normative integration within social systems. However, conflict is 
often conceived merely in terms of an episodic rivalry that ignores its role in 
constructing the identity of hegemonic discourses. Such is explained by the 
concept of social antagonism that examines the constitutive role of 'friend-enemy' 
divisions. 137 
Laclau and Mouffe claim that discourses are historically contingent and politically 
constructed. Here, it is instructive to observe how Derrida 
138 
and Richard Rorty 
139 
elucidate the historicity and contingency of identities. For Derrida, identities are 
never fully constituted because their existence depends upon something external 
134 See: ? 
-i2ek, 
S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 75. 
135 For example, see: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 115. 136 See also: Laclau, E. (1990a) Op. Cit. pp. 5-41; Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 52-3,128-31; and 
Zi2ek, S. (1 990a) Op Cit. pp. 249-54. 137 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 82. 
138 See, for example: Derrida J. (1981) [1972] Positions. (Chicago: Chicago University Press). 139 See, for example: Rorty, R. (1980) Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell), Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
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to, or different from, identity. For Rorty, social agents, communities and languages 
are all historical products vulnerable to change and transformation. However, 
these two perspectives pose a problem for political research: if identities are never 
ultimately fixed, how is an identity possible? Are we condemned to live in a world 
full of meaninglessness and chaos? That is, if we inhabit a world without any 
closure, is there no possibility of fixing the identity of discourses at all? 140 
/ 
Laclau and Mouffe resolve this problem with the affirmation of the primacy of 
political practices in constructing identities - it is through the drawing of political 
frontiers and constructing antagonisms between 'friends' and 'enemies' that 
discourses acquire their identity. Indeed, the construction and experience of social 
antagonisms is important to discourse theory in three respects. First, the creation 
of an antagonistic relationship - which always creates an 'enemy' or 'other' - is 
crucial to the production of political frontiers. It is by contrast to the 
(deviant/alien/abnormal) 'Other' that we are reassured of our superiority and 
'rightness', and that such 'orthodox' attitudes are reproduced and reinforced. 
Hence, secondly, the establishment of antagonistic relationships and the 
stabilisation of political frontiers are crucial for the partial fixing of the identity of 
discursive formations and social agents. Finally, the experience of antagonisms is 
exemplary in exposing the contingency of identity. 141 
Discourse theory holds that such antagonisms exist because it is impossible for 
agents and groups to find full and positive identities. The presence of the 'enemy' 
in an antagonistic relationship prevents the attainment of the identity as 'friend' by 
the Other. For example, as the process of European integration directly prevents 
the identity of Britain as an independent sovereign, nation state, so for the rest of 
140 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 119. 141 Ibid. pp. 121-122. 
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Europe, Britain is preventing or undermining the completion of the EU. Thus, the 
experience of antagonism - the conflict between Britain and the EU - 
demonstrates the mutual failure of identity for both; as each struggles to maintain 
its identity and will in the face of the negating Other. 
Antagonisms are also subject to a process of construction and deconstruction. 
For example, during the integration process, the EU has attempted to 
accommodate individual member states in a system of non-antagonistic 
relationships. This is what Laclau and Mouffe have called 'the logic of difference I 
142 
above . They argue that this logic may take place either through a partial 
process of assimilation, or through a policy of 'divide and rule', each being 
underpinned by the exclusion of those forces resistant to incorporation. As is often 
the case, resistance to these forces - here, to the pressures of European 
integration - results in an attempt to interrupt and challenge these 'divisionary' 
logics. The manner in which this antagonism is organised generally involves the 
development of a frontier against the Other. In doing so, the various 
manifestations of the Other - languages, traditions, institutions, cultures, and so 
forth - become equivalent as they are discursively constructed as the 'enerny'; 
symbolising anti-'us'. Hence, symbolising 'anti-Britain', the EU becomes the 
enemy of the British nation. Simultaneously, the different identities of those 
against the Other are condensed into, for this example, notions such as 'the 
British nation', prevented by the Other from realising 'freedom', its 'traditional way 
of life', and so forth. Thus, the EU as the Other is presented as blocking the 
British identity. 
As Howarth explains, the floating signifiers symbolising an antagonistic 
relationship are crucial to the analysis of the hegemonic practices at play and the 
139 
manner by which political subjects are being constituted. 143 Thus, in Part /1, this 
thesis will identify the floating signifiers that have symbolized the British 
antagonistic relationship with the EU. This will improve our understanding of the 
hegemonic development of the EU and the degree to which this process is 
reconstituting the political subjects of Britain and Continental Europe. 
4.1. Social antagonism and hegemony 
Hegemonic articulation involves the negation of identity in two senses: by the 
negation of alternative ideas, meanings and options, and, of those people 
144 identifying with them . For example, Chapter 5 demonstrates the British 
hegemonic articulation negating alternative European ideas, meanings and 
options for European integration as well as those European people and 
'Eurocrats' who identify with them. The hegemonic force, which is responsible for 
the negation of individual or collective identity, constructs the excluded identity as 
one of a series of threatening obstacles to the full realization of chosen meanings 
and options. Again, Chapter 5 illustrates how the British government constructed 
the European identity as one of a series of threatening obstacles to the full 
realization of British meanings and options. 
Thus, hegemonic articulation involves a negation of identity that tends to produce 
social antagonism. As hegemony involves antagonism and is a form of politics, it 
follows that politics is inextricably linked to social antagonism. However, this does 
not imply that political antagonists are necessarily enemies in the strict sense of 
the term. Indeed, as Mouffe argues, distinguishing between enemies and 
142 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 127-131. 143 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. pp. 122-3. 144 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 120. 
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adversaries permits us to link politics and social antagonism within liberal 
democracy: 
Once we accept the necessity of the political and the impossibility of a 
world without antagonism, what needs to be envisaged is how it is 
possible under those conditions to create or maintain a pluralist 
democratic order. Such an order is based upon a distinction between 
'enemy and 'adversary. It requires that, within the context of the 
political community, the opponent should be considered not as an 
enemy to be destroyed, but as an adversary whose existence is 
legitimate and must be tolerated. We will fight against his ideas but we 
145 will not question his right to defend them . 
As will be argued in Chapter 7, such a distinction may not aid agreement between 
the different discursive systems of the EU. However, Torfing observes that the 
intrinsic link between politics and social antagonism is challenged by the belief 
that politics should be tied rather to authority, which is contingent upon 
conflict/consensus in the sense that it does not necessarily imply the one or the 
other. 146 That said, Torfing holds that this argument is questionable in three 
respects that are relevant to this thesis. 
First, authority is needed because of the presence of antagonistic conflicts, and is 
a way of ensuring governance in the face of it. Second, the attempt to identify 
politics with authority tends to ground politics in social phenomena themselves 
resulting from antagonistic struggles. Authority is normally conceived as based 
either on tradition (conservatism, as in Britain, or communitarianism, as in 
Continental Europe); on the formal rationality embodied in the legal framework of 
the state (liberalism, as in Britain); on the morality (Emile Durkheim), truthfulness 
(Habermas) or charisma (Max Weber) of those exercising power; or the 
anticipation of those subjected to the exercise of power that, in the normal course 
145 Mouffe, C. (1993) 'Introduction: For an Agonistic Pluralism', in C. Mouffe (ed) The Retum of the 
PoliticaL (London: Verso. ) p. 4. 146 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 121-122. 
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of events, compliance with regulations and actions will be forthcoming (David 
Easton). 147 
Common to all these different conceptions of the source of authority is the idea 
that something (tradition, or rationality, and so forth) makes people accept political 
decisions without protest. However, all these things which tie politics to a tacit 
rather than an explicit consensus are social 'facts' that are constructed in and 
through political struggles involving force and repression and thus, antagonism. 
That is, politics as authority hinges upon something which is itself the result of the 
workings of a more fundamental form of politics, defined as hegemonic struggles 
experienced in a context of social antagonism. 148 Hence, it follows that the 
success of either the British or Continental European vision of European union will 
be the consequence of a hegemonic struggle experienced in a context of social 
antagonism. 
Third, there are no sources of authority that can ensure a total consensus that 
precludes the exclusion of a 'constitutive outside'. Tradition, rationality, and so 
forth, are always subject to negation, and thus, fail to provide an ultimate ground 
for everybody to reach agreement, or merely to accept the ruling of others. As in 
Britain, tradition and liberty are sources of authority that preclude the exclusion of 
Continental Europe. Hence, it follows that new sources of authority must be found 
that are based upon a different constitutive outside so that Britain and Continental 
Europe can reach agreement, or Britain must accept the sources of authority of 
Continental Europe as embodied in the EU framework (or vice versa). Such is the 
subject of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this research. 
147 Ibid. p. 122. 148 Ibid. 
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An alternative conception of politics in terms of 'authoritative decisions' also 
presents a challenge to the discourse-theoretical emphasis upon the intrinsic link 
between politics and social antagonism. There may be a concern that the 
consequence of such an intrinsic link could be the failure to acknowledge 'routine 
politics' in the sense of minor policy changes, unanimous and routine decisions, 
rules, norms, procedures, and so forth, that exist in a highly institutional context 
and do not incite any antagonistic conflicts. 149 This would be a significant problem 
for this thesis because, as the domestic politics approach by George et al 
illustrated in Chapter 2, the routine politics of member states have had a serious 
impact upon the process of European integration. 150 Moreover, George et al 
observe that British routine politics has posed a particularly serious obstacle to the 
process of European integration because it has tended to conflict with the routine 
politics of the other member states. 151 However, there is no such problem for a 
discourse-theoretical approach, which in contrast to all previous analyses, 
conceives such institutionalized contexts as 'sedimented' discourses. 152 That is, 
routine politics constitutes relatively permanent and durable discourses resulting 
from political and social practices. Thus, as explained in Section 2.1, in contrast to 
the structural approaches, such institutionalized contexts are conceived as 
discourses rather than structures. As such, there are no qualitative distinctions 
between these discourses, only differences in their degree of stability. 153 
149 
Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 122-123. 150 See, for example: George, S. (ed -) (1992) Britain and the European Community. The Politics of Semi-Detachment. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). pp. 206-7. 151 See, for example: George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner. ' Britain in the European Community. 
Third Edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). p. 278-9. 152 To elucidate, hegemonic discourses have become sedimented when we no longer question 
them or recognise them as discourses. That is, a discourse has become sedimented (and 
hegemonic) when we no longer feel any opposition between it and reality because it has succeeded 
in determining the mode of our everyday experience of reality itself. See: Laclau, E. (11990) Op. Cit. 
pp. 31-5, Howarth, D. (1995) Op Cit. p. 132, Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 69-71,121-123. For 
further discussion of the discourse-theoretical approach to subject and agency, see: Howarth, D. 
(2000) Op. Cit. pp. 121-22, Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. pp 123,132; Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 
135-154. 
153 
Howarth, D. (1995) Op Cit. P. 132. 
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However, as Torfing emphasizes, not all routine decisions are, at bottom, political: 
The degree of social sedimentation of a certain context of decision 
making might be so high that the element of conflict and antagonism 
tends to evaporate. In that case we should simply speak of social 
routines rather than routine PolitiCS. 
154 
Nevertheless, as routine politics are discursively constructed, they are still open to 
change. That is, the term 'routine' does not involve the eradication of 
'undecidability'. As Torfing affirms, the following of rules is necessarily based upon 
constitutive interpretations. 155 In all, undecidability penetrates rule-governed 
decisions and actions, and thus, the difference between routine politics and the 
156 
more fundamental forms of politics is eroded . Indeed, it can be observed that 
British routine politics was changed significantly by British neo-liberalism as a 
result of its attack upon social democracy and the bureaucratic, restricting and 
inefficient 'nanny state'. However, this development moved British routine politics 
away from the more social democratic and communautaire practices of the EU 
and Continental Europe rather than closer to them. 
From a discourse-theoretical perspective, what might appear as unanimous, 
routine decisions in the British state might be revealed as the source of all kinds 
of frustrated desires, unstated criticism, and endlessly deferred confrontations. 
Thus, the EU may appeal to these scattered, micro-level resistances. However, 
without any external influence, such seldom become major upheavals because of 
the normalizing aspect of the power strategies that penetrate such social and 
political institutions. The primary objective of these strategies is to efface the 
traces of the contingent political interventions constituting the social. The 
154 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 123. 155 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 122-123. 
156 Ibid. p. 123. On the undecidability of rule-governed decisions and actions, see: Derrida, J. 
(1988) [1977] Op. Cit. pp. 116,149-50; Derrida, J. (1992) Op. Cit; Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 
171-4, Laclau, E. (i 991)'Community and its Paradoxes: Richard Rorty's Liberal Utopia', in Miami 
Theory Collective (eds) Community at Loose Ends. (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press). pp. 
89-90; Rorty, R. (1989) Op. Cit. pp. 3-22, and Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 67-69. 
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politically constructed is presented as normal or natural, and resistance is 
constructed as deviant or unnatural. 157 Following Foucault, subtle logics of self- 
concealment are deployed by political power strategies making political decisions 
appear unopposed, routine decisions. 
158 
4.2. The limits of discourse 
As the following two sections illustrate, the limits of a discourse (or discursive 
formation or a discursive system of identity) are established in terms of the 
exclusion of a 'radical and threatening otherness' not presenting itself as yet 
another difference, but rather, expanding a chain of equivalence. That is, 
construction of the limits of a discourse involves the construction of a social 
antagonism. This is significant to this thesis because it is proposed in Chapter 5 
that the construction of the limits of British discourse has involved the construction 
of a social antagonism with Europe. 
To establish what keeps different discourses apart, it is necessary to establish 
what keeps them together. The possibility of a fundamental ground as the source 
of all differences within the discourse is inevitably rejected by discourse theory. 
However, that the limits of a discourse can be defined in terms of what lies 
beyond them is also rejected. If what is beyond is merely other differences, then it 
is impossible to establish if these differences are internal or external to the 
discourse in question . 
159 Hence, it is necessary to conceive how a discourse 
establishes its limits by excluding a 'radical (and threatening) otherness' that has 
no common measure with the differential system from which it is excluded, and 
157 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 123. 
158 See: Foucault, M. (1985) [1969] Op. Cit, Foucault, M. (1986) [1976] PowerlKnowledge. 
ýBrighton: Harvester). 
59 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 124. 
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thus, that poses a constant threat to the very system. 160This radical otherness 
simultaneously constitutes and negates the limits and identity of the discourse 
from which it is excluded. Derived from Staten 
161 
, Laclau calls this radical 
otherness the 'constitutive outside'. Since this constitutive outside is coterminous 
with 'social antagonism', it once again follows that social antagonism is 
simultaneously the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of 
discursive systems of identity. 162 This thesis will now explain how this constitutive 
outside is discursively constructed because this is crucial to our understanding of 
how'Europe' became the Other for the British identity, as presented in Chapter 5. 
4.3. Social antagonism and the relations of equivalence and difference 
It is at this point that Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the 'relation of 
equivalence' (as described in Section 2.2.1. ) becomes relevant. The constitutive 
outside introduces a radical negativity that cannot be presented directly, as a 
positive difference, but only indirectly through chains of equivalence which subvert 
the differential character of the discursive identities. 163 The differential character of 
social identities collapses when they become inscribed in chains of equivalence 
that constructs them in terms of a certain - though not 'essential' - identical 
something or sameness. Hence, all that the excluded have in common is their 
negation of the discursive form in question. That is, the chain of equivalence has 
no positive identity as it annuls all positivity of the excluded element and thus, 
produces negativity as such. 164 Thus, the constitutive outside of a discourse W, 
which is discursively constructed by the expansion of a chain of equivalence, is 
neither 'B' nor 'non-A', but 'anti-A'. As argued in Chapter 5, the constitutive outside 
160 Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 151. 161 Staten, H. (1985) [1984] Wittgenstein and Derrida. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). pp. 15-9. 162 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 124. 163 See: Laclau, E and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 128-9. 
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of the British identity is 'anti-Britain'. As such, the British identity is established in a 
confrontation with a threatening constitutive outside which prevents it from being 
what it is. 
In their formula for social antagonism, Laclau and Mouffe emphasize that it is not 
that a negative equivalential pole confronts a positive differential pole because, 
faced with an external threat, a certain sameness of the differential moments will 
165 be established .A relevant illustration would be the discursive effects of the 
external threat of Nazism confronting the allied powers during the Second World 
War. Faced with a common enemy, the British and European national 
governments emphasized their common commitment to peace, freedom and 
democracy. The content of these common values was emptied to the degree that 
they became empty signifiers; merely symbolizing a communitarian space 
deprived of its fullness due to the presence of the evil forces of Nazism. 
Such an external threat, such a 'constitutive outside', could bring Britain and 
Continental Europe together again, leading to the necessary common 
supranational commitment to democratic values. The emptying of conflicting 
national contents of signifiers to a mere common symbolization of a 
communitarian space could enable the successful integration of Europe. 
Following Preston, the emerging groupings of 'Japan/Asia' and 'USA/Latin 
America' within the broader global system, as a result of the global dynamics of 
change, could be conceived as providing this external threat, this constitutive 
outside, to the small national economies of Britain and Continental Europe. For 
Preston and neo-functional accounts, it is 'rational'for the small nations of Europe 
to integrate in response to the threat posed by these new economic blocs. 
164 See: Ibid. pp. 128-9. 165 Ibid. p. 128. 
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However, this thesis is sceptical that such threats to capitalist nationalist 
economies can provide the necessary constitutive outside to invoke a common 
political European commitment to democratic values. 166 1 ndeed, after the defeat of 
Nazism, it was the political concern for curbing the totalitarian logic of nationalism, 
and preserving peace, freedom and democracy - rather than the concern for 
economic competitiveness in the global capitalist economy, as implied by Preston 
and neo-functionalism - that instigated the Continental European project of 
European integration in the first place. 
Returning to the construction of a constitutive outside, it is important to note that it 
is because a negative identity cannot be represented in a direct way (that is, 
positively); it can only be represented indirectly, through an equivalence between 
its differential moments. Hence, an ambiguity penetrates every relation of 
equivalence because two terms, to be equivalent, must be different - otherwise, 
there will be a simple identity. 167 Hence, during the Second World War, to be 
equivalent in one respect, the European allies had to differ in other respects. 
Moreover, it must be emphasized that it is not only the moments articulated within 
the allied political discourse that are either differential or equivalential: the 
constitutive outside of Nazism, which the allied discourse constructed as 
equivalent with other evil forces, had a differential character in that it was 
considered to be one of many competing ideologies. Thus, all social identities are 
cross-points between the logic of equivalence and the logic of difference. 
166 In accordance with the predictions of Preston and the logic of spill-over of neo-functionalism, this 
economic threat will lead to European economic integration, and this process will inevitably lead to 
supranational political integration. However, even if this is so, in contrast to Preston's assumptions 
and in accordance with many of George's observations, there is no reason to believe that such 
capital ist-econorn ic concerns will spill-over into a new political and universal concern for democratic 
values. 167 
Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 128. 
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Furthermore, neither the logic of equivalence nor the logic of difference will 
dominate completely. 168 They mutually subvert each other. However, the 
undecidable relation between the two logics can be temporarily fixed in a 
determinate hierarchy. Which of the two logics achieves predominance in this 
hierarchy depends upon the political struggle over hegemony in this area. 169 Here, 
there are two extreme possible outcomes. 
First, the logic of equivalence may dominate. As a consequence, political plurality 
is significantly reduced. The space of differentiality is narrowed by a friend-enemy 
distinction, and thus, the discursive space is divided into camps. 170 The 
antagonism does not admit 'tertium quid'. For example, the logic of equivalence 
dominated within the allied discourse during the Second World War. The all- 
penetrating antagonism between the allies and their constitutive outside did not 
allow tertium quid. The underlying dictum was 'if you are not with us, you are 
against usf. 
Another example would be the discursive effects of the external threat of Eastern 
Communism upon the discourse of Western Capitalism. Once again, the space of 
differentiality was narrowed by the expansion of the 'friend-enemy' distinction. The 
discursive space was divided into camps. As Ettienne Tassin observes, the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945 subsequently divided Europe into 'democratic' and 
'socialist' systems. 171 It can also be argued that, in Britain, the external threat of 
Communism led to Continental Europe per se (and thus, the EU) being identified 
as the enemy because its social democratic ideas were perceived as equivalent to 
socialism by the neo-liberal hegemonic project of Thatcherism. Drawing upon the 
168 Ibid. p. 129. 169 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 126. 170 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 129-30. 
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broader divide that defined the identity of the West against the East during the 
Cold War, the Thatcherite project narrowed the space of differentiality by 
constructing an antagonism between British liberalism and the threat posed to 
them by European socialism. By constructing them within a chain of equivalence 
that represented 'anti-Britain', this neo-liberal project collapsed the differential 
character of Communism, socialism, and social democracy. As identified as the 
cause of these anti-British ideas, Continental Europe was negated as a moment 
of this equivalential chain. In due course, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, the process 
of European integration was also discursively constructed as equivalent to this 
anti-British threat, as reflected in the speeches of Powell and Thatcher. In 
confrontation with this constitutive outside, the differential character of Thatcherite 
ideas and policies was also collapsed as they became discursively constructed as 
equivalent to 'Britishness'. 
Second, the logic of difference may dominate. 172 Here, political plurality is 
significantly increased. An example would be the political development of the 
allied European powers after the defeat of the external threat of Nazism. Here, the 
differential space was expanded and thus, there was a true proliferation of 
legitimate differences. In due course, the plurality and often opposing ideas, 
meanings, and interests returned to the different national discourses of Europe. 
Thus, in sum, when the allied forces were fighting against Nazism, they united all 
the anti-fascist elements under the signs of 'peace ', 'freedom', and 'democracy'. 
Within the spontaneous experience of the unity of this fight, the crucial fact 
passed unnoticed that the same words used by all participants referred to the 
different discourses of Britain and Continental Europe. As ? -i2ek 
illustrates, this 
171 Tassin, E. (1992)'Europe: A Political CommunityT, in C. Mouffe (ed. ) Dimensions of Radical 
Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. (London: Verso). p. 171. 
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can also be explained by means of the Lacanian opposition, 'subject of the 
enunciated/subject of the enunciation': the same enunciated (demands for peace, 
freedom, democracy, and so forth) is supported by a different position of 
enunciation, is spoken from a totally different horizon of meaning. 173 Hence, after 
Nazism had been defeated, and the project for a unified, peaceful, free, and 
democratic Europe was instigated, there began a crucial hegemonic fight for the 
appropriation of these 'floating signifiers' at the supranational level. 
4.4. Social antagonism and dislocation 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, social antagonism is held to constitute the 
limits of every objectivity and can be depicted thus: 
A -. *-- anti-A 
Figure 2: Social antagonism as the negative external force that constitutes the limits of 
every objectivity174 
For this conception of social antagonism, it is the external enemy (for example, 
Continental Europe) that prevents identity 'A' (for example, the British identity) 
from becoming fully sutured. However, 2iz'ek observes that what is negated in 
175 
social antagonism is always already negated . 
That is, there is a force of 
negativity that is prior to social antagonism. This force is the 'Lacanian Real', the 
traumatic kernel that always resists symbolization. Thus, in Lacanian terms, it is 
172 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 130. 173 - 
174 
Zi2ek, S. (1 990b) Op. Cit. p. 6 1. 
175 
Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 128. 
See: 2i2ek, S. (1990a) Op. Cit. pp. 249-60. 
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necessary to distinguish antagonism as real from the social reality of the 
antagonistic fight. 
176 As Torfing depicts: 
ARC -*-- anti -A 
Figure 3: The Real as the internal negative force prior to the external negative force of social 
antagon iSM177 
Here, the bar through the 'A' signifies the traumatic effect of the Real. A-barred is 
negated by'anti-A', and the result is the negation of a negation. 178 
Zi2ek's Lacanian conception elucidates how social antagonism is constitutive of 
social identity. The point is not that 'we' are nothing but the drive to annihilate the 
antagonistic force that prevents us from achieving our full identity. Rather, the 
crucial point is that the antagonistic force is held responsible for the blockage of 
our full identity, and this permits the externalization of our constitutive lack as 
subjects to the negating Other, which thus becomes the positive embodiment of 
our self-blockage. 179 Hence, the British Eurosceptic struggle against European 
integration is necessarily filled out by the illusion that afterwards, when 'European 
interference' is retracted, Britain can achieve its full identity, realize its full 
potential, and so forth. 
Welcoming 2i2ek's constructive critique of their conception of social 
antagonism '180 Laclau agrees that social antagonism should be conceived as a 
discursive response to the dislocation of the social order. Thus, it is redefined in 
terms of the presence of a constitutive outside which, at the same time, 
176 bid. p. 2RIA 177 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 128. 178 Zi2ek, S. (1 990a) Op. Cit. p. 252. 
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constitutes and denies the identity of the inside-181 Hence, as illustrated below in 
Sections 5.1-2., social antagonism plays an important role in the construction of 
II the spatiality of myths' and 'social imaginaries . 
In sum, discourse theory has shifted its emphasis from the conception of social 
antagonism as dislocation per se to the affirmation of social antagonism as a 
discursive response to dislocation. Moreover, it is now argued that a severe 
dislocation may not necessarily be responded to by the construction of a social 
antagonism, by the detection of the cause of the dislocation serving as an 
enemy. 182 However, emphasis upon the 'stabilizing function' of social antagonism 
does not expel social antagonism as a source of dislocation. Thus, every identity 
is dislocated insofar as it depends on an outside that both denies that identity, and 
at the same time, provides its condition of possibility. 183 Consequently, social 
antagonism is double-edged because it constitutes and sustains identity by 
positing a threat to it. For instance, in Britain, the threat of an envisaged intruding 
Continental European 'socialist super-state' helps unify and sustain a British 
identity based upon the contradictory liberal notion of a limited and national 
sovereign state. However, such antagonistic forces can cease to have a 
stabilizing function and become a major source of dislocation. 
This chapter will now examine the discourse-theoretical approach to ideology. 
Discourse theory questions orthodox conceptions and develops an alternative 
approach in which ideology is conceived in terms of the construction of particular 
discursive forms within a totalizing horizon with universalist pretensions. 184 
Therefore, this examination will expose the limitations of previous analyses of 
179 Ibid. p. 253. 180 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. P. xvi. 181 Ibid. p. 17. 182 See: Torfing, J. (1999) OP. Cit. P. 131. 
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British Euroscepticism as an ideological phenomenon 185 , as well as provide an 
alternative understanding. It will also address the concern that discourse theory 
lacks a critical and normative edge because it rejects the traditional Marxist 
conception of ideology as a form of 'false consciousness'. As a consequence, 
there has been the additional concern that it cannot criticise existing discourses or 
ask where social ideas actually hail from. 186 
5.0. The question of ideoloq 
For Laclau and Mouffe, ideology plays a crucial role in the construction of 
hegemonic discourse because the formation of a resilient 'metaphorical' 
hegemony necessitates an ideological closure. An examination of this function of 
ideology questions the traditional Marxist conception. 187 As Torfing illustrates, 
there are two classical Marxist approaches to ideology that tend to be combined. 
First, ideology is conceived as a particular 'supranational level' within the social 
totality, and second, it is identified as false consciousness. 188 Inspired by post- 
structuralism, both these approaches are held to be problematic because of their 
essentialist grounding of 'society' and 'social agency'. That is, post-structuralism 
rejects the essentialist conception of 'society' as a unitary, fully intelligible, 
structural totality, divided into a base and superstructure. In contrast, the structural 
totality is always surrounded by an 'excess of meaning' which it cannot master. 
183 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 39. 184 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 114. 185 For example, as indicated above and described in Chapter 2, Preston suggests that British 
Euroscepticism reflects the success of an 'official' ideology, a 'false' consciousness that has 
obscured the 'reality'of the ruling class following its own interests to the detriment of economic and 
ýolitical development. See, for example: Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 21-3,29-31175,197. 86 On this question, see also: Eagleton T. (1991) Ideology. An Introduction. (London: Verso). p. 
219; Howarth. D. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 131; Howarth. D. (2000) Op. Cit. pp. 122-4, and Norris, C. 
Q179T903r)f 
. 
The Truth about Postmodernism. (Oxford: Blackwell). pp. 289-92. 
188 ing, 
J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 113. 
Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 89. 
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Thus, 'society' as a unitary and intelligible object that grounds its own partial 
process is an impossibility. 
189 
In addition: 
The same excess of meaning, the same precarious character of any 
structuration that we find in the domain of the social order, is also to be 
found in the domain of subjectivity. 190 
Hence, also rejected is the essentialist notion of 'social agency' as a 'self-identical 
Subject' endowed with a set of objective interests on the basis of which the actual 
Subject can be judged. Thus, the theoretical basis of the Marxist concept of 'false 
consciousness' collapses when we attempt to specify the real, non-ideological 
identity of the Subject and discover nothing but the kaleidoscopic movement of 
differences. 191 
To provide a more instructive anti-essentialist conception of ideology, discourse 
theory looks to the Lacanian psychoanalytical approach developed by 2iZ'ek. 192 
Following 2i2ek, for Laclau, the problem with the Marxist conception of ideology is 
that the 'extra-ideological' reality is always already ideological. We have no access 
to the 'real world' except through its construction as a discursive form with more or 
less ideological systems of representation. Rejection of the possibility of an 
objective world of real essences against which we can measure and finally 
demask ideological forms of representations robs the Marxist concept of ideology 
193 
of its meaning . 
189 
id. p. 90. 190 bid. p. 92. 191 Torfing, J. (1999) qp. Cit. p. 113. 192 See, for example: Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. See also: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 113-118. 193 See: Laclau, E. (1996) 'The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology', Joumal of 
Political Ideologies. Volume 1, No. 3. pp. 210-3. 
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However, the rejection of essentialist conceptions of 'society' and 'social agency, 
as objective essences does not imply that the concept of ideology should be 
abandoned. 194 Indeed, the concept is retained precisely because both society and 
social agency are frequently misconceived as fully constituted essential unities. It 
is maintained in an inverted sense of the 'non-recognition of the precarious 
character of any positivity, of the impossibility of any ultimate suturei. 195 Any 
attempt to expand a hegemonic discourse necessarily invokes a totalizing 
reduction of the infinite play of meaning. The ideological consists precisely in the 
discursive forms seeking to construct society and social agency as decidable 
within a totalizing horizon that projects on to a particular discursive form an 
impossible fullness and transparency. The ideological is 'the will' to totality of any 
totalizing discourse. 196 As Laclau asserts, the operation of closure is impossible 
but also necessary: it is impossible because of the constitutive dislocation which 
lies in the heart of any structural arrangement, and it is necessary because there 
would be no meaning at all without that fictitious fixing of meaning. 197 
Thus, for example, it follows that 'epiphenomenalism' and 'class reductionism I 
provide ideological support for Marxism. 198 That is, the Marxist notion of the self- 
developing economic substratum (epiphenomenalism) and a privileged social 
class (class reductionism), which together will cause a full emancipated society, 
clearly involves ideological total ization. 199 Another example of such ideological 
totalization is the Western European belief that the unfettered rule of the capitalist 
, 200 market mechanism will solve the problems identified as'Euro-sclerosis . 
194 See: Howarth. D. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 131, Howarth. D. (2000) Op. Cit. pp. 122-4. 
195 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 92. 196 Ibid. 
197 Laclau, E. (11996) Op. Cit. p. 205. 198 The concepts 'epiphenomenal ism' and 'class reductionism'are examined in: Torfing, J. (1999) 
Op. Cit. pp. 20-26,299,301. 190 Ibid. p. 114. 
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The discourse-theoretical conception of ideology informs further important 
, 201 functions, those of 'myths' and 'social imaginaries . 
5.1. Myths 
A myth is a principle of reading of a given situation. 202 The condition for the 
emergence of myth is structural dislocation, and the function of myth is to suture 
the dislocated space by constructing a new space of representation. 203 That is, the 
role of myth is hegemonic: 'it involves forming a new objectivity by means of the 
, 204 rearticulation of the dislocated elements . Thus, the gap opened 
by the 
dislocation of a structure will be filled by emerging hegemonic projects that have 
the character of myths. 
Laclau claims that myths are constitutive of any possible society: 
... any space formed as a principle 
for the reordering of a dislocated 
structure's elements is mythical. Its mythical character is given by its 
radical discontinuity with the dislocations of the dominant structural 205 forms 
. 
For example, the welfare state was a myth aimed at reconstructing the operation 
206 
of capitalist societies following the Great Depression . Relevant to this research, 
British 'parliamentary sovereignty' and 'the British nation' are myths that have 
upheld British political legitimacy, economic stability and the social order in the 
face of the decline of the British Empire and Britain's dominant and independent 
role in the global economy. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 61-5. 202 Ibid. p. 61. 203 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 115,303. 204 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 61. 205 Ibid. p. 67. 206 
Ibid. 
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However, myths are more than a description of a utopia in the sense of a blueprint 
for an achieved or achievable society. The concrete or literal content of myth 
represents something different from itself: the very principle of a fully achieved 
literal ity. 
207 That is, myth is a metaphor for an absent fullness -a fullness that 
cannot be realized at present. 208 The metaphoric character of myth permits 
expression of the very form of fullness itself beyond any concrete or literal 
content. 
209 The indeterminateness of the expression of fullness opens a space for 
the inverted representation of all kinds of structural dislocation. That is, myth 
tends to provide a surface on which unsatisfied demands are inscribed. If the 
surface of inscription is hegemonized by what is inscribed upon it, then the 
moment of inscription will be eliminated in favour of the literality of what is 
inscribed. If instead the expression of the every form of fullness continues to 
dominate, it becomes the unlimited horizon of any social demand. Thus, myth is 
transformed into a Isocial imaginary ,. 
210 
5.2. Social imaginaries 
A social imaginary is a horizon in the sense that it is not one object among others, 
but rather the condition of possibility for the emergence of any object . 
21 1 For 
example, Christian millennium, the concept of 'progress' held by the 
Enlightenment and positivism, and the communist dream of a classless society, 
are all social imaginaries. As such, a social imaginary is a myth in which the 
fullness of the surface of inscription continues to dominate. Consequently, the 
somewhat limited myth is transformed into an unlimited horizon for the inscription 
207 See: Ibid. p. 63. 208 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 115- 209 Ibid. 
210 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 63-4. 211 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 115. 
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of any social demand. 212 To elucidate, as a hegemonic strategy gains authority, 
more and more subject positions are reconstructed with reference to its logic. 
Thus, it becomes the framework through which more and more identifications 
become possible. At its highest moment of authority, it shifts from being a 'myth' 
to being a 'social imaginary' in the sense that it is no longer just a list of political 
positions, a bloc of concrete social agents, or one alternative to many, but the only 
possible alternative to total chaos. 213 Indeed, the success of a hegemonic project 
depends on its ability to operate as a social imaginary in this way. 
Moreover, as a hegemonic strategy becomes a social imaginary, it becomes 
embodied in different key institutions, and thus, it ensures the incitement of 
identifications within its framework in as many different sites in the social as 
possible. This is a crucial aspect of its operation: the constitution of a social 
identity is an act of power and identity as such is power. 214 To the extent that a 
hegemonic discourse becomes an institutionalized horizon, it rules out alternative 
frameworks for identification as increasingly illegitimate, immoral, irrational and 
finally, incoherent. 215 Thus, institutionalization always involves an exercise of 
power: the brutal exclusion - whether concealed or explicit - of alternative 
frameworks. 
Myths and social imaginaries conceptualize the ideological forms of discourse that 
aim to construct society and social agency as positive and fully sutured 
identities. 216 Social imaginaries provide a horizon for meaning and action that is 
structured by tendentially empty and essentially ambiguous signifierS217, such as 
'democracy', 'liberty', 'peace, 'freedom', 'order', 'the nation', 'the people', 'the 
212 Ibid. p. 305. 213 Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 171. 
214 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 31. 
215 Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 172. 
216 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 115. 
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national interest', revolution, 'unity', 'European union', and so forth. At a less 
ambitious level, myth provides a 'reading principle', embodied in a set of norms, 
values, and so forth, which helps to constitute a new objectivity. For both, the 
intervention of an external hegemonic principle would lead to the construction of a 
totalizing and reductive discourse that would seek a metaphysical closure. Hence, 
the essentializing gesture of ideology involves the recognition of the contingent 
character of any positivity and of the impossibility of any final suture. That is, 
ideology involves the forgetting of the undecidability that prevents closure and 
ensures the limited and precarious nature of the decidable forms of social identity. 
It constructs the 'real world' as a set of fully constituted essences and denies that 
these essences are contingent results of political decisions taken in an 
218 
undecidable terrain . 
5.3. Ideology and social antagonism 
The discourse-theoretical conception of 'social antagonism' is crucial to the 
construction and destruction of the spatiality of myths and social imaginaries. As 
Laclau explains, myths and social imaginaries aim to reconcile the social field in 
the face of structural dislocation, which involves 'the disruption of the structure by 
forces operating outside it' . 
219 They provide a homogeneous space of 
representation because all forces of negativity have become displaced to an 
outside that is both constitutive and subversive of the unity of the inside. 
However, myths and social imaginaries fail to function as surfaces of inscription 
as soon as they are put into question by external events: 'For longer or shorter 
periods they have a certain elasticity beyond which we witness their inexorable 
217 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 65. 218 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. PP- 115-6. 
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decline 1.220 Their final breakdown occurs when the spatial forms of representation 
and the discursive structure they support are confronted with a set of 
undomesticable events. The presence of events that can neither be symbolized 
by the discursive formation nor inscribed at the level of the social imaginary, 
undermines the social order precisely because its ability to sustain order is 
jeopardized . 
221 For example, the persistence of low economic growth rates led to 
the questioning of the institutional matrix of the modern welfare state. 222 Similarly, 
and analogous to the predictions of Preston and neo-functionalist accounts, 
Britain may finally accept supranational European integration if the process of 
globalisation undermines the British myths of political and economic sovereignty. 
5.4. Ideological fantasies 
The concept of social antagonism also plays a crucial role'in the development of 
the discourse-theoretical conceptual couplet of ideology and 'ideological 
fantaSY'223 . As Zi2ek explains, ideology involves a certain mis- or non-recognition 
224 
on the part of subjects . Here, the point 
is not that people possess a distorted 
representation of reality, because the extra-ideological reality is always already 
ideological: we do not have any access to the real world except through its 
construction as a discursive form within more or less ideological systems of 
representation. As Peter Sloterdijk argues, nor is the point that most people 
possess a distorted representation of reality because many people no longer trust 
ideological truths or take ideological propositions seriou Sly. 
225 Rather, the point is 
that even when we keep an ironical distance from totalizing ideological 
219 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 50. 220 Ibid. p. 67. 221 Torfing, J. (1999) OP. Cit. P. 130. 222 Ibid. 
223 For 2i2ek, ideological fantasies structure what we call reality and determine the contours of 
desire. (Kay, S. (2003) Op. Cit. P. 163. ) 224 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 32-3. 
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representations, we still act according to them. That is, the illusion is not on the 
side of knowledge, but on the side of what people are doing. As Zi2ek explains: 
* ", what 
they overlook, what they misrecognize, is not the reality but the 
illusion which is structuring their reality, their real social activity. They 
know very well how things really are, but still they are doing it as if they 
did not know. The illusion is therefore double: it consists in overlooking 
the illusion which is structuring our real, effective relationship with 
reality. And this overlooked, unconscious illusion may be called the 
ideological fantaSy. 226 
Thus, Ziz'ek claims that we act 'as if the totalizing and reductive forms of ideology 
are true and serious, although we know that they are not. In contrast to Marx's 
definition of ideology, 'They do not know it, but they are doing it', 227 Zi2ek argues 
that 'They know that, in their activity, they are following an illusion, but still they 
are doing it'. 228 For example, we already know that our idea of freedom is masking 
a particular form of exploitation, but we still continue to follow this idea of freedom. 
For Zi2ek, the crucial point is that ideological fantasy is a means for an ideology to 
take its own failure into account in advance . 
229At the level of knowledge, 
ideological fantasy compensates for the observation that people are not 
convinced by the totalizing and reductive propositions of ideology. The social is 
structured around a constitutive impossibility and is traversed by social 
antagonisms. The function of ideological fantasy is to mask the void opened by 
the impossible and antagonistic character of society, which can neither be 
integrated into the symbolic order nor represented at the level of the imaginary. 230 
225 See: Sloterdijk, P. (11983) Kritik der Zynischen Vemuft. (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp). 226 - 
227 
Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. pp. 32-3. 
Marx provided this elementary definition of ideology ('Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es') in 
Marx, K. (11977) [1867-94] Capital, Volume 1. (London: Lawrence & Wishart). As referred to and 
referenced in: Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 28,234. 228 
bid. P. 33. 229 
Ibid. p. 126. 230 Ibid. p. 126-7. 
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That is, ideological fantasy is the safety net of ideology and thus, provides the 
ultimate support of 'reality ,. 
231 
Therefore, we act 'as if, not because it is rational, but because the masking of the 
failure of ideology allows us to be freed from facing up to the impossible and 
antagonistic character of the social. This reveals ideological fantasy as a crucial 
counterpart to the concept of social antagonism: ideological fantasy is precisely 
the way the antagonistic fissure is masked. That is, ideological fantasy is a means 
for an ideology to take its own failure into account in advance. 232 As Laclau and 
Mouffe propose, 'Society doesn't exist': the social is always an inconsistent field 
structured around a constitutive possibility, traversed by an antagonism. This 
proposition implies that every process of identification conferring upon us a fixed 
socio-symbolic identity is ultimately doomed to fail. The function of ideological 
fantasy is to mask this inconsistency, the fact that 'Society doesn't exist', and thus, 
233 to compensate us for the failed identification . 
In sum, following Lacan, the last support of what we call 'reality' is fantasy. 234 In 
the opposition between dream and reality, the Lacanian thesis contends that 
fantasy is on the side of reality: it is the support that gives consistency to what we 
call real ity. 
235 'Reality' is a fantasy-construction that enables us to mask the Real 
of our desire. 236 Zi2ek demonstrates that it is the same with ideology: 
Ideology is not a dreamlike illusion that we build to escape 
insupportable reality; in its basic dimension it is a fantasy-construction 
which serves as a support for our 'reality' itself: an 'illusion' which 
structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks some 237 insupportable, real, impossible kernel. 
231 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 117. 232 - 
233 
Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 126. 
234 
See: Ibid. p. 127. 
235 
id. p 47. 
236 
Ibid. p 44. 
237 
ýbid. p. 45. See: Lacan, J. (1979) [1977]. Op. Cit. Chapters 5-6. pp. 53-78. 
Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p 45. 
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This proposition is conceptualized by Laclau and Mouffe as 'antagonism': a 
traumatic social division that cannot be symbolized. Thus, the function of ideology 
is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality 
itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel. Hence, the difference with 
Marxism is thus: in the predominant Marxist perspective the ideological gaze is a 
partial gaze overlooking the totality of social relations, whereas in the Lacanian 
perspective, ideology rather designates a totality set on effacing the traces of its 
own impoSSibilit Y. 
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In all, this Lacanian approach has major implications for the critique of ideology, 
and thus, the discourse-theoretical approach to British Euroscepticism developed 
by this thesis. The main consequence of the conceptual couplet of ideology and 
ideological fantasy is that the political critique of ideology must involve more than 
simply 'demonstrating how a given ideological field is a result of a montage of 
heterogeneous "floating signifiers", of their totalization through the intervention of 
certain "nodal points"' . 
239 Rather, in order to undermine the grip of ideology, we 
need to account for how ideology implies, manipulates and produces a pre- 
ideological 'enjoyment, 240 structured in fantaSy. 24'That is, we must expose the 
negative properties attributed to 'Europe' to be nothing but a response to the 
constitutive impossibility of the social, which produces in advance the ultimate 
failure of ideology. To this end, we must invert the linking of causality as perceived 
242 by the gaze of ideological edifices . 
238 Ibid. p. 49. 239 Ibid. p. 125. 240 See: Ibid. pp. 124-6; 2i2ek, S. (1990b) Op. Cit. pp. 51-7, and Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 117- 
8 and Zi2ek, S. (1990b) Op. Cit. pp. 51-52. See also: Kay, S. (2003) Op. Cit. pp. 30,33,151,167. 2ý1 ý 
242 
Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 125. 
See: Ibid. p. 127. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated that 'discourse', 'hegemony', and 'social antagonism' 
are the key conceptual and analytical tools of a discourse-theoretical approach to 
political research. With regard to 'discourse', following Derrida, this concept was 
defined as a decentred structure in which meaning is constantly negotiated and 
constructed. As discourse is conceived in terms of an ensemble of signifying 
sequences, both physical objects and social practices are meaningful parts of 
discourse. Similar to Wittgenstein's concept of language-games, the concept of 
discourse designates the constitution of a signifying order that is not reducible to 
243 its linguistic or its extra-linguistic aspects . 
Discourse theory also emphasizes that the meaning-given relations of discourse 
244 
are social and not logical or natural . To elucidate, Hegelian dialectics conceives 
the connection between different notions as part of the progressive unfolding of 
Reason, while the naturalist scheme conceives the relations between different 
identities as given by nature (that is, the 'material conditions of life'). Both these 
conceptions deny the presence of a discursive terrain for the social construction 
of our world. All worldly phenomena have an essence that is there for us to 
discover (although we might not have direct access to it). 
In contrast to such essentialist conceptions of identity, discourse theory claims 
that social identity is constructed in and through 'hegemonic practices' of 
articulation, which partially fix the meaning of social identities by inscribing them in 
the differential system of a particular discourse. Here, the word 'hegemonic' in the 
term 'hegemonic practices' means hegemonic in intent rather than hegemonic in 
243 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1987) Op. Cit. pp. 82-3. 
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effect. Hence, 'hegemonic practices' refers to attempts to dis- and re-articulate 
social elements in and through antagonistic struggles in order to become 
hegemonic. As we have seen, 'hegemony' is the achievement of such leadership 
by providing a persuasive and credible redescriPtion of the world through the 
expansion of a discourse that partially fixes meaning around nodal points. 
The discourse-theoretical approach also emphasizes that hegemonic practices 
are constitutive of all social identity. Here, the crucial point is that the discourse- 
theoretical conception of hegemony leads to the affirmation of the irreducible and 
constitutive character of difference and thus, to the abandoning of the essentialist 
reduction of difference to identity. Hence, the starting point of political analysis is 
'difference': identity is a result of the hegemonization of a field of differential 
subject positions, rather than an embodiment of a pregiven, paradigmatic interest 
under which a whole lot of other interests and identities can be subsumed. 
Thus, it can be concluded that, whereas hegemonic practices of articulation 
constitute discourse, the irreducible play of signification within discourse provides 
the condition of possibility of hegemonic practices. This suggests that there is no 
room for hegemonic practices of articulation within a fully sutured structure where 
the play of signification is suppressed by the founding centre. 'Articulation' 
presupposes the constitutive unfixity of discourse - an unfixity affirmed by the 
proposition that, in the absence of a transcendental signified, the hegemonic 
practices of articulation result only in a partial fixation of meaning. In sum, the 
discourse-theoretical concepts of discourse and hegemony are mutually 
conditioned in the sense that hegemonic practice shapes and reshapes 
244 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1982) 'Recasting Marxism: Hegemony and New Political Movements', 
Socialist Review, Volume 12, November. p. 98. 
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discourse, which in turn, provides the conditions of possibility for hegemonic 
articulation. 
In addition, both discourse and hegemony are mutually conditioned by the 
discourse-theoretical concept of 'social antagonism'. Social antagonisms are 
discursively constructed through hegemonic practices of articulation that unify 
discourse. As was illustrated, following Foucault, the concept of hegemony 
accounts for the unity of discourse in terms of a 'regularity of dispersiong. 
However, social antagonism establishes the constitutive limits of discourse, as 
well as distinguishing hegemonic articulations from other articulations. That is, the 
boundaries of a particular discourse are constructed by the exclusion of a 
discursive exteriority that threatens the particular discourse in question. The 
exclusion of such an antagonistic force is the sine qua non of hegemonic 
practices of articulation. 
In social antagonism, this chapter has shown how 'the Other' prevents identity 
from being fully constituted. As identity is threatened by an antagonistic force, 
social antagonism puts into question any objectivity. That is, social antagonism 
constitutes the limits of every objectivity, which is revealed as partial and 
precarious objectification. Hence, if social antagonism helps to establish the 
boundaries of the discursive formation of society, it also, at the same time, 
prevents society from constituting an objective, rational and fully intelligible reality. 
Thus, social antagonism is simultaneously the condition of possibility and the 
condition of impossibility of society. 
However, it is difficult to provide a clear definition of social antagonism because it 
collapses the differential aspect of language. It can only exists as a metaphorical 
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disruption of 'natural' language. This explains why social science can help explain 
the conditions of possibility of social antagonism, but fails to account for social 
antagonism as such. Social antagonism involves a loss of meaning that cannot be 
symbolized. In place of a clear definition, social antagonism is depicted as: A- 
anti-A. Here, identity 'A' is threatened by the antagonistic force 'anti-A'. The result 
is the subversion of the identity W. For example, and as this thesis illustrates in 
Chapter 5, the British identity is subverted by the threatening antagonizing force of 
Continental Europe and the process of European integration. 
We now turn to Part //, which applies these discourse-theoretical concepts to the 
hypotheses of this thesis. Although it is acknowledged that these concepts are 
inter-related and mutually conditioned, Chapter 4 focuses predominantly upon the 
concept of 'discourse', and Chapter 5 upon Isocial antagonism'. 
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Part 11 
A Discourse-Theoretical Approach 
Chapter Four 
The Floating Signifiers of Europe 
"Hurry into being, integrated Europe of a myriad of regions, ruled by the 
golden thumb of subsidiarity, where no state need assert itself by 
building yet another set of borders". ' 
Zdena Tomin. 
Introduction 
As Chapter 2 illustrated, previous approaches have observed various differences 
in ideas and interests between Britain and Continental Europe that have 
obstructed the process of European (political) integration. However, these 
analyses have ignored how this divergence reflects a difference in (hegemonic) 
discourse that is also reflected in a difference in meanings. Hence, in an 
examination of the debate upon the Maastricht Treaty (or 'Treaty on European 
Union' (TEU)) in 1991-3, this chapter will apply a discourse-theoretical approach 
to demonstrate how the process of European integration has been obstructed 
because Britain and Continental Europe have different discourses, and thus, 
conflicting understandings of the same concepts and principles. It is also 
1 Tomin, Z. (1992) The Independent, 29 December. Zdena Tomin is a novelist and former 
spokesperson for the Czech dissident group, Charter 77. 
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observed that successful European integration depends upon the way that 
EU initiatives resonate with these different discourses. In this sense, Britain has 
been perceived as an awkward or irrational partner because British discourse 
conflicts with those of Continental European discourse which tend to be embodied 
within the initiatives for European union. However, before this analysis begins, it is 
instructive to provide an overview of the British obstruction to European 
integration that culminated in its resistance to the political initiatives of the TEU. 
1.0. An overview of the British obstruction to European political integration 
With regard to European (political) integration, from the time of Britain's 
membership of the EC to the agreement upon the TEU, the British government 
had opposed European Political Union (EPU), a stronger European Parliament 
(EP), the social charter/chapter, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 
and majority voting, especially in social and political spheres. Britain had 
defended decision-making by the veto rather than the vote in the European 
Council, and had tended to oppose the introduction of EC legislation by majority 
voting or'qualified majority voting' (QMV) in favour of unanimity. 
Britain had favoured unanimity rather than QMV because the latter would 
represent a move away from intergovernmental ism and towards supranationalism 
since it would provide the Commission with greater leverage in its dealings with 
the Council, and thus, it would have greater leverage over the national interests of 
member states. In addition, an increase in majority voting over the national veto 
and unanimity would represent a move towards the 'collectivist' discourse of 
Continental European republican democracy. That is, in opposition to the 
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principles of liberal individualism, majority voting allows the Council to 
become more than the aggregate of the individual member states. Hence, in 
accordance with the functionalist claims of Walter Hallstein, the first President of 
the Commission, the Council would have become a supranational 'institution of 
the Community' rather than a liberal-individualist or intergovernmental 'conference 
of governments ,. 
Thus, an increase in majority voting produces a 'collectivist' and supranational 
institutional framework in two ways. First, it increases the leverage of the 
Commission over the Council because it would make it harder for the Council to 
reject its proposals. Thus, individual national interests would not obstruct 
proposals made in the supranational and collective interest of Europe. Second, as 
for Commission proposals, the decisions of the Council would reflect the collective 
and supranational European interest. The British preference for unanimity and the 
national veto as opposed to majority voting is particularly strong in relation to 
political and social policy. Britain has upheld the veto and unanimity to defend 
itself from EC political and social proposals that have tended to embody the 
conflicting political and social principles of Continental Europe, as examined 
below. 
In contrast, Continental European countries had sought national rather than 
collective Community solutions to the economic recession of the 1970s. The 
perceived failure of these national strategies led to a renewed impetus for the 
political and supranational integration of Europe in order to develop a more 
collective and social democratic approach to economic recovery. However, in the 
mid-1970s, following the first enlargement of the EC with the membership of 
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Britain and Denmark, this new initiative was obstructed because these new 
members opposed majority voting. However, the legislative situation improved 
once again in the early 1980s as political and economic pressures mounted to 
complete the SEA. Many Community reports and proposals - from 'Tindemans' 
(1975) to the 'Three Wise Men' (1979) to 'Genscher-Colombo' (1981) - called for 
the use of the vote rather than the national veto in the Council as a step towards a 
more collective approach to international economic growth. As Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher declared in November 1981: 
The economic problems now confronting us go to the roots of our 
democracies and of the European Community. Nevertheless, we 
cannot focus our efforts solely upon economic issues. We must, 
instead, set our sights on the grand design of the political unification of 
Europe, for it is from that design that we shall draw the strength to act 
as one and take decisions, on economic matters and others, which will 3 
not simply paper over the cracks but provide forward-looking solutions . 
Such a strategy was evident within the draft TEU that was adopted by the EP 
(February 1984 ). 4 However, Britain did not welcome the political dimension of this 
draft, such as references to 'European union' and 'federalism'; to strengthening 
the powers of the EP; increasing the scope of QMV in the Council, and to more 
far-reaching provisions in the social sphere. In contrast to the Commission and 
other member states, the British neo-liberal (hegemonic) project held that such a 
perspective was regressive rather than progressive - it reflected the social 
democratic causes of economic crisis rather than a possible cure. For the British 
Government, neo-liberalism was the only solution for economic recovery, and 
thus, the EU should merely represent an open economic market of competing 
individual member states rather than an intervening, centralised (or 'federalist'), 
and bureaucratic social democratic 'superstate'. Thus, it is evident that 
international economic problems had invoked a renewed EC social democratic 
Hallstein, W. (1970) LlEurope Inachev6e (Paris: Robert Laffont) p. 77. 
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strategy for the political and supranational integration of the EC, but as a 
result, an increase in British Euroscepticism. 
For Britain, the greatest constitutional impact of the ratified TEU was that it 
extended the scope of EC legislation introduced by QMV in the Council. As 
developed further in Chapter 5, this move represented a significant supranational 
threat to British neo-liberalism and to national and parliamentary sovereignty. As 
Lady Thatcher declared: 
By extending EC majority voting, it (the TEU) will undermine our 
parliamenta V and legal institutions, both far older than those in the 
Community. 
Here, as for Winston Churchill below, we can also observe the longstanding 
conservative notion that institutions that have lasted the test of time are somehow 
necessarily better. 
Returning to the TEU, Britain had also conceded to increasing the powers of the 
EP. Against the British preference for intergovernmental cooperation, the EP 
represents a supranational element of the EU framework, with members aligned 
on a political rather than a national basis. Moreover, in contrast to British liberal 
interests, the Christian Democrats (officially, the 'Group of the European People's 
Party') and Socialist groups have predominated over the Liberals in the EP, and 
both have provided the bulk of the presidents. Contributing to their success, both 
are the only two groups that include individual politicians from every member 
state. 
3 Bulletin of the European Communities, 11 - 198 1, point 1.2.2. 4 Bulletin oil' the European Communities, 2-1984, point 1.6.1. 5 Thatcher, M. (1993) Speech in The House of Lords. 7 June. 
6 See: Dinan, D. (11994) Ever Closer Union? (London: Macmillan). pp. 273-7. 
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The EP acquired an enhanced role in Community affairs and greater 
legislative power through extensive use of the co-decision procedure. However, 
Britain had successfully resisted pressure to take decisions on foreign policy by 
majority voting, and only limited moves towards majority voting in other areas 
were conceded. For example, as described below, all but Britain decided to take 
majority voting into the social field. In all, the balance between the supranational 
and intergovernmental elements had been maintained because the Council and 
the Parliament gained most, and the Commission gained least. 
A discourse-theoretical approach to this subject will now be presented. This 
chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 2 will illustrate how the diverging 
discourses of Britain and Continental Europe have led to diverging 
understandings of 'liberal democracy'. Section 3 will examine the EC debate 
(1991-3) to demonstrate how this divergence in discourse equally explains the 
diverging understandings of the principle of 'subsidiarity', and thus, of 'European 
union'. The following chapter will explain why these discourses are different and 
opposed, and why British discourse is opposed to European political integration 
as a consequence. 
2.0. Liberal democracy as a discursive formation 
This section will begin by illustrating that 'liberal democracy' is a contingent 
articulation of liberalism and democracy, and thus, a 'discursive formation'. A 
discursive formation is a result of the articulation of a variety of discourses into a 
relatively unified whole. Hence, liberal democracy is a discursive formation 
because it consists of a variety of different discourses that have been articulated 
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together. 7 This observation will be examined in regard to the different and 
opposing articulations of liberal democracy in Britain and Continental Europe. 
The work of C. B. Macpherson is instructive here because it introduced the 
'radical contextual ization' to the question of democraCy. 8 That is, Macpherson 
demonstrated that the links between components of a theoretical structure or a 
C worldview' are contingent rather than necessary or logically required. Thus, 
Macpherson exposed the contingent articulation of democracy and liberalism, the 
unexpressed assumptions of liberal theory that govern its discursive sequences, 
and finally, the other ways in which democracy could be conceived and articulated 
to totalizing discourses beyond those of Western liberalism. 9 As he asserts, 
'democracy has become an ambiguous thing, with different meanings - even 
apparently opposite meanings - for different peoples'. 
10 As this chapter illustrates, 
in the EC, 'democracy' is a 'floating signifier' overflowed with meaning because it 
is articulated differently within the different (hegemonic) discourses of the member 
states. 
Similarly, liberalism has never constituted a unified and consistent doctrine. 
Rather, it has represented an amalgam of different doctrines, including the 'Recht 
Staat', the defence of individual freedom and basic rights, the recognition of 
pluralism, representative government, the separation of powers, the limitation of 
the role of the state, rationalistic individualism, and capitalist market economy. 
7 Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe andbtek. (Oxford, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell. ) p. 300. 8 Laclau, E (1993) 'The Signifiers of Democracy', in: J. H. Carens (ed. ) Democracy and Possessive 
Individualism. (New York: State University of New York Press). p. 221. 9 Ibid. 
10 Macpherson, C. B. (1966) The Real World of Democracy. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). p. 2. 
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In the sense of representative government, liberalism existed for a long 
period without being democratic in any possible sense of the term. " Democracy 
emerged later as a discourse of popular sovereignty, universal suffrage and 
equality. For a long while, the two terms opposed each other as democracy was 
identified with mob rule and carried a pejorative meaning. 12 As Macpherson 
observes: 
Democracy used to be a bad word. Everybody who was anybody knew 
that democracy, in its original sense of rule by the people or 
government in accordance with the will of the bulk of the people, would 
be a bad thing - fatal to individual freedom and to all the graces of 
civilized living. That was the position taken by pretty nearly all men (sic. ) 
of intelligence to about a hundred years ago. 13 
Indeed, it was only through a long process, which embraced the whole Nineteenth 
Century and the beginning of the Twentieth Century, that the contingent 
articulation of liberalism and democracy as 'liberal democracy' was progressively 
established. However, this contingent articulation has not produced a harmonious 
unity: a tension persists between the traditional liberal principles of 'pluralism', 
'individualism' and 'freedom' and the democratic principles of 'unity', 'community' 
I and 'equality . 
Significant to our understanding of British Euroscepticism, this tension is reflected 
in a conflict between British and Continental European discourse. Indeed, extant 
British and Continental European hegemonic forces responded differently to the 
conflict between liberalism and democracy, and as a consequence, British 
hegemonic discourse reflects a liberal democratic, or more precisely, a liberal- 
individualist articulation, and Continental European hegemonic discourse reflects 
a liberal democratic articulation. As Section 3 demonstrates, but previous 
11 Laclau, E. (1993) Op. Cit. p. 222. 12 Ibid. 
13 Macpherson, C. B. (1966) Op. Cit. p. 1 
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research has ignored, this conflict in discourse has been a crucial obstruction 
to the process of European integration. 
2.1. Pluralism and unity 
For Liberal democracy, there is a conflict between the liberal principle of 
'pluralism' and the need for the social and political 'unity' of democratic society. 
The principle of pluralism cannot reign unchallenged, as a (minimum) consensus 
concerning the values informing a mode of societal coexistence is required. 14 
Here, the problem is that a consensus based upon a comprehensive moral ideal 
would obstruct the principle of pluralism, as it would arbitrarily privilege a particular 
conception of the common good. British discourse opposes such an assertion of a 
common good in its understanding of a Hobbesian modus vivendi in terms of a 
consensus on a set of institutional procedures based upon self-interest. 
2.2. Individualism and communitarianism 
For this thesis, the crucial point is that there is a conflict between the moral and 
ontological 'individualism' of liberalism and the 'communitarianism' implicit in 
democratic theory. For example, the democratic (and Continental European) 
notion of 'popular sovereignty' refers to the existence of a 'collective will' that is 
more than the aggregate of individual wills and whose realization will often conflict 
with some of these individual WillS. 
15 It is precisely the politics of collective will 
formation, hinging upon the construction of antagonistic relations between 
'friends' and 'enemies', that conflicts with liberal-ind ivid ual ism and thus, with 
14 Torfing, J (1999) Op. Cit. p. 250. 15 Ibid. p. 251. 
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British (hegemonic) discourse. For example, Britain upholds a notion of 
'parliamentary sovereignty' which refers to the liberal-individualist conception of an 
aggregate of atomized and competing individuals. It perceives the individual as 
the starting point and destination of social action, and politics is consequently 
defined as the selfish pursuit of private interest. 16 As liberalism is essentially a 
theory of atomistic individualism, it is radically incompatible with the 
communitarian aspect of democracy implicit within Continental European 
discourse and thus, its initiatives for European political integration. 
i 
For the term 'liberal-democracy' , liberal' is a qualification upon 
'democracy', in the 
sense that the right of the majority to have public policy based on its will is 
qualified by the rights of individuals and minorities, so as to avoid the 'tyranny of 
the majority'. By contrast, in Britain, the electoral system tends to produce a 
single-party government with minority popular support. Moreover, the existence of 
only a maximum term of office - at Prime Ministerial initiative - and the increased 
power of the Executive over the Legislature, plus the absence of a written 
constitution and Bill of Rights, and the maintenance of official secrecy rather than 
a Freedom of Information Act, all these indicate a very divergent understanding of 
'liberal-democracy' in these terms. As will now be illustrated, the reasons for these 
divergences lie in the British system being founded upon liberal freedoms rather 
than democratic rights. 
2.3. Freedom and equality 
There is a direct conflict between the liberal and British principle of 'freedom' and 
the democratic and Continental European principle of 'equality'. The British liberal 
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concept of liberty defends the negative freedom of individuals from the 
tyranny of political authorities and institutions (such as that of the EU). Individuals 
should be free to do what they want providing they are responsible for their 
actions and allow other people the same degree of freedom. As examined in 
Section 2.6.4, this notion is reflected in the British understanding of 'government) 
as 'responsible' for determining the national interest rather than being 'responsive' 
to popular or majority perceptions of it. Hence, the British principle of 'ministerial 
responsibility' allows ministers to be free to do what they want to do providing they 
take responsibility for any actions that undermine the (govern ment-determined) 
national interest. 
As British government is founded upon freedoms rather than rights, the extent 
and therefore the very definition of freedoms lies with government, whereas rights 
would serve to limit the initiative and discretion - and ultimately the scope of 
authority - of govemment. Hence, the British obstruction to the social and political 
dimensions of European integration. Indeed, British governments from the Whig 
era (1679-1867) to the present have prided themselves upon defending 
'traditional liberal freedoms' rather than 'constitutional democratic rights'. But as 
indicated, this leaves govemment to differentiate between 'liberty' (the freedom to 
do good things) and 'licence' (the freedom to do ill or to act irresponsibly). Thus, in 
Britain the greater freedom and discretion lies with government whilst the citizen is 
bound by the greater obligation. In contrast, the Continental European conception 
of equality gives the greater freedom to citizens and robs government of much of 
its discretion, indeed produce unavoidable obligations (to uphold citizens' rights) 
for government. 
16 Mouffe, C. (1990) 'Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy? ', Socialist Review, May, pp. 60-1. 180 
In sum, Continental European liberal democracy advances the liberal 
principle of freedom and the democratic principle of equality, as reaffirmed by 
Laclau and Mouffe's project of 'radical plural democracy' in Chapter 7. However, 
British liberal-individualism primarily supports the liberal principle of freedom 
rather than the democratic principle of 'equality'. Indeed, in direct conflict with 
Continental European discourse, British liberalism opposes equality where it 
threatens the freedom of the individual (or the individual state in international 
relations) to compete with other autonomous individuals, and thus, to prosper over 
others. Thus, whilst Continental European liberal democracy supports the 
principles of freedom and equality, British discourse supports the principle of 
freedom, but holds that this primary concern is undermined by the pursuit of 
equality. Hence, British Government defends individual freedom against 
democratic initiatives for equality (such as those that may be proposed by the 
Commission and supported by other EC/EU member states) because they are 
seen to undermine I iberal-ind ividual ism rather than to enrich liberal democracy. 
In all, as this section has demonstrated, the crucial difference between Britain and 
Continental Europe is that the democratic element of liberal democracy is absent 
within British discourse. Thus, the Continental European member states of the EC 
are liberal democratic, but Britain has a conflicting liberal-individualist discourse. 
This aberrant British discourse will now be examined because, as Section 3 
illustrates, it is crucial to explaining why Britain is seen to hold an awkward 
conception of European integration. 
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2.4. British liberal-individualism 
It might be possible to mediate these persistent conflicts between pluralism and 
unity, individualism and communitarianism, and freedom and equality. However, 
none of the possible forms of mediation can reconcile the immanent conflicts of 
liberal democracy. There is a fundamental tension between the liberal logic of 
difference and the democratic logic of equivalence. For Mouffe, it is the 
'undecidable' game between these logics that keeps liberal democracy alive and 
secures the primacy Of PolitiCS. 
17 
However, this fundamental tension is not evident in British discourse because the 
principles that are assumed above to signify 'democracy' (unity, community and 
equality) are largely absent. This democratic deficit raises questions about the 
liberal democratic status of Britain. Furthermore, although it incorporates the 
principles that are assumed above to signify 'liberalism', the British understanding 
of liberalism is also different. Indeed, it is precisely the lack of a democratic 
tradition as a counter-resistance or fundamental tension within British discourse 
that has allowed an aberrant liberalism to develop. Furthermore, as Chapter 4 
demonstrates, the aberrant nature of British liberalism is explained by its 
development in opposition to the democratic traditions of Continental Europe. 
Hence, French 'liberalism' is not as close to the 'possessive individualismý 
described by Macpherson 18 and signified by the British equivalent. Consequently, 
what Britain conceives as 'liberal democratic' would be viewed as a peculiar 
understanding of liberalism from the above liberal democratic perspective and 
from the Continental understanding of liberal democracy which this perspective 
17 Mouffe, C. (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 65-6. 
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describes. Conversely, from the British liberal perspective, the above 
perspective an its given liberal democratic criteria could equally be contested, 
and its anti-foundational basis could be questioned and condemned as 
ethnocentric and 'Eurocentric, as explained in Chapter 6. 
Such observations emphasize that there has to be a shared discourse within 
which decisions and judgements can be made in regard to empirical and moral 
claims19, and Britain does not share the same liberal democratic discourse which 
the above perspective shares with Continental Europe. Without this minimum 
condition, the different - but equally justifiable - values and principles of each 
discourse renders meaningless such debate across discourses. Concomitantly, 
the meaning of such debate between different discourses is undermined because 
of the consequent different values and principles signified by common terms. 
2.5. The philosophical principles of British liberal-individualism 
As this chapter emphasizes, it is these discursive factors which are crucial to the 
problem of British-European integration. First, however, it is necessary to 
determine the specific ideas of British 'liberal-individualism' which produce this 
effect, and thus, which produce the different understandings of the principles of 
European integration, and of the EU itself. 
Here, it is important to consider that the form in which notions such as liberty and 
democracy are defined at the level of political philosophy has important 
consequences at a variety of other levels of discourse, and contribute decisively 
18 See: Macpherson, C. B- (1962) The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
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to shaping the common sense of the masses . 
20S 
uch 'irradiation effects' 
cannot be considered as the simple adoption of a philosophical point of view at 
the level of 'ideas'. Rather it should be seen as a more complex set of discursive 
hegemonic operations embracing a variety of aspects, both institutional and 
ideological, through which certain 'themes' are transformed into nodal points of a 
discursive formation (that is, of an historical bloc). 
In this sense, the British understanding of liberalism is derived from the English 
political philosophy of the seventeenth century that was, at that time, perceived as 
both novel and progressive. 21 It was novel in that it advanced the idea of 
6 possessive individualism', where individuals were sovereign over their own 
persons and could enter into a variety of contractual social exchanges to secure 
their autonomous needs and wants. Following the English political theory of 
possessive individualism developed by Thomas Hobbes 22 and John Locke 23 , the 
inviolable integrity of the individual was broadened further to include not only 
personal actions and opinions, but also its natural possessions in terms of body, 
capabilities, property and a relentless drive to appropriate material as well as 
immaterial resources. Thus, the individual is only free if these possessions are 
protected from interference by public authorities and institutions (such as the 
EU ). 24SU ch ideas represented a change in British discourse from the 
contemporary religious and feudal-based related ideas that placed individuals 
19 Howarth, D. (1995) 'Discourse Theory', in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds) Theories and Methods in 
Political Science. (London: Macmillan). p. 128. 
20 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. (London: Verso). p. 174. 
21 See: Macpherson, C. B. (1962) Op. Cit. 
22 Hobbes, T. (1986) [1651] Leviathan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin), Hobbes, T. (1839) The English 
Works of Thomas Hobbes: Volumes /-//. (London: J. Bohn); Hobbes, T. (1928) Elements of Law, 
Natural and Politic. Edited by F. T6nnies- (Cambridge), and Hobbes, T. (1651) [1642] Philosophical 
Rudiments Concerning Government and Society. 
23 See: Locke, J. (1894) Essays on the Law of Nature. Edited by W. Von Leyden, Oxford, and 
Locke, J. (1960) Two Treaties of Government. Edited by Peter Laslett, Cambridge. 
24 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 251. 
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within a social hierarchy of duty, obedience, and deference. Such political 
philosophy was progressive in that it offered a new legitimating interpretation for 
the rising mercantile bourgeoisie in their struggle against feudal absolutism, in 
both state and church. 25 That is, it was the theory of the nascent English bourgeois 
revolution. 26 British utilitarian ethics and theories of government action were later 
developed in the theory of market liberalism by Jeremy Benthan and James Mill. 
27 
Hence, liberalism ensured a certain 'intelligibility' in Britain during the early 
development of its industrial capitalism which took place before the influence of 
democratic thought. As Laclau asserts: 
... the availability of certain discourses is what ultimately 
decides what 
reading is going to prevail. Discourse is often accepted not because it is 
particularly liked, but because it is the only one that ensures a certain 
intelligibility of what would otherwise be an irrational si I tuation. 28 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the influential presentation of liberal democracy in 
the work of J. S. Mill was the one major attempt to reply to the democratic critique 
of liberalism. Here, as Macpherson asserts, the attached democratic elements 
were extra-liberal and represented an attempt to improve liberalism by co-opting 
pre-seventeenth century notions of democracy which held an understanding of 
humankind and thus, affirmed the intrinsic value of human action: in sum, the 
discourse of civic virtue and natural capacity derived from Aristotle. In contrast, 
the British liberal discourse of humankind affirms that man is a bundle of appetites 
in search of satisfaction. 
25 Preston, P. W. (1994) Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain: An Essay on the Issue 
of Europe in UK Public Discourse. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). p. 36. See also: Moore, B. 
ý1 966) The Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. (Boston: Beacon Press). 
6 See: Pollard, S. (1971) The Idea of Progress. (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
27 See: Held, D. (1987) Models of Democracy. (Cambridge: Polity). 
28 Laclau, E. (1993) Op. Cit. p. 228. 
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Macpherson argues that Mill's attempt to combine these two ideas was a 
logically incoherent failure because they upheld two different ideas of power. 
Congruent to Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative libert Y29, the 
Aristotelian discourse upholds an ethical developmental idea (power to do) and 
the liberal discourse upholds a neutral-descriptive idea (power over). 30 
Thus, an aberrant British discourse prevailed with a specific set of core liberal- 
individualist ideas. In accordance to the logic of equivalence, these moments 
construct a chain of equivalence because they express a certain 'liberal- 
individualist' sameness. Hence, liberal-individualism represents a nodal point 
within British discourse, as an empty signifier that has fixed the content of these 
floating signifiers by articulating them within this chain. From the point of view of 
this research, these liberal-individualist ideas are the same ideas that have 
undermined British-European integration and opposed the liberal democratic 
chain of equivalence of Continental Europe. These inter-related and mutually 
conditioned liberal-individualist ideas are described in the following subsection. 
2.6. The liberal-individualist moments of British discourse 
2.6.1. Possessive individualism 
As emphasized in this chapter, in the absence of a British (hegemonic) 
democratic tradition, there is a conflict between British liberal-individual ism and 
the Continental European articulations of liberalism and republican democracy as 
liberal democracy. However, there is also a conflict between British and 
29 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op - Cit. p. 36. 
See: Berlin, 1. (1969) Four Essays on Liberty. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). 
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Continental European conceptions of liberalism itself. As will now be 
examined, the British abstract conception of the individual as an 'uncumbered 
self' conflicts with the Continental European 'collectivist' conception of the 'social 
located' individual, as developed by the English possessive individualism of 
Hobbes and Locke and the French liberal theory of Rousseau respectively. The 
possessive individualism of Hobbes and Locke, whereby individuals are 
autonomous agents who both know their own minds and are themselves the seat 
of unlimited desires, is an important tenet of British liberalism. Such ontological 
claims differ to the continental philosophical perspective of such theorists as 
Rousseau, where individuals are viewed as essentially social. 
To elucidate, British liberal-individualism affirms the maximization of liberty for 
each individual. Whilst it is recognized that one individual's liberty potentially 
impinges upon that of another, this is conceived in universalist abstract terms, 
rather than via concrete social location. By contrast, European notions of 
liberalism consider the effect of the individual - and hence the potential 
consequences of such individual liberty - upon the nature of the community, 
because it is recognized, following Rousseau, that the relationship between the 
individual and the community is not unproblematic. Not only does the interest of 
the individual as a member of the community differ from their 'selfish' individual 
interest, but the ability of some to follow selfish interests is more detrimental to the 
community than the result of that same freedom followed by others. In short, 
European liberalism takes far more account of the social location of the individual 
it posits, whilst British liberalism tends to focus upon an abstract individual. It is 
instructive to transpose these perceptions onto the European political arena; that 
is, for 'individual' read Britain; for 'Community/society', read 'Europe'! Here, 
30 See: Macpherson, C. B. (1962) Op. Cit. 
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'Europe' respects and tries to incorporate the different viewpoints made by 
Britain in the process of European integration to achieve the maximum benefit of 
all and to create the best Europe for all (whilst being aware that the pursuit of 
selfish interests by any given 'individual' will undermine the community). By 
contrast, Britain pursues the greatest self-interest and benefits to itself, and in 
doing so, limits the benefits not only to (the rest of) Europe as a whole, but 
ultimately and paradoxically, limits the benefits accruing to Britain itself. 
The British liberal idea of economics affirms 'non-citizenship' from its 
understanding of an agglomeration of private individuals competing in a free 
market. This premise is upheld by Hobbes who rejected the Aristotelian notion of 
the essence of man in favour of humankind as 'material'. The consequence was 
that the ethics of British discourse were limited to a notion of untutored nature and 
a set of rules. Such undermined the attempt by British theorists of the 
I Enlightenment to develop ethical rules derived from claims about 'natural man . 
Moral philosophy was lost because British discourse could only comprehend the 
development of individuals as bundles of appetites bounded by restrictions . 
31 The 
consequence is that British discourse views individuals as morally autonomous 
individuals confronting other individuals, where self-responsibility and 
manipulative competition are conjoined in a social realm without a shared 
understanding of commun itY32 (and thus, of a European community). 
31 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 50. See also: MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue. (London: 
Duckworth). 
32 Ibid. See also: MacIntyre, A. (1981) Op. Cit. 
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2.6.2. Contractual social relations 
This characterization of social life as essentially contractual is derived from the 
possessive individualist premise of the centrality of the autonomous individual. 
The social sphere or the trans-individual is constituted by the myriad contracts 
which individuals enter into either directly or indirectly via involvement in 
established institutions. This eliminates the Continental notion of the social, and 
thus, Continental notions of the collective, community and interdependence. For 
Britain, collectivity connotes constraint and individualism connotes freedom. 
Congruent to liberal-individualism, the sphere of politics as well as the public is 
contractual. There is no principle of collective political life or political behaviour 
outside the institutional arenas of national parliamentarism. Hence, political action 
outside national parliamentary control is equated with illegitimate interference, 
disorder, chaos and crisis. The liberal-individualist ideas of individual autonomy 
and contracted rules means that there is no principle of citizenship, with its 
legitimate public sphere centred upon a republican democratic state. This British 
position is reinforced by market liberalism (see Section 2.6.8. ), which envisages 
an agglomeration of private individuals whose autonomous arising wants are 
secured contractually in the marketplace. 
2.6.3. Parliamentary sovereignty 
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty requires detailed examination since it is 
pivotal to British political discourse. Moreover, it is significant to the British 
rejection of supranational levels of political representation and decision-making. 
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Thus, it is crucial to our understanding of the Britain's opposition to European 
political supranational integration and its aberrant conception of subsidiarity, as 
examined in Section 3. 
As explained in Chapter 5, in Britain, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is 
articulated with liberal-individualism, and thus, this discursive formation can be 
described as 'parliamentary liberalism'. As a prescription, this British 
parliamentary liberalism advances a system of representative and responsible 
government, as described in the following subsection. 33 Within this prescription, 
A. V. Dicey presented parliamentary sovereignty in The Law of the Constitution as 
an 'undoubted legal fact': 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less 
than this, namely, that Parliament ... 
has, under the English constitution 
the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no 
person or body is recognised by the law of England as having the right 
34 to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament . 
Since then, the sovereignty of parliament has been accepted as one of the 
fundamental doctrines of constitutional law in Britain, retaining 'what seems to be 
35 
an absolute and immutable character' . It is this immutability as a prescription, as 
the 'critical morality' of the constitution - as a specification of the relationship that 
ought to exist between the British executive, parliament and the electorate - that 
blocks the process of British-European integration. Indeed, British government 
has fiercely opposed EU initiatives that would give its political institutions 'the right 
to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament'. The extent to which this right 
33 See: Birch, A. H. (11998) The British System of Government. Tenth Edition. (London, New York: 
Routledge). First published in 1967 (London: Allen and Unwin), and Birch, A. H. (1964) 
Representative and Responsible Government. (London: Allen and Unwin). 34 Dicey, A. C. (1885) The Law Of the Constitution. As quoted in: Judge, D. (1988) 'Incomplete 
Sovereignty: The British House of Commons and the Completion of the Internal Markets in the 
European Communities', Parliamentary Affairs, October, Volume 41, No. 4, p. 444. (pp. 441-55). 35 Bradley, A. W. (11985) 'The Sovereignty of Parliament - In Perpetuity? ' in Jowell, J., D. Oliver 
(eds). The Changing Constitution. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). p. 24. 
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has already been taken by the EU is widely resented, and has instigated 
implacable resistance among traditionalists of both major parties to any further 
'incursions' into parliamentary sovereignty. In all, in the absence of a republican 
democratic form and the congruent specification of citizen rights, parliamentary 
sovereignty is a law-unto-itself. 
Thus, as a theory of legitimate power, the prescriptive force of the concept of 
6parliamentary sovereignty' cannot be challenged - it provides British government 
with both the right and duty to control the destiny of the nation. It therefore follows 
that beyond its necessity for the proper defence and security of the nation, 
supranational commitments limiting national sovereignty must be resisted. Hence 
the very nature of British government represents a crucial impediment to the 
integration of Britain within the EU. As Marquand observes, the 'Westminster 
model' is a very particular form of institutionalized power and authority. The model 
is a legacy of the nineteenth century that is heavily influenced by the utilitarian 
individualism of Jeremy Benthan who thought that sovereignty was inherently 
unlimited, that the Crown-in-Parliament must be absolutely and inalienably 
sovereign. 36 Thus was political authority concentrated and protected against rival 
claims, from local or regional government, from supra-national bodies such as the 
institutions of the EU. 
Indeed, it is the defence of this legacy that is manifest in the present British 
obstruction to EU integration. This is manifest in that the defence of this legacy is 
circular: the long duration of the legacy is proof itself of the legacy. Secondly, for 
the 'conservative' nature of British discourse, the long duration of the legacy 
strengthens its present resonance as something 'British' and sacred. Third, the 
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successful defence of the legacy makes it something to be proud of - British 
discourse constructs parliamentary sovereignty as a 'trophy' that Britain has 
successfully retained through 'thick and thin'. 
These points are evident within the 'humble address to the Sovereign' in 1945 by 
Winston Churchill which is claimed to be a classic example of what Marquand 
calls a 'Whig imperialist' view of the past and the British state: 
... but it is kinship to which all the other governments of the Empire feel 
an equal allegiance ... It is the golden circle of the Crown which alone 
embraces the loyalties of so many states and races all over the world ... we may certainly flatter ourselves. The wisdom of our ancestors has led 
to an envied and enviable situation. We have the strongest parliament 
in the world. We have the oldest, the most famous, the most secure, 
the most serviceable monarchy in the world. King and parliament both 
rest safely and solidly upon the will of the people expressed by free and 
fair election on the basis of universal suffrage. Thus the system has 
long worked harmoniously both in peace and war. 37 
Here, there is evidence of the traditional belief that the British democratic system 
is enviable because it is based upon monarchy and 'strong' parliament - it is thus, 
something glorious and demanding of defence. Also evident is the British idea of 
conservation and order as glorious within themselves in that the British monarchy 
is glorious because it is the oldest and most secure. There is also a circular 
argument that suggests that this system should be proudly defended because it 
has been strong enough to defend itself for the longest time. The conservative 
logic of these latter two points is examined further in Chapter 5 with regard to 
Edmund Burke. In addition, it is inferred that this system has stood the test of time 
because of its democratic nature, despite the 'reality' that true universal suffrage 
was not granted until 1928, and indeed the notion of 'strong government' itself 
suggesting otherwise. 
36 Marquand, D. (1988) The Unprincipled Society. (London: Fontana). p. 9. 37 Marquand, D (1995) 'After Whig imperialism? Can there be a British identityT New Community, 
Volume 21, No. 2. P. 186. 
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Such 'Whig-imperialist' attitudes have prevailed, and thus British discourse 
continues to understand the EU as a foreign-dominated forum that desires to 
'drag sovereignty away from the mother of parliaments' and to subject Britain to a 
'mercilessly centralising' bombardment of rule by Euro-money and Euro-directive. 
Such an understanding is implicit in the spoken foreword by the former Speaker of 
the House of Commons, the late Lord Tonypandy, to the pre-election video issued 
by the Referendum Party in April 1997: 
My support for Sir James Goldsmith's initiative is natural for me for I am 
in harmony with the sturdy defence of our British parliamentary system 
advanced by my predecessors in the speaker's Chair of the House of 
Commons. For me to remain silent would be an act of treason, for such 
a cowardly act would betray the noble heritage handed on to me in the 
House of Commons. God bless you in your efforts as you battle for 
38 Britain . 
Here, Tonypandy implies the 'historically rooted genius and superiority of the 
British parliamentary system' which is threatened from without by 'the Other', the 
EU. 'To remain silent' against this threat to parliamentary sovereignty by 'the 
Other' is equated to treason and cowardice, that is, the betrayal of a set of values 
39 
enclosed within the 'noble heritage ... in the House of 
Commons,. 
That this tradition has been conserved, has been 'handed on', which is the very 
rationale for its continued defence and superiority - it is not suggested that it 
should be preserved because it is democratic to the masses or even profitable to 
the elite, but only that it has been handed on by his predecessors. Hence, the 
focus of concern is merely the betrayal of a tradition rather than any attempt to 
assess the present value of this tradition itself in fulfilling the purpose for which it 
was created in the first place. 
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Having made these observations, a fourth can be presented regarding British 
discourse. Hegemony is achieved if and when one political project determines the 
rules and meanings in a particular social formation . 
40 The long success of the 
existing hegemonic relations in Britain has maintained a discursive articulation of 
utilitarian individualism and parliamentary sovereignty and thus, a utilitarian 
individualist understanding of 'absolute' parliamentary sovereignty persists. This 
discursive articulation also explains why Britain understands 'European Union' as 
an aggregate of individual competing national states (see Section 2.6.7. ). 
Thus, and fifth, in contradiction to Preston's optimism for 'external structural 
dynamics of change' breaking the contain ing/demobil izing effects of an 'official 
British ideology', such 'dynamics' confront a much greater problem -a different 
British national understanding of these global dynamics that results from the 
British discursive articulation of utilitarian individualism and absolute sovereignty. 
Hence, a discourse-theoretical approach would suggest that the EU can only 
achieve hegemony over Britain if and when it comes to determine a new 
discursive articulation of the rules and meanings of the British social formation. 
2.6.4. Representative and responsible government 
Representative government is the mechanism of British political liberalism . 
41 As 
indicated above, it is a mechanism informed by the discursive formation of British 
parliamentary liberalism. It means that British subjects (not citizens) view 
parliament from outside as a place that belongs definitely to those who are 
38 As cited in: Anderson, P. J. and T. Weymouth (1999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and 
the European Union. (London, New York: Longman). p. 19. 39 Ibid. 
40 Howarth, D. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 124. 41 See: Birch, A. H. (1964) Op. Cit., and Birch, A. H. (1998) Op. Cit. 
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deemed 'responsible' to make decisions on their behalf. This contrasts with 
Continental understanding of participatory government where citizens (not 
subjects) are routinely and extensively involved in national d ecision-ma king. In 
Britain, representative government is upheld by parliamentary sovereignty 
because parliament enshrines the electoral principle and thereby legitimates 
government and the political system within British rationale. Thus, since the 1867 
Reform Act, a political system has evolved in Britain based upon the liberal- 
individualist idea of a minimum state and the negative liberal principle of freedom 
and responsible government, rather than upon the continental democratic idea of 
rights and responsive government and the notion that the state (and thus, the 
European state) can have a positive role in the development of formal and 
substantive democracy. 
In sum, following the British concept of liberty, British government is 'responsible' 
for determining the national interest (that reflects the national aggregate of the 
negative freedoms of individuals). It is also responsible for defending the national 
interest from the tyranny of non-national political authorities and institutions (such 
as that of the EU). In due course, as this chapter illustrates, the failure to do so is 
viewed as treason - as a betrayal of the nation. 
Moreover, in accordance with the British principle of absolute parliamentary 
sovereignty, the upper limits of the British conception of government are the 
national institutions of government and parliament. Thus, the British notion of 
government is only compatible with national governance and opposes 
supranational levels of political representation and decision-making. Thus, once 
again, British government is responsible for defending the national interest from 
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the tyranny of non-national political authorities and institutions, and the failure 
to do so is viewed as treason, and so on. 
In direct contrast, reflecting its republican notion of citizenship and civil rights, the 
role of government in Continental Europe is to defend and respond to the national 
interest as determined by the majority of its citizens. Thus, this 'bottom-up' 
republican and participatory conception of government has no upper limit. As 
reflected in its conception of subsidiarity, the Continental European notion of 
government is compatible with national and supranational levels of governance 
because all these forms of political representation can defend and respond to the 
rights of citizens. 
Therefore, the bottom-up Continental European conception of responsive 
participatory government allows for supranational government, but the British 'top- 
down' conception of representative and responsible government does not. In due 
course, and significant to Section 3 of this chapter, British discourse rejects 
supranational decision-making, and thus, Continental European notions of 
European political integration. 
2.6.5. The minimum state 
For British government, democracy has become merely a technique for recruiting 
office holders rather than a substantive ethic as evident in Continental democratic 
theory. For Continental democratic theory, the state can have a positive role in the 
development of formal and substantive democracy. 
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Congruent with the British liberal rationale of the above moments, the state 
(and thus, the European supranational state) has a minimum role as a 'rule- 
keeper'. Here, the British idea of negative liberty as freedom from restraint is 
affirmed . 
42 'The social' is dangerous: it is either the sphere of the state, which is 
perceived as necessarily restrictive, or the realm of aggregated individuals, the 
mass, which is perceived as inherently unstable and disorganized. Both spheres 
1 43 imply 'unfreedom, de jure or de facto. Hence, the intervention by the state is 
minimized in all spheres which are perceived to restrict freedom, but increased in 
the sphere of 'law and order' to secure the individual freedoms of the masses. In 
accordance with Hobbes, subjects are seen as in need of protection from each 
other as well as from their governors, and following the British liberal philosophy 
of Locke, the role of the state is to protect individual freedom and the property that 
individuals acquire as a result. Indeed, British discourse is underpinned by 
Locke's assertion that individual property rights are antecedent to society. 44 
As a sphere of the state, bureaucracy is also equated with the restriction of 
freedom. Congruent to Berlin's description of negative liberty, freedom is freedom 
from constraint, and hence, the bureaucratic sphere appears as a restriction to 
the freedom of responsible politicians and responsible subjects. In pursuit of the 
central liberal concern of private satisfaction, a minimum amount of bureaucracy 
may be required to secure 'order'. However, it is held that these associated 
restrictions are negative liberties that are likely to expand. 45 As Preston observes, 
the consequence is that bureaucracy becomes the realm of state-occasioned 
unfreedom. 46 Bureaucratic rules that are perceived as fussy, irrational, obscure 
42 See: Berlin, 1. (1969) Op. Cit. 
43 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 41. 44 Marquand, D. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 154. 45 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 44. 46 Ibid. 
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and foolish 47 serve to undermine privacy, private satisfaction, and freedom 
from constraint. Moreover, bureaucracy is perceived as inefficient. Red tape is 
deployed to enforce intrusive and meddlesome rules. Furthermore, bureaucracy is 
deemed to have its own internal agendas. It is remote, uncaring and 
unresponsive. It fails to provide a good standard of service. It fails also to be 
deferential and does not know its place as the servant - rather than master - of the 
public. As Preston asserts, it is revealing that the 'business of service' became an 
early theme for John Major as prime minister and formed the core of his 'citizens 
charter ,. 
48 
As perceived as the concentrate of the broader state, bureaucracy is symbolic of 
the unfreedorn and danger of state intervention. It embodies the intensified 
manifestation of the broader state's self-seeking - and thus, uncontrollable - drive 
towards expansion and autonomy. Consequently, bureaucracy becomes separate 
from the body politic and its original purpose and thus, increasingly ineffective and 
corrupt. As it expands and becomes self-perpetuating, it also becomes 
increasingly costly. Furthermore, as its sphere of control broadens, it represents a 
greater threat to the liberal principle of freedom from constraint. 
This rationale evolved during the Cold War where bureaucracy became equated 
with the unfreedom, ineffectiveness, high costs and corruption of communism and 
socialism. With the crisis of the post-war settlement, this rationale underpinned 
the neo-liberal attack upon social democracy and the welfare state. It has 
continued today as the rationale behind British Euroscepticism where the 
'European Union' is upheld as merely the 'European Commission' in Brussels, 
47 See: Albrow, M. (1974) Bureaucracy. (London: Macmillan). 
48 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 44. 
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which is equated to a growing French-German conspired and socialist 
'European superstate' of 'burgeoning bureaucracy'. As such, it is equated with 
corruption, ineffectiveness, high costs, and restrictions to traditional British 
freedoms. 
2.6.6. Rule of law 
In accordance with the liberal ideas of British discourse and in contrast to the 
democratic ideas of Continental Europe, the role of the British state is to protect 
individual freedom rather than to protect citizen rights. In contrast to the political 
systems of Continental Europe, civil rights are not positively defined in Britain. 
Rather, they represent a legislative loophole or residue: 
Freedom is not something that can be asserted in opposition to law; it is 
the residue of conduct permitted in the sense that no statute for 
common-law rule prohibits it. 49 
2.6.7. International liberal-individualism 
As described, the ontological priority of the individual is affirmed by the British 
philosophical tradition of liberalism and possessive individualism. Formally, within 
British discourse, there are only individuals, and thereafter, there are those 
institutions which individuals freely contract. Each individual confronts the social 
world thus understood as a realm of potential gain and loss, with other individuals 
as potential allies or opponents . 
50 This idea is translated to the international level: 
for such 'liberal-ind ivid ual ism writ-large', there are only individual states and 
49 Ewing, D. K. and C. A. Gearty (1990) Freedom under Thatcher. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). P. 9. 50 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 29. 
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thereafter, there are those international institutions (such as EU, NATO, etc) 
to which individual states freely contract. Each individual state confronts the 
international arena thus understood in realist terms, as a realm of potential gain 
and loss, with other individual states as potential allies or opponents. (Crucially, 
however, as national parliament is the very rationale of British government, Britain 
can only contract with international institutions in so far as this does not obstruct 
parliamentary sovereignty. ) 
Hence, congruent with neo-realism, and in contrast to neo-functionalism, British 
liberal-ind ivid ual ism holds that it is in the interest of British state to freely contract 
in the global sphere rather than confine itself to regional binding contracts. As 
George et al observe, Britain has been a semi-detached or awkward partner of 
the EC/EU because it has refused to confine itself to a European sphere of 
economic, political, and defence interests. 
2.6.8. British economic liberalism and the free market 
Market liberalism is the pivotal prescription of British economic theory. It 
envisages an agglomeration of individuals competing in a free market for 
individual interests. This is a key element of the philosophical tradition of Locke 
and Bentham, which holds that autonomous action in the open market place will 
maximize human welfare. Such action was 'progressive' when turned against 
proponents of restriction from feudal and church absolutism, but 'regressive' when 
cast in the late nineteenth century as neo-classicism and deployed against the 
ideas of democracy. Hence, how meaning is 'temporal' must be considered. This 
regressive element was reinforced by the British New Right and anti-democratic 
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offensive in response to the collapse of the post-war social-democratic 
settlement (see Chapter 7) and in opposition to the democratic initiatives of 
Continental Europe and the EU. 
British liberal economic theory, which prescribed free trade, sound finance and 
'laissez faire', was obscured in the legitimation accorded to it in state policies. 
Thus free trade transcended economic theory and became hegemonic state 
policy. As Andrew Gamble argues: 
So firmly embedded ... did liberal political economy become that it has 
rarely appeared a crusading doctrine in England but enerally as an 
orthodoxy emanating from the very bowels of the 
ýtate. ql 
For free trade, the conceptual hegemony has consistently found reflection in state 
policy. Indeed, since the mid-nineteenth century, the theory of liberal political 
economy has prescribed policy and accurately described those mercantile policies 
interpellated as the British 'national interest'. Indeed, free trade has remained the 
commercial policy of successive governments, and its ascendancy - though not 
unchallenged - has never been seriously threatened by opposing ideologies or 
economic strategies (Sir Joseph Austen Chamberlain's 'social imperialism' at the 
turn of the century, the 'democratic socialism' of the post war period, or the 
present process of European integration). 
As will now be examined, representing the British discursive formation of 
parliamentary liberalism, these articulated moments have obstructed European 
integration. It will be demonstrated how this British discursive formation has 
produced aberrant understandings of the key principles of European integration, 
and different understandings of what is signified by that union itself. 
51 Gamble, A. (1985) Britain in Decline. (London: Macmillan). p. 129. 
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3.0. Britian and the EC debate on subsidiarity (1991-3) 
Without attention to the different and often opposed discourses of Britain and 
Continental Europe, any ensuing analysis of British-European integration is 
misguided. This chapter seeks to affirm this assertion by providing a discourse- 
theoretical analysis of the EC debate upon the principle of 'subsidiarity' (1991-2). 
By exposing the different and opposing meanings of subsidiarity within Britain and 
Continental Europe, it will be argued that the ratification of the (1992) Treaty upon 
European Union (TEU - that is, 'the Maastricht Treaty') represented a facade of 
agreement and progress towards an integrated Europe, masking unchanged 
underlying conflicts and differences. 
3.1. Different meanings of subsidiarity 
The Maastricht debate upon subsidiarity in December 1991 was the culmination 
of a process that had begun when the EP first developed the principle in the 
context of European integration. As examined below in Section 3.4.3., this 
process was later accelerated by the TEU ratification crisis, which forced the EC 
to come to terms with it and to develop the meaning of 'Eurofederalism'. However, 
this initiative failed. Subsidiarity remained an ambiguous and vague concept 
because it continued to be interpreted differently by different member states, and 
between the European Commission and 'awkward' member states such as 
Britain. 
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Jacques Delors had begun to explore the potential of the concept of 
subsidiarity from the time that he became president of the EC Commission in 
1985.52 As he told Le Figaro in June 1992, subsidiarity was the essence of 
federalism because 'the federal approach is to define clearly who does what ,. 53 
Thus, subsidiarity would provide clear guidelines as to where Brussels could or 
could not act within a European federal system, just as similar constitutional 
provisions determined the proper functioning of U. S. and German federalism. 
However, this chapter emphasises that the opposite occurred in the EC. In 
contrast to the Tenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution or Germany's Basic 
Law federalism and subsidiarity proved difficult to define for the EC because they 
had different and conflicting meanings within the different discourses of Britain 
and Continental Europe. In all, the development of a EU federal constitution is 
more problematic than these other examples because it has to overcome 
significant differences in national discourse, as well as the problem of nationalism 
itself, as examined in Chapter 5. 
The concept of 'subsidiarity' featured extensively in the Maastricht debate and 
was accepted by all sides. However, otherwise implacable enemies could unite 
behind the banner of subsidiarity because the TEU stated two different and 
ambiguous definitions that concealed opposing understandings and preferences. 
For Britain, subsidiarity was a vital safeguard of national sovereignty and a way to 
prevent the EC from involving itself in national affairs. For Brussels and other 
member states, it was a crucial tenet of Eurofederalism. As observed by the 
French politician, Jean-Pierre Cot, this explains why only subsidiarity could 'put 
52 See: Delors, J- (1992) Le Nouveau Concert Europ6en. (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob), and his 
S eech to the EP in January 1985, Bulletin of the European Communities. S/1 -1985. 5P Le Figaro (1992) 8 June. p. 1- 
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Delors perfectly in tune with Mrs Thatcher ... on a misunderstanding. 
54 
Similarly, in direct contrast to Delors' notion of subsidiarity as the essence of 
federalism, Major accepted subsidiarity because he conceived it as the essence 
of anti-federalism, that is, as a concept that signified a limited and 
intergovernmental approach: 
There is a tendency for the Community to want to legislate over a very 
wide area. That tendency needs to be curbed, and that is the essence 
of what has become known as subsidiarity. 
What subsidiarity must mean is that if a problem can be dealt with at a 
national level, it should be. 55 
Initially, subsidiarity had found its first legal expression in an EC treaty in the 1986 
Single European Act (SEA) article on environmental protection. This remains the 
clearest application of subsidiarity in EC practice as all member states recognised 
the need to remedy this gap in the powers of the EC. However, even here 
different interpretations of subsidiarity were present. Inevitably, political judgement 
will always be involved whenever decisions are made about whether the EU or its 
member states acting on their own can better achieve a certain goal. However, 
different discourses produce these different judgements. Hence, the diverging 
discourses of Britain and Continental Europe have led to different perceptions of 
the integration process and conflicting views about which level of government 
should intervene in any given set of circumstances, or whether government 
should intervene at all. 
It is possible to identify three different understandings of subsidiarity because of 
three different discursive positions within the Maastricht debate upon the TEU. 
54 Le Monde. (1990) 22 June. 
55 Major, J. (1991 a) John Major on the Forthcoming Maastricht Conference. Extracts from the 
speech by Prime Minister John Major on the European Community, House of Commons, 20 
November. In: Harryvan, A. G. and J. Van der Harst (eds) (1997) Documents on European Union. 
(London: Macmillan). p. 264. 
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These different discourses were Christian democracy, German federalism, 
and British parliamentary liberal iSM. 
56 
3.1.1. Christian Democracy 
As indicated above, there is a particularly large Christian Democratic consensus is 
in the EP, and thus, its particular understanding of subsidiarity is relatively 
common. As reflected in its official title in the EP, the 'European People's Party', 
its interpretation of subsidiarity reflects the Christian Democratic tradition of 
Personalism for which federalism is the corresponding politics. It embraces the 
principles of Catholic social philosophy: small groups should be autonomous and 
sovereign in pluralist society, yet united in a common morality that emphasizes 
duty and harmony. Hence, it reflects the liberal democratic tension between liberal 
A pluralism' and democratic 'unity'. Small groups should be assisted in their 
activities by a state which neither substitutes for social groups nor is restrained by 
their demands, but which provides legal order and serves the democratic principle 
of the public common good. Christian democracy confers a dynamic as opposed 
to a centralist view of politics as it envisages state intervention only for limited 
periods to address specific social needs. 
3.1.2. German federalism 
As exemplified by the position of Delors, German federalism affirms that a federal 
understanding of subsidiarity would secure the principle of universality in EU law 
implementation. Universality will bind any EU law on all member states unless 
56 See also: van Kersbergen, K. and B. Verbeek (1994) 'The Politics of Subsidiarity in the European 
Union', Journal of Common Market Studies, June, Volume 32, No. 2, pp. 215-236. pp. 221-226. 
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special provisions to the contrary are agreed. As Delors hoped to establish, it 
supports a 'total concept' or clear plan for the political evolution of the EU, which 
specifically defines the duties and powers of different levels of government in 
Europe. As described above, subsidiarity was the essence of federalism because 
'the federal approach is to define clearly who does what'. 57 In particular, the 
German lander wanted to see their substantial powers, which are guaranteed by 
the German constitution, protected against trespass by EU institutions as 
integration proceeds. 
In contrast to the Christian democratic dynamic conception, the German federal 
version of subsidiarity as a means of protection is more static because it seeks to 
constitutional ize a division of powers between different levels of government in a 
federal constitution for Europe. However, expressing the same liberal democratic 
tension evident within the Christian democratic understanding, German federalism 
upholds the principle of liberal 'pluralism' as well as democratic 'unity': congruent 
to the constitutional principles guaranteed by German federalism which uphold the 
national common good, it is held that Europe requires congruent constitutional 
principles for a European common good guaranteed by a European federal 
system. Hence, these two Continental liberal democratic discourses of Christian 
democracy and German federalism affirm a political function for the European 
state which reflects their common understanding of liberal 'pluralism' as 
decentralization, and their common understanding of democratic 'unity' and a 
European public common good. 
57 Le Figaro (1992) 8 June. p. 1. 
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3.1.3. British parliamentary liberalism 
As outlined below, the British conception of subsidiarity achieved full expression 
when the Major Government held the EC presidency in July 1992 and embraced 
subsidiarity as an anti-federalist and intergovernmental principle that would serve 
to limit EC powers. This narrow definition would be employed to sanction EC 
action when it was necessary to ensure the 'four liberal freedoms' of the single 
market: the free movement of goods, people, services and finance across 
borders. 
As a consequence, the British understanding of subsidiarity confronts the logic of 
the Continental European liberal democratic perceptions which can - and 
increasingly have been used - to justify decentralising political power to 
supranational or sub-national units of government. Certainly, the hegemony of 
parliamentary liberalism in Britain has informed a constitutional settlement that 
has produced the most centralised state in the EU. Moreover, as reflected in their 
oppositions to European integration, British governments have been reticent 
about tampering with a system of government that has given them a 
disproportionate share of political power. In accordance with the principles of 
parliamentary liberalism, these hegemonic projects have resisted any internal or 
external constraints on the autonomy of central government and parliament. In 
due course, the British aberrant conception of subsidiarity holds that EU action 
can only be supported when it does not obstruct the sovereignty of national 
government and parliament, and it will only be supported if it defends or develops 
the European internal economic market - that is, when supranational action 
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serves rather than obstructs British national liberal-individualist interests (as 
determined by national government and parliament). 
Hence, and as will be illustrated below, British discourse reflects an aberrant 
parliamentary liberalist understanding of subsidiarity that confronts the Continental 
European liberal democratic basis of both Christian democracy and German 
federalism. In accordance with the tenets of parliamentary liberalism, political 
power is centralized within the national institutions of British government. The 
absolute sovereignty of parliament blocks any liberal democratic understanding of 
political supranational decision-making. In sum, the Continental European 
interpretation of subsidiarity threatens the fundamental principle of British 
government that national parliamentary sovereignty is legitimised by the popular 
consent of the nation. As explained in Sections 2.6.3-4., British parliamentary 
liberalism also blocks the Continental European liberal democratic understanding 
of a common good per se - that is, at any level of decision-making, whether 
subnational, national or supranational. 
In particular, British government has feared that European integration would erode 
national and parliamentary sovereignty because it would impose a European 
federal system in which political power would become centralized at a 
supranational level. More precisely, within British parliamentary liberalism, 
Eurofederalism is a negative concept that is equivalent to the centralization of 
power at a supranational level in the European Commission in Brussels. For 
example, Margaret Thatcher, the leading Conservative backbench Eurosceptic 
after her ouster as party leader, warned that'coming together in Europe [must not 
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mean] more centralization. That would be a most undesirable constraint on 
58 liberty' . 
In contrast, for the Christian democracy and German federalism of Continental 
Europe, subsidiarity is a positive concept that is equivalent to the decentralization 
of power throughout the EU. As will be demonstrated below, this direct conflict in 
the meaning and value of federalism has meant that Britain has used 'subsidiarity I 
to obstruct its negative interpretation of federalism in the defence of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty and its I iberal-ind ivid ualist preference for 
intergovernmental ism, while Brussels and other member states have used it to 
develop the positive supranational goals signified by their interpretation of 
federalism. In sum, Brussels and other European member states view subsidiarity 
as a tool for developing political integration, whilst Britain views it as a tool for 
limiting European political integration. This latter point will now be further explored 
and elucidated. 
3.2. Subsidiarity and British parliamentary liberalism 
Section 2 of this chapter demonstrated how the diverging discourses of Britain 
9 
and Continental Europe have led to diverging conceptions of 'liberal democracy . 
It will now be demonstrated how this divergence in discourse equally explains the 
diverging understandings of 'subsidiarity' evident within the Maastricht debate. 
As described in Sections 2.6.3-4, the 'bottom up' Continental European 
conception of participatory responsive government allows for supranational 
government, but the British 'top-down' conceptions of 'absolute parliamentary 
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sovereignty I and representative responsible government do not. Hence, this 
conflict in conception of government - and thus, of how Europe should be 
governed - is reflected in conflicting interpretations of subsidiarity. Therefore, 
subsidiarity is a 'slogan which has practical force only when understood within the 
framework of a particular conception of the common good . 
59 That is, different 
meanings of subsidiarity reflect different articulations of the common good. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.1., within liberal democracy, different 
conceptions of the common good reflect different articulations between the liberal 
principle of 'pluralism' and the need for the social and political 'unity' of democratic 
society. For the liberal democratic discourses of Continental Europe, pluralism 
cannot reign unchallenged, because a (minimum) consensus concerning the 
values informing a mode of societal coexistence is required . 
60 Here, the dilemma 
is that a consensus based upon a comprehensive moral ideal would obstruct the 
liberal principle of pluralism because it would arbitrarily privilege a particular 
controversial conception of the common good, and thus, of subsidiarity. British 
discourse opposes such an assertion of a common good and thus, of subsidiarity, 
in favour of its understanding of a Hobbesian 'modus vivendi' seeing a consensus 
on a set of institutional procedures based upon self-interest. Hence, the British 
conception of 'subsidiarity' differs from the liberal democratic notion upheld by the 
discourses of Continental Europe. 
Section 2 also illustrated that, within Continental European discourse, the 
I collective will' is more than the aggregate of individual wills and its realization will 
often conflict with some of these individual WillS. 
61 For example, in Germany, it is 
58 Margaret Thatcher (1990) 'My Vision', The Financial Times, 19 November, p. 10. 
59 Adonis, A. and S. Jones (1991) Subsidiarity and the Community's Constitutional Future. (Oxford: 
Nuffield College). p. 10. 60 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 250. 
61 Ibid. p. 251. 
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held that such a notion of the 'common good' is best served by a federal 
system, and thus, a federal understanding of 'subsidiarity' was affirmed. As 
illustrated above, German federalism affirms that such a conception of subsidiarity 
would secure the principle of universality in EU law implementation. Universality 
binds any EU law on all member states unless special provisions to the contrary 
are agreed. Hence, there is concern that the ratified principle that 'EU action is the 
exception and national action the rule' may be exploited for non-compliance or 
patchy implementation of EU directives because EU action to ensure universal 
compliance may be resisted on grounds of subsidiarity. 
Such ideas of federalism and universality are absent within British discourse 
because the liberal-individualist affirmation of the ontological priority and 
sovereignty of the individual obstructs a democratic notion of a collective will. 
Accordingly, at an international level, British discourse affirms the ontological 
priority and sovereignty of the individual state, and this is reflected in its conflicting 
understanding of I subsidiarity' for which 'EU action is the exception and national 
action the rule'. 
Within British discourse, as the sovereign state is the starting point and 
destination of international action, international politics is consequently defined as 
the selfish pursuit of the national interest. For example, Thatcher argued that 
I willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best 
way to build a successful European Community 1.62 Similarly, Major declared that: 
For many of our Community partners ... the diminution of the power of 
national governments and national parliaments is not an issue. They 
accept the idea of a European Federation. 
62 Thatcher, M. (1988) The European Family of Nations. Speech given at the College of Europe, on 
the State and Future of the European Communities', Bruges, 20 September. In: Harryvan, A. G. 
and J. Van der Harst (eds) (1997) Op. Cit. p. 243. 
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We have never done so. ... we have shown ourselves ready to discuss individual changes in the role of the Community where these 
are in the national interest. But we are not prepared to accept 
wholesale changes in the nature of the Community which would lead it 
towards an unacceptable dominance over national life. ... We must 
constrain the extension of community competence to those areas 
where Community action or than action on a voluntary, 
i ntergovern mental ist basis. 63 
Hence, the Continental European understanding of the necessary universality of 
EU law implementation is absent. British liberal-individualism also upholds the 
idea of negative liberty as freedom from constraint, and this affirms the minimal 
role of the state and bureaucracy. Accordingly, British discourse emphasizes the 
negative freedom of the sovereign state from the tyranny of international 
European political authorities, bureaucracies and institutions. Therefore, individual 
sovereign states should be free to do what they want providing they are 
responsible for their actions and allow other national states the same degree of 
freedom. 
Here, as explained in Section 2.6.7, the British conception of international 
relations as essentially contractual is derived from the possessive individualist 
premise of the centrality of the autonomous individual: there are only individuals, 
and thereafter, there are those institutions to which individuals freely contract. 
Each individual confronts the social world thus understood as a realm of potential 
gain and loss, with other individuals as potential allies or opponents. Accordingly, 
the centrality of the autonomous individual nation state is affirmed: there are only 
individual states, and those international institutions to which these individual 
states freely contract. Consequently, each individual state confronts the 
international arena thus understood as a realm of potential gain and loss, with 
other individual states as potential allies or opponents. 
63 Major, J. (1991 a) Op. Cit. pp. 263-4. 
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For British liberal-individualism, the international sphere is constituted by the 
myriad contracts which individual states enter into either directly or indirectly via 
involvement in international institutions. Hence, this eliminates the Continental 
conception of the social, and concomitant notions of a European collective or 
European community, as well as federal notions of 'subsidiarity'. For British 
parliamentary liberalism, 'European collectivity' connotes constraint and 'national 
sovereignty' connotes freedom. Furthermore, as such ideas affirm absolute 
national parliamentary sovereignty, the consequence is that European contracts, 
and thus 'subsidiarity I, are opposed because they would obstruct national political 
decision-making. Moreover, over the whole, of which Britain is merely part, for 
sovereignty to pass to a European supranational federal government would be to 
betray the traditional and treasured role of British government as custodian of the 
destiny of the British nation and state. This is then the ultimate concern to Britain 
held out by the prospect of European Union. As the British MEP, Lord O'Hagan 
explains with regard to the phrase 'federalism': 
On the Continent, it a harmless label, neither exciting nor controversial. 
In Britain, it carries connotations of unspeakable disloyalty and 
unmentionable perversity. 64 
Liberal-ind ivid ual ism also affirms that Britain understands 'European Union' as 
merely a means for expanding European economic trade. Concomitantly, this is 
reinforced by the notions of British market liberalism that envisage an 
agglomeration of individuals competing in a free market for individual interests. 
Accordingly, the European Union is understood as an agglomeration of individual 
states competing in a free market for individual national interests. Hence, the 
concept of subsidiarity is interpreted as a means to block any political initiatives 
that interfere with inter-state economic competition in the internal free market. 
64 Lord O'Hagan (199 1) 'Federalism', in Manchester Guardian Weekly, 7 July, p. 12. 
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Consequently, subsidiarity is conceived as a tool to uphold liberal notions of 
pluralism, individualism and freedom against restricting political actions proposed 
by the European Commission. 
By direct contrast, and congruent with the liberal democratic understanding of 
unity, communitarianism and equality, the Commission and Continental European 
member states are concerned that subsidiarity could be used to protect 'unequal; 
competition. For example, French politicians frequently quoted the principle in 
1992 as part of the protest relating to the poor treatment of French firms by the 
competition authorities of the Commission. The inherent liberal democratic 
understanding of equality, evident within this interest in a 'level playing field' and 
universal compliance with EU law, is in direct contrast to the British liberal- 
individualist understanding of freedom and the consequent understanding of free 
market economics which affirms an agglomeration of private individuals 
competing in a free market. Here, in accordance to the idea of 'possessive 
individualism', individual states are sovereign over their own interests and can 
enter into a variety of contractual social exchanges to secure autonomous needs 
and wants. Furthermore, congruent with the principles of English theorists such as 
Hobbes and Locke 65 , the inviolable 
integrity of the individual sovereign state 
includes its possessions in terms of capabilities, property and relentless drive to 
appropriate material. Thus, the individual sovereign state is only free if these 
possessions are protected from interference by the supranational authorities and 
institutions of the EU. Hence, since international relations are conceived as freely 
contractual, the international arena is understood as a realm of potential gain and 
loss. 
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For Continental Europe, in accordance with the liberal democratic principle of 
rights and responsive government, the state (at either a national or supranational 
level) can have a positive role in the development of formal and substantive 
democracy. Thus, a broader definition of subsidiarity would be effective in 
developing a more democratic and efficient multi-tiered system for European 
governance. This would help balance democracy with efficiency by illuminating 
the costs and benefits of alternative choices. As the EU should acknowledge, 
efficiency gains must be weighed against the possible costs to democracy of 
making decisions at a level that is far removed from most citizens. Indeed, one 
effect of the debate over subsidiarity has been to highlight this imbalance between 
efficiency and democratic guarantees in EU politics. Hence, the liberal democratic 
criticism of the EU as a highly undemocratic system of governance where the 
Commission remains unelected, the EP weak and the Council of Ministers a 
closed, secretive cabal. 
However, the criticism of the EU emanating from Britain signifies a diverging 
liberal-individualist focus that affirms the negative idea of freedom as freedom 
from constraint. A political or democratic role for the EU is rejected in the pursuit 
and defence of liberal-individualist freedoms. No supranational democratic or 
political function is necessary or desirable in the defence of liberal freedoms, 
where national parliament is sovereign and the role of the EU is limited to 
protecting the freedom of the single market. 
Thus, in British discourse, the EU is criticized for the restriction of freedom rather 
than the restriction of democracy. That is, the EU is equated with the infringement 
of freedom that state intervention and bureaucracy represents for British liberal- 
65 See: Macpherson, C. B. (1962) Op. Cit. 
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individualism. As indicated in Section 2.6.5., and examined further in Chapter 
5, British discourse often equates the 'European Union' with only the 'European 
Commission' in Brussels, which is equated to a growing French-German 
conspired and socialist 'European superstate' of 'burgeoning bureaucracy'. As 
such, the EU embodies the self-seeking drive towards expansion and autonomy 
equivalent to state intervention and bureaucracy, and hence, increasingly 
ineffectiveness. Moreover, as the EU expands and becomes self-perpetuating, 
Britain is concerned that it will also become increasingly costly. As its sphere of 
control broadens, it represents a greater threat to the liberal-individualist principle 
of freedom from constraint. Therefore, Britain obstructs initiatives for the political 
expansion of the EU. Following the philosophical tradition of Locke and Bentham, 
British government holds that autonomous action in the open market will 
maximize human welfare. Consequently, European state intervention is 
unnecessary and undesired in this regard, this rationale is reflected in the British 
obstruction to the social dimension of European integration. Thus, this thesis 
holds that it is important to demonstrate that Britain has opposed the social 
initiatives of the EC/EU in its defence of the free market economy and 
parliamentary sovereignty. Although this thesis focuses upon the political aspects 
of Britain's opposition to European integration, it is acknowledged that the 
development of a social dimension is an important step towards a progressive and 
supranational European identity. 
3.3. The British obstruction to the European social dimension 
As for the political initiatives of European integration, the conflict in discourse 
between Britain and Continental Europe was reflected in Britain's awkward 
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position upon the social integration of Europe. Britain has been the only 
member state to consistently oppose the Commission's proposals for a social 
dimension. It opposed the Social Charter (1989); the 'Action Programme (1989)'; 
additional directives upon maximum hours and maternity rights (and to the 
Commission's classification of them as measures involving health and safety at 
work, and thus, subject to QMV under the SEA), and the Social Chapter of the 
TEU (1992). 
To elucidate, opposition from Britain meant that social policy was excluded from 
the extension of QMV in the SEA. Britain also abstained from the Social Charter, 
even though it was non-binding and included no provisions to transform it into a 
set of binding regulations. Thus, the French presidency had to negotiate a deal 
with Britain under which the other eleven countries adopted the Social Charter. 
Britain also opposed the (1989) Action Programme that contained more specific 
guidelines and draft proposals for social legislation. Combined with the Social 
Charter, areas that were addressed included rights in employment, living and 
working conditions, freedom of association and collective bargaining. 
At the Maastricht Summit, the question of QMV on social matters became the 
most difficult issue because of fierce opposition from Britain. All but Britain 
displayed a desire to take QMV into the social field. Britain also rejected the 
Social Chapter of the draft of the TEU, which concerned basic salary matters, but 
also employee rights across the spectrum. Agreement only proved possible by 
dropping the Social Chapter from the draft treaty, and replacing it with a Social 
Protocol in which eleven member states committed themselves to making 
progress on social issues while Britain committed itself to nothing beyond its 
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liberal economic understanding of the obligations signified by the Treaty of 
Rome and the SEA. 
This Social Protocol was phrased in such a way that Britain was permanently 
outside the structure - there was no possibility, in the absence of treaty 
amendment, of 'opting in' to the agreement. It was emphasized that, as according 
to the European Communities Act (1972), the Social Protocol cannot be 
recognised, and thus can have no force, in British law. 66 Hence, Britain preserved 
British national and parliamentary sovereignty and its 'right to make or unmake 
any law whatever. 
As examined further in Chapter 5, British Government had consistently rejected 
the social dimension on the grounds that it was considered to be a 'socialist' 
initiative. Such 'socialist' ideas were perceived as outdated and costly. They 
represented a socialist infringement upon liberal economic freedom and 
competition, and thus, an economic cost upon prosperity and employment. For 
example, in the run-up to the Madrid Summit in June 1989, Thatcher explained to 
the House of Commons her imminent opposition to the Social Charter, and the 
necessity for unanimity upon it. She argued that it would impose: 
... unnecessary controls and regulations which would tie up 
industry, 
which would put many more costs on industry, which would make 
industry uncompetitive and which would therefore increase 
unemployment and mean that we could not compete with the rest of the 
world for the trade that we so sorely need. 67 
Similarly, on the Social Chapter of the TEU, John Major declared: 
We reject, and will continue to reject, the Social Chapter. ... Let Jacques Delors accuse us of creating a paradise for foreign investors. I 
66 European Communities Act 1972,1(2)(k). 
67 Hansard (11989) Col. 470,18 May. 
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am happy to plead guilty. Again and again we warned our 
European partners about the Social Chapter ... They can have the Social Chapter. We'll have the jobs. 68 
In the Conservative Party political broadcast of 18 April 1996, John Major also 
described the Social Chapter as a 'European tax on jobs' that would stop Britain 
becoming the 'enterprise centre of Europe' able to compete with the states of the 
69 Pacific Basin . 
Britain rejected such social initiatives because they represented the infringement 
of freedom that state intervention and bureaucracy posed for British liberal- 
individualism. They reflected the social democratic preference for state 
intervention and burgeoning bureaucracy that the British (hegemonic) project of 
neo-liberalism had identified as the cause of effectiveness and crisis in Britain in 
the late 1970s. Thus, Britain fiercely opposed social initiatives that reflected the 
development of what it perceived as a European social democratic superstate. 
Moreover, it was held that such social democratic initiates would impose high 
economic costs that were unnecessary because autonomous action in the 
European open market would itself maximize social welfare. 
In sum, British neo-liberalism continued to support EC economic initiatives that 
assisted the completion of the single European economic market, but opposed 
the social and political initiatives that would obstruct its free-market forces and/or 
threaten national and parliamentary sovereignty. The fierce British parliamentary 
opposition to the European social dimension is illustrated by the observation that, 
in 22 July 1993, the Social Protocol of the TEU produced the most serious 
parliamentary defeat suffered by a Conservative government in the twentieth 
68 Major, J. (1993) Speech at Conservative Party Meeting. 27 February. 
69 Party Political Broadcast by the Conservative Party (1996), 18 April. 
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century. 70 However, all other member states supported the social dimension 
in a shared social democratic belief that 'social consensus ... is an essential 
condition for sustained economic development', and that 'in the context of the 
establishment of the single European market, the same importance must be 
71 
attached to the social aspects as to economic aspects' . 
Indeed, from this 
perspective, the British neo-liberal preference for a low welfare economy would 
encourage crime and break down the social fabric of the 'collective' community, 
and thus, would have heavy costs in the long term. 
Thus, Britain has supported economic initiatives that assisted the completion of 
the single European economic market, but opposed social and political initiatives 
that obstructed its free-market forces. As argued, the British obstruction to these 
initiatives reflects a divergence in discourse between Britain and Continental 
Europe. As will now be examined, this conflict in discourse was manifest within 
the Maastricht debate upon the TEU. 
3.4. A case study: the floating signifiers of the TEU (1992) 
It should be noted that subsidiarity achieved its prominence in the EC debate as a 
result of a convergence of three currents in 1991-92: the British refusal to accept 
a reference to the 'federal vocation' of the EC in the TEU; the rejection of the 
treaty in the first referendum in Denmark; and the success of British Conservative 
I rebels' in thwarting the plans of the Major government for the smooth and speedy 
ratification of the TEU. 
70 Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994) 'The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: 
Conservative Divisions and British Ratification', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 47, No. 1, p. 57; 
Ludlam, S. (1998) 'The Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European Integration', in: 
Baker, D. and D. Seawright (eds) Britain for and Against Europe: British Politics and the Question 
of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). p. 31. 
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We will begin with the British opposition to the word 'federalism'. Britain 
rejected this principle because it signified 'centralization' because it signified 
centralization. Thus, John Major was adamant that the reference to federalism in 
the preamble of the 1985 Luxembourg draft of the TEU had to be removed, and 
insisted again on its withdrawal from the 1991 Dutch draft. (To Major's 
annoyance, the new Dutch presidency had merely changed the phrase 'federal 
goal' to 'federal vocation'. ) Demonstrating his interpretation of federalism as a 
centralizing principle, Major argued: 
The notion of a Federal Europe leads over time to a European 
Parliament with full legislative powers, to which national governments 
and parliaments would be subordinate. ... We will not therefore accept 72 
a Treaty which describes the Community as having a federal vocation . 
However, following Christian Democratic and German federal discourses, Delors, 
and other member states interpreted federalism as a decentralizing principle. 
Conceiving it as decentralizing move, other states supported the use of word 
'federal', and would have settled for a phrase that appeared in previous drafts 
describing the treaty as marking 'a new stage in the process leading gradually to 
73 Union with a federal goal' . For example, as a highly decentralized state with 
regional rather than national allegiances, Italy was a wholehearted champion of 
supranationalism, and similar to Belgium, Germany and Spain, welcomed the 
emergence of a federal Europe. Indeed, there were few proposals on political 
74 
union to which Italy objected . However, with the British government remaining 
completely unwilling to see the 'f-word' appear in any form at all, in the political 
trading which occurred before the Maastricht summit, this point was finally 
71 Social Charter. Preamble, recitals 5 and 2.1989. 
72 Major, J. (11991 b) The House of Commons, 20 November. 
73 As cited in: Nugent, N. (1999) [1989] The Government and Politics of the European Union. 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan). p. 65. First published in 1989 as The Government and Politics of the 
European Community. See also: Cram, L., D. Dinan and N. Nugent (eds) (1999) Developments in 
the European Union. (Basingstoke: Macmillan). 
74 Dinan, D. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 139. 
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conceded. Hence, the reference in the opening article of the Treaty, Article A, 
to the 'federal vocation' was replaced by a commitment to create: 
... an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. 75 
The British delegation perceived this outcome as a victory. Its vague commitment 
would not be difficult to keep, even for the British. Yet, to Delors and the other 
member states, the phrase 'ever closer union' seemed more centralist than the 
word 'federal" Indeed, as federalism signified decentralization in other European 
discourses, then Britain was actually supporting European centralization in its 
opposition to federalism. 
In fact, a separate reference to subsidiarity was also formally incorporated by 
Article 3b of the TEU: 
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon 
it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas 
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall 
take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and 
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the 
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the 
Community. Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is 
necessary to achieve the objects of this Treaty. 76 
In accordance with Delors' interpretation, the Commission vice president, Leon 
Brittan, argued that this formalization of the principle of subsidiarity must be 
treated as a guiding political principle as well as a clearly defined legal restraint: 
(Article 3b) places a legally-binding limitation on the scope of action of 
the Community; it applies without caveat, limitation or exception. ... Once the Treaty has come into effect, every single new legislative act 
of the Community can be held up and judged under this standard. 77 
75 The Treaty upon European Union. Article A. 1992. 76 Ibid. Article 3b. 
77 Brittan, L. (1992) Speech delivered to the European University Institute, 11 June, IP/92 1477, 
92/06/11. 
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However, similar to Article A, this formalization did not provide a clear guiding 
principle or legal restraint because it was imprecise and open to many 
interpretations. For example, without a specific universal agreement, how is it 
decided what constitutes 'sufficient' achievement or 'necessary' Community 
action? Thus, as for Article A, it only required a vague commitment from the EC 
and its member states. Again, as for Article A, it was likely that such judgements 
would vary between member states as well as between national and European 
decision-makers. Furthermore, as will now be demonstrated, the consequent 
ambiguity of the meaning of subsidiarity is particularly evident when the two treaty 
references are compared. For example, in Article A, subsidiarity appears to claim 
that decisions in a European Union should be taken, I as closely as possible' to the 
citizens, which might well be taken to imply at the level of local government 
whenever possible. However, Article 3b presents subsidiarity as a procedural 
device for dividing competencies between the EC and (the national governments 
of) its member states according to which can perform specific actions most 
efficientl Y. 
78 Thus, these two definitions do not have the same meaning, and nor 
do they amount to a clear, legal definition of subsidiarity. What they do offer, 
however, are definitions to suit ratification, and this suggests that there was a 
stronger commitment to ratifying the TEU than there was of ensuring 'an ever 
closer unionp. 
It could be thus suggested that the two articles were designed to appeal to two 
different discourses. They would help ratification by providing a definition of 
subsidiarity to suit each position. For example, the former Article A reference to 
subsidiarity based on 'closeness to the citizen' would be welcomed by Belgiurnq 
78 Scott, A., J. Peterson, and D. Millar (1994) 'Subsidiarity: a "Europe of the Regions" v. the British 
ConstitutionT, Journal of Common Market Studies, March, Volume 32, No. 1, pp. 49-50. 
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Germany, Italy, and Spain, because it could be interpreted as Protecting the 
subnational interests of the Belgian and Italian regions, the German lander, and 
the Spanish 'autonomous communities'. Here, in accordance to the principle of 
absolute parliamentary sovereignty, British negotiators had condemned 
arguments that the treaty should contain a legal definition of subsidiarity and give 
sub-national powers to the European Court of Justice to decide whether or not EC 
acts respected it. Such demands came from many political leaders at the state 
level in Germany as well negotiators from Belgium who insisted that the treaty 
should reflect a 'total concept' of EC governance, including 'precise details of 
respective powers in sensitive areas in which national traditions frequently 
differ' . 
79This was also the preference of the Commission, as exemplified above in 
the words of Delors and Brittan. However, these proposals were rejected, and 
thus, Article A emerged as a diluted compromise which sought to satisfy states 
such as Germany, Belgium and Britain. 
In contrast, 'subsidiarity' in Article 3b reflected the British principles of 
parliamentary sovereignty and the autonomy of national states in EC decision- 
making. The Major government presented this definition of subsidiarity to 
parliament as a British victory. However, the vague language of this article could 
also satisfy opposing conceptions: the terms 'sufficiently' in relation to national 
acts, and 'better' to sanction intervention by the EC, could also signify the 
imposition of new supranational powers over foreign policy, defence and 
immigration - in direct conflict with the British conception. In sum, the term 
I subsidiarity' aPpealed to the federal and supranational interests of Delors and 
79 Belgium memorandum, 19 March 1990, reprinted in: Laursen, F. and S. Vanhoonacker (eds) 
(1992)'The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies 
and the International Identity of the European Community', European Institute of Public 
Administration, pp. 269-72. 
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member states such as Belgium, Italy, Germany, Spain, as well as to the 
conflicting anti-federalist and intergovernmental interests of Britain and Denmark. 
Rather than representing an anomaly, however, such ambiguity is typical of the 
TEA: a vague document that lacks a common conception of the EU or any 
common vision for its future. Such vagueness reflects the lack of agreement and 
progress towards the political integration of Europe that is signified by the treaty. 
Indeed, the crucial point is that the TEU did not represent any significant 
agreement or progress because what was signified by the treaty was different and 
even opposed for the different and opposing discourses of Britain and Continental 
Europe. The significance of the TEU was undermined because common terms did 
not signify common values and principles. 
In this sense, the principle of subsidiarity in the TEU is a 'floating signifier': it is 
overflowed with meaning because it is articulated differently within the different 
discourses of Britain and Continental Europe. As a consequence, Britain and 
Continental Europe have agreed upon the signifier 'subsidiarity' (the sound- 
image) but not upon its signified (its concept or content). Hence, agreement upon 
the signifier'subsidiarity' does not represent any genuine agreement or progress 
towards a common understanding of European union, or towards any common 
vision of its future. 
As this thesis emphasizes, it is only agreement upon the signified that is 
significant because only this represents genuine agreement and progress. As 
advocated by German federalism, such would reflect a universal European 
discourse, and thus, a universal and clear understanding of European union and 
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the form that it should take. Yet, for the sake of ratification of the TEU, the 
lack of such a genuine agreement upon signifieds, which would reflect a common 
understanding of 'an ever closer% was concealed by a facade of agreement upon 
signifiers. Such a veneer helped conceal the impossible task of ratifying what 
came to be an unratifiable treaty, as illustrated below in Section 3.4.3. In this 
sense, the treaty concealed the continuation of a conflict in ideas and interests 
that needed to be effectively and directly confronted before a universal conception 
and vision of European union could be achieved. 
3.4.1. Hollow victories and empty signifiers 
In practice, subsidiarity is most often associated with a federalist theory of the 
state. However, in British-EU discourse, 'federalism' signifies 'centralism' - and it 
was the signification of the centralization of power at the supranational rather than 
the national level that the British government opposed. For example, when the 
ratification debate on the TEU bill opened in Parliament on 20 May 1992, Major 
emphasized that the TEU marked a rejection of EC centralization, and where it did 
not, Britain had opted out. He argued that the British Government had 
successfully managed to make the TEU into a very limited document that 
enshrined intergovernmental ism and represented a decline in the political 
integration: 
Many of the issues that which are most problematic for us are ones 
that arise from the application of the original Treaty of Rome not the 
Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty marks the point at which for 
the first time, we have begun to reverse that centralising trend. We 
have moved decision taking back towards the member states in 
areas where Union law need not and should not apply. (Thus, we 
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have diminished) 
... the old tendency among some of our 
partners to think that action by the Community was always the best 
answer. 80 
John Major was able to present the treaty as such a victory against the federalist 
goals of Continental Europe by emphasizing that a definition of 'subsidiarity' had 
been written into the treaty as a legally binding principle which stated that 
decisions should only be taken at the Community level where a compelling case 
could be made that they were more appropriately taken at that level than at the 
national level. 81 That is, Major referred to Article 3b with its preferred specific 
reference to 'member states' rather than the Article A reference to 'as closely as 
possible to the citizen ,. 82 As such, he was defining subsidiarity in a way that 
directly opposed its original formulation in Catholic social discourse as a weapon 
against the nation state. For example, following the Danish referendum vote 
against the treaty, he declared to the House of Commons that the TEU and its 
concept of subsidiarity represented a move towards intergovernmental ism: 
The Maastricht treaty began to build the kind of European Community 
that we wish to see. It introduced the concept of intergovernmental co- 
operation outside the treaty of Rome. It established the principle of 83 
subsidiarity rather than centralism . 
As this they represented a shift towards intergovernmental ism, Major emphasized 
that it also represented a move towards the British rationale of parliamentary 
sovereignty: 
... common consent 
in this country is exercised through a 
parliamentary democracy and through the voices and words of 
Members of Parliament in this House. As for ... a 
decentralised Europe 
(, ) I believe that the point that is central to the agreement secured at 
Maastricht is that Maastricht traced the pattern for the development of 
80 Hansard (1992) 6 th Ser. 208, Col. 268,20 May. After the Maastricht summit, Major declared 
I ame, set and match'. (The Financial Times (1991) 12 December, p. I 
8q See: Hansard (1991) 6 th ser. 200, Cols. 859-62,11 December, and 18 December 1991, Cols. 
275-86. 
82 Nicoll, W. and T. C. Salmon. (1994) Understanding the New European Community. (Hemel 
Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf). p. 260. 
83 Hansard (1992) Col. 827,3 June. 
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that sort of Europe. That is what lies behind the provisions for 
intergovernmental agreement rather than agreement only under the 
treaty of Rome, and that is what also lies behind a number of the other 
provisions, including subsidiarity. We have begun to build that sort of 
Europe. 84 
However, Delors announced to the EP and the media that the very same treaty 
had relaunched political integration 85 , and other member states also interpreted 
the TEU in this way. 86 Moreover, to the detriment of Major's attempt to appease 
Eurosceptic rebels, the German Vice-President of the Commission, Martin 
Bangemann, declared that the TEU was 'federalist' on the eve of the crucial 
House of Commons vote on the TEU bill on 4 November 1992.87 
Thus, the TEU allowed each participant, including the Commission, to claim its 
own victory. However, by replacing the f-word for 'subsidiarity', the aims of treaty 
and the possibility of 'an ever closer union' had been undermined because the 
previously signified 'federal' future of the EU was now only ambiguous and 
uncertain. Moreover, in direct contrast to the German federalist aims of Delors, 
the previously clear federal understanding of 'subsidiarity' had been replaced by 
the ambiguous and uncertain content of 'an ever closer union', and thus, it was so 
over coded with meaning that it meant everything and nothing. In this sense, from 
a discourse-theoretical perspective, subsidiarity became an 'empty signifier' 
because it was a signifier without a signified. That is, it is emptied of any precise 
content due to the 'sliding of the signifieds under the signifier,. As a consequence, 
the TEU meant everything to everyone and thus, it meant nothing at all. 
84 Ibid. Col. 832. 
85 Official Journal of the European Communities: Debates of the European Parliament (1991) 12 
December, No. 3-412/232-6. 
86 See: George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner, Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press). p. 247. 
228 
In sum, the treaty had failed to achieve any steps towards any vision of 
European union because it had not only failed to achieve agreement upon exactly 
what this process meant, but it had also undermined previous understandings. 
Thus, it is ironic that the agreed phrase 'an ever closer union' signified the 
growing uncertainty of that possibility. Rather than bargaining over floating 
signifiers, the debate upon the TEU should have focused upon fixing the meaning 
of such terms so that any confusion and misunderstanding over key principles 
was eradicated. As this research emphasizes, it is agreement over what is 
signified by European integration and its related concepts and principles which is 
the crucial starting point for the development of an integrated Europe. As also for 
the academic analysis of the European integration process, there has to be a 
universal discourse -a common set of meanings and assumptions - before 
judgements and decisions can be meaningful and universally applied. 
3.4.2. The British presidency and trouble at home 
This section will examine the British domestic politics that had an important impact 
upon the British Government's position upon the TEU and the principle of 
subsidiarity. In particular, following the Maastricht debate in 9-11 December 1991, 
there was a British general election on 9 April 1992, as well as the British 
presidency of the EC from July to December 1992. With regard to the looming 
general election, and with Thatcher and her Eurosceptic backbench supporters 
hovering in the wings, it was very important for Major to be able to claim a victory 
in the pre-Maastricht fight against the 'f-word'. He needed a victory to improve his 
political position at home, both with the British electorate as well as within his own 
87 Nicoll, W. and T. C. Salmon (1994) Op. Cit. p. 291. On this day, the British Government had 
scraped a victory by only three votes in the House of Commons on the motion to reintroduce the Bill 
to ratify the Treaty. 
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party. Indeed, fuelled by Thatcher, protest against the use of the f-word was 
particularly strong within the Conservative backbenches of British parliament. 88 
Many agreed with the sentiments of Roger Knapman: 
I believe in a group of sovereign and nation states co-operating for their 
mutual advantage, principally through the means of a single market, 
regulated as little as possible. That is very different from integration, 
federalism or union. 89 
Moreover, although John Major won the 1992 general election, he only scraped a 
narrow majority in Parliament9o, and thus, it was apparent that his European 
strategy would be very vulnerable to any Eurosceptic parliamentary protest. In 
contrast to the more Eurosceptic position of the previous Thatcher Government, 
Major's strategy was to put Britain at the 'heart of Europe'. He argued that Britain 
could better change the direction of the EC 'from within'. With a small 
parliamentary majority, a large Eurosceptic backbench resistance, and a 
predominantly Eurosceptic press, it was crucial to Major that his European 
strategy was successful. 
3.4.3. The ratification crisis 
Problems began for Major's European policy immediately after the narrow Danish 
referendum defeat of the TEU on 2 June 1992 (50.7 per cent to 49.3 per cent). 
This result sparked a TEU ratification crisis in Britain. It exacerbated British anti- 
Maastricht sentiment, and it was seized by British parliamentary Eurosceptics to 
reinforce their interpretation of the TEU. The Danish defeat of the TEU also led 
88 See for example: Major, J- (1999) The Autobiography. (London: HarperCollins. ); Baker, D., A. 
Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 37-60; Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1993) 
'Whips or Scorpions? The Maastricht Vote and Conservative MPs', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 
46, No. 2. pp. 151-166; Baker, D., 1. Fountain, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1995)Backbench 
Conservative Attitudes to Europe', The Political Quarterly, Volume 66, No. 2, pp. 221-233, and 
Ludlam, S. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 31-56. 89 Knapman, R. (1992) Hansard, Col - 393,20 May. 
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sixty-eight Conservative back-bench MPs, to sign a House of Commons 
motion calling on the Government to use its presidency to make a new clear anti- 
federal start on EC development. Major soon became a hostage of such 
Eurosceptics in his own party, who continued to capitalize on such crises as well 
as upon Labour's determination to undermine his government. In sum, after the 
Danish result, a disastrous ratification debacle ensued in Britain that was fuelled 
by a combination of weak political leadership, unfortunate timing, and arcane 
parliamentary procedures. 
More domestic problems for Major followed when Britain took over the British 
presidency in July -a bad time for a government that was experiencing serious 
Eurosceptic back-bench opposition. 91 In the face of growing Eurosceptic 
sentiment, clearing the way for the ratification of the TEU became a priority of the 
programme of the British presidency. Thus, as described above, during the 
ratification debate, it was no surprise that Major stressed that the TEU was an 
intergovernmental ist and minimalist treaty that marked a turning away from EC 
centralization, and that this was reflected in its anti-federal formalization of 
subsidiarity. 
However, the Conservative backbenches were not satisfied by the replacement of 
federalism with subsidiarity. As Michael Spicer asserts: 
People say that the Bill is not about federalism ... , it 
is just a minor step 
along the road towards greater co-operation. By and large, that tends to 
be the Government's position. They feel that they were clever in getting 
the word federalism out of the treaty. That argument does not hold up. 9 
90 21 seats, compared with 88 in the previous Parliament. 91 See: Major, J. (1999) Op. Cit; Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994) Op. Cit; Baker, D., A. 
Gamble and S. Ludlam (11993) Op. Cit; Baker, D., 1. Fountain, A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1995) Op. 
Cit, and Ludlam, S. (1998) Op. Cit. 92 Spicer, M. (11992) Hansard, Col - 569,21 May. 231 
Moreover, as Britain assumed the presidency, the domestic problems 
concerning the TEU were exacerbated by Thatcher's repeated attacks upon 
Major's position on the TEU and her repeated calls for a British referendum on the 
issue. For example, in her maiden speech in the House of Lords on the subject on 
2 July, Thatcher declared that to ratify the TEU without a referendum would be: 
- to 
betray the trust as guardian of the parliamentary institutions, of 
the courts and of the constitution ... to betray the trust they have placed in us. ... It is the people's turn to speak. It is their powers of which we 
are custodians. 93 
Thus, following Lord Tonypandy and Lord O'Hagan above, support of European 
integration was once again made equivalent to treason - the 'betrayal' of the 
British nation and the political institutions that defend its interests. Indeed, 
Norman Tebbit went on to actually describe the treaty as 'close to treason' in mid- 
94 February 1993 . 
However, the Major Government argued that referenda were not 'the way to 
proceed in a parliamentary democracy': 
The British system is a parliamentary democracy: the Government is 
accountable to the Parliament and Parliament is accountable to the 
electorate. The House of Commons approved the British negotiating 
position before Maastricht and the results afterwards. It has also given 
a second reading, after the election, to the Bill which would enable the 
Government to ratify the Treaty. Parliament will have a thorough and 
detailed discussion of the bill at Committee stage. The Government 
believes that is the right way to proceed in a parliamentary 
democracy. 95 
Indeed, the call for referenda in Britain is very rare because it is a procedure that 
conflicts with the tenets of British responsible and representative government and 
absolute parliamentary sovereignty. Thus, as the Major Government statement 
93 Baker, D., A. Gamble and S. Ludlam (1994) Op. Cit. p. 46,49. 
94 Ibid. p. 46. 
95 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office. (11992) Britain in Europe: the European Community and 
Your Future. (London: The Foreign and Commonwealth Office). p. 23. 
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indicates, by demanding a referendum, Thatcher was betraying the very 
principles that she was attempting to defend against European integration! As 
such, she was paradoxically betraying parliamentary sovereignty in order to 
prevent its betrayal. Moreover, by arguing that such a popular democratic 
procedure was necessary to achieve public consent, she was actively 
acknowledging and exposing the limitations of the parliamentary principles that 
she was attempting to defend, and thus, she was undermining the basis of her 
own argument for opposition to European integration. These observations suggest 
that this demand for a referendum was influenced by pragmatism as much as 
principle. As Conservative Eurosceptic rebels have admitted, they had two 
principal hopes for a referendum: they were convinced that their position had 'the 
support of the majority of the British people', and that believed that a referendum 
would scupper the TEU. 
96 
With the Danish and British ratification crises, as well as a narrow referendum 
victory in France on 20 September, it was becoming increasingly apparent that 
European-wide public opinion was beginning to swing against Brussels. This led 
to many member states using subsidiarity as means for allaying public concern 
and possibly hoping to use it to roll back intrusive but beneficial policies such as 
the aggressive enforcement of competition law. However, the two different 
formalizations of subsidiarity in the TEU also allowed it to be used in Britain to 
exacerbate such public concerns. As this section has shown, British Eurosceptics 
used it as a means for invoking national concern about excessive centralization in 
Brussels. 
96 Knapman, R. (1993) 'Bureaucrats Beware', Parliamentary Brief, July. 
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3.4.4. The Birmingham Summit in October 1992 
If this ratification crisis was not bad enough, from September onwards, it was 
coupled with the ERM crisis. In the face of these crises, Major looked for salvation 
to the specially convened European Council in Birmingham summit in October 
1992, which became one of the least purposeful in the history of the EC. Indeed, 
this summit failed to develop a solution to either crisis or the Danish problem. 
However, during the summit, the British presidency had attempted to divert 
attention from the severe setbacks to its European programme, and from 
Maastricht initiatives that may invoke more British Eurosceptic fervour, by 
focussing upon the debate upon 'subsidiarity' and linking it to a general campaign 
to make the workings of the EC 'transparent' and comprehensible to the public. In 
all, little was achieved at the summit, which concluded with a new but equally 
vague declaration on subsidiarity in which the term was replaced by'nearness': 
We affirm that decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the 
citizen. Greater unity can be achieved without excessive centralization. 
It is for each Member State to decide how its powers should be 
exercised domestically. The Community can only act where Member 
States have given it the power to do so in the treaties. Action at the 
Community level should happen when proper and necessary ... 
subsidiarity' or 4 nearness' is essential if the Community is to develop 
97 with the support of its citizens . 
Less than two weeks after the Birmingham summit, to improve progress, the 
Commission submitted a lengthy political, technical and legal analysis of 
subsidiarity to the European Council and Parliament. This developed the 'two 
dimensions' of subsidiarity - the need for action and the proportionality of action - 
and asserted that the burden of proof in both cases should lay with EC 
institutions. However, the Commission also argued that subsidiarity could not 
become an excuse for member states either to blame Brussels for unpopular 
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actions or to curb the legitimate legislative and executive authority of the 
Commission. 98 Together with a foreign minister's report, this communication set 
the stage for the discussion of subsidiarity at the Edinburgh summit. 
Despite this communication, and despite the evidence to suggest that the British 
presidency was at least partly to blame for the existing problems facing European 
integration, this did not stop the Major government exploiting the growing crisis of 
confidence in the EC in order to weaken the position of the Commission. When 
the Commission represents the key supranational body of the EC, this action 
would strengthen the intergovernmental basis of the EC (represented by the 
Council of Ministers), and thus, British parliamentary-liberal-individualist 
preferences. Hence, when the Commission produced a paper on subsidiarity, the 
British presidency submitted its own paper and insisted that it should form the 
basis for all discussions. The British paper contained a list of Commission 
proposals that accorded with the Continental European social democratic 
discourse and thus, that opposed the perceived British national interest. For 
example, although they were accepted by all other member states, supranational 
and social democratic proposals for employee protection and social security, as 
well supranational measures to protect the environment, were to be scrapped or 
amended on the grounds that they were against the spirit of the British 
understanding of subsidiarity. For example, the British Foreign Office criticized an 
EC proposal that required environmental impact statements whenever any 
national public policy had environmental consequences: 
How to take account of environmental considerations in policy- 
making must be up to national governments ... The directive would 
require changes in fundamental constitutional arrangements such as 
97 Bulletin of the European Communities. 10-1992, Presidency Conclusions, point 1.8. 98 The European Commission, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity', SEC (92) 1990 final, 27 October 
1992. 
235 
the relationship between government and Parliament and the 
principle of collective responsibility. 99 
Nevertheless, Britain ultimately failed in its attempt to use subsidiarity as a tool 
against European intervention, particularly EC environmental legislation. It led 
only to the further estrangement of its fellow awkward partner, Denmark, which 
was perhaps the keenest proponent of stronger supranational EC powers to 
enforce tougher environmental national standards. The result was that Britain 
finally had to withdraw its aberrant subsidiarity text. 
At home, the Major Government was still failing to reassure Eurosceptics in 
Parliament that subsidiarity was an effective defence against loss of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty. Many shared the view of Ulster Unionist member, 
David Trimble, that: 
... The Maastricht Treaty is a giant step towards a 
federal European 
Union and the things that the Prime Minister is clinging to, such as 
subsidiarity, are meaningless. 100 
Indeed, as Bernard Jenkin argued: 
Subsidiarity - along with the establishment of the union, the single 
currency, common foreign policy leading to a common defence, the 
citizenship, the single institutional framework, the Council, the 
Parliament, the judges and the court presiding over a supreme body of 
law - is yet another manifestation of the centralised European 
superstate in the making. History will laugh at those who advocated the 
treaty in the name of the sovereignty of Parliament, or who said that it 
would strengthen the role of national Parliaments and was a step 
towards a Community of nation states. We are already in a legal 
federation. 101 
As a result, in order to succeed in what can only be considered as an 
unnecessary paving motion in the House of Commons, the Government was 
99 The Independent. (1992) 14 December. 
100 Agence Europe. (1993) 10 June. 
101 Jenkin, B. (1993) Hansard, Column 748,8 March. 
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forced to concede a promise not to attempt British ratification until after a 
second referendum in Denmark (that took place on 18 May 1993). 
3.4.5. The Lisbon Summit in June 1992 
With the prevailing climate of anti-TEU and anti-Commission protest in Britain, it 
was evident to Delors that the EC needed a much firmer definition of subsidiarity 
and explanation of its possible applications than had been developed at 
Maastricht. Thus, at the Lisbon summit on 26-27 June 1992, Delors presented a 
report to the European Council on subsidiarity. After discussing the issue, the 
European Council emphasized the need for this principle to be strictly applied, 
and called on the Commission and Council of Ministers to examine the steps 
needed to implement it and report back to the European Council at the Edinburgh 
summit. The Commission undertook to justify future proposals on the basis of 
subsidiarity, and the heads of government instructed the Council of Ministers to do 
the same if it decided to amend an original Commission proposal. 102 
3.4.6. The Edinburgh Summit in December 1992 
On 11-12 December 1992, the Major Government sought to fight off its critics by 
claiming a success at the Edinburgh summit at the end of its 1992 presidency. 
The British government redeemed its otherwise disastrous presidential 
performance by successfully chairing this summit. Indeed, all parties present at 
the summit alleged a breakthrough when agreement was reached on such 
troublesome issues as the EC budget, enlargement and subsidiarity. However, a 
declaration on 6... certain problems raised by Denmark' offered Denmark a string 
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of opt-outs from the TEU and stressed the significance for Denmark of a 
separate text on subsidiarity. 
In particular, the priority of the British presidency at Edinburgh was to achieve a 
new statement upon subsidiarity - 'transferring power from Brussels to London' as 
John Major described it. 103 In accordance with its preferences, it achieved 
agreement on a document that amplified the sense of Article 3b of the TEU and 
the imposed a three-stage test which EC legislation had to pass before being 
accepted under the criterion of subsidiarity. First, the community had to prove that 
it had the power to act under its treaties before a proposal was considered. 
Second, it had to then be shown that proposed objectives could not be achieved 
through national or local action. Finally, any proposed European political 
intervention must then be the minimum necessary. In opposition to further EC 
supranational development, this test had affirmed three principles favoured by 
Britain: first, national powers are the rule and the Community's the exception, 
second, subsidiarity as defined in Article 3b of the TEU, and third, the means to 
be employed by the Community (when it acts within the first two principles) must 
be proportional to the object to be pursued. Only in passing did this summit 
declaration on subsidiarity mention Article A of the TEU and its commitment to 
take decisions 'as closely as possible to the citizen'. Thus, the British Government 
perceived the Edinburgh criteria of subsidiarity as a success because it was 
interpreted as a means to block political interference with the internal economic 
market. 
However, the successes achieved at Edinburgh could not mask the poor record of 
102 Bulletin of the European Communities. 6-1992, Presidency Conclusions, point 1.1. 103 Nicoll, W. and T. C. Salmon (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 298-9. 
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the British presidency. In all, combined with the European Monetary System 
(EMS) crisis, problems with TEU ratification had turned the British presidency into 
one of the worst in the history of the EC' 04 and undermined Major's strategy to put 
Britain at the heart of Europe. By the end of 1992, the TEU ratification crisis was 
more acute than ever. Indeed, the TEU bill remains without parallel in post-war 
British history as a case study in parliamentary dissent. Although the Major 
leadership survived the rebellion against the TEU, the treaty could only be saved 
by resorting to a humiliating vote of confidence following, on 22 July 1993, the 
most serious parliamentary defeat suffered by a Conservative government in the 
twentieth century over the Social Protocol. 105 In addition to these problems, Britain 
and Germany were at loggerheads, and John Major seemed to lack the necessary 
political weight to help save the endangered GATT Uruguay Round. In sum, the 
attempt to appease Eurosceptic backbenchers (with a small parliamentary 
majority) with its EC presidency programme, as well with its aim to put Britain at 
the heart of Europe, had led to a disastrous presidency. 
Although domestic preoccupations had made it difficult for the British presidency 
to take a strong line in Community affairs, it was also apparent to other EC 
members, as well as to the Commission, that Britain was exploiting its term of 
presidency to following its own national interests rather than the 'common good' of 
the EC. Indeed, Britain had successfully fulfilled one priority of its presidency 
programme that directly served its own liberal-individualist interests: the 
completion of the internal economic market. In this regard, the British presidency 
had been an overwhelming success: the internal market was completed in all its 
essentials, with agreement on some ninety measures -a record for any 
104 
Dinan, D. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 239. 105 Baker, D., Gamble, A., Ludlam, S. (1 994)Op. Cit. p. 57; Ludlam, S. (1998) Op. Cit. p. 31. 
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presidency. Although the successful agreement upon this issue may suggest 
that other members were also following similar national liberal-economic interests, 
the determination and enthusiasm that this priority was given (and supported at 
home) by the British presidency throws its poor record on political and social 
matters into sharp relief, and thus, emphasizes the British presidency's adherence 
to its own liberal-individual interests (as determined by its national government 
and parliament) rather than the liberal democratic 'common good' of Europe (as 
determined at a supranational level by the political institutions of the EC). 
Conclusion 
This chapter began by presenting democracy as a floating signifier, and thus, as a 
signifier that is articulated differently within the discourses of the different member 
states of the EC/EU. As Section 2 illustrated, this signifier has a liberal democratic 
signified in Continental Europe, but a liberal-individualist signified in Britain. 
Ultimately, these different discourses have conflicting notions of state and society, 
and thus, of the future shape and form of the EU. 
Section 3 proposed that both federalism and subsidiarity are also 'floating 
signifiers': such pivotal signifiers of the debate upon European political integration 
have a liberal democratic signified in Continental Europe and a liberal-individualist 
signified in Britain. Thus, these terms become ambiguous within the debate upon 
European integration between Continental Europe and Britain. Moreover, since 
there is a conflict between these discourses, as illustrated in Section 2, this has 
led to conflicting meanings of such important terms within this debate, as well as 
conflicting preferences for the form of the 'ever closer union'. As a result, 
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European integration is obstructed and Britain is perceived as an 'awkward 
partner'. Explanations for this conflict in hegemonic discourse will be developed in 
Chapter 5. 
With regard to these observations, it is instructive to quote Delors reaction to the 
obstructions caused by Britain over the use of the f-word. He asked: 'what does a 
word matter, as long as we have the actual thing? '. 106 However, as this chapter 
has demonstrated, the point is precisely that the opposite had occurred - no 
progress had been achieved because agreement was finally made on words (that 
is, the signifiers 'subsidiarity' and 'an ever closer union' rather than 'federalism') 
but not on the 'actual thing' (that is, what was to be signified by these words). 
Thus, differences in the ideas, meanings, and interests of member states were 
unaffected by the TEU because it failed to address such significant differences 
between the discourses of the member states. As a consequence, British 
opposition to European political integration was preserved: the British aberrant 
parliamentary liberalist conceptions of subsidiarity and 'an ever closer union' were 
maintained by a treaty which produced agreement upon words but not upon 
meanings. As this chapter has also illustrated, this important divide was not 
addressed in subsequent negotiations and declarations. 
Yet this thesis proposes that agreement upon what is signified by European 
integration and its related concepts and principles is the crucial starting point for 
the development of an integrated and democratic Europe. As for the academic 
analysis of the European process, there has to be a universal discourse -a 
common set of meanings and assumptions - before judgements and decisions 
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(and policy decisions) can be meaningful and commonly applied. In addition, 
it is such a universal discourse that is necessary to remedy the crisis of 
confidence in the EU that stems from the lack of a definable and definite 
framework in which all majorities are 'compound' and minorities are protected. 
These crucial problems will prevail in Europe until an attempt is made to develop 
the discussion on subsidiarity further and link it with broader discussions about 
democracy in the EU. Certainly, as merely a functional and ambiguous concept, 
subsidiarity cannot compensate for the lack of democratic guarantees in the EU or 
help remedy the democratic deficit that exists, and these points are crucial in 
explaining support for a political and federal European unity on the Continent and 
the lack of it in Britain. Following the propositions of discourse theory, the 
European hegemonic project must introduce a master signifier, a nodal point, to 
retroactively constitute the identity of such floating signifiers; as 'democracy' and 
'subsidiarity' within a supranational paradigmatic chain of equivalences. As 
Chapter 7 proposes, we could quilt such floating signifiers through 'radical plural 
democracy'to give them a precise, fixed, and progressive signification. 
In terms of further EU debate upon subsidiarity, a detailed institutional agreement 
could help affirm a more universal meaning to this principle, as could the 
inevitable body of case law on the subject as times goes on - the practical 
implications of subsidiarity may develop as a consequence of landmark rulings 
from the Court of Justice. However, the Court of Justice hardly relishes 
adjudicating such politically charged cases. Thus, although such cases would help 
develop a universal legal definition of subsidiarity, it is probable that they would 
also bring to the surface, once again, the conflict of discourse that exist in the EU. 
106 
Agence Europe (1991) 1 JUIY. 
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The following chapter will apply the discourse-theoretical analytic to help 
explain why British discourse developed in opposition to the discourses of 
Continental Europe and the initiatives for European political integration. 
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Chapter Five 
Europe, the Other 
Introduction 
The previous chapter focused predominantly upon the discourse-theoretical 
concept of discourse to illustrate how the process of European (political) 
integration has been obstructed because Britain and Continental Europe have 
different (hegemonic) discourses and thus, different understandings of the same 
concepts and principles. However, it is crucial to explain why British discourse is 
opposed to other Continental European discourses if we are to understand the 
British 'awkward' partnership with the EU and its obstruction to European 
integration. To this end, this chapter applies the discourse-theoretical conception 
of 'social antagonism' to argue that this divergence in discourse reflects a British 
antagonism with Continental Europe. It will be demonstrated that the construction 
of the British identity has involved the construction of this antagonism, and thus, 
that British-European integration has been obstructed because Continental 
Europe (and its hegemonic discourse) represents its 'radical (and threatening) 
otherness'. 
Moreover, as Chapter 3 explained, such antagonisms are both a discursive 
response to dislocation as well as a source of dislocation. As this chapter will 
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demonstrate, the British antagonism with Continental Europe - and hence, with 
the EU - is a discursive response to dislocation. However, as well as this 
stabilizing function, the British identity has developed in opposition to European 
integration because Continental Europe has been identified as a cause of 
dislocation. 
In all, the discourse-theoretical approach will be applied to elucidate how the 
British identity has been disrupted by dislocations that have been harnessed 
through the construction of a social antagonism with Continental Europe (and 
thus, the EU). It will be demonstrated that gaps opened by such dislocations of 
the British structure have been filled by emerging hegemonic projects that have 
the character of myths. These hegemonic projects have attempted to suture this 
dislocated space, and naturalize the British identity with their claims to 
universality, by discursively constructing an antagonism with Europe. 
In addition, this chapter further elucidates why the issue of (national and 
parliamentary) sovereignty has made Britain such an aberrant member of the EU. 
It is also argued that the growing political implications of European integration, as 
particularly expressed by the TEU, invoked an unresolvable tension within the 
contingent articulation of the discourses of British economic liberalism and 
parliamentary sovereignty. Hence, the process of European integration exposed 
the 'contingency' and 'mythical' status of this discursive formation, and created 
unresolvable disputes within the Conservative Party that played a significant role 
in the demise of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 and the Major Government in 1997. 
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It will also be argued that Britain's awkward partnership with the EU is linked to the 
phenomena of nationalism and racism. This thesis observes that previous 
research upon British-European integration has not examined the intrinsic link 
between Euroscepticism, nationalism and racism within Britain. Moreover, this 
intrinsic link has also been neglected by research upon racism and nationalism in 
Britain. It is also proposed that previous essentialist and functionalist conceptions 
of nationalism and racism are problematic. As this chapter aims to demonstrate, a 
discourse-theoretical approach can provide a new and more productive framework 
for analysing these phenomena and thus, the phenomenon of British 
Euroscepticism. However, the analysis will begin with the examination of the 
British myths (and social imaginaries) that have invoked the antagonism with 
Continental Europe, and thus, obstructed the process of European integration. 
1.0. The significance of mvths and social imaginaries 
This chapter argues that the construction of the British (discursive system) of 
(national) identity has involved the development of an antagonism with 
Continental Europe, and thus, with the EU. The British identity represents a 
contingent articulation of myths that have conflicted with the process of European 
integration because Continental Europe has represented their radical otherness. 
These British myths will be described as 'parliamentary liberalism' and 'the British 
nation'. Here, the myth of 'parliamentary liberalism' represents the contingent 
articulation of parliamentary sovereignty and liberal-individualism, as described in 
Chapter 4. This myth has been articulated with the myth of the British nation to 
form the discursive formation of '(neo-) British national parliamentary liberalism I 
I as reflected in the defence of 'national parliamentary sovereignty . 
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I. I. The source of myths 
This analysis relates to the propositions outlined in Chapter 3 that concern social 
antagonism as a discursive response to the dislocation of the social order. In 
Chapter 3, it was argued that social antagonism should be defined in terms of the 
presence of a constitutive outside which, at the same time, constitutes and denies 
the identity of the inside. However, as well as its stabilizing function as a response 
to dislocation, it was emphasized that social antagonism is also a source of 
dislocation. Indeed, every identity is dislocated insofar as it depends on a 
constitutive outside that both denies that identity and provides its condition of 
possibility at the same time. ' Thus, social antagonism is double-edged because it 
constitutes and sustains an identity by positing a threat to it. 
In accordance with these propositions, social antagonism plays an important role 
in the construction of the spatiality of myths. A myth aims to reconcile the social in 
the face of structural dislocation, which involves the disruption of the structure by 
forces operating outside it. Thus, the condition for the emergence of a myth is 
structural dislocation, and it functions to suture the dislocated space by 
constructing a new space of representation. That is, it performs a hegemonic role 
since it aims to form a new objectivity by rearticulating the dislocated elements. As 
stated above, gaps opened by dislocations of the structure are filled by emerging 
hegemonic projects that have the character of myths. These myths have come to 
provide a homogeneous space of representation in Britain by displacing all forces 
of negativity - such as Continental Europe, and thus, the EU - to the 'constitutive 
outside I, which is both constitutive and subversive of the unity of the inside (that 
represents the British discursive system of identity). 
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1.2. Myths and identification 
In the condition of undecidability that is invoked by a structural dislocation, the 
decision to select a particular myth is analogous to 'identification' in 
psychoanalysis, in contrast to the 'rational decision' in previous theories of 
international relations examined in Chapter 1. Here, we can make an analogy 
between the selection of a particular discourse and the struggle of Lacan's infant 
2 
in the 'mirror stage' to make sense of its chaotic surroundings . Traumatized by 
the unbearable experience of dislocation, the Subject searches for an organizing 
framework that makes its experience bearable. As Anna Marie Smith describes: 
Lacan's infant (mis-)takes the image in the mirror as its own self, and 
the lure of the mirror image that facilitates this substitution consists 
precisely in its framed and stabilized character. The infant thereby 
achieves the sense of itself as a coherent totality, but only through (mis) 
identification with an external image that remains irreducibly 'other'. In 
this manner, dependence on otherness, alienation, transitivism and 
paranoiac knowledge are written into the very principle of our 
subjectiVity. 3 
Prior to the decision, there is no Subject with fully formed desires: there is only a 
deep anxious need for order (and thus, structure). Hence, a particular discourse 
will prevail over others to the extent that it effectively promises to provide a 
'minimal consistenCY, 4 in an otherwise chaotic terrain. Thus, it is primarily the 
formal operation of a myth, its provision of an orderly space, which makes it a 
compelling site of identification. For example, as ? -i2ek claims: 
1 Laclau, E. (1990) New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time. (London: Verso). p. 39. 
2 See: Lacan, J. (1977) 'The Mirror Image as Formulative of the Function of the I as Revealed in 
Psychoanalytic Experience', in 8crits. (London: Tavistock). pp. 1-7. 
3 Smith, A. M. (1998) Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary. (London, New York: 
Routledge). p. 77,207. 4 2i2ek, S. (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. (London: Verso). p. 75. 
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One approves of the Law because it is Law, not because it is rational. 
In a situation of radical disorganization there is a need for an order, and 5 its actual contents become a secondary consideration . 
In a moment of organic crisis, the Subject becomes acutely aware of the 
dislocation in the structure in the sense that it has an experience that makes 
visible the ultimate contingency of all forms of identification. 6 In pursuit of order, 
we are extremely vulnerable during such crises to hegemonic projects that 
promise to restore coherence by offering a particular myth that may later become 
a social imaginary. 7 For instance, despite observable 'rational' reasons for why a 
majority of British voters should oppose the Conservative Party, a discourse- 
theoretical approach can explain its electoral success in terms of its conservative 
nature. That is, although British voters may know that it is 'rational' for them to 
vote for a different party, they have voted for the Conservative Party because it 
promises order and consistency in its conservation of traditional British ideas - 
even if these ideas are known to be flawed or outdated. 
With regard to the development of such myths, it is apparent that key theoretical 
ideas of British political and governmental discourse have developed as a 
response to structural dislocation. As will be illustrated below, the English 
possessive liberalism of Thomas Hobbes, the English conservatism of Edmund 
Burke, and the British neo-liberalism of Thatcherism, all responded to the demand 
for order invoked by structural dislocation (as caused by the English Civil War, the 
French Revolution and the crisis of social democracy respectively). 
5 Laclau, E. and L. Zac (1994) 'Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics', in E. Laclau (ed. ) The 
Making of Political Identities. (London: Verso). p. 35. 6 Norval, A. (1996) Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse. (London: Verso). p. 13. 
7 See: Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 76-7. 
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Following Laclau, the relation between 'the filling' and the 'filling function' of myths 
depends upon the size and scope of the dislocation of the structure. 8 When 
routine expectations and practices are shattered, there is a generalized 
dislocation of traditional patterns of life. Thus, myths emerge as a possible 
response to the dislocation, and offer a principle of intelligibility for the new 
situation. However, as there is no common measure between the dislocated 
structure and the myth that aims to introduce a new order and a new articulation9, 
the content of this myth does not stem necessarily from the crisis itself. That the 
crisis is resolved in favour of a particular myth cannot be deduced from the terms 
of the crisis. Rather, a particular myth may be the only discourse that addresses 
the specific problems experienced by the groups in question and offers a 
coherent principle for their interpretation. Its victory may result from its availability 
on a terrain and in a given situation where no other discourse presents itself as a 
viable hegemonic alternative. The mere fact that it presented itself as the 
embodiment of 'fullness' can be enough to ensure its acceptance. Again, the 
discourse of a 'new order' is often accepted not because its content is particularly 
liked, but because it is the discourse of an order, of something that is presented 
as an alternative to a crisis and a generalized dislocation. 10 The more the 
organisation of an identity has been dislocated, the more those basic principles 
will have been shattered, thereby widening the areas of social life that must be 
reorganized by a mythical space. 
However, this does not suggest that any available myth will be accepted. The 
acceptance of a myth also depends upon its credibility, and this will not be 
granted if its proposals clash with the basic principles informing the organization 
8 Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and Atek. (Oxford, Massachusetts: 
Blackwell). p. 152. 9 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 65. 
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of an identity group. " Here, ( credibility' concerns whether a concrete proposal 
accords with some of the basic principles that organize life. The hegemonic 
strategy must seem to be consistent with cherished rules, norms, and values. 
However, credibility can also be a seeming willingness to reject what are 
perceived as unsustainable and discredited principles - principles that have been 
identified as the cause of dislocation, crisis and disorder. In sum, to be credible, a 
hegemonic strategy must be able to respond adequately to problems in society by 
offering a solution that leads to a 'simultaneous conservation-dissolution of 
, 12 institutionalized ways of life . Thus, 'history' and 'tradition' are important factors 
in the development of credible myths and social imaginaries. 
In all, with regard to the question of the 'limits to the possible', the mere availability 
of political projects for social restructuration counts more than their credibility 
when structural dislocation goes to the bottom of the social, and thus, the desire 
for order expands infinitely. That is, the 'filling function' tends to be relatively more 
important than 'the filling' in times of profound crises. In contrast, credibility 
becomes extremely important when structural dislocation is not as deep, and thus, 
debates over concrete proposals for a solution are intense. 13 . That is, 'the 
filling' 
tends to be relatively more important than the 'filling function' in times of more 
manageable crises. Hence, the importance of 'history' and 'tradition' to the 
construction of a successful myth is linked to - and is relative to - the size of the 
structural dislocation. 
However, it must also be emphasized that, despite the disruptive force of 
dislocation, there is always 'a relative structuration of the social' that might block 
10 Ibid. p. 66. 11 Ibid. 
12 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 152. 
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the advancement of a particular hegemonic project. 14 Furthermore, as observed 
by the neo-functionalists in Chapter I and George et al in Chapter 2, the form of 
institutions will influence the fate of political strategies. Indeed, congruent with the 
propositions of this thesis, George et al argue that the institutional form of British 
government and politics has posed a serious impediment to the process of 
European integration. However, in contrast to these previous accounts, a 
discourse-theoretical approach holds that what may seem as a structural 
constraint (in the sense of a highly sedimented institutional blockage) might over 
15 
time be eliminated or transformed into a conjunctual facilitation. As argued 
below, the myth of 'British parliamentary liberalism' conflicts with the supranational 
process of European integration, but new emerging myths can challenge and 
dissolve discourses if they offer more credible alternatives. 
Moreover, although the structural account of British-European integration by 
Preston has observed the possibility of 'structural change' in Britain (as examined 
in Chapter 2), it fails to provide an adequate explanation of how this change takes 
place. Furthermore, similar to the neo-functionalist accounts described in Chapter 
1, the structural change described by Preston tends to follow a teleological 
rationale rather than being amenable to the more undecidable change advocated 
by this thesis. Indeed, combined with the rejection of reductionism, it is for this 
reason that this thesis has applied the discourse-theoretical concept of 'discourse I 
I 
rather than more orthodox and essentialist concepts of 'structure . 
Nevertheless, discourse theory does accept that structural and institutional 
conditions, and the given distribution of resources, impose important limits to the 
13 Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 66. 14 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit, P. 153. 15 Ibid. 
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possible within the dislocated structure. Here, the most important limit to the 
possible remains the opposition from antagonistic forces. The struggle for 
hegemony always occurs in a terrain criss-crossed by antagonisms that 
simultaneously affirm and block each other's identity. However, the struggles 
between hegemonic agents are conditional upon 'sedimented' institutional 
structures that hold a certain 'strategic selectivityl. 
This thesis will now turn to the particular British myths that have obstructed the 
process of British-European integration. Following the propositions outlined in 
Chapter 3, it will be illustrated that the hegemonic articulation of significant British 
myths has involved the negation of Continental Europe in two senses: the 
negation of its alternative ideas and meanings, as well as the negation of the 
people (such as 'Eurocrats') who identify with them. This negation has invoked a 
British antagonism with Continental Europe, and thus, a resistance to European 
integration. As will be illustrated, the British hegemonic forces responsible for this 
negation have constructed Continental Europe, an thus, the process of European 
integration, as a threatening obstacle to the full realization of Britain's chosen 
ideas, meanings, and 'way of life'. 
2.0. The English myth of parliamentarV liberalism 
With regard to the contemporary British Eurosceptic attitude towards European 
integration, the first important myth to be examined is I parliamentary liberalism'. 
As a myth, it emerged in England as a response to the structural dislocation 
caused by the move from agrarian feudalism to agricultural-based mercantile 
capitalism, and the struggle over property rights between King and Parliament in 
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the English Civil War (1640-52). These events and demands could not be 
domesticated, symbolized or integrated within the existing hegemonic discourse 
of Absolute Monarchy. Its final breakdown occurred because the spatial forms of 
representation and the discursive structure it supported were confronted with this 
set of undomesticable events. The presence of such demands and events 
undermined the British social order because they jeapardized its ability to sustain 
order and stability. As a response to these dislocating forces, the contingent 
articulation of 'parliamentary sovereignty' and 'liberal individualism' as the 
discursive formation of 'parliamentary liberalism' emerged as a suturing myth. As 
such, it provided a space of representation for social, economic and political 
demands as legitimate differences and displaced all social antagonisms to its 
I constitutive outside'. As examined below, it became a social imaginary held 
together by the exclusion of any threat to its universalist and rationalist 
pretensions, such as threats to individual freedom, property rights, and 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
As the English Civil War had invoked a profound structural dislocation, the 
availability of political projects for social restructuration counted more than their 
credibility. The success of parliamentary liberalism as a suturing myth was the 
result of its availability on a terrain and in a situation where no other discourse 
presented itself as a viable hegemonic alternative. It was accepted because it 
represented an order and offered the only credible alternative to crisis and 
dislocation. As previous accounts of the English (and British) aberrant political 
tradition have not addressed 16 9 it was this deep anxious need for order (in 
16 For example, the Marxist accounts examined in Chapter 2 by Perry Anderson, David Marquand, 
Tom Nairn, and Peter Preston. 
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response to the traumatic and unbearable experience of dislocation) that helps 
explain why English subjects accepted this discourse. 
For example, writing Leviathan 17 in the aftermath of the Civil War, Hobbes had no 
problem convincing his readers that the demand for order was urgent. For 
Hobbes, the anxious need for order legitimized the political power of the absolute 
state. 18 The sovereign monarch was the only solution to the disorder associated 
with the traumatic and chaotic terrain of the 'state of nature'. In accordance with 
this theoretical proposition, the traumatic effects of 'Cromwellian Puritanism' that 
followed the Civil War led to the persistence of constitutional monarchy, and 
hence, the myth of 'crown-in-parliament'. 19 Thus, the principle of absolute 
parliamentary sovereignty became hegemonized in England. 
This desire for a new principle of order and intelligibility that followed the Civil War 
had come before the availability of the democratic elements that were later 
articulated within Continental European discourse following the later 'Democratic 
Revolution', as described in the following section. 20 As this desire occurred before 
the Democratic Revolution, the responding hegemonic project articulated the 
available and credible oligarchic, hierarchical, and mercantile elements of the city- 
state republicanism of the Renaissance. In due course, this new hegemonic 
discourse was aberrant to those that later developed in Continental Europe as a 
17 Hobbes, T. (1986) [1651] Leviathan. (Harmondsworth: Penguin). 
18 Clegg, R. (1989) Frameworks of Power. (London: Sage). p. 5. 19 See, for example: Nairn, T. (1988) The Enchanted Glass. (London: Hutchison Radius). pp. 163- 
4. 
20 The'Democratic Revolution'is examined further in Chapter 7, and it is a term that was first 
employed by Alexis de Tocqueville. (Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. (London: Verso). p. 155). On the Democratic 
Revolution, see: Lefort, C- (198 1) Linvention D6mocratique: Les Limites de la Domination 
Totalitaire. (Paris: Fayard); Lefort, C. (1986) The Political Forms of Modem Society. (Cambridge: 
Polity Press), and Lefort, C. (1988) Democracy and Political Theory. (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
See also, for example: Ifversen, J. (1989) 'Den Franske Revolution mellem Demokrati og Ideologi', 
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consequence of the Democratic Revolution, and its prevailing hegemony explains 
Britain's contemporary awkward relationship with rest of the EU. Indeed, as will be 
illustrated below, British hegemonic agents successfully defended parliamentary 
liberalism against the later threat of the Continental European Democratic 
Revolution, as well as against other perceived threats that emanated from 
'Europe, the Other'. 
2.1. The revolutionary threat of 'Europe, the Other' 
As a new hegemonic project, English parliamentary liberalism was distinct from 
the 'Absolute Monarchies' that still dominated the Continent, and was also distinct 
- and in contradiction to - its later and lasting successor: the republican 
democratic notion of 'popular sovereignty ,. 21 As emphasized in Chapter 4, the 
Continental European hegemonic principles of republican democracy and popular 
sovereignty are amenable to supranational decision-making, but the British 
hegemonic conceptions of liberal-individualism and parliamentary sovereignty are 
not. Indeed, English parliamentary liberalism represented 'reform-from-above', 
which was distinct from the Continental European experience of 'reform-from- 
below' that was imposed by the Democratic Revolution and its republican 
democratic ideas. Indeed, as identified in Chapter 4, the tension between this 
English top-down conception of 'reform-from-above' and the European bottom-up 
conception of 'reform-from-below' is reflected in the contemporary tension 
between British and continental European understandings of the future shape of 
the EU. 
C%I- Summer, pp. 31-52; Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 152-171, vicigmark, Volume 13, 
186-7; Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 6-41, and Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 192,247-9,256-7. 
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Over two hundred years ago, the Democratic Revolution imposed a new social 
imaginary upon many Continental European societies. As such, new democratic 
principles came to constitute new fundamental nodal points in the construction of 
the political in Continental Europe. This event represented a break with the 
ancient regime, it designated the end of hierarchic and inegalitarian societies 
ruled by a 'theological-political' discourse in which the social order was founded 
upon 'divine will'. Following Frangois Furet, the key moment in the inauguration of 
the Democratic Revolution was the French Revolution (1789-99) because it 
introduced something truly new at the level of the social imaginary, the affirmation 
of the power and sovereignty of the people. 22 It was precisely this affirmation that 
challenged the British social imaginary of parliamentary liberalism and its 
conception of the power and sovereignty of parliament. 
Indeed, the Democratic Revolution and its republican democratic ideas 
threatened to dislocate the universalist and rationalist pretensions of British 
parliamentary liberalism. The spatial forms of representation and the discursive 
structure that parliamentary liberalism supported were destabilized because they 
were confronted with these new alien and revolutionary ideas that they could not 
domesticate, integrate, or symbolize. Thus, the Democratic Revolution posed a 
serious threat precisely because it threatened the ability of the existing British 
social order to sustain order and stability. Hence, the democratic movements that 
began to sweep through the rest of Europe were renounced as an alien threat. 
21 On Britain's aberrant tradition of government, see: Tant, A. P. (1993) British Government: The 
Triumph of Elitism. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). 22 Furet, F. [1981] (1978) Interpreting the French Revolution. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). p. 109. Translated by Elborg Forster. Originally published as 'Penser la R6volution 
Francias'. (Paris: Gallimard). As Hannah Arendt argues, the French Revolution had a significantly 
greater impact upon the Western world than the American Revolution because it was the first to 
found itself on the legitimacy of the people. (See: Arendt, H. (1973) [1963] On Revolution. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin). p. 55. Originally published by Viking Press, New York. ) It thus initiated 
a new mode of the institution of the social, as described by Claude Lefort. (See: Lefort, C. (198 1 
Op. Cit., Lefort, C. (1986) Op. Cit., and Lefort, C. (1988) Op. Cit. 
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In particular, the founding theorist of English conservatism and forerunner of 
Nineteenth Century liberalism, Edmund Burke, defended the hegemonic 
discourse of British parliamentary liberalism against the threat posed by the 
French Revolution and the new and radical political ideas that it invoked. This 
deep concern was expressed to a French correspondent: 
Formerly your affairs were your own concern only. ... 
But when we see 
the model held up to ourselves, we must feel as Englishman, and 
feeling, we must provide as Englishmen. Your affairs, in spite of us, are 
made a part our interest; so far at least as to keep at a distance your 
23 panacea, or your plague . 
Following the Derridian logic of 'supplementarity P, this conception of the French 
Revolution as a 'plague' exemplifies the notion of a dangerous and alien 'disease' 
threatening British identity, which, as examined below, was also evident in the 
discursive construction (and success) of neo-parliamentary liberalism. Similar to 
Enoch Powell and Thatcher, Burke defended the British tradition of parliamentary 
government against this threat, but he also defended the traditional and organic 
British conceptions of liberalism against the more abstract conceptions that 
developed in the Continent following this revolution. For example, he defended 
the notion that liberties should be transmitted to the people 'without any reference 
, 24 whatever to any other more general or prior right. Moreover, Burke opposed the 
notion of 'revolution' per se. As the father and key theorist of British 
Conservatism, he argued that evolution (through heritage) rather than revolution 
was the only path to progressive change and national development. As Burke 
argues: 
You will observe, that from the Magna Charta to the Declaration of 
Right, it has been the uniform policy of our constitution to claim and 
assert our liberties, as an entailed inheritance derived from our 
forefathers 
... 
23 Burke, E. (1993) [1790] Reflections on the Revolution in France. Edited by L. G. Mitchell. 
ýOxford: Oxford University Press). p. 185. 
4 Ibid. p. 119.258 
By a constitutional policy, working after the pattern of nature, we 
receive, we hold, we transmit our government and our privileges, in the 
same manner in which we enjoy and transmit our property and our 
lives. The institutions of policy, the goods of fortune, the gifts of 
providence, are handed down, to us and from us, in the same course 
and order. Our political system is placed in a just correspondence and 
symmetry with the order of the world, and with the mode of existence 
25 decreed to a permanent body composed of transitory parts . 
Here, as reflected in the arguments for the defence of parliamentary sovereignty 
by Churchill and Thatcher in Chapter 4, the theoretical basis of this argument is 
the vague conservative and utiliarian principle that institutions that have lasted a 
long time have thereby demonstrated their worth. 26 
Moreover, similar to Hobbes, 27 Burke argues that on entering civil society the 
natural rights of the people must be given to the government for protection. Out of 
civil society, these natural rights are 'absolutely repugnant' because there is no 
, 28 sufficient restraint on 'passion . Hence, to provide a 'minimal consistency' of 
29 
order, the purpose of government was to 'bridle and subdue' these passions . In 
accordance with this proposition, parliamentary liberalism successfully contained 
the dislocatory effects of the French Revolution and provided a 'minimal 
consistency' in Britain through its rationale of 'responsible government'. As Burke 
declared, affairs of the state must be left to parliament as a means to preserve 
'good order': 
Good order is the foundation of all good things. To be able to acquire, 
the people, without being servile, must be tractable and obedient. The 
magistrate must have his reverence, the laws their authority. The body 
of the people must not find the principle of natural subordination by art 
rooted out of their minds. They must respect that property of which they 
cannot partake. 30 
25 Ibid. pp. 119-20. 26 See: Macpherson, C. B. (1980) Burke. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). pp. 40-1. 27 See: Hobbes, T. (1986) [1651 ]. Op. Cit. pp. 41,61-3. 28 Burke, E. (1993) [1790] Op. Cit. P. 150. 29 Ibid. p. 151. 30 Ibid. pp. 372. 
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Thus, a notion of government emerged in Britain for which members no longer 
represented 'particular' interests (those of their constituents), but instead were 
held to represent the interests of the nation as a whole. The idea that 'good order' 
lay in the ability of government to determine the national interest was normalized: 
Since government is not (directly) accountable to the people, there is 
little need for the people to be well-informed about the details of public 
policy; it is for Parliament, not the unsophisticated public, to scrutinize 
government decision making. Indeed, order and stability might be 
threatened by disclosure to those unschooled in responsible 
judgement: hence parliamentarians are not obliged to be responsive. 31 
Hence, in contrast to Continental Europe, a minimal consistency was successfully 
achieved by developing a responsible rather than a responsive conception of 
government. To preserve 'good order', the British public were reminded that: 
The people of England will not ape the fashions they have never tried; nor 
go back to those which they have found mischievous on trial ,. 32 
As illustrated below, this rationale was re-established by the British hegemonic 
project of neo-parliamentary liberalism: the people of Britain will not ape the 'alien' 
projects of Continental Europe nor go back to the European-derived social 
democratic project that led to crisis in the post-war period. In the process of 
European integration, Britain is warned against introducing, once again, such a 
dangerous European 'supplement 
Thus, despite the dislocatory effects of the French Revolution, British 
parliamentary liberalism proved resilient and survived precisely because its 
universal rationale supported the notion that 'good order' required the absolute 
sovereignty of parliament. Any external idea would be considered to be an 
irrational threat to order because it had not emanated from parliament and those 
31 Tant, A. P. (1990) 'The Campaign for Freedom of Information: A Participatory Challenge to Elitist 
British Government', Public Administration, Volume 68, No. 4, p. 480. 
32 Burke, E. (11993) [1790]. Op. Cit. P. 111 - 260 
schooled in 'responsible judgementf. By contrast, the Continental European 
conception of republican democracy supports the notion that order requires the 
sovereignty of the people, and thus, an external idea or supranational process 
can be considered to be rational and acceptable if it is consistent with popular 
interests. 
Moreover, the continued hegemonic success of parliamentary liberalism in Britain 
has been aided by relatively passive internal oppositional forces. 33 The 
seventeenth century English Civil War led to the early development of English 
capitalism, and thus, the early development of its industrial relations. The English 
workforce accepted the strictures of parliamentary liberalism as credible before 
the availability of the more democratic notions that developed in Continental 
Europe as a result of the Democratic Revolution. Furthermore, in contrast to the 
major democratic and constitutional goals of the French Revolution instigated by 
a mass peasantry, the English Civil War was invoked by property owners with the 
lesser aim of defending their property rights -a right that was articulated in the 
English liberal theory of Locke. And, following the Civil War, the more radical 
democratic and egalitarian ideals within the Cromwell camp were suppressed. 
Nevertheless, in the Nineteenth Century, the English working class movement of 
Chartism (1839-48) did achieve some democratic change, as evident within the 
political reforms contained in the (1838) 'Peoples Charter'. For example, this 
movement successfully achieved manhood suffrage and vote by ballot. The 
constitution of Chartism and its main objectives, such as the key role of the 
33 See: Marquand, D. (11988) The Unprincipled Society. (London: Fontana); Marquand, D. (1991) 
The Progressive Dilemma. (London: Heineman); Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. pp. 280-321; Preston, P. 
W. (11994) Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain: An Essay on the Issue of Europe in 
UK Public Discourse. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). pp. 13-4,18-20,113-125, and Tant, A. P. 
(1993) Op. Cit. pp. 125-95. 
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demand for universal suffrage, were fundamentally developed from the ideas of 
English Radicalism that were themselves profoundly influenced by the French 
34 
Revolution . 
However, after the collapse of Chartism in 1848, republican 
democratic ideas tend to disappear from the discourse of British resistance. 
Moreover, although Chartism grew out of anti-democratic resistance and posed a 
significant radical and revolutionary threat to the presiding elitist system of 
'minimal government', its charter was entirely compatible with the rationale of 
parliamentary liberalism. 
The ultimate result of the above is that a labourist movement developed in Britain 
that represented a gradualist and reformist manner of advancing the interests of 
labour. As such, it contrasted significantly with the more confrontational and 
revolutionary socialist movements that developed elsewhere in Europe with 
broader republican democratic and social democratic agendas. 35 In due course, 
and as Preston et alargued in Chapter 2, the British labour movement has failed 
as an internal agent of progressive change and modernist development36 , and by 
, 37 the 1990s, it became 'both imaginatively and practically crippled . In sum, its 
goals have been lacking with regard to developing a more republican democratic 
or social democratic discourse in Britain, and hence, a discourse congruent with 
those of mainland Europe, and consequently, with the EC project. Concomitantly, 
as Ashford also observes, the basic theme of the post-war Labour Party was the 
national and parliamentary road to 'socialism', and thus, it defended the British 
parliamentary system of government against the process of European 
34 See: Stedman Jones, G. (1983) 'Rethinking Chartism', Chapter 3, Languages of Class: Studies 
in Working Class History, 1832-1982. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press). pp. 90- 
178. 
35 For a comparative analysis of modern European socialist movements, see: Wilde, L. (1994) 
Modem European Socialism. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). 
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38 integration . Indeed, this defence of national and parliamentary sovereignty has 
been criticized by academic democratic socialists. As Bernard Crick points out, 
I, 39 national sovereignty is surely, as Laski argued, the very anti-thesis of socialism . 
Moreover, as a result of its consequent opposition to European integration, the 
Labour Party lost a potentially effective ally in its fight against Thatcherism. In 
sum, British internal opposition forces have not effectively challenged the 
hegemony of parliamentary liberalism, not even during the so-called 'social 
democratic post-war consensusf. 
Therefore, the social imaginary of parliamentary liberalism has continued to 
function as a surface of inscription for political demands in Britain because it has 
not been successfully challenged by internal or external threats. However, 
applying the Lacanian and discourse-theoretical propositions examined above, 
the success of parliamentary liberalism against such potential threats can also be 
explained by its successful provision of a 'minimal consistenCy, 40 in response to 
dislocation. It has been its successful formal operation, its ability to provide an 
orderly space, which has made it a compelling site of identification. It was the 
deep anxious need for order (in response to the traumatic and unbearable 
experience of dislocation) that explains why British subjects know that their idea of 
government is masking a particular form of exploitation, yet still continue to follow 
it. This Lacanian and discourse-theoretical perspective on the reasons for the 
success of the British system of government conflicts with the orthodox Marxist 
36 See: Anderson, P. (11992) English Questions. (London: Verso). p. 307. See also: Marquand, D. 
(1988) Op. Cit., Marquand, D. (1991) Op. Cit., Nairn, T (1988) Op. Cit. pp. pp. 280-321; Preston, P. 
W. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 13-4,18-20,31-32,113-125, and Tant, A. P. (11993) Op. Cit. pp. 125-95. 37 Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 20. 38 Ashford, N. (1992) 'The Political Parties', in George, S. (ed. ) Britain and the European 
Community. The Politics of Semi-Detachment. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). p. 120. 39 Crick, B. (1975) 'Pandora's Box, Sovereignty and the Referendum', Political Quarterly, April- 
June, Volume 46, No. 2, p. 125. 40 2i2ek, S. (11989) Op. Cit. p. 75. 
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assumption of Preston et al that British subjects were simply fooled into consent 
by an ideological false consciousness constructed by the English ruling elite. 
Applying the psychoanalytical theory of Z'i2ek, what previous Marxist analyses of 
British ideology have overlooked is that the British discourse of parliamentary 
liberalism did not achieve and maintain hegemony by simply constructing a false 
consciousness. The British know very well how things really are - for example, 
that their tradition of government is masking a form of exploitation - but they act 
'as if this ideology is true and serious because it has successfully provided order 
and consistency, even in the face of profound dislocation. However, as argued in 
Section 5.2, its ability to provide such an effective order was being increasingly 
challenged by the political 'spill-over' effects of European integration. 
In all, this section has demonstrated that the persistence of the aberrant discourse 
of parliamentary liberalism is crucial to understanding the British opposition to 
European integration. In particular, this section has emphasized the 
6 awkwardness' of the British principle of parliamentary sovereignty. As the very 
rationale of British government, it is non-negotiable. Indeed, the paramount 
importance bequeathed to parliamentary sovereignty within British hegemonic 
discourse suggests that European integration is, at best, a means to national 
rather than supranational ends. 
In sum, as key moments of parliamentary liberalism, Britain embraced liberal- 
individualism, parliamentary sovereignty, labourism, and responsible government, 
which were distinct and threatened by the later development of Continental 
European conceptions of republican democracy, popular sovereignty, socialism 
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(and later, social democracy), and responsive government. The stability of British 
parliamentary liberalism was seriously challenged by these new political ideas that 
it could not domesticate, symbolize or integrate. Thus, British hegemonic agents 
did not merely fail to adopt these ideas, but constructed them as a threat to the 
English social order. As these Continental European ideas were constructed as 
'anti-British parliamentary liberalism', this has posed a significant problem for 
British-European integration. Indeed, the construction of the limits of the British 
hegemonic discourse of parliamentary liberalism has involved the exclusion and 
negation of these Continental European ideas as moments of a chain of 
equivalence that represent its radical otherness. More broadly, as will be 
illustrated below, Britain has opposed European integration because Continental 
European countries, ideas, projects, habits and people - and thus, the EU - 
constitute 'the Other' in this way. 
3.0. The mvth of the British nation 
Britain's awkward partnership with Europe has not been previously linked to the 
phenomenon of British nationalism. The analysis of British-European relations has 
not developed within the same theoretical and methodological discourse as the 
analysis of nationalism, and thus, our understanding of British nationalism has not 
had a significant impact upon our conception of British Euroscepticism. This 
section will address this concern. However, this thesis argues that previous 
essentialist and functionalist conceptions of nationalism are problematic. It will be 
demonstrated that a discourse-theoretical approach provides a more productive 
framework for analysing this phenomenon, and thus, British Euroscepticism. 
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Nationalism has been traditionally viewed as either a functional response to the 
structures of modern society or as a primordial, and thus, natural form of human 
belonging . 
41 Both Marxist and liberal theory have conceived nationalism as the 
ideological cement of the nation-state, which in turn, is seen as providing the best 
political shell for the capitalist market econo MY42 , fulfilling the cultural needs of 
modern growth-oriented societies 43 , or masking the class conflicts and factions of 
modern societies. 44 Reversing the causal relationship between structure and 
superstructure, other theories have perceived nations and nationalism as basic 
forms of human association and sentiment45 , which determine the contents of 
modernity. 46 Rejecting these functionalist and essentialist conceptions of the 
nation and nationalism, this discourse-theoretical approach follows Jacob Torfing 
and his conception of nationalism as: 
... a certain articulation of the empty signifier of the nation, which itself becomes a nodal point in the political discourse of modern democracy 
and generally functions as a way of symbolizing an absent 47 
communitarian fullness . 
Significant to the aims of this chapter, nationalist discourse has played an 
important role in developing the aberrant myths and social imaginaries, such a 
parliamentary liberalism, that have organized and guided British Euroscepticism. 
As will now be demonstrated, the myth of the British nation has contributed to the 
41 Smith, A. D. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. (Oxford: Blackwell). 42 See: Hobsbawm, E. (1990) Nations and Nationalism Since 1780. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
43 See: Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press). 44 See: Sklair, L. (199 1) Sociology of the Global System. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press). 
45 See: Armstrong, J. (1992) 'The Autonomy of Ethnic Identity: Historic Cleavages and Nationality 
Relations in the USSR', in A. J. Motyl (ed. ) Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities. (New 
York: Columbia University Press). pp. 23-43; Fishman, J. (1980) 'Social Theory and Ethnography: 
Neglected Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity in Eastern Europe', in P. F. Sugar (ed. ) Ethnic 
Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe. (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio). pp. 69-99, and Greenfield, L. 
ý1992) Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
6 Smith, A. D. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 53. 
47 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 192. 
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construction of the British antagonism with Continental Europe, and thus, with the 
EU. 
3.1. Nationalism and the Democratic Revolution 
Following Laclau and Mouffe, Torfing's conception of nationalism takes Lefort's 
study of the 'Democratic Revolution 48 as its point of departure. Lefort claims that 
society can only be unified in relation to a 'symbolic power' outside society. Such 
a constitutive power is a symbolic power rather than an actual power of a state 
apparatus. 49 The relationship between society and this symbolic power is 
imaginary: the symbolic power that retroactively constitutes and unifies society is 
50 itself imagined by the individuals of that society. 
For example, in the time of the ancien regime, the locus of symbolic power was 
'the Prince' . 
51 That is, under the monarchy, power was embodied in the person of 
the Prince. To maintain legitimacy, he mediated between mortals and gods. If he 
associated himself with one of the two poles, he would either reveal the gulf 
between his particular body and the universality he was supposed to incarnate, or 
become a despot who ruled in his own name. However, the role of the Prince in 
the configuration of society became obsolete with the secularization of society and 
the breakdown of the absolute monarchies. In Continental Europe, the 
Democratic Revolution invoked 'the dissolution of the markers of certainty' and 
undermined the possibility of embodying symbolic power in a particular bod Y. 
52 
48 See: Lefort, C. (1981) Op. Cit., Lefort, C. (1986) Op. Cit., and Lefort, C. (1988) Op. Cit. Here, the 
argument presented by Torfing follows lfversen's discussion of Lefort's understanding of the 
French Revolution. See: lfversen, J. (1989) Op. Cit. 
49 Lefort, C. (1986) Op. Cit. p. 279. 50 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 192. See also: lfversen, J. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 33. 51 Lefort, C. (1988) Op. Cit. pp. 16-17. 52 Ibid. pp. 16-19. 
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Consequently, the locus of power became an empty space. The locus of power 
could not be occupied: no individual or group could be consubstantial with it. 
Government could not appropriate power since its exercise was subject to 
procedures of periodical redistribution and controlled contest. 53 In national 
elections, atomized individuals chose a government that promised to unify society. 
This led to the emergence of a purely social society in which the people, the 
nation, and the state, held the status of universal entities, and in which any 
individual or group could be accorded the same statu S. 
54 However, the experience 
was different in Britain, and this difference will now be examined because it helps 
explain why Britain has defended parliamentary sovereignty against supranational 
European integration. 
3.2. British parliamentary sovereignty and the 'Divine Right of Kings' 
The British period of absolute monarchy differed to the Continental European 
experience in the sense that the English conception of the 'divine right' of kings 
was quite different to the Continental conception of the 'divinity' of Kings. The 
British king was human rather than divine, and thus, fallible. Hence, in contrast to 
Europe, symbolic power was not embodied in a particular body but in particular 
institutions, the institutions of the crown. The English notion of the 'divine rights of 
kings' was more acceptable to the public than its European equivalents, and its 
checks and balances made it more sustainable. 
Moreover, the different goals of the English Civil War and the French Revolution 
inevitably led to different results. The latter was a war against the threat that 
53 Ibid. P. 17. 54 Ibid. P. 18. 
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absolute monarchies posed to the economic interests of the developing propertied 
and manufacturing classes, whilst the latter was a democratic and constitutional 
revolution that required the complete destruction of monarchy. That is, the 
moderate economic goals of the English Civil War sought to overcome absolutism 
but not monarchy. Hence, in contrast to the major political consequences of the 
French Revolution, no democratic and constitutional obstructions were developed 
(or desired) in England to prevent the possible return of the monarchy or to 
prevent the misuse of its power by others. 
Furthermore, as described above, the later consequences of Cromwellian 
Puritanism led to the myth of 'crown-in-parliament'. As a consequence, Crown 
and State ('Monarchy and Parliament') remained the symbolic constitutive power 
that provided the unification of English (and later, British) society. That is, it 
configured English society and determined the national interest. Thus, in contrast 
to the continent, the location of symbolic power in England/Britain has always 
been an empty space in the sense that it has always been embodied within 
institutions rather than particular individuals or groups. That is, no individual or 
group can be consubstantial with the symbolic power of the realm of Crown and 
State. Moreover, since it is the institutions of crown-in-parliament that are the 
locus of symbolic power, then this helps explain the paramount importance that 
Britain has given to the defence of parliamentary sovereignty, and thus, to 
obstructing supranational European integration. 
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3.3. The hegemonic articulation of the myth of the British nation 
Wherever it is located, symbolic power is always 'invisible' in the sense that only 
attempts to exercise power in the name of society can be observed. 
Paradoxically, the attempt to represent the unity of society always reveals conflicts 
and antagonisms. Hence, an expansive hegemony must be established in order 
to occupy, even temporarily the empty space of symbolic power. This will require 
the authorization of power by referring it back to the empty signifiers of 'the nation' 
and 'the people', which have been the nodal points in the contemporary political 
discourses of Western Europe. That is, the 'I speak' must be transformed into 'the 
55 
nation/the people speaks' . 
One must be able to speak in the name of the nation 
and the name of the people in order to become hegemonic. This was very well 
understood by Powell. As he explains: 
Ask who are 'we' and who are 'they', and you will get an answer in 
circle; 'we' are those at whose hands we accept compulsion, and 'they' 
are all those who are not'we'. ... (T)hat'we' is the nation ... . 
56 
Indeed, as this chapter argues, the British 'we' was successfully constructed by 
such hegemonic agents through their articulation of the myth of parliamentary 
liberalism with the myth of the British nation as 'British national parliamentary 
liberalism t. 57 
However, it is not enough to refer abstractly to what is good for the 
'nation/people'. To exercise hegemonic power, it is necessary to hegemonize the 
empty signifiers of 'the nation' and 'the people' by giving them a particular 
55 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 193. See also: lfversen, J. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 38. 56 Ritchie, R. (ed. ) (1989) Enoch Powell on 1992. Extract on "We' and 'They" from a speech to a 
fringe meeting of Conservatives at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, 14 October 
1981. (London: Anaya Publishers Ltd). p. 125. 
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content. 58 Hence, nationalism is a myth that provides the empty signifiers of 'the 
nation' and 'the people' with a particular, substantial embodiment. It constructs the 
'nation-as-this' and the 'people-as-one'. As such, the nationalist myth aims to 
guide social and political action in the name of a particular 'ethnos' (for example, 
being British) and a particular imagined national space (for example, 'Britain' as 
the locus of 'Britishness'). This aim has achieved hegemonic success when it 
manages to obscure differences between the ethnos and the national space. 
For instance, Thatcherism successfully achieved hegemony by constructing a 
'populist unity' with the British people . 
59 As Stuart Hall explains, Thatcherism 
established this alliance by presenting itself as a great national crusade to make 
Britain 'Great' once more . 
60 This populist unity served to establish an alliance 
between the British people and the neo-liberal interests of Thatcherism. For 
example, Thatcher claimed to be speaking in the name of the British people in her 
neo-liberal opposition to Europe. As she asked: 
Are we then to be censured for standing up for a free and open Britain 
in a free and open Europe? No. Our policies are in tune with the 
, 61 deepest instincts of the British people . 
Such attempts to homogenize and substantiate the national space will take the 
form of a number of predicative statements defining what the nation is. However, 
despite how many essential predicates of the nation are listed, there is always 
something missing because the true essence of the nation will always escape 
predication. In the final instance, the homogenization and substantialization of the 
57 On Thatcher's construction of the British 'we', see: Hall, S. (1983) 'The Great Moving Right 
Show', in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds) Thatcherism. (London: Lawrence & Wishart). pp. 30-34, 
and Fairclough, N. (1989) Language and Power. (London, New York: Longman). pp. 179-180. 
58 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 193. 59 See: Hall, S. (1983) Op. Cit. pp. 30-34. 60 Ibid. pp. 30-1. 61 Thatcher, M. (1990) Hansard, Col - 453,22 November. 271 
nation can only be obtained in and through social antagonism: by the discursive 
construction of 'enemies of the nation ,. 
62 
For instance, Thatcherism was successfully articulated as equivalent to the 
interests of the British people by constructing an antagonism with social 
democratic elements that were negated as a cause of crisis and disorder, and 
thus, as the cause of the dislocation of the British nation. For example, in this 
antagonism between 'us' (the British people) and 'them' (those identified with this 
alien social democratic supplement), the Labour Party was constructed as 'them', 
whilst Thatcherism was constructed as embodying the intrinsic interests of the 
British people . 
63 Moreover, in accordance with its neo-liberal economic strategy, 
the negation of the Labourist divide between workers and employers allowed 
Thatcher to establish employers as with, rather than against, the British people. 
As she told readers of Woman's Own: 
Don't talk to me about 'them and 'us' in a company ... You're all 'we' in a 
company. You survive as the company survives, prosper as the 
company prospers - everyone together. The future lies in cooperation 64 
and not confrontation . As a consequence of the Thatcherite populist unity, 'being British' became 
identified with the neo-liberal restoration of competition and profitability, and the 
essence of the British people became identified with self-reliance and personal 
responsibil ity. 
65 To restore these traditional interests and values to the British 
people, Thatcher promised to expel the intruding and alien social democratic 
supplement. As she said, it is time 'to put people's destinies again in their own 
hands ,. 66 
62 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 193. 63 See: Hall, S. (1983) Op. Cit. p. 34. 
64 As quoted in: Ibid. p. 31. 65 Ibid. p. 29. 
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As demonstrated below, Thatcherism also negated 'Europe' as a social 
democratic alien supplement. Indeed, as will now be illustrated, the 
homogenization and substantialization of the British nation has been established 
in and through a longstanding antagonism with Continental Europe, and as a 
consequence, Euroscepticism has played a key role in the construction of the 
myth of the British nation. 
3.4. The British nation as a discursive response to dislocation 
Despite the various sizes and functions of the substance of the nation, 
nationalism always provides a surface of inscription for social demands, hopes 
and aspirations. Hence, nationalism, and the social antagonisms it invokes, can 
be conceived as a discursive response to dislocation. Dislocations emanating 
from internal or external forces or events (that question, destabilize or dismantle 
the current regime) foster an acute need for a hegemonic project that can 
rearticulate the 'floating signifiers' within a discursive order that promises the full 
realization of the dislocated identities within a unified communal 
space. 67 Therefore, the role of a hegemonic project of nationalism is to provide the 
empty signifier of the nation, which symbolizes an absent fullness, with a precise 
substantive content that the people can identify with. With the transformation of 
the mythical space of nationalist discourse into a social imaginary, there is no 
fixed limit to the demands, hopes and aspirations that can be inscribed upon the 
ideological surface. 
66 See: Ibid. 
67 Ibid. P. 195. 
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Significant to the aims of this thesis, the British nation emerged as a suturing myth 
of British society. A condition for the emergence of this myth was the dislocation 
produced by the antagonistic relationship with the Continent, particularly in terms 
of religious conflict and war. This explanation of the construction of the British 
nation accords with the observations of Linda Colley: 
It was an invention forged above all by war. Time and time again, war 
with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or 
Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile Other 
and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They 
defined themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the 
world's foremost Catholic power. They defined themselves against the 
French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, militarist, decadent 
and unfree. And, increasingly, as the wars went on, they defined 
themselves in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples 
who were manifestly alien in terms of culture, religion and colour. 68 
Moreover, between 1733-1848, dislocation in Britain was also occasioned as a 
consequence of the Industrial Revolution (1733-1800); the American rebellion 
(1775-83); the French Revolution and the broader Democratic Revolution; the 
modernist ideas of the Eighteenth Century French Enlightenment; the war with 
Napoleon (1805), as well as the internal oppositional force of Chartism (1839-48). 
The combined dislocatory effects of these forces and events brought the British 
regions together. As a consequence of such dislocation, the myth of the British 
nation functioned to suture the dislocated space by constructing a new space of 
representation, and this required the construction of an antagonism. To obtain the 
homogenization and substantialization of the empty signifier of the British nation, 
Continental Europe was identified as the cause of dislocation, and thus, as an 
object of an antagonism. The logic of equivalence collapsed the differential 
character of these separate regional identities by means of expanding a signifying 
chain of equivalence. Here, while being different in other respects, these regional 
identities became the same - and thus, part of this chain of equivalence - because 
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of their mutual negation of Continental Europe as a cause of dislocation, and thus, 
as a threat to order and stability. Hence, the myth of the British nation successfully 
developed into a new social imaginary and provided a new space of national 
representation by displacing all antagonisms to its constitutive outside. It has 
excluded and negated all elements that have threatened its universalist and 
rationalist pretensions, such as Continental European ideas of international 
socialism, supranational integration, and so forth. 
3.5. British national parliamentary sovereignty 
As Bulmer emphasizes, the defence of British sovereignty has both an internal 
and external dimension. The former relates to parliamentaty sovereignty and 
dates from the struggle between King and Parliament of the English Civil War 
onwar s. 69 e latter concerns national sovereignty, that is, British (or English) 
territorial integrity since 1066 . 
70 However, the contingent articulation of the myths 
of the British nation and parliamentary liberalism as the discursive formation of 
'British national parliamentary liberalism' meant that the defence of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty became coterminous. The articulation of the British 
nation and parliamentary liberalism was reflected in the defence of national 
parliamentaty sovereignty. Reflecting this discursive articulation, the myth of the 
British nation became embodied in the key institutions of crown and parliament7l I 
thereby inciting identifications within its framework in as many different sites in the 
68 Colley, L. (1992) Britons: The Forging of the Nation. (London: Yale University Press). pp. 5-6. 69 See also: Wallace, W. (1986) 'What Price Interdependence? Sovereignty and Interdependence 
in British Politics', International Affairs, Volume 62, p. 367. 
70 Bulmer, S. (1992) 'Britain and European Integration: of Sovereignty, Slow Adaptation, and Semi- 
Detachment', in S. George (ed. ) Op. Cit. pp. 26-7. 
71 On the particular significance of the monarchy in the construction of the British nation, see: 
Colley, L. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 195-236; Cannadine, D. (1983) 'The Context Performance and 
Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the Invention of Tradition, 1820-1977', in: E. 
Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds) The Invention of Tradition. (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge 
University Press), and Nairn, T. (1988) Op. Cit. 
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social as possible. This articulation served to reinforce and broaden the defence 
of sovereignty. Since parliament was now the locus of British rather than English 
symbolic power, (configuring British society and determining its national interest), 
defending national parliamentary sovereignty became the very rationale of British 
government. Hence, defending the sovereignty of parliament was now even more 
important than before because it was now responsible for determining the 
interests of the British nation rather than just the English region. 
This resolute defence of national parliamentary sovereignty has obstructed the 
possibility of supranational British-European integration. It has meant that Britain 
has perceived European integration as a means to national rather than 
supranational ends, and thus, it has tended to be perceived as an awkward 
partner. Moreover, as will now be examined, following a post-war social 
democratic interruption, Thatcherism achieved hegemonic success by re- 
establishing moments of this traditional British discursive formation. This was 
accomplished by a reinforcement of the traditional British antagonism with 
Continental Europe. However, with the new phenomenon of European integration, 
it was the new institutions and bureaucrats of the EC that became the main 
objects of this antagonism since these were now perceived to represent the 
greatest threat from 'Continental Europe, the Other 
4.0. Thatcherism and British 'neo-national parliamentary liberalism' 
The severe dislocation caused by the Second World War dissolved the British 
discursive formation of 'British national parliamentary liberalism'. Therefore, 
following the war, Britain looked for a new available discourse that could restore 
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order and bring a speedy recovery. Moreover, a credible alternative was required 
that could bury the discredited traditional British ideas that had become equivalent 
to high unemployment and extreme right politics, and thus, with the causes of 
fascism and war. Consequently, following the example of Continental Europe, a 
social democratic discourse was established in Britain during the post-war period. 
However, the profound dislocation that resulted from the war experience did not 
weaken the myth of the British nation. As the Continent began to develop its plan 
for a supranational Europe that could overcome the nationalism that it blamed for 
the rise of fascism and war, Britain's war victory only led to a renewed belief and 
pride in the myth of the British nation. Indeed, the war victory served to 
exacerbate Britain's belief in its superiority over Continental Europe and the war 
experience itself reaffirmed the conception of Europe as its 'threatening other'. 
The British myth of parliamentary sovereignty also survived the consequences of 
the dislocation invoked by the Second World War, and was heralded as the best 
way to establish a social democratic road to recovery in Britain. Indeed, both 
Conservative and Labour post-war governments opposed supranational 
European integration on the basis of their defence of national and parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
72 
Therefore, it was only the liberal moment of the traditional British social imaginary 
that was dissolved as a consequence of the war experience. The continued 
defence of British national and parliamentary sovereignty meant that social 
democracy could only be established at the national level, and consequently, the 
post-war Continental European project for a supranational social democratic 
72 See, for example: Baker, D. and D. Seawright (eds) (1998) Britain for and Against Europe: British 
Politics and the Question of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press). pp. 56,83-85; 
George, S. (ed. ) (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 8-10,120,144. 
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project was rejected. Hence, the traditional British social imaginary of 'national 
parliamentary liberalism' was replaced by national parliamentary social 
democracy, and thus, the national and parliamentary moments that opposed 
European integration maintained intact. 
4.1. The return of British national parliamentary liberalism 
However, the hegemony of the British post-war social democratic project was 
short-lived. Conceived as the cause of the structural dislocation experienced in 
the 1970s as a result of a culmination of national and international crises, it was 
73 
replaced by the hegemonic project of 'Thatcherism' by 1979. In response to this 
structural dislocation, this neo-liberal hegemonic project emerged as a new 
suturing myth for British society. It began to redefine the terms of the political 
debate and set a new agenda by returning to traditional British liberal elements. 
Thatcherism presented itself as the only credible alternative to the problems 
perceived to be caused by social democracy. However, as the 1970s crises were 
not as profound as the structural dislocation caused by the English Civil War or 
the Second World War, the credibility of political projects for social restructuration 
counted relatively more than their availability. Neo-liberalism was credible in both 
senses identified above in Section 1.2. First, it was credible because it was 
consistent with, and borrowed extensively from, traditional and British ideas of 
Politics, economics, the family, nation, race, gender, sexuality, and so forth. That 
73 See, for example: Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and T. Ling (1988) Thatcherism: A Tale of 
Two Nations. (Cambridge: Polity Press). pp. 77,164-9; Gamble, A. (1994) Britain in Decline: 
Economic Policy, Political Strategy, and the British State. Fourth Edition. (London: Macmillan). p. 
186-225, and Hall, S. and M. Jacques (eds) (1983) Op. Cit. pp. 23-34,79-105, and Overbeek, H. 
0 990) Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in Perspective. (London: 
Unwin Hyman) pp. 141-175. For a critical discussion of the various approaches to Thatcherism and 
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is, it promised a return of the traditional rationality, meanings and ideas that had 
previously been articulated and normalized by the discursive formation of British 
national parliamentary liberalism. It could be properly described as a 'neo-liberall 
project because it reflected a return to the traditional British liberal ideas that had 
been previously displaced by the social democratic post-war consensus. Second, 
it demonstrated a willingness to bury the 'alien, unsustainable and discredited 
social democratic principles that were seen to be responsible for structural 
dislocation and Britain's general decline. Indeed, Thatcherism promised to restore 
order and Britain's former world status by removing this dangerous supplement 
that had infected the British nation. 
As Hall argueS74, the neo-liberal ideas of Thatcherism were articulated to form a 
new hegemonic project by constructing an antagonism with the existing social 
democratic discourse. Hence, a negated chain of equivalence was constructed 
between elements that were identified with the crisis of social democracy. For 
example, 'social democracy I became equivalent to 'burgeoning bureaucracy', 
$centralism', 'collectivism', 'consensus politics', 'inefficient corporatism', 'European 
union', 'federalism', 'national isation', 'protectionism', 'regulationy, 'socialism', 
'statism', 'trade unionism', and so forth. For instance, as demonstrated below, the 
process of European integration was negated as a Continental European strategy 
for a social democratic superstate that would impose 'burgeoning bureaucracy II 
'centralism', 'collectivism', and so forth, upon Britain. As Hall demonstrates, the 
Labour Party was also discursively articulated as equivalent to these negated and 
displaced social democratic elements. It was constructed as part of the discredited 
power bloc and state apparatus, and thus, as riddled with bureaucracy and anti- 
its many different meanings, see: Jessop, B., Bonnett, K., Bromley, S. and T. Ling (1988) Op. Cit. 
? p. 5-9,24-51,68-98. 
Hall, S. (1983) Op. Cit. pp. 27-34. 
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British 'socialist' ideas. As identified with social democracy, such negated 
elements were held responsible for crisis, chaos and decline. 
In contrast to these negated and displaced ideas, Thatcherism promised individual 
freedom and enterprise (as opposed to the sterile power of state managers or the 
trade unions); the moral and political rejuvenation of the British nation (rather than 
its terminal decline), and decisive leadership (as opposed to the muddle of 
consensus politics and an overburdened and inefficient welfare state). Thus, 
combined with repeated attacks upon elements that were negated as equivalent to 
the crisis of social democracy, the celebration of individual freedom, the free 
market, entrepreneurship and 'Britishness', were all important moments in the 
hegemonic discourse of Thatcherism. 
As indicated above, similar to Powell, Thatcherism applied the British conservative 
logic of Burke as well as his construction of 'Europe' as a threat to the order and 
stability of the British identity. Indeed, Powell played a significant role in the 
emergence of the myth of Thatcherism, and thus, Thatcherite Euroscepticism. 
Powell had been a key proponent in development of neo-liberal economics from 
the 1950s onwards, and his economic views began to become persuasive within 
the Conservative Party with the deepening crisis of social democracy in the 1960s. 
At this point, he began to articulate his economic liberalism with political 
75 
nationalism. His economic critique of social democracy and European economic 
integration became linked with the political nationalist construction of the threat 
posed by immigrantS76 and European political integration, as well as a defence of 
75 Gamble, A. (1994) Op. Cit. P. 141, Jacques, M. (1983) 'Thatcherism - Breaking Out of the 
Impasse', in S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds) Op. Cit. p. 51. 76 Hall. S. (1983) Op. Cit. p. 38. 
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the Ulster Protestants and the need to maintain the Union .. Combining these two 
aspects, Powell was instructive in developing the Eurosceptic argument that 
economic advantages could never justify the sacrifice of national and 
parliamentary sovereignty, an argument most explicit in the debate upon the 
78 TEU . Thus, Powell provided a significant intellectual influence upon the return of 
the hegemonic articulation of the myth of the British nation with parliamentary 
liberalism, as represented by the hegemonic project of Thatcherism. 
With time, this neo-liberal project effectively replaced social democracy. That is, it 
became the new social imaginary that provided a space of representation for 
political, social and economic demands as legitimate differences and displaced all 
social antagonisms to its constitutive outside. As a new social imaginary that 
brought a return of traditional British ideas and values, neo-liberalism had 
successfully hegemonized, and thus re-established, those important signifiers of 
parliamentary liberalism (freedom, individualism, the free market, and so forth) 
that had become floating signifiers during the post-war social democratic period. 
This was achieved by successfully negating and displacing the signifiers of the old 
social democratic discourse (socialism, 'collectivism', 'bureaucracy, and so on) as 
equivalent to crisis, chaos and national decline. 
4.2. The return to order 
Congruent with the myth of parliamentary liberalism and the Burkean tradition of 
responsible government, Thatcherism promised a return to order through an 
authoritarian restoration of strong government and decisive leadership. This 
77 Gamble, A. (1994) Op. Cit. P. 141. 
78 Forster, A. (2002) Euroscepticism in ContemporarY British Politics: Opposition to Europe in the 
British Conservative and Labour Parties Since 1945. (London, New York: Routledge). pp. 70-1,91. 
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promise proved to be popular with the British public. Indeed, empirical analyses of 
voting statistics cannot explain the paradoxical success of Thatcherism: that is, 
there is substantial evidence that many voters supported Thatcherism although 
they did not support or gain from the 'literal' content of its policies . 
791-lowever, by 
interpreting it as a response to dislocation, a discourse-theoretical approach can 
make sense of its electoral success: following the conservatism of Burke, it 
provided a clear promise of 'good order' through 'strong government' as well as 
the promise to make people feel good about being British again. Therefore, by 
providing a 'minimal consistency' in the face of dislocation, Thatcherism became a 
defining framework for British politics, and a framework for identification on the 
part of enough voters, including those voters who would not benefit from a 
majority of its policies. 
To elucidate, as a new social imaginary, many political demands of the 
hegemonic project of Thatcherism signified much more than their 'literal' content. 
For example, as emphasized below, obstructions to European integration were 
not merely advanced as rational policy positions, they were linked to the defence 
of the order and stability of the British nation against a European conspiracy to re- 
introduce a dislocating socialist threat. To this end, following Burke and Powell, 
Thatcher sought popular consent by employing conservative logic and the threat 
posed to 'good order' by 'Europe, the Other' rather than relying upon rational 
theoretical arguments. 
Thus, once again, the myth of British parliamentary liberalism had proved popular, 
despite its anti-democratic and negative economic elements, because it promised 
a minimal consistency in the face of dislocation caused by a dangerous and 'alien' 
79 Smith, A. M. (1998) Op. Cit. P. 164. 
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supplement. That such social imaginaries are successful in terms of their provision 
of order and consistency rather than their content is expressed by the observation 
that - rather than high unemployment, unpopular tax initiatives, decline in social 
welfare, education, housing, and so on - it was the failure of the Conservative 
Government to maintain order and leadership, and effectively provide a minimal 
consistency in the face of European integration, that led to its demise. As 
illustrated in Section 5.2, the downfalls of both Thatcher and Major were invoked 
by their failure to provide a coherent order and effective leadership in response to 
the process of European integration. 
In sum, Thatcherism re-articulated the British myth of parliamentary liberalism as a 
response to the structural dislocation invoked by the crisis of social democracy. To 
achieve hegemony, it successfully negated social democracy as a dangerous 
alien supplement that was the cause of dislocation. By promising a return to 
traditional British values, Thatcherism was constructed as the only credible path to 
the return of order and stability. Hence, this hegemonic project gained support not 
because its claims were considered to be rational or true, but rather because it 
offered a principle of order and intelligibility at this time of crisis. Thatcherism 
represented 'hegemony-as-normalization' as opposed to a 'hegemony-of- 
domination'. 80 Moreover, as for previous projects, Thatcherism successfully 
achieved hegemony by articulating its political agenda with notions of the 'British 
nation'and 'ethnos', as examined above and developed further below. 
80 See: Smith, A. M. (1994) New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). p. 40. 
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4.3. Euroscepticism and British neo-liberalism 
The upshot of the above is that the construction of this new Thatcherite social 
imaginary led to increased Euroscepticism in Britain since Continental European 
ideas, and therefore, the ideas embodied within the EU, were also negated and 
displaced as equivalent to the crisis-ridden ideas of social democracy. That is, 
they were also articulated as moments of the negated chain of social democratic 
equivalences. Thus, Thatcher and her Eurosceptic supporters warned that the 
Continental European strategy for European integration would re-establish a 
dangerous socialist (or social democratic 81) supplement into Britain: it represented 
the potential threat of a Continental European social democratic super-state that 
would impose 'burgeoning bureaucracy', ' centralism', 9 collectivism , and so forth. 
For example, an equivalence between 'social democracy', 'bureaucracy', 
'centralism', 'socialism', 'European union' and 'crisis' is directly and succinctly 
articulated in Thatcher's address to the Conservative Party Conference in October 
1988: 
Today, that founding concept (of economic liberty) is under attack from 
those who see European unity as a vehicle for spreading socialism. We 
haven't worked hard all these years to free Britain from the paralysis of 
socialism only to see it creep through the back door of central control 
and bureaucracy in Brussels. 82 
Similarly, in her Bruges speech in September 1988 83 , Thatcher attacked 
Commission initiatives for regulating the internal market, centralizing power in 
Brussels, and for pursuing common rules on the protection of workers. The ideas 
of Jacques Delors were presented as a socialist attack upon the concept of the 
81 It is apparent that Thatcherism, as well as the popular press, discursively articulated and negated 
'social democracy'as equivalent to'socialism'. 82 See: http: //www. euroscep. dircon. co. uk/bg-index. htm 83 See: Thatcher, M. (1988) The European Family of Nations. Speech given at the College of 
Europe, on the State and Future of the European Communities', Bruges, 20 September. In: 
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EC as embodied in the Treaty of Rome, which she conceived as a charter for 
economic liberty. She claimed that his socialist ideas would lead to a highly 
damaging 'European conglomerate 84 and 'European super-state' that would 
undermine the liberal economic objectives of the Treaty of Rome and enforce 
'socialism' upon Britain from a supranational level. As she declared: 
(W)orking more closely together does not require power to be 
centralised in Brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed 
bureaucracy. 
Indeed, it is ironic that just when those countries such as the Soviet 
Union, which have tried to run everything from the centre, are learning 
that success depends on dispersing power and decisions away from 
the centre, some in the Community seem to want to move in the 
opposite direction. 
We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in 
Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a 
European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels. 85 
Such 'European super-statism' was also rejected - as well as ridiculed - by the 
Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, at the Conservative Party Conference in 
1995: 
... the foreign and defence policies of this country will not 
be dictated to 
us by a majority vote of a council of ministers ... (otherwise, in the future, ) the European Commission might want to harmonise uniforms 
and cap badges, or even metricate them. The European Court would 
probably want to stop our men fighting for more than forty hours a 
week. They would have sent half of them home on paternity leave. 86 
In particular, European social initiatives were negated as equivalent to socialism, 
and thus, the crisis of social democracy. For example, as Thatcher argued: 'From 
all the accounts that I have received about the social charter, it is more like a 
Harryvan, A. G. and J. Van der Harst (eds) (1997) Documents on European Union. (London: 
Macmillan). pp. 242-7. 84 bid. p. 243. 85 Ibid. pp. 243-4. 86 Portillo, M. (1995) His ('Who Dares Wins') Speech as Defence Secretary at Conservative Party 
Conference in Blackpool, 10 October, http: //www. conservative-party. org. uk 
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Socialist charter'. 87 Similarly, with regard to the Social Chapter of the TEU, John 
Major later declared: 
We reject, and will continue to reject, the Social Chapter. France can 
complain as much as it likes ... Let them call it social dumping. I call it dumping socialism. 88 
British Eurosceptics have also described this socialist threat as the consequence 
of a 'French-German' conspiracy. For example, the Conservative Government 
vice-chairman, Patrick Nicholls, claimed that ministers would resist, 'some 
bastardised, federalised European destiny, actively and fawningly crawling to 
France and Germany v. 
89 Similarly, Bill Cash described a "German-Russian 
condominium", of which the European Union would form the western pillar'. 901n 
addition, Nicholas Ridley depicted European monetary union as 'a German racket 
designed to take over the whole of Europe I. 
91 
In sum, European integration was discursively constructed as a threat to the 
rationale and pretensions of British neo-liberalism, and thus, as a threat to the 
order and stability that had been re-established after the supplement of social 
democracy had been removed. Following Burke, Thatcherite Eurosceptics argued 
that European integration would reimpose an alien supplement that we had 
already found to be 'mischievous on triall. 
87 Thatcher, M. (1989) Hansard, Col. 470,18 May. 
88 Major, J. (1993) Speech at Conservative Party Meeting, 27 February. As cited in Baker, D., A. 
Gamble and S. Ludlam (11994) 'The Parliamentary Siege of Maastricht 1993: Conservative 
Divisions and British Ratification', Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 47, No. 1, pp. 52-3. 
89 Nicholls, P. (1994) 'Why Britain Ought to Remain the Sceptical Man of Europe', The Western 
Morning News, 23 November. p. 4. 
90 Stephens, P. (11997) Politics and the Pound. (London: Macmillan). p. 350 
91 Lawson, D. (1990) 'Saying the Unsayable about the Germans'. Interview with Nicholas Ridley, the 
Secretary State of Industry. The Spectator, 14 July, p. 8. 
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4.4. Euroscepticism and absolute parliamentary sovereignty 
As emphasized by this thesis, for many British Eurosceptics on the left92 and the 
right, the longstanding main concern has been that European integration poses a 
direct to threat to the British principle of absolute parliamentary sovereignty. As 
explained above, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty was not dissolved by 
the social democratic post-war consensus, and thus, this aspect of 
Euroscepticism predates the neo-liberal moment. However, the concern for 
parliamentary sovereignty intensified with the growing political implications of 
membership, as reflected in the TEU. As declared by the Conservative MP, 
Michael Spicer: 
In the United Kingdom it (the TEU) would have the profoundest 
possible consequences for the very foundation of the constitution. This 
rests above all on the notion that the people exert their sovereignty 
through a Parliament which is the supreme authority in the land. An 
essential element of this supremacy is that Parliament can effect 
whatever changes it chooses, including, often especially, amending the 
laws passed by a previous Parliament. The commitment at Maastricht 
to the 'irrevocable' is in direct contrast to this. ... 
In this sense, 
Maastricht is a torpedo aimed but not yet fired at the keel of British 
democracy. 93 
Following Dicey's presentation of parliamentary sovereignty as an 'undoubted 
legal fact', this argument has a more substantial rational theoretical basis than the 
Burkean conservative logic of Powell and Thatcher. For example, Powell explains 
to a French audience in Lyon in 1971: 1 
... your assemblies, unlike the British Parliament, are the creation of deliberate political acts. The notion that a new sovereign body can be 
92 Representing the left and its preference for the parliamentary road to socialism, Tony Benn 
argued: 'Britain's continuing membership of the Community would mean the end of Britain as a 
completely self-governing nation and the end of our democratically elected Parliament as the 
supreme law-making body of the United Kingdom'. (Benn, T. (1974) The Common Market: Loss of 
Self Government, 29 December. Letter sent to his constituents in Bristol South East as a New Year 
Message for 1975. In: M. Holmes (ed. ) (1996) The Eurosceptic Reader. (London: Macmillan). p. 38. 93 Spicer, M. (1992) A Treaty Too Far., A New Policy for Europe. (London: Fourth Estate) pp. 13-4. 
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created is therefore as familiar to you as it is repugnant, not say 
unimaginable, to US. 
94 
In addition, as observed in Chapter 4, Section 1.0., Lady Thatcher argued that the 
TEU should be rejected on the basis that it threatened parliamentary institutions 
that were 'far older than those in the Communityw. 95 However, all these 
Eurosceptic arguments share Burke's concern that Europe represents a serious 
threat to those schooled in 'responsible judgement'. 
In sum, these two sections have demonstrated that European integration has 
been perceived as a direct threat to order and stability because it threatened the 
discourses of 'neo-liberalism' and 'parliamentary sovereignty' that are articulated 
as'neo-parliamentary liberalism'. Thus, as for all discourses, the constitutive limits 
of this discursive formation were constructed in relation to a threatening 
constitutive outside. In the same way that parliamentary liberalism had previously 
constructed the republican democratic ideas of Continental Europe as its 
constitutive outside (as described in Section 2 above), the return of this traditional 
British discursive formation led to the negation and displacement of the social 
democratic ideas of Continental Europe and its supranational project for 
European integration. As with its previous construction, the development of this 
European 'radical otherness' was reflected in a British antagonism with 
Continental Europe. Britain opposed the process of European integration because 
it was identified with 'Europe, the Other'. Similar to its previous manifestations, 
British neo-parliamentary liberalism had identified Continental Europe as a cause 
of dislocation, and thus, it promised to restore order and stability by obstructing its 
influence. 
94 Powell, E. (1971) Britain and Europe. Speech delivered in Lyons, 12 February. In: M. Holmes 
(ed. ) (1996) Op. Cit. p. 85. Previously published in: E. Powell (1971) The Common Market- The 
Case Against. (Elliot Right Way Books). 
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The following section will examine the discourse-theoretical propositions that help 
elucidate why the construction of the British national identity has required the 
establishment of an antagonism, as discursively articulated with Europe. 
5.0. The construction of British identit 
This chapter has argued that the British discursive system of national identity has 
comprised of a contingent articulation of the myth of parliamentary liberalism and 
the myth of the British nation. After being re-established by Thatcherism, this 
discursive formation could be described as 'British (neo-) national parliamentary 
liberalism'. As indicated above, the limits of this discursive formation have been 
established in relation to Continental Europe, and thus, the EU, as its radical and 
threatening otherness or 'constitutive outside'. This constitutive outside is a 
discursive exteriority that cannot be related to the moments within the British 
discursive formation through relations of simple difference, since it has the form of 
a 'radical alterity' that threatens and disrupts its discursive system of differences. 
This constitutive outside simultaneously constitutes and negates the limits of the 
British discursive formation from which it is excluded. It is an outside that blocks 
the identity of the inside, but is nonetheless a perquisite for its construction. As the 
'constitutive outside' is coterminous with 'social antagonism', it can therefore be 
affirmed that the British social antagonism with Europe simultaneously represents 
the condition of possibility and the condition of impossibility of the British 
discursive system of identity. 
95 Thatcher, M. (1993) Speech in the House of Lords. 7 June, http: //www. parliament. the-stationery- 
office. co. uk/pa/cm/cmhansrd. htm 
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To elucidate further, the limits of this British discursive system of identity have 
been established by the exclusion of a threatening radical alterity, which does not 
present itself as yet another difference but involves the expansion of a chain of 
equivalence. The negated elements of this chain are somehow considered to 
pose a threat to its rationale and pretensions. Continental European countries, 
ideas, and people have become caught up in this chain of equivalence. 
Overall, the British antagonism with Europe has constituted and sustained the 
British identity, but only by being identified as a threat to it. As this chapter has 
illustrated, British myths have functioned to suture dislocated spaces, but in turn, 
they have led to an antagonistic relationship with Europe that has invoked further 
dislocations. As previous accounts of the British-European integration have not 
addressed, the antagonism with Europe has been a major source of stability and 
dislocation for the British identity in this way, and the result of the latter has been a 
conflict with the EU and its initiatives for European integration. Indeed, this 
antagonism helped to unify and sustain the hegemonic project of Thatcherism, but 
it also meant that the process of European integration represented a serious 
threat to its universalist and rationalist pretensions as well as its ability to provide 
order and stability. As Section 5.2. demonstrates below, the spatial forms of 
representation and the discursive structure that Thatcherism supported were 
confronted with a process that it could not be domesticated or symbolized, nor 
inscribed upon at the level of the social imaginary. Thus, European integration 
posed a serious threat to the hegemony of Thatcherism and successive 
Conservative governments. 
290 
5.1. The British identity and the antagonism with Europe 
Following Derrida, the British obstruction to European integration is guided by the 
illusion that the annihilation of the antagonistic force will permit us to become the 
fully constituted 'we' that we have always sought to be. For example, the British 
Eurosceptic struggle against European integration is necessarily filled out by the 
illusion that afterwards, when 'European interference I is retracted, Britain will 
achieve its full identity, be a sovereign nation, realize its full potential, reclaim its 
former global dominance, and so forth. Here, Britain has tended to perceive 
Continental Europe as simultaneously a foreign invader and an insidious enemy 
within. It is an alien and geographically detached continent, while at the same time 
it has penetrated deep into the British nation (via Catholicism, socialism, social 
democracy, EU policy, and on). This paradoxical 'doubleness' accords to the 
Derridian logic of 'supplementarity': essentialist and metaphysical discourse tends 
to make a distinction between the privileged, self-identical essence and its 
harmless, non-constitutive supplement, which can be added or subtracted without 
affecting essential identity. However, a Derridean deconstructive reading of the 
essentialist and metaphysical discourse reveals the subversive character of this 
external supplement, which positions itself as a necessary completion of the 
inside, and in this manner shows that the inside has always remained incomplete 
on its own. 
96 
In accordance with this logic of supplementarity, British Eurosceptics perceive 
Continental European meanings and ideas (social democracy, European 
Commission initiatives, and so on) as a pure addition to Britain, initiatives of an 
alien culture that can be 'repatriated' without damage to the true British nation. 
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However, such initiatives are also portrayed as a dangerous supplement, as the 
embodiment of an 'enemy within' which must be countered by a British national 
solidarity and a patriotic commitment to rebuilding the British nation. 
As illustrated in Chapter 3, Section 4.4., Zi2ek's Lacanian conception of social 
antagonism deepens our understanding of social antagonism as constitutive of 
social identity. Similar to Derrida, he argues that the construction of the Other is 
necessary for identification, and the Subject will hold this antagonistic force 
responsible for the blockage of its full identity. That is, the Subject will establish a 
social antagonism with an external enemy because it is considered to deny the full 
constitution of its identity. As such, it is identified as a cause of dislocation. 
However, Zi2ek observes that what is negated in social antagonism is always 
already negated. 97 There is a force of negativity that is prior to social antagonism. 
This force is the 'Lacanian Real', the traumatic kernel which always resists 
symbolization. Thus, in Lacanian terms, it is necessary to distinguish antagonism 
as real from the social reality of the antagonistic fight. 98 
Thus, for Zi2ek, the point is not that 'we' are nothing but the drive to annihilate the 
antagonistic force that prevents us from achieving our full identity. Rather, the 
crucial point is that the antagonistic force is held responsible for denying our full 
identity, and this permits the externalization of our constitutive lack as subjects to 
the negating Other, which thus becomes the positive embodiment of our self- 
blockage. 99 Hence, as for Derrida, the annihilation of the Other merely confronts 
the Subject with its own incomplete identity: it is not the external enemy that 
prevents identity from becoming fully sutured. Following Lacan, 2iZ-ek explains 
96 See: Smith, A. M. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 74. 97 See: Ibid. pp. 249-60. 98 Ibid. p. 253. 
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that what is negated in social antagonism is always already negated because the 
Real is a force of negativity that is prior to social antagonism. 
Applying these propositions, the British antagonism with 'Europe' can be 
conceived as a discursive response to the dislocation of the British identity, and 
defined in terms of the presence of a Continental European constitutive outside 
which, at the same time, constitutes and denies this identity. 1001n sum, British 
Eurosceptics believe that the European integration is as an antagonistic force that 
is denying the British identity because it is identified as a cause of its dislocation. 
As an alien supplement, it denies the possibility of a fully constituted British 
identity. However, the possibility of this British identity is already blocked by the 
Lacanian Real, and the identification of European integration as an antagonistic 
force actually constitutes this identity by externalizing this constitutive lack. 
5.2. European integration and structural dislocation in Britain 
The foregoing emphasizes how the processes of Europeanisation could represent 
a profound dislocation for the myths of British nationalism and parliamentary 
liberalism. That is, similar to the predictions of the structural and functional 
accounts of the process of European integration examined in Chapters 1-2, it 
could be argued that the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation are 
dislocating the ideas of the nation-state (such as the national parliamentary 
sovereignty) as the privileged terrain of British political, economic, and social 
activity. Indeed, all the accounts of British-European relations described in 
Chapter 2 suggest that: 
99 - 
100 
Zi2ek, S. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 253. 
Laclau, E. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 17. 
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At the level of British decision-makers (who are having increasingly to 
cope with European and global concerns) nationalist appeals are 
increasingly anachronistic. 101 
As Preston emphasizes, all European countries, including Britain, are locked into 
regional blocs and tied by their dependence on world trade and capital flows. 
Moreover, as Robin Cohen has surmised, 'undiluted nationalism' will not provide a 
long-term palliative, particularly if the 'nation' is advanced as an exclusive focus of 
loyalty and identity. This is because, in such Western nation-states, a Pandora's 
box of multiple loyalties and identities - nationalist, ethnic, religious, linguistic, 
culture and gender based - has already been opened. 
102 As will be examined in 
Chapter 7, Laclau and Mouffe observe a similar plurality of non-nationalist 
identifications in the contemporary and 'post- modern' Western epoch. 
For a discourse-theoretical approach, the final breakdown of such myths occurs 
when the spatial forms of representation and the discursive structure they support 
are confronted with a set of undomesticated events. The presence of events that 
can neither by symbolized by the discursive formation or inscribed upon at the 
level of the imaginary, threatens the social order precisely because it threatens its 
ability to sustain order. 103 This is apposite in that the process of European 
integration has created a tension within the discursive formation of British 
parliamentary liberalism because it invoked an asymmetry between its articulated 
discourses of parliamentary sovereignty and economic liberalism. This asymmetry 
was the result of a conflation between the rationale of European and British 
economic liberalisation in response to globalisation, which, in turn, conflicts with 
the British rationale of national parliamentary sovereignty. 
101 Cohen, R. (1994) Frontiers of Identity. The British and the Others. (London, New York: 
Longman). p. 203. 102 
Ibid. p. 204. 
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This asymmetry produced a tension within the hegemonic neo-liberal discursive 
formation. The process of European integration had created inconsistencies 
between the moments of this discursive formation, and thus, the contingency of its 
articulated moments was revealed. Hence, the mythical status of neo-liberalism 
was exposed. Since it could not offer credible and internally coherent principles of 
intelligibility for this new situation, it could no longer provide an order for British 
society. 
This internal inconsistency led to leadership battles, Conservative Party disputes 
and fierce parliamentary debates. 104 For example, it was evident in the 
parliamentary discussion of the European Communities (Amendment) Act (1986) 
and the implementation of the SEA (1986)1 05 , and played a pivotal role in the 
demise of Thatcher. The significance of this asymmetry upon the internal 
cohesion of the Conservative Party is also reflected in the divide it invoked 
between Thatcher and Powell. In contrast to Thatcher, Powell believed that the 
preservation of national and absolute parliamentary sovereignty was more 
important than the economic incentives of the completion of the Single European 
Market. Moreover, this tension intensified as the political implications of European 
integration continued to grow. The greater political consequences of the TEU led 
to the fiercest parliamentary debates in British post-war history, and accentuated 
the party splits that played a significant role in the electoral defeat of the Major 
Government in 1997. 
103 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 129-30. 104 See: Ludlam, S. (1998) 'The Cauldron: Conservative Parliamentarians and European 
Integration', in: Baker, D. and D. Seawright (eds) Britain for and Against Europe: British Politics and 
the Question of European Integration. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) pp. 31-33; Baker, D., A. Gamble 
and S. Ludlam (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 56-7. 
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Moments of choice between discourses occur when existing discourses can no 
longer provide coherent and rational answers when challenged by such new 
events. Hence, it is the failure of Britain's particular hegemonic form of rationality 
in the face of this event that requires the reconstitution of British hegemonic 
discourse along different lines. Indeed, it is questionable whether national 
parliamentary sovereignty can provide a rational and internally coherent response 
to the increasing pressures of Globalisation and Europeanisation. However, the 
process of European integration did not only expose the mythical status of the 
contingent articulation of British economic liberalism and the British parliamentary 
sovereignty. 
5.3. Allies and adversaries 
As indicated above, throughout British history, Europe has been consistently 
constructed as an enemy of the nation: it has successively represented the alien 
and antipathetic threat of Catholicism, political revolution, republican democracy, 
fascism, communism, socialism, social democracy and federalism. All these ideas 
have been perceived as potentially disruptive to the British social order. The 
necessity of combating these European ideas has dictated a choice of allies for 
Britain, such as Protestants, monarchists, liberals, and anti-Communists. A 
I special relationship' with the US was formed to combat these enemies. For 
example, Britain and the US have experienced mutual victories as major allies 
over Continental European antagonistic forces, whether in the form of nazism, 
fascism, or communism. Moreover, this 'special relationship' with the US, which 
contrasts with the British 'awkward partnership' with Continental Europe, reflects 
105 See: Judge, D. (1988) 'Incomplete Sovereignty: The British House of Commons and the 
Completion of the internal Market in the European Communities', Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 41, 
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that the US is 'of us' because it was colonized by 'us'. (In contrast, the British 
antagonistic relationship with Continental Europe reflects its competition with 'us' 
in such colonization that resulted in many conflicts that exacerbated this 
antagonism. ) Strong linguistic and cultural similarities developed, and hence, the 
US became 'one of us'. Therefore, the ideas, meanings, and options of the US 
are equivalent to those of Britain in many respects relevant to this research focus, 
and have been discursively constructed as such in Britain. The consequence of 
the above is that, although Britain has refused to be ruled by the EU, it has shown 
itself to be more than willing to be subservient to the US. Moreover, as Chapter 2 
illustrated, the British 'special relationship' with the US itself has been a major 
106 
obstacle to British-European integration . 
In economic terms, reflecting its discourse of global economic liberalism outlined 
in Chapter 4, Britain conceives other nations as 'legitimate adversaries' competing 
within a global capitalist market. For example, as George et al and Preston 
observed in Chapter 2, Britain wanted to include global non-European economic 
forces, such as Japan and the US, within the process of European economic 
integration. 107 Moreover, in Britain, there is a conflict between such antagonistic 
and adversarial relations. That is, the British Eurosceptic construction of a 
European conspiracy conflicts with the Europhile construction of global non- 
European legitimate adversaries. Indeed, the conflict between these antagonistic 
No. 4, pp. 441-55. 
106 See also: Aldrich, R. J. (1998) 'British Intelligence and the Anglo-American "Special 
Relationship" during the Cold War', Review of International Studies, Volume 24, No. 3. pp. 331-51; 
Anderson, P. J. and T. Weymouth (11999) Insulting the Public? The British Press and the European 
Union. (London, New York: Longman). p. 160-2; Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 11 -2,17,21-3; 
George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner, Britain in the European Community. Third Edition. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press). pp. 14-5,279-80; Hill, C. (1983) 'Britain: A Convenient Schizophrenia', in 
C. Hill (ed. ) National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation. (London: Allen and 
Unwin). p. 26; Preston, P. W. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 163-6,168-9,207. 107 Bulmer, S. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 12-3, George, S. (1992) 'The Policy of British Governments within 
the European Community', in George, S. (ed. ) (1992) Op. Cit. p. 32,59-60, and Preston, P. W. 
(1994) Op. Cit. pp. 130-5,196-7. 
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and adversarial relations is pivotal to the British debate upon European union and 
reflects a fundamental crisis for the British national identity. That this debate 
remains unresolved reflects the significant crisis that this conflict poses for Britain. 
6.0. The relationship between British Euroscepticism, racism, and 
nationalism 
This section argues that Euroscepticism is a form of racism that is intrinsically 
linked to the development of the myth of the British nation. Racism itself is a 
discursive construction that develops within the discourse of nationalism. 108 
However, both racism and nationalism are mutually conditioned: nationalism is the 
determining condition in the production of racism, and racism is a necessary 
element in the constitution of nationalism. 109 Hence, an analysis of racism is 
significant to the study of Euroscepticism because it contributes to the constitution 
of nationalist discourse by producing the fictive 'ethnos' that interpellates 
particular individuals as members of the nation and others as intruders or 
enemies. Racism contributes to constructing the 'us' and 'them' dichotomy. Yet, 
although nationalist and racist discourses are intrinsically linked, racism is 'a 
supplement internal to nationalism, always in excess of it, but always 
indispensable to its constitution and yet always insufficient to achieve its 
project'. 110 
Relevant to this discussion, Anne Marie Smith has analysed the racism of 
Thatcherism and the New Right. "' For Smith, the standard accounts of 
108 Balibar, E. (1991 a) 'Racism and Nationalism', in E. Balibar and 1. Wallerstein (eds) Race, 
Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. (London: Verso). pp. 37-8. 
109 Ibid. p. 48. 110 Ibid. p. 54. 
Smith, A. M. (1994) Op. Cit. 
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Thatcherism are limited because they have focused almost exclusively on the 
economic policies, and have generally treated racism as if it were a minor issue 
within New Right discourse. ' 12 However, British Euroscepticism has also been 
marginalised in this way. Similar to racism, Euroscepticism constituted a pivotal 
strategic element in the attempt by Thatcherism to articulate and hegemonize its 
new political project in the face of profound dislocation. As for the racist assault 
upon black immigrants and asylum seekers, British Thatcherite Euroscepticism 
reflected the promise to rejuvenate the myth of the British nation by rejecting a 
dangerous alien supplement. 
In her attempt to address the lack of attention to the race issue, Smith has 
extensively examined Enoch Powell's contribution to the formation of an anti-black 
immigration movement. However, it is also important to consider his major 
contribution to the formation of British Euroscepticism. Indeed, as emphasized 
above, Powell was central to the campaign against continued community 
membership by 1975 as well as to the formation of Thatcherism, and to the 
articulation of Euroscepticism as a major element of this discourse. 
As a key proponent, the speeches of Enoch Powell articulated the myth of the 
British nation with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, thus representing the 
discursive formation of 'British national parliamentary sovereignty'. His 
Euroscepticism represented a desire to preserve the institution of parliament that 
simultaneously reflected Britishness as well as defended it. As Powell 
demonstrates to a French audience: 
... it is a fact that the 
British Parliament and its paramount authority 
occupies a position in relation to the British nation which no other 
112 
Ibid. pp. 1-5. 
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elective assembly in Europe possesses. Take parliament out of the 
history of England and history itself becomes meaningless. ... (T)he British nation could not imagine itself except with and through its 
parliament. Consequently the sovereignty of our parliament is 
something other for us than what your assemblies are to YOU. 113 
Indeed, Powell declared that the question of British membership of the EEC had 
to be set in the context of nationhood and thus, of 'instinct, of feeling, of passion, 
of prejudice evenw. 114 It also had to be set in the context of the political 'fighting 
question' of freedom, the freedom of 'us' from 'compulsion by 'them'. 115 In sum, 
v 116 'We' is the nation, and the freedom in question is 'national independence . 
Reflecting the articulation of parliamentary liberalism and British nationalism, 
Powell explains that: 
The England which expects its people to do their duty in the hour of 
peril is a parliamentary nation. The soul of that liberty with which its 
citizens associate their nationhood is the right to live under laws which 
are made by that Parliament and government which is consented to by 
that Parliament. ' 17 
However, he argued that external European forces were destroying such 
nationhood and liberty: 
... The rights of a freeborn Englishman, which used to be secured to him by his native institutions, are no longer good enough. On pain of 
displeasing an outside world that lived under horrid tyrannies long after 
England was self-governing, we petition foreign judges on the continent 
to declare and enforce our rights by interpreting at their discretion a 
document which no English lawyer -I almost said no writer of decent 
English - would imagine in a nightmare. 
' 18 
Such Euroscepticism constitutes a nodal point in British nationalist discourse. That 
is, Euroscepticism plays an important role in the symbolization of the communal 
space of the British nation, which has been constructed in relation to the perceived 
113 Powell, E. (1971) Op. Cit. p. 85. 114 Ritchie, R. (ed. ) (1989) Op. Cit. Extract on 'Nationhood' from a speech to a fringe meeting of 
Conservatives at the Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, 14 October 1981. p. 126. 115 Ibid. Extract on "We' and 'They" from a speech to a fringe meeting of Conservatives at the 
Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool, 14 October 1981. p. 125. 116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. 'A Parliamentary Nation', Extract from a Speech in London, 22 April, 1986. p. 152. 
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threat of 'Europe, the Other'. This is evident in the similarities between the 
arguments of such major protagonists as Edmund Burke (as examined above in 
Section 2.1. ) and Enoch Powell in their defence of British national parliament and 
political culture against the French Revolution and European integration 
respectively-' 19 Indeed, the relationship between the 'Eurosceptic defenders of the 
British nation' and the threat of the 'anti-British European invader' has operated as 
a key to make intelligible the dislocation and disintegration of the British nation. 
Following the propositions of discourse theory examined in Sections 1.1-2. and 
5.0-1. above, it has helped make bearable the impossibility of such a fully 
constituted British national identity. It obscures the impossibility of restoring 
something that has never been, or could ever be, complete. It will now be 
explained how such anti-European sentiment has played this stabilizing function 
for the British identity, and thus, how it was able to achieve hegemonic success. 
6.1. Patria and ethnos 
The 'British nation' is an empty signifier symbolizing an absent fullness; that is, it 
is a cultural and political community that is imagined precisely because it is not 
realized . 
120 The homogenization and substantialization of this empty signifier of 
the nation is a defining feature of nationalist discourse. As illustrated above, such 
invokes a reduction of difference to sameness. As for previous British nationalist 
movements, the aim of Thatcherism was to hegemonize the empty signifier of the 
British nation by attaching it to a transcendental signified that could arrest the play 
of meaning. As such, Thatcherism tended to define the nation in terms of 'patria II 
118 Ibid. 'A Sub-species'. Extract from a Speech in London, 22 April, 1986. p. 153. 
119 However, in contrast to Burke, Powell required a political revolution in order to reintroduce 
British conservatism. 120 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 202. 
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which involved a transcendental reference to a necessary relation between blood 
and soil. This relates to the Derridian notion of 'ontology': 
... an axiomatics linking indissociably the ontological value of present- being [on] to its situation, to the stable and presentable determination of 
a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city, body in general. 121 
This 'ontological essential ization' of the relation between being and a place is a 
constitutive feature of nationalism, and it can be identified within the words of 
Powell and Thatcher. For example, Powell explains that pro-European statements 
simply denote 'the British' as: 
... those of the Community's inhabitants who live in Britain, speak English, eat fish and chips, and exhibit other non-political symptoms 122 
associated with the people of this island . 
The result is that they fail to acknowledge the 'true' significance of surrendering 
parliamentary sovereignty for European political integration: 
Never again, by the necessity of an axiom, will an Englishman live for 
his country or die for his country: the country for which people live and 
die was absolute, and we have abolished it. 123 
Such an ontological essential ization requires the additional essential ization of a 
being in terms of a definition of a privileged, distinctive and unified 'ethnos' that 
inhabits the national territory. The auto-referential interpellation of a superior race 
with a privileged link to the national soil is conditional upon the hetero-referential 
interpellation of other inferior races, which are either inside or outside the nation, 
or both. For example, the neo-liberal assault upon an intruding European 'super- 
state' that is subservient to a conspiracy of 'German warmongers' and 'French 
collaborators', as described below. It is such auto-referential and hetero- 
referential interpellations of individuals as belonging to a certain race (defined in 
121 Derrida, J. (1994) Specters of Matx: The State of the Debt, the Working of Mourning, and the 
New International. (New York: Routledge). p. 82. 122 
Ritchie, R. (ed. ) (1989) Extract from an article in The Daily Telegraph, 9 June 1975. p. 146. 123 
Ibid. 
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either biological or cultural terms) that together constitute the defining gestures of 
'racism ,- 
124 
Hence, the Euroscepticism of Powell and Thatcher functioned to organize British 
nationalist discourse around a 'fictive ethnos'. Similar to other myths and 
discourses, this fictive ethnos is constructed by excluding a constitutive outside 
that is constructed through the rearticulation of differential moments as part of a 
chain of equivalence. This chain of equivalence may construct different ethnic 
groups as belonging to an undifferentiated mass of people who are conceived as 
inferior because of their biological race, as reflected in the British Eurosceptic 
sentiment that 'the wogs begin at Calais v. 125 However, racism may also operate 
within a system of differences by associating other identities with particular 
, 126 essential cultural traits that are incompatible with the British 'ethnos . 
Smith observes that British New Right racist discourse tends to underline the 
insurmountability of cultural differences more than biological superiority. It is also 
apparent that British Euroscepticism asserts such cultural differences. It seeks to 
defend 'our' British culture from 'them' and their 'alien' and incompatible cultures. 
Examples include the many scares about the European Commission interfering in 
our British way of life, including our traditional diet, working hours, and pass-times. 
However, it is also apparent that British Euroscepticism has tended to assert a 
fictive British cultural superiority. Frequently compounded by selective and 
inaccurate references to history, Britain is held to be intrinsically superior in 
political, economic, social and military terms. In particular, the perception of British 
superiority is often developed from of superior British war capabilities, as well as a 
124 Balibar, E. (1991 a) Op. Cit. p. 49. 
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distorted memory of how Britain stood alone against evil European forces and 
'won the war'. Such rhetoric was evident in the Conservative Party Conference in 
1995, when the Defence Secretary, Michael Portillo, offered a historical reminder 
of how, "twice this century we have risked everything to restore freedom to 
Europe". 127 Similarly, Thatcher argued that Britain's successful war efforts have 
demonstrated its commitment to Europe: 
We British have in a special way contributed to Europe. Over the 
centuries we have fought to prevent Europe falling under the 
dominance of a single power. We have fought and we have died for 
her freedom. Only a few miles from Bruges lie the bodies of 120 000 
British soldiers who died in the First World War. Had it not been for 
their willingness to fight and die, Europe would have been united 
long before now - but not in liberty, not in justice. 
128 
Yet it is also evident that the more radical or explicit British Euroscepticism has 
asserted Britain's biological difference and superiority. As demonstrated below, 
radical Eurosceptics argue that European integration must and will be obstructed 
because the British people are believed to have a different and superior Inaturef. 
As explained above, the interpellation of a particular race with a privileged link to 
the nation by a hegemonic strategy involves the construction of an antagonism, 
and in Britain, Continental Europe has been the object of such an antagonism. 
For example, as illustrated above, reflecting the construction of a populist unity, 
Thatcher spoke in the intrinsic interests of the British people whose deepest 
instincts were opposed to European integration. 
In particular, radical British Eurosceptics argue that the superior 'essence' of the 
British people is opposed to the 'socialist' intrinsic nature of the French or the 
inherent 'Nazism' of the Germans. In accordance with these natural traits, these 
125 Sharpe, L. J. (1996) British Scepticism and the European Union: A Guide for Foreigners, in M. 
Holmes (ed. ) (1996) Op. Cit. p. 309. 126 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 203. 127 Portillo, M. (1995) Op. Cit. 
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other nations have a natural instinct to take over others, to spread and invade like 
a disease. Once again, many of these Eurosceptic beliefs are founded on The 
War. It is argued that European integration represents another Continental 
European strategy to take over Europe - that 'Europe, the Other' is, once again, 
threatening to destroy the British nation. However, in accordance with their 
superior essential nature, and demonstrated by their previous war victories, it is 
claimed that the British people will never allow this to happen. These observations 
will now be substantiated. 
For example, Powell illustrates that Britain's superior military mentality has 
developed a symbolic 'ditch' between 'us' and 'them': 
An essential element in forming a single electorate is the sense that in 
the last resort all parts of stand or fall, survive or perish, together. This 
sense the British do not share with the inhabitants of the continent of 
Western Europe. Of all the nations of Europe Britain and Russia alone, 
though for opposite reasons, have this in common: they can be 
defeated in the decisive land battle and still survive. This characteristic 
... Britain owes to its ditch. The British feel and I believe that instinct 
corresponds with sound military reason - that the ditch is as significant 
[today and as it was] in the Grand Arm6e of Napoleon ... Error or truth, 
myth or reality, the belief itself is a habit of mind which has helped to 
form the national identity of the British and cannot be divorced from it. 
Radical British Euroscepticism often demonstrates a more explicit racist and 
xenophobic tendency in its references to 'The War'. Revisiting the opening 
quotation of this thesis, Patrick Nicholls declares: 
In short, I have no great liking for a Continent dominated by two 
countries, the unique contribution of one of which has been to plunge 
Europe into two world wars in living memory, and another which proved 
itself incapable of winning any war unless it is fought by the French 
Foreign Legion 
... 
(and which) ... 
had the nerve to represent itself as a 
nation of resistance fighters in the second World War when, in fact, it 
, 129 was a nation of collaborators . 
128 Thatcher, M. (1988) Op. Cit. In: M. Holmes (ed. ) (1996) Op. Cit. p. 89. 129 Nicholls, P. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 4. 
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Thus, Nicholls continues to equate Germany with 'Nazism' and perceives them as 
'warmongers' with a threatening inherently desire for war itselfl 30, whilst the 
French cannot be trusted as they are 'Nazi collaborators'. Similarly, with regard to 
the threat posed to British sovereignty by European integration, Nicholas Ridley 
argued that 'You might just as well give it up to Adolf Hitler'. 131 Indeed, he was 
uncertain whether the German Chancellor, Helmot Khol, was preferable to Hitler: 
I'm not sure that I wouldn't rather have the shelters and the chance to 
fight back, than simply being taken over by ... economics. He'll soon be 
coming here, and trying to say that this is what we should do on the 
banking front and this is what our taxes should be. I mean, he'll soon be 
trying to take over everything. 132 
Dominic Lawson suggests that Ridley's confidence in expressing such xenophobic 
133 
opinions might reflect his previous enthusiastic support for Enoch Powell . He 
also suggests that it might be owed to Ridley's knowledge that similar views were 
held by Thatcher. Lawson recalls an incident when one of Thatcher's former 
advisors arrived for a meeting in a German car: 
What is that foreign car? She gowered. 
Its a Volkswagen, he replied ... 134 Don't ever park something like that her again . 
Similar to Thatcher, Ridley argues that his views represent the British people, and 
he also claims that European monetary union could invoke a 'bloody revolution' in 
Britain: 
You can't change the British people for the better by saying 'Herr 
P6h 1135 says you can't do that'. They'd say, 'You know what you can do 
with your bloody Herr P6hl'. I mean, you don't understand the British 
people if you don't understand this point about them. They can be 
130 Of course, such a perception is ironic when we examine the post-war period and observe that 
Britain has supported more wars than the rest of Europe. Indeed, such reflects the British special 
relationship with the US and its awkward partnership with the EU, as examined above. 131 Lawson, D. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 8. 132 Ibid. pp. 8-9. 133 For example, he voted for Powell in the Conservative leadership contest in 1965. 134 Lawson, D. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 9. 
135 At this time, Herr P6hI, the president of the Budesbank, was visiting England to promote 
European monetary policy. 
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dared; they can be moved. But being bossed by a German - it would 
cause absolute mayhem in this country, and rightly, I think. 136 
Of course, it is ironic that such racist and xenophobic perceptions of Germany are 
based upon the previous threat of Nazism! 
Other British Eurosceptic interpretations of the war have led to a perception of the 
French and Belgians as untrustworthy. For example, on the subject of European 
defence policy, the MP for Welwyn and Hatfield, David Evans, said, 'I don't trust 
the French and Belgians to be there when it matters. Twice this century they 
P 137 138 haven't been there . Similarly, the Italians have been portrayed as cowards. 
Although it is no longer viewed to be 'politically correct' to be racist in many of its 
other forms, such anti-European sentiment still remains publicly acceptable in 
Britain. Similar to racism, the more extreme forms of Euroscepticism are more 
139 140 
publicly espoused in jokes, football chants , and the British press , including 
references to 'Frogs', 'Krauts', 'Spics', and Wops'. For example, an extract from 
The Daily Express argues that, ' ... the British bulldog isn't going to 
be dictated to 
by the Froggies or any other foreigners ... ,. 
141 
All forms of racism and Euroscepticism involve the 'stigmatization of otherness'. 
This inscribes itself in social practices of elimination, violence, intolerance, 
humiliation, discrimination, and so forth. It also inscribes itself in 'fantasmatic 
136 Lawson, D. (1990) Op. Cit. p. 9. 137 Webster, P. and J. Bale (1997) The Times, 6 March. p. 2. 138 For example, the old British joke: 'Did you hear about the new Italian car? It has one forward 
1 ear and four to reverse'. 39 See: Levermore, R. (2001) Sport and Identity in Intemational Relations: The 1998 World Cup. 
Plymouth International Papers; PIP No. 17. (Plymouth International Studies Centre, University of 
Pýmouth). 
14 See: Anderson, P. J. and A. Weymouth (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 60-92. See also: Wilkes, G. and D. 
Wring (11998) 'The British Press and European Integration: 1948 to 1996', in D. Baker and D. 
Seawright (eds) Op. Cit. pp. 185-205. 
141 Wheatcroft, G. (1997) 'Two Parties Splash Each Other with Mud from the Same Road', The 
Daily Express, 15 Ap ri 1, p- 10 - 307 
representations 042 that invoke the need to purify the social body, to preserve its 
identity, to protect it from all forms of invasion. 143 Such fantasmatic 
representations might spontaneously develop as part of racist practices or they 
may result from theoretical doctrines that organize them, such as with the 
hegemonic project of Thatcherism described above. The significance of such 
doctrines is that they provide the 'interpretative keys not only to what individuals 
are expenencing but also to what they are in the social world'. 144 The strength of 
these discourses are their mythical function: in the face of dislocation, they 
provide a reading principle that allows the British to make sense of an impossible, 
divided and chaotic world and to assess their own role in its reorganization. 145 
That is, they help reconcile the impossibility of a fully constituted British identity. 
Moreover, as these myths successfully became social imaginaries, they came to 
provide the ultimate horizon of meaning and action in Britain. They became the 
only 'true' reading principles able to reveal the secret of the social order and the 
enemies that conspired to deprive its fullness. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the following interrelated insights into Britain's 
obstruction to the process of European integration. First, the British antagonism 
with Continental Europe has invoked the conflict in hegemonic discourse that was 
observed in Chapter 4. In turn, this divergence in discourse has produced new 
antagonisms. This conclusion was informed by applying the discourse-theoretical 
142 See: Chapter 3, Section 5.4; Torfing, J. (199) Op. Cit. PP. 116-8; 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. pp. 
32-3,126-7, and 2i2ek, S. (1990) 'East European's Republic of Gilead', New Left Review, Volume 
183, September-October, pp. 50-62. 143 Balibar, E. (1991 b) 'Is there a 'Neo-Racism'? ', in E. Balibar and 1. Wallerstein (eds) Op. Cit. pp. 
17-8. 
144 Ibid. p. 19. 145 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 203. 
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conception of social antagonism and the constitutive outside. In accordance with 
this conception, it was argued that the British antagonism with Continental Europe 
has unified and sustained the British discursive system of identity. That is, the 
construction of British identity has involved the construction of a social antagonism 
with Continental Europe. The problem for British-European integration is that the 
limits of the British discursive system of identity are established in terms of the 
exclusion of Continental Europe as its constitutive outside. Thus, Britain has 
obstructed the process of European integration because it represents the threat of 
its radical otherness. 
It was also argued that the British antagonism with Continental Europe - and 
hence, with the EU - is a discursive response to dislocation. As illustrated above, 
the exclusion and negation of Continental European alternative meanings and 
options, and the people who identify with them, has helped constitute and sustain 
the British identity. Hence, as the EU is identified as a Continental European 
entity, it has also served to stabilize the British identity in this way. 
As well as providing this stabilizing function, it was also emphasized that this 
antagonism has been a major source of dislocation for Britain. It was illustrated 
that Continental Europe became the constitutive outside for the British identity 
because it was detected as an external cause of dislocation. The British identity 
has been dislocated by the threat posed by'Europe, the Other' and its alien ideas. 
Hence, European integration represents the growing threat to order and stability 
posed by this external antagonistic and potentially dislocating force that 
represents 'anti-Britain'. in addition, whether they were 'true' the cause or not, it is 
evident that Continental European ideas, interests and projects - and thus, the EU 
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- have been negated by successive British hegemonic projects because they have 
been identified as an external cause of dislocation. In contrast, hegemonic 
strategies have presented their ideas, interests and projects as inherently 'British', 
and thus, as the only credible alternative to these 'alien' and negated elements. 
Following these insights, it can be concluded that the British antagonism with 
Europe is double-edged because it has constituted and sustained the British 
identity, but only by positing a threat to it. Hence, there seems to be an 'oscillation I 
between dislocation and social antagonism: the British antagonism with Europe is 
a discursive response to a dislocation, but this dislocation was also caused by an 
antagonism with Europe. Furthermore, subsequent dislocations renewed this 
antagonism and vice versa. However, following the principles of a discourse 
theory, it must be emphasized that a dislocation may not necessarily be 
responded to by the construction of a social antagonism in this way, that is, by the 
detection of a cause of the dislocation that can serve as an enemy. 146 Indeed, 
history is plagued with examples of hegemonic agents identifying 'false'causes of 
dislocation to suit their own ends and to divert attention away from themselves as 
a 'true' cause. Appropriate scapegoats that suit the political and economic goals of 
the hegemonic project or that reflect, or prey upon, traditional and irrational fears 
of the Other are identified or selected. All these observations relate to the 
phenomenon of British Eurosceptics, and it is precisely because Continental 
Europe was detected as a 'true' cause of dislocation in the past that has made it a 
primary source of dislocation today, as well as a convenient scapegoat for it. 
Thus, in sum, this analysis suggests that there is a complex non-linear, oscillating 
inter-relationship between dislocation, social antagonism and discourse. 
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With regard to the development of the British antagonism with Europe, this 
chapter examined the myths that have been important articulated moments of the 
British discursive system of national identity. These myths became articulated 
moments of the discursive formation of 'British national parliamentary liberalismi. 
These articulated myths were examined because they have played a crucial role 
in the development of British Euroscepticism. For example, the myths of the 
British nation and (neo-) parliamentary liberalism have informed the defence of 
national and parliamentary sovereignty (respectively) against European 
integration. The process of European integration was negated as a moment of a 
chain of equivalence that represented 'social democracy', and thus, 'anti- 
parliamentary liberalism'. As such, it was identified as a source of dislocation. 
Moreover, with regard to the development of the myth of the British nation, 
Continental Europe itself has been discursively constructed as a cause of 
dislocation, and thus, as an enemy of the British nation. 
In relation to the development of the myth of the British nation, one aspect of 
British Euroscepticism that is often overlooked is its intrinsic relationship with 
xenophobia and racism. Congruent with the psychoanalytical insights into racism, 
British Euroscepticism also represents a pathological and 'irrational' fear of the 
Other, as mentioned above. As this chapter has illustrated, hegemonic agents 
have played upon this irrational fear in their attempt to achieve popular consent 
for'British parliamentary liberalism' and to fend off popular demands for the more 
democratic discourses of the Continent (that are constructed as an alien threat to 
the order and stability of the British nation). 
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Yet the growing pressures of globalisation and Europeanisation may undermine 
these 'nationcentric' myths. They may no longer be able to provide a credible 
discourse in the face of these great external forces. Similarly, as Cohen suggests, 
the myth of the British nation may not be able to provide a credible discourse in 
the face of the growing multiplicity of loyalties and identities. As illustrated in the 
following chapter, Laclau and Mouffe observe a similar plurality of identifications in 
the post-modern Western world. Indeed, we now move on to this final chapter 
which will apply a discourse-theoretical approach to the problem of overcoming 
the conflict between the plurality of national identities that have obstructed the 
development of a universal and supranational European identity. 
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Part III 
Towards a New European Identity 
Chapter 6 
The Universal, the Particular, and the 
Question of a European Identity 
Introduction 
This thesis has shown that European (political) integration has been obstructed by 
a divergence in (hegemonic political and governmental) discourse between Britain 
and Continental Europe. Moreover, it was argued that the possibility of developing 
a universal European identity is made even more problematic because British 
identity was actually constructed in opposition to Continental Europe as its 
threatening radical other. Therefore, this chapter will examine whether a 
discourse-theoretical approach holds the key to resolving this conflict between 
British and Continental European identities that has obstructed the development 
of a universal European identity. As represented by the tension between 
supranationalism (as advanced by neo-functionalism) and intergovern mentalism 
(as advanced by neo-realism and domestic politics approaches), this chapter 
observes that the question of European integration reflects the problem posed by 
the conceptual dyad of the universal and the particular. The pivotal question 
addressed by this chapter is how to consider the plurality of particular identities 
but also develop a common destiny with universal meanings and values. 
From another perspective, the dilemma posed by the universal and the particular 
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is also significant because it reflects the problem that the particularities of member 
states have undermined the universal assumptions of either intergovernmental ism 
or supranationalism. As this thesis has demonstrated, British discourse supports 
the universal assumptions of neo-realism, but the national discursive particularities 
of Continental Europe tend to support the universal assumptions of neo- 
functionalism, and thus, the claims to universality of both theories are undermined. 
This chapter also shows that there are significant problems specific to the 
discourse of modernity that have obstructed the development of a universal and 
democratic European identity. The limitations of the project of modernity have 
been reflected in theory and practice in relation to European integration, and thus, 
they have been part of the problem rather than the solution. Hence, this chapter 
will explore other discourses in pursuit of a more democratic and universal 
European identity, and a Europe that is finally free from the threat of 
totalitarianism. However, before we begin this analysis, it is first necessary to 
outline the identity and democratic deficits that the modernist approach has failed 
to resolve and that Part /// of this thesis seeks to address. 
1.0. The identity deficit 
EC/EU initiatives have not led to the development of a shared collective European 
identity. The absence of such an identity is the most serious obstacle to the 
development of political legitimacy at the European level. Here, there are two 
ways in which European governance may be considered to be illegitimate. First, it 
may be considered that decisions are taken in the right political unit but by an 
illegitimate procedure, and second, it may be considered that decisions have been 
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taken by an acceptable procedure but in a collectivity that has no right to expect 
cooperation. ' As expressed by British Euroscepticism, where people do not feel a 
part of the unit in question, its acts may be experienced as an outrageous 
interference, rather than as a pleasing exercise in self-governance by a well- 
defined community. 
In the case of the liberal democratic discourse of Continental Europe, there is a 
peculiarly intimate link between the legitimacy of the unit and that of the political 
process. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau affirmed, the principle of popular sovereignty 
presupposes that the question of who constitutes the people has been settled by 
mutual agreement .2 In addition, the procedures of democratic decision-making, 
especially that of majority decision, require enough trust between people for them 
to accept that being outvoted does not constitute a threat to their identity or 
interests. At the level of the state, and since the rise of modernity, it has been 
nationhood that has provided the sense of common identity and mutual trust 
necessary for these procedures to work. Thus, the question is whether there can 
be an equivalent sense of identity at the European level. 
Most commentators agree that the existing sense of European identity is 
embryonic at best among the peoples of Europe. The European level lacks many 
of the elements which typically form the concept of nationhood - such as a 
common language, shared customs, or a common historical experience - on the 
basis of which the consciousness of a distinctive identity can be constructed. 3 An 
imPortant distinction between the contending schools of thought that dominate the 
Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. (London, New York: 
Longman). p. 27. 2 See: Rousseau, J-J - (1963) 
[1762] The Social Contract and Discourses. (London: Dent). p. 173. 3 See: Smith, A. D. (1992) 'National identity and the idea of European unity', International Affairs, 
Volume 68, No. 1, pp. 55-76. 
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study of European integration (su pranational ism/neo-fu nctional ism and 
intergovern mentalism /realism) is to be found in the different assumptions that 
they make in relation to the possibility and validity of European identity formation. 
Neo-functionalists have proposed that a European identity will develop 
incrementally and interactively from the 'top-down'. European integration will be 
cumulative from one policy area to another, and correspondingly, transnational 
political identities will spill-over from one elite to another before embracing a wider 
public. European integration will be a process in which organised 'political actors' 
will be gradually persuaded to shift their'loyalties and expectations' towards a new 
centre. 4 By contrast, i ntergovern mental ists have argued that patterns of 
international co-operation will adapt to obstinately national patterns of identity, 
5 
rather than the other way round . However, both schools of thought seem to agree 
that out of three dimensions of legitimacy - identity, democracy and performance - 
6 the first is likely to be the weakest link for the EU . It is the aim of this chapter to 
identify solutions to this weakest link. 
2.0. The democratic deficit 
In May 1991, the vice president of the European Parliament (EP), David Martin, 
emphasized that if the European Community was a state and it applied to join the 
EC, it would be turned down on the grounds that it was not a democracy. 7 Is 
observation highlights the so-called 'democratic deficit' of EC/EU institutions that 
4 Haas, E. B. (1958) The Uniting of Europe. (Stanford: Stanford University Press). pp. 12-13. 5 See: Hoffman, S. (1966) 'Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of 
Western Europe'. Daedalus, Volume 95, pp. 862-915. See also: Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) 
'Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the 
EC', Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Volume 20, Part 1, p. 8. 6 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. p. 27. 
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had become increasingly noticeable since the mid-1 980s. 8 In a narrow sense, the 
democratic deficit is the gap between the power of the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, and the European Council on the one hand, and that of the national 
parliaments and the EP on the other. 9 In part, it results from the transfer of powers 
from member states to the EC. Before this transfer, national parliaments held the 
power to pass laws, but at the EC level, the same powers are often held by 
institutions other than the EP. As the EC acquired greater competence, national 
parliaments relinquished power not to the EP but to the European Commission, 
the Council of Ministers, and the European Council, all of which have considerable 
legislative and executive power. 
Thus, national parliaments lost legislative authority and sovereignty because the 
EC acquired new competences. In addition, in the early 1980s, legislative authority 
was lost because the Council of Ministers gradually abandoned unanimity in 
favour of QMV. The decline of unanimity also meant the decline of national 
parliament control over their governments: as long as a government could veto EC 
legislation, its national parliament could hold it accountable for exercising - or 
failing to exercise - that veto. However, once governments subscribed to QMV, 
national parliaments could no longer hold them responsible for being outvoted and 
accepting the majority decision-10 Paradoxically, although QMV is inherently 
democratic, it has deepened the democratic deficit if viewed from the perspective 
of individual member states rather that the EC as a policy-making body and 
collective entity. 
7 David Martin's remarks at the European Community Studies Association's Second International 
Conference, George Mason University, 27 May, 1991. As cited in Dinan, D. (1994) Ever Closer 
Union? (London: Macmillan). p. 288. 8 Williams, S. (1991) 'Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community', in R. O. Keohane 
and S. Hoffman (eds) The New Community., Decision-making and Institutional Change. (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview). pp. 155,162. 9 Dinan, D. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 288. 10 Ibid. p. 289. 
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The democratic deficit refers to the comparative weakness of the EP in relation to 
the Council of Ministers and the failure of national parliaments to become more 
involved in Community affairs. In addition, it concerns 'the absence of a genuine 
European political culture and discussion of key political matters outside of elite 
circles'. " It has been observed that 'the shortcomings of the Community lie in the 
feelings of remoteness and lack of influence and involvement on the part of many 
citizens,. 12 Indeed, in Denmark and France in particular, public disquiet over the 
elitism and obscurity of Community decision-making, rather than over the relative 
impotence of the EP and national parliaments in Community affairs, burst into 
open during the Maastricht Treaty ratification crisis in 1992. The governments of 
Denmark and France learned a costly lesson from this crisis: as the Community 
encroaches more and more on people's daily lives and the distinction between 
domestic affairs and Community affairs disappears, the public wants greater 
13 
openness and involvement in Community decision-making. Moreover, exposed 
problems of fraud in the EP have further undermined its legitimacy and increased 
concern. 
14 
The democratic deficit cannot be rectified by simply giving more power to the EP. 
David Martin's analogy notwithstanding, the EU is not a state, and its institutional 
framework and political system will never correspond to that of a classic liberal 
democracy. Similarly, the Commission will never acquire the characteristics of a 
11 Meunier-Aitsahalia, S. and G. Ross (11993) 'Democratic Deficit or Democratic Surplus: A Reply to 
Andrew Moravcsik's Comments about the French Referendum', French Politics and Society, 
Volume 11, No. 1, Winter. p. 63. 12 Bogdanor, V. and G. Woodcock (1991)'The European Community and Sovereignty', 
Parliamentary Affairs, Volume 44, No. 1, October. p. 492. 
13 Dinan, D. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 291. 14 See: Middelhoek, A. (1999) 'First Report on Allegations regarding Fraud, Mismanagement and 
Nepotism in the European Commission', 15 March. (Luxembourg: European Parliament; 
MacMullen, A. (1999) 'Fraud, Mismanagement and Nepotism: The Committee of Independent 
Experts and the Fall of the European Commission', Crime, Law and Social Change, Volume 31, No. 
3, pp. 193-208. 
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national executive. 15 However, the legitimacy of the decision-making authority of 
the EU can be analysed through the democratic criteria of accountability, 
authorisation and representation. 16 As will now be illustrated, the authority of EU 
institutions can be observed to be deficient in each of these aspects of democratic 
legitimacy. 
First, the individual accountability of Council Ministers to their domestic 
parliaments is, at best, tenuous. 17 Their accountability to their national parliaments 
is hindered by the traditions of foreign office secrecy, by the log-rolling procedures 
of decision making in the Council of Ministers, and by its increasing use of majority 
voting. 18 Moreover, the collective accountability of either the European 
Commission or the Council of Ministers directly to the EP is limited by the 
restrictions on the powers of scrutiny, amendment and approval of the latter. 19 
Second, members of both the Commission and the Council are not popularly 
authorised. Commission members are appointed by national governments, and 
although Council Ministers may be popularly elected, they are elected by national 
electorates to fulfil an explicitly national rather than a European function . 
20 Finally, 
there are a number of different issues that relate to democratic representation and 
participation. One issue is that European elections have remained 'second-order' 
since their inception in 1979. That is, voters rank the national arena as more 
important than the European level; they use European elections to express 
15 Dinan, D. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 292. 16 See: Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. pp. 26-29. 17 Ibid. P. 27. 18 Weiler, J. H. H. (1992)'After Maastricht: Community Legitimacy in Post-1992 Europe, in: W. J. 
Adams (ed. ) Singular Europe: Economy and Polity of the European Community after 1992. (Ann 
Arbor, MF: University of Michigan Press). p. 14. 19 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. p. 27. 20 Ibid. p. 26,63. See also: Hallstein, W- (11970) LEurope Inachev6e. (Paris: Robert Laffont). p. 77. ) 
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preferences about domestic politics rather than the EU, and they turn out in lower 
numbers than for national elections. 
21 
As this second-order problem demonstrates, the EU has failed to encourage the 
active participation of a European electorate. 22 Although turnout to European 
elections has varied greatly between member states, it has steadily declined from 
62.5 % in 1979 to only 49% in 1999.23 As Paul Magnette observes, the apathetic 
24 
category of civic participation is much larger at the European level. However, this 
apathy cannot be simply resolved by assigning political powers to particular EU 
institutions. For example, it can be observed that voter participation has fallen in 
all of the five European elections since 1979, even though the powers of the EP 
25 have increased considerably in this period , including, in 1994, the new right to 
26 
confirm the Commission in office . 
Various other reasons can be given for this apathy. For example, European 
barometer polls frequently indicate that a significant number of citizens do not feel 
27 informed about European issues and do not understand its political system . 
Also, the highly complex institutional system of the EU does not reflect the 
democratic mechanisms of participation and accountability with which its citizens 
21 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (11998) Op. Cit. p. 27,78; Held, D. (11996) Models of Democracy. 
ýCambridge: Polity). pp. 115-8. 2 Magnette, P. (2003)'European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist CitizenshipT, 
Political Studies, Volume 51, No. 1, p. 148. See also: Hix, S. (11999) The Political System of the 
European Union. (London: Macmillan). 
23 See: Jones, R. A. (2001) The Politics and Economics of the European Union. Second Edition. 
(Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, Massachusetts). pp. 138-9; Jacobs, F., R. Corbett, and M. Shackleton 
(1995) The European Parliament. Third Edition. (London: Catermill). pp. 25-30. Turnout was 59% in 
1984,57.2% in 1989, and 56.4% in 1994. Between 1994 and 1999, turnout decreased in nine out of 
the twelve countries that participated, including Britain. See: Jones, R. A. (2001) Op. Cit. pp. 138-9. 24 Magnette, P. (2003) Op. Cit. p. 148. 25 The SEA, the TEU, and the Treaty of Amsterdam (ToA) (11997) have all increased the powers of 
the EP. (See: Jones, R. A. (2001) Op. Cit. p. 138. ) 
26 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. p. 78. See also: Jones, R. A. (2001) Op. Cit. p. 138. 27 Magnette. P. (2003). Op Cit. P. 148. See also: Hix, S. (1999). Op. Cit. 
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are familiar. 28 Moreover, although the EP has been elected by universal suffrage 
since 1979, the Council of Ministers and the European Council are not affected by 
European elections, and the composition of the Commission is only slightly 
dependent upon the results of these transnational election S. 
29 In sum, electoral 
participation is dampened by the knowledge that these elections do not amount to 
'throw the scoundrels OUtv. 
30 
Moreover, as indicated above, there is not a sufficient sense of common identity 
amongst the people of Europe for elections to bear the weight expected of them. 
The divisiveness of competitive electoral politics is only sustainable on the basis of 
a more fundamental unity, such as agreement on political nationhood typically 
provides at the level of member states. As David Beetharn and Christopher Lord 
argue: 
Once issues of political identity are themselves brought into play in 
electoral politics, and become a major source of electoral division, then 
democracy becomes unsustainable, since electoral minorities lack the 
necessary trust in the majority that their vital interests will be 
protected. 31 
This suggests that any further democratisation of the EU cannot move beyond the 
development of a stronger sense of common identity and a fuller acceptance of 
the appropriateness of the European level of governance. 32 The construction of a 
European identity is crucial to establishing the trust between the people of Europe 
that is necessary for democratic procedures to work. To develop this trust, the EU 
must develop an identity based upon citizenship and the guarantee of shared 
basic rights that would be immune from erosion by contingent majorities. To the 
28 Ibid. p. 144. 29 Ibid. 
30 Weiler, J. H. H. (1999) 'To be a European Citizen: Eros and Civilisation', in: The Constitution of 
Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). p. 329. 31 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. p. 28. 32 Weiler, J. H. H. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 22. 
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extent that shared civic rights are part of the solution, identity construction will 
require democratization of the EU, and vice versa. 33 
As will now be argued, solutions to the identity and democratic deficits of the EU 
have been hindered because both theory and practice have reflected the 
limitations of the discourse of modernity of which they are part. The possibility of a 
more democratic identity will be examined in Chapter 7. 
3.0. The limitations of modernit 
Similar to Preston et al, this thesis has argued that Continental European 
hegemonic discourse is more amenable to supranational integration and the 
development of a democratic European union than the discourse that has 
prevailed in Britain. However, in contrast to Preston et al, this thesis also 
emphasizes that Continental European discourse should not be advanced as an 
ideal. As will now be argued, with regard to the development of a European 
identity, both theory and practice have been limited because they are all moments 
of the discourse of modernity, and thus, reflect the limitations of this project. As 
such, they tend to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution. 
Moreover, with specific regard to theory, orthodox modernist analyses are part of 
the problem because they tend to reinforce the differences between discursive 
systems of identity - and thus, the antagonisms between them - by upholding a 
particular one as an ideal. 
33 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. P. 58. 
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3.1. Modernity and essentialism 
There has been a growing awareness of the limits of project of modernity. First, it 
has been radicalized as the contingency of its meta-narratives and grand 
narratives have been exposed. 34 Here, the foundational drives of modernity that 
have aimed to ground our knowledge and values on an objective and essential 
foundation have been deconstructed. That is, there has been a questioning of the 
modernist assumption of underlying and totalizing narratives that ensure the 
objectivity or truth of our knowledge. It is no longer readily accepted that these 
narratives can provide a privileged insight into the 'true' conditions of our being in 
the world. 
Second, the universality and claims to truth of these narratives have been 
questioned as we have begun to accept the credibility of others. Hence, although 
modernity has presented itself as a final and universal truth about the human 
condition, it is has become increasing exposed as simply one among other 
credible alternatives. As addressed below with regard to the problem of 
'Eurocentrism', the hegemony of the narratives of modernity led to 'ethnocentric, 
perceptions of the world. 
35 
Third, it is becoming increasingly recognized that the category of 'the Subject' 
cannot provide an ultimate or objective starting point for theoretical analysis, since 
it is constructed in and through hegemonic strategies taking place within an 
undecidable discursive terrain. Subjectivity is no longer conceived as a unified and 
34 Lyotard, J. F. (1984) [1979] The Postmodem Condition: A Report of Knowledge. (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press). p. 75. 
35 On the problem of ethnocentrism, see for example: Said, E. W. (1978) Orientalism. (New York: 
Pantheon); Young, R. J. C. (1996) Tom Halves: Political Conflict in Literary and Cultural Theory. 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press), and Young, R. J. C. (1990) White Mythologies: Writing 
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self-conscious starting point for the construction of social life, but revealed as a 
divided and overdetermined subjectivity constructed by such unmasterable 
strategies. 
Fourth, reason cannot provide such an ultimate or objective starting point for 
precisely the same reasons. Rationality fails to provide an ultimate ground for 
ethico-political judgement and historical development because it is itself inflicted 
36 
with aporias that cannot be resolved on logical grounds . Thus, although it 
remains a marginal position, it is becoming increasingly accepted that knowledge 
rests upon communal rules and values, and therefore, that it must renounce all 
pretence to universal ity. 
37 
Fifth, modernity has become fissured because the main features of modern 
societies have become increasingly ambiguous. There has been a growing 
recognition of the ambiguity of the constitutive traits of modern Western society. 
Recent developments have challenged modernist assumptions of the tendency 
towards a separation of state and civil society, an ever-deepening social division 
of labour, and the formation of nation-states. For example, as Preston argues, the 
traditional sovereignty of European nation-states is being undermined by the 
processes of regional ization, internationalization, and globalization. Similarly, as 
illustrated in Chapter 7, Laclau and Mouffe observe a complex plurality of 
History and the West. (London: Routledge). 36 For example, Kurt G6del's proof showed the impossibility of the self-grounding of any logical 
system. See: G6del, K. (1931)'Ober Formal Unentscheidbare S; ýtze der Principia Mathematica und 
Verwandter Systeme 1', Monatshefte ffir Mathernatik und Physik, Volume 38, pp. 173-98; Nagel, E. 
and J. R. Newman (1959) [1958] Gddel's Proof (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul). 
37 For example, Kuhn's notion of scientific paradigms emphasizes the rules and values that govern 
the research activities of a scientific community. See: Kuhn, T. (1970) The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
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identities that do not represent the simple national and class divisions that have 
been traditionally inscribed by the narratives of modern ity. 
38 
Indeed, the fundamental values and essential identities of modernity are not able 
to conceive the politics of identity flourishing in the contemporary western world. 
The complex plurality of identities, conflicts, struggles and social movements are 
not grounded in any single transcendent or underlying positive ground, and thus, 
they cannot be made intelligible by a single essential principle such as 'the nation' 
or 'class'. For example, there exists a plurality of identities in the EU that traverse 
the national and class divisions. Moreover, by obstructing this plurality of identities 
and interests, these fundamental values and essentialist identities limit liberal 
democratic development and are potentially totalitarian. 
For example, a crucial problem for the development of a progressive European 
identity is the tradition of nationalism that has been an essential moment of the 
discourse of modernity. The nation, conceived as a community that is both limited 
and sovereign, has been the predominant way of imagining the cultural and 
political community of modern societies . 
39The drive to the modern world had led 
to the political form of the sovereign state (a bounded juridical unit competitively 
interacting with other such units) which in turn brought a mobilized population. 
That is, the shift from politically decentralized feudalism to industrial capitalism 
required states, which in turn required nations. Hence, in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, the people of Continental Europe came to inhabit real and 
cognitive worlds of interacting bounded nation states, each with its nationalism. 
38 See, for example: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a 
Radical Democratic Politics. (London: Verso). pp. 159-71. 
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As indicated in Chapter 5, modernist theory has traditionally viewed the nation and 
nationalism as either a functional response to the structures of modern society or 
as a natural form of human belonging. Both Marxism and liberalism have 
conceived them as the ideological cement of the nation-state, whilst other theories 
have perceived them as a basic form of human association and sentiment, which 
determine the contents of modernity. 
Yet paradoxically, both liberal and Marxist theory have also argued that 
nationalism is antithetic to the discourse of modernity. Modernity, with its 
emphasis upon enlightened reasoning and the universal right to human equality, 
was supposed to eradicate this irrational and excessive ideological phenomenon. 
However, modernity has failed in this respect. Nationalist discourses have 
continued to play a crucial role in providing the myths and social imaginaries that 
have organized and guided the project of modernity. As such, they have 
represented a significant obstacle to supranational European integration. This 
dilemma should not be seen as an exceptional development, an unfortunate 
anomaly, or an unenlightened residue. Rather, it must be recognised that this 
problem remains unresolved because nationalism is an essential moment of 
modernity and its conception of democracy. 
Modernity has also failed in the sense that the liberal democratic values of 
'freedom and equality for all' have not swept the world. Even where liberal 
democracy has prevailed, it has been restricted to the public sphere of the political 
system and has suffered from a lack of active political involvement, and it has 
been further undermined by growing social and economic inequalities. Similarly, in 
contrast to the stages of economic development stipulated by the historical and 
39 See: Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
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dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxism, it is apparent that international 
socialism has not triumphed over national capitalism. 
Moreover, rather than liberal democracy or socialism, the foundational drives of 
modernity have frequently led to totalitarianism or authoritarianism. For example, 
as Tassin 40 argues below, totalitarianism in Europe has developed as a 
consequence of the nationalist basis of modernist discourse. Moreover, Tassin 
also proposes that this nationalist foundation has obstructed the development of a 
supranational European identity. 
Thus, in relation to the development of a new European identity, the Continental 
European modernist project should not be upheld as an ideal because it is limited 
by its capitalist and nationalist objectives. Capitalism, nationalism and democracy 
are intrinsically linked within the modernist project, and thus, the problems posed 
by capitalist and nationalist conceptions of European union and democracy are 
perpetuated and non-capitalist and non-nationalist possibilities are obstructed. 
However, in relation to European integration, both theory and practice have 
inevitably upheld these objectives because they have either been moments of the 
discourse of modernity or they have presented the Continental European 
modernist project as an ideal that must be embraced by Britain. 
In sum, there has been an increasing awareness of the limits of modernity as a 
blueprint for the necessary development of all societies; as a privileged insight into 
our true conditions of being; as a subjectivistic and rationalistic grounding of the 
world, and as a relevant and progressive project for the postmodern world. Hence, 
Nationalism. (London: Verso). 
40 Tassin, E. (1992) 'Europe: A Political CommunityT, in C. Mouffe (ed. ) Dimensions of Radical 
Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. (London: Verso). pp. 169-92. 
328 
what is questioned is the status of modernity as a fundamental ontology that can 
provide an ultimate ground for making intelligible a world of objective social 
essences. Moreover, the very possibility of such a fundamental ontology is being 
abandoned. Postmodern theorists claim that there are no objective standpoints 
that guarantee absolute or universal truths or knowledge, and it is argued that the 
philosophical projects from Plato to Habermas have all failed in this pursuit. 
41 If 
such a standpoint does not exist, such projects can be considered to be 
misguided, and thus, ineffectual. 
In addition, these philosophical explorations for ultimate foundations have been 
criticized for constructing a false division between thought and reality, and thus, 
for being pointlessly preoccupied with ensuring a correspondence between them. 
For example, as illustrated below, Etienne Tassin explores a Platonic and 
universal theory of 'the European mind' to identify solutions to the contemporary 
problem of developing a European political community. However, such an 
exploration can be considered as misguided because it attempts to 'externalize' 
the historically specific phenomenon of European integration. This denies the 
historicity and fluidity of our knowledge and beliefs, and assumes that we can step 
outside 'reality' and achieve a completely detached, objective and universal 
understanding of social practices. 
Such limitations have made it increasingly difficult to address the problem of 
European integration from within a modern theoretical perspective. Thus, this 
chapter aims to identify more credible alternative narratives in the pursuit of a new 
and democratic European identity. 
41 See: Rorty, R. (1 98o) Philosophy and the Mirror of Knowledge. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell). 
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3.2. Modernity and Eurocentrism 
Related to the limitations of modernity examined above, the theory and practice of 
European integration has also tended to be Eurocentric. 42 The modernist claim to 
universal and absolute truths has tended to obliterate other credible alternative 
narratives, and thus, has inhibited diversity, tolerance, and radical change. The 
hegemonic narratives of Western European modernity have advanced its values7 
such as capitalism and nationalism, as the only credible foundations for human 
progress and development. 
For instance, many previous approaches to British-European integration can be 
described as Eurocentric in the sense that they have advanced the Continental 
European project of modernity as an ideal. As Preston acknowledges about his 
own analysis: 
... the ethic affirmed in the essay is informed by the modernist project 
of the rational pursuit of formal and substantive democracy, and in 
discussing the situation of the UK the critical referent is an ideal-type 
compounded of this notion of democracy plus the practical example of 
northwestern European social-democraCy. 43 
Moreover, Perry Anderson and Tom Nairn have been criticized for relentlessly 
denigrating British culture in the light of a largely unacknowledged 'ideal-typical' 
characterisation of the French Revolution . 
44 Ellen Meiskins-Wood has also argued 
that historical reflection of such matters is frequently shaped by the 'bourgeois 
42 The term 'Eurocentrism' describes the beliefs that postulate past or present superiority of Europe 
over the rest (and over minority people of non-European descent). (Blaut, J. M. (1993) The 
Colonizer's Model of the World: Geographical Diffusionism and Eurocentric History. (London, New 
York: Guildford Press). ) As Samir Amin explains, this term was established to assemble 'European 
ethnocentrism' into one word. (See: Amin, S. (1988) Eurocentrism. (New York: Monthly Review 
Press). However, it is conceived as more of a species of ethnocentrism by many commentators. 
jSee, for example: Amin, S. (1988) Op. Cit., Blaut, J. M. (1993) Op. Cit. ) 3 Preston, P. W. (1994) Europe, Democracy and the Dissolution of Britain: An Essay on the Issue 
of Europe in UK Public Discourse. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). p. 5. 
44 Nairn, T. (1988) The Enchanted Glass. (London: Hutchison Radius). pp. 378-81. 
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45 
paradigm' that acts to read the 'French experience' into that of everyone else. 
Similarly, Colin Mooers describes a 'normative theory of bourgeois revolution 46 
that affirms a shift from traditional to modern ordered by the conflict of aristocracy 
and bourgeoisie. Meiskins-wood holds that Anderson and Nairn use this bourgeois 
paradigm to argue that British capitalism is an 'early variant' and is now both 
deformed and stuck in terms of development. As illustrated in Chapter 2, the 
account by Preston is largely derived from the work of Anderson and Nairn, and 
thus, it is perhaps unsurprising that it also employs this ideal-typical model of 
modernism. As explained above with regard to the critique of the meta-narratives 
of modernity, this paradigm represents the modernist recourse to some 
predetermined, teleological and totalising foundation of historical development, as 
with the orthodox Marxist proposition that history will necessarily progress in 
particular successive stages towards a final utopian stage of objectivity and truth 
represented by socialism. 
Thus, reflecting both the modernist problems of essentialism and Eurocentrism, 
the common criteria for evaluating British economic and political development 
have been the bourgeois paradigm and the overall experience of Continental 
Europe. In sum, the British experience tends to be conceived as an 'early variant II 
9 under-developed', 'half-hearted', 'deformed', 'failed', 'in decline', and so on, in 
relation to an ideal-typical characterisation of Continental European modernist 
development. Furthermore, these problems have tended to be reflected in the 
analysis of British-European relations. Accordingly, the British position upon 
European integration is conceived as 'awkward', 'reluctant' and 'flawed' in relation 
to an ideal-typical perception of the stance of Continental Europe. Similarly, 
previous analyses have assumed that the British acceptance of this position will 
45 Meiskens-Wood, E. (1991) The Pristine Culture of Capitalism. (London: Verso). 
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provide it with an opportunity to embrace the Continental European project of 
modernity that is perceived as an ideal model for economic and political national 
development, and this despite significant limitations to this project. 
in sum, capitalism and nationalism are integral features of modern democracy and 
essential moments of the discourse of modernity. The discourse of modernity is 
limited because it obstructs the possibility of non-capitalist and non-nationalist 
conceptions of European union and democracy. Thus, within the discourse of 
modernity, theory and practice relating to European union have tended to 
constitute part of the problem rather than part of the solution because they have 
inevitably reflected these limitations. That is, their national basis has served to 
reinforce the differences in discursive systems of national identity that have 
prevented the development of a supranational European identity, and their 
capitalist basis has prevented the possibility of a more socialist and democratic 
unity. As a consequence, it is necessary to seek solutions to these problems that 
may exist within different discourses, as will be pursued below. 
3.3. Modernity and the primacy of the universal over the particular 
Another related problem of the discourse of modernity is that it gives primacy to 
the universal over the particular. With the emergence of the discourse of 
modernity, the former divine foundation of reality was replaced by a rational 
foundation, which was not external but internal to the totality it was supposed to 
ground. The rational ground has a logic of its own that, in contrast to the designs 
of God, is fully transparent to human reason. The universal principle of rationality 
transcends all particular human beings, but as the former is fully comprehensible 
46 See: Mooers, C. (1991) The Making of Bourgeois Europe. (London: Verso). 
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by the latter, human beings can identify themselves with the universal principle of 
rationality and begin transforming society and nature in its image. This gives way 
to a complete subsumption of the particular under universal rational ity. 
47 
The Enlightenment saw in rationality a universal principle for reorganizing social 
and political life. Feudalism, religion and patrimonial administration had to give 
way to the market economy, science and bureaucratic administration. The highest 
point in the advance of modernity of this rationalistic hegemony was when the gap 
between the universal principle of rationality and the irrationality of the particular 
forms of reality was completely closed. This task was accomplished by Hegel and 
48 Marx who both asserted that 'the real is rational' . As Laclau explains: 
The body of the proletariat is no longer a particular body in which a 
universality external to it has to be incarnated: it is instead a body in 
which the distinction between particularity and universality is cancelled 49 
and, as a result, the need for incarnation is definitely eradicated . 
However, this was the point at which social reality refused to abandon its 
resistance to universal rationalism because an unresolved problem still remained: 
the universal had found its own body, but this was still the body of a certain 
particularity - European culture of the Nineteenth Century. 
50 Thus, European 
culture was a particular one, and at the same time, the expression (rather than the 
incarnation) of universal human essence. 
Here, the crucial problem is that there was no means of distinguishing between 
'European particularism' and the universal functions that it was supposed to 
47 Torfing, J. (1999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, and 2ifek. (Oxford, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell). p. 169. 48 Ibid. P. 170. 49 Laclau, E. (1996) [1992] 'Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity', in E. Laclau, 
Emancipation(s). (London: Verso). p. 24. Originally published in October, Volume 61, Summer, pp. 
83-90. 
50 Ibid. 
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incarnate. European universalism had constructed its identity precisely through 
the cancellation of the logic of incarnation and, as a result, through the 
universalization of its own particularism. Thus, European imperialist expansion 
had to be represented not as struggles between particular identities and cultures, 
but as part of an all-embracing and epochal struggle between universality and 
particularisms - the notion of peoples without history expressing their incapacity to 
represent the universal. 
51 
This argument could be conceived in negative, reactionary and very explicit racist 
terms (as in the various forms of social Darwinism) or could be given some more 
progressive versions (as in some sectors of the Second International). In these 
more progressive versions, the logic of incarnation was reintroduced: for a certain 
period, Europe had to represent universal human interests. A similar 
reintroduction of this logic took place in Marxism. 52 
Overall, a common feature of these different accounts is the metaphysical 
hierarchy privileging universality over particularity. The latter is either conceived as 
a corruption of being, a passive object of incarnation of universal events, or 
something that is completely absorbed by the universal principle of rationality. 
However, in contrast to the previous Christian incarnation, the secular eschatology 
of modernity conceives the source of the universal as internal to the world: the 
universal can only manifest itself through the establishment of an essentialist 
inequality between the objective positions of the social agents. Some of them are 
going to be privileged agents of historical change, not as a result of a contingent 
relation of forces, but because they are incarnations of the universal. The same 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. pp. 25-26. 
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type of logic operating in Eurocentrism will establish the ontological privilege of the 
proletariat. 53 
4.0. In search of 'the Europe of the Mind' 
Moving outside the discourse of modernity, both Alasdair Maclntyre 54 and Etienne 
Tassin look to classical ancient philosophy to address the problems associated 
with the discourse of modernity. Ancient philosophy maintains that there is a strict 
dividing line between the universal and the particular, and that the pole of the 
universal can be fully grasped by reason. No mediation is possible because the 
universal and the particular are mutually exclusive poles. Either the particular 
becomes universal by transforming itself into a transparent medium for the 
actualization of the universal (which is conceived as the source of all possible 
meaning); or it negates the universal by asserting its own particularism (which, 
because of its irrationality, can have no entity of its own and can thus only exist as 
a corruption of being ). 
55 
For the communitarian theory and neo-Aristotelian moral philosophy of Maclntyre, 
there is a fundamental gulf between the universal and the particular. Thus, either 
we accept the notion of the common good or we give up all reference to universal 
values. Faced with such a radical choice, Maclntyre insists upon the primacy of 
the universal over the particular. Similarly, as will now be examined, Tassin gives 
such a priority to the universal in his exploration of ancient Platonic philosophy in 
pursuit of a European political community. 
53 Ibid. P. 25. 54 Macintyre, A. (198 1) After Vitfue: A Study in Moral Theory. (London: Duckworth). 
55 Laclau, E. (1996) [1992] Op. Cit. p. 22. 
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In accordance with the concerns outlined above with regard to the limitations of 
modernity, Tassin advances a federal future for Europe that calls into question the 
traditional categories through which the political form of modern states has been 
conceptualized. 56 Following Edmund Husserl and Jan Patocka, Tassin argues that 
we must rediscover the Platonic ancient and spiritual telos of 'the European Mind' 
which once dedicated Europe to a transcendental universality that was not tied to 
any national tradition or will. Thus, it will now be examined whether this approach 
could overcome the national antagonisms and differences in national discourse 
that haved obstructed the possibility of a universal European identity. Here, as 
dictated by the focus of this thesis, attention will be given to the British 
particularisms that conflict with the rest of Continental Europe. 
4.1. The European heritage of the universal 
Etienne Tassin argues that the immediate post-war attempt to rebuild Europe 
failed because it was unified on the basis of nation-states. Moreover, such a 
national basis would only maintain the threat of national antagonisms and 
totalitarianism that had previously destroyed Europe. For Tassin, the problem is 
that the modern idea of Europe sprang from the political experience of resistance 
to Nazism, and hence, the idea of a European political community drew its 
meaning from an armed struggle, and broke both with the philosophical idea of 
Europe and with a political tradition. Hence, following Patocka, Tassin explores 
the philosophical concept of Europe, which sees the Greek city-state as the 
57 
birthplace of the European mind in the shape of Platonic metaphysics . 
For 
Patocka, only a philosophical understanding of the foundations of the European 
56 See: Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. P. 170. 57 
Ibid. p. 173. 
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mind can restore meaning to a European Community enterprise that the Twentieth 
Century repudiated in the experience of two World Wars. As Patocka describes: 
Europe really was master of the world. As economic master, it 
developed capitalism and the commercial network of the global 
economy. As political master, it held a monopoly of power deriving from 
science and technology, all of which was linked to its level of reflection 
and to the rational civilization that it alone possessed. Europe was all of 
that. And this colossal reality was wiped out for good in the space of 
some thirty years, in two world wars which left nothing of its world- 
dominating power. It destroyed itself with its own forces. Of course, it 
drew the whole world into this process, just as before it had 
appropriated it materially. It forced the whole world to join in these 
destructive enterprises, with the result that successors came forward 
who would never accept that Europe should be what it once was. 58 
However, all that is to accept an 'inclusive' Europe, or at least some European 
defining commonalities. For Britain, which typically has wished historically to 
remain aloof from such a perspective, and indeed has maintained significant 
political, economic and cultural divergencies from such commonalities, there was 
a national sense of victory from this experience. In the Second World War, it had 
successfully defended its position as a world-dominating power and had defeated 
its rivals with the help of its main (and non-European ally), the US. The experience 
also deepened Britain's traditional powerful insularity and strong sense of 
xenophobia, much of which was a product of the unequal and dominant power 
relationship which Britain once enjoyed as an imperial power. 
Thus, although the idea of Europe was destroyed during the two wars, British 
nationalism emerged more resolute than before. In all, the war experience 
deepened Britain's belief in itself as a powerful nation-state and exacerbated 
British national chauvinism and supremacism, reinforcing the misplaced notion 
that Britain is best and knows best. Indeed, Britain had traditionally perceived itself 
as the 'master of the master', as the world-dominating power. Thus, rather than 
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denying 'that Europe should be what it once was', Britain emerged from the war 
with deeper nation-state aspirations, a stronger xenophobia towards those nations 
it had fought against, and a greater sense of insularity, national chauvinism and 
supremacy (as illustrated in Chapter 5). These components of British 
exceptionalism suggest that Britain would not accept the necessity of a restored 
Europe of the Mind. It would not be perceived as a credible discourse. 
Patocka argues that Europe found itself on this path to destruction because it 
followed a destiny that lead to the situation of 'modern man' in general. This is 
defined by three components: science and technology as a knowledge of 
domination; the sovereign state as the concrete organization of human society, 
and a profusion of sovereign states in disunity. These combined are said to 
account for the conflict that has turned Europe upside down. The disunity among 
states expresses a lack of political and mental unity that allows the logic of state 
59 domination to make unparalleled technological power a slave to its own ends . 
Again, as was demonstrated above, Britain was the birthplace of these three 
components, and since its traditions have been built upon these foundations - 
foundations that have not been shaken in the long duration of their existence - it is 
difficult for the Europe to disrupt them now. Within British hegemonic discourse, 
Europe cannot be anything other than a9 profusion of sovereign states in disunity' 
because the notion of the 'sovereign state as the concrete organization of human 
society' is the cornerstone of the British tradition of government. Moreover, this 
British nationcentric perception could be enough itself to keep Europe upon this 
disruptive path. 
58 Patocka, J. (1983) Platon et I'Europe. (Paris) pp. 16-17. As quoted and cited in Tassin, E. (1992) 
Op. cit. P. i go. 59 Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 173-4. 
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However, Patocka emphasizes that the inner logic which governed the destiny of 
the European mind cannot, and should not, be ascribed to the 'philosophical 
wellsprings' of Europe. He argues that it is important to distinguish between the 
philosophical and historical-political concepts of Europe and not accuse the 
mental source of what pertains to political history. We are reminded that the 
political birth of Europe did not coincide with its philosophical birth, that it was not 
until the Middle Ages that it became a political concept designating a real political 
unity. 
As Tassin illustrates, the philosophical concept of Europe emerged from the 
Greek 'polis' and the Roman Empire. On the one hand, the 'polis' died when the 
Greek world of mutually destroying urban communities fell apart. The Hellenistic 
period unfolded through the collapse of the city-state and the political notion of 
4 public liberty' associated with it. However, the concept of humanity was initiated 
by Hellenism and expressed itself politically in the forms of a world state, religion, 
and citizenship. These characteristics of late Hellenism then crystallized in the 
Roman Empire. 
On the other hand, the Roman Empire lived spiritually on the heritage of the Greek 
polis, as this asserted itself in a law-governed state in which civil law was based 
upon the rights of citizens. Concurrently, however, the imperial ambition tended 
towards a hegemony that could only rest upon force and create a void around it. 
Universalism of thought, translated into a universality of law and institutions, 
housed within it a contradictory hegemonic logic that induced its decline. Despite 
this, however, this imperial disaster in turn left to invaded Europe the principles of 
the Greek mind: universality of thought and law, and more fundamentally, the 
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metaphysical principle developed by Plato which Patocka calls 'care of the SOUI,. 
60 
For Patocka, it is this legacy which today makes it possible to find in the idea of 
Europe'a support amid general weaknesses and acquiescence in decline ,. 
61 
Thus, an original combination has merged through the dissociation of the historical 
logic that gave rise to political Europe from its spiritual or metaphysical foundation. 
A theorization of Europe's decline as a catastrophe, bound up with the 
establishment of nation-states and the deployment of metaphysics in the form of 
technological power, is conjoined to a theorization of Europe's spiritual 
permanence. Hence, Patocka could argue: 
Metaphysics, which issued from the specific historical situation of the 
decline of the Athens-type polis, gave shape to a legacy that could also 
survive the decline of the Hellenistic world and contribute, after the 
decline of the Roman Empire, to the formation of Europe in the proper 
sense of the term. The survival of this heritage naturally also involved 
its transformation, but the metaphysical basis remained. 62 
For Tassin, it is no accident that this philosophical enterprise, which has striven to 
preserve the philosophical meaning of Europe, is the work of a dissident thinker 
from Eastern Europe, seeking in philosophy the assurance that the source of his 
struggle has not perished with Europe's tilt into totalitarian systems. For Patocka: 
Europe is doing everything to avoid reflection about such things; no one 
is concerned about them. Since Husserl's Krisis no philosopher has 
really reflected upon the problem of Europe and the European 
heritage. 63 
Indeed, seeking to constitute itself as a political community after the Second 
World War, Western Europe was unable to do so with the philosophical conviction 
that the European heritage had not been lost. Western philosophy did not address 
the questions posed between 1930 and 1935 by Husserl who reaffirmed, in the 
60 See: Ibid. p. 174-5. 61 Patocka, J. Op. Cit. p. 21. As quoted and cited in Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 174. 62 Ibid. p. 139. As quoted and cited in Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. pp. 174-5. 
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face of war and the ordeal of genocide, the essentially Greek form of Europe. On 
the contrary, European philosophy appeared to have died intestate. 64 
In Vienna in 1935, Husserl had attempted to get to the heart of the 'phenomenon 
of Europe', which he believed to be distinguished by a telos of its own: 
An entelechy is inborn in our European civilization which holds sway 
throughout all the changing shapes of Europe and accords to them a 
sense of development toward an ideal shape of life and being as an 65 
eternal pole . 
This telos is said to have dedicated Europe's historicity to universality since its 
birth in Athens. The 'Urph6nomen' or primal phenomenon, which spiritually 
defines Europe, rests upon what the Greeks called 'philosophy' -a theoretical 
attitude aiming at universality that confers an infinite task upon humanity. It is 
through this approach that thought extricates itself from a finite world to elaborate 
upon its truth. It is this attitude which is at the origin of the infinite construction of 
theoretical knowledge embodied in European thought. However, the dedication of 
philosophy to the universal creates a humanity that is not limited to any particular 
community. Since philosophy is not rooted in any practical interest, it does not 
derive from the interest of any national tradition. Rather, a pure and ideal 
community evolves based upon the power of ideas rather than nations. As Husserl 
66 
argues, 'Ideas are stronger than any empirical powers' . 
63 Ibid. p. 163. As quoted in Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 175. 64 Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 175. 65 Husserl, E. (1970) [1954] 'Appendix 1: Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity', The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenemenology. p. 275. A lecture presented 
before the Vienna Cultural society on 7 and 10 May 1935. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press). Originally published in Germany as 'Die Krisis der Europaischen Wissenschaften und die 
Transzentale Ph6nomenologie: Eine Einletung in die Ph6nomenologische Philosophie'. (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff). The Vienna lecture appears in this original German edition as the third 
'Abhandlung', pp. 314-48. 66 Ibid. P. 288. 
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Thus, for Husserl, 'Europe' is the proper name of philosophy conceived as a 
conversion of humanity - it refers to this new ruling spirit of humanity, a 'treasure 
of associated nations', rather than to a juxtaposition of nations. A task is finally 
bestowed upon philosophy: 'Within European civilisations, philosophy has 
constantly to exercise its function as one which is archronic for civilisation as a 
whole 67 , regulating it according to the principles of absolute universality and the 
totality of truth. Hence, the European mind merges with the spirit of philosophy 
that merges with the spirit of human ity. 
68 
According to Husserl, therefore, the existential crisis of Europe should be 
described as stemming from an alienation of reason in the face of the objectivist, 
naturalist modernist rationality evident in science. However, this rationality crisis is 
expressed politically in the modern impossibility of man being grasped at the 
spiritual level of community life. As Tassin describes: 
The spirit of community gives way to the spirit of national wills, distorted 
in the political discourse of particularities that are set up as so many 
sovereignties. This compartmentalization erects the mind against itself, 69 
and the various nations against Europe . 
For Husserl, this crisis has only two possible outcomes: either Europe will 
disappear by alienating itself from its Greek spiritual significance, or it will be 
reborn through 'the heroism of reason' to rediscover faith in the West's 
humanitarian mission and the conviction that'the spirit alone is immortal ,. 70 
67 Ibid. 
68 Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. P. 176. 69 Ibid. 
70 Husserl, E. (1970) Op. Cit. p. 299. 
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4.2. Personalism and the federal response to totalitarianism 
To overcome this crisis, Tassin examines the idea of a European federation, a 
conception grounded upon the resistance to Nazism and fascism. This idea was 
forged through contacts between many resistance movements. In particular, the 
Declaration of European Resistance Movements (July 1944) was formulated at 
secret meetings by representatives from nine European countries, including 
France, Italy, and the Netherlands (but not Britain), and proclaimed the 'necessity 
of rebuilding Europe on a federal basis'. 71 This presupposed that 'the various 
countries of the world agree to go beyond the dogma of absolute state sovereignty 
and integrate themselves into a federal organization'. 72 This agreement was 
deemed necessary considering that: 
.. within the space of a single generation 
Europe has been the 
epicentre of two world wars whose chief cause lies in the existence of 
some thirty sovereign states on this continent ... 
the main task is to cure 
this anarchy through the creation of a federal Union among the 
7 European peoples . 
This federal union would rest upon 'a declaration of civil, political and economic 
rights guaranteeing free development of the human personality and normal 
functioning of democratic institutions', and it would involve a government 
74 
responsible to 'the peoples' rather than the member states of Europe . 
For the Resistance, therefore, Europe could not be rebuilt upon an assemblage of 
sovereign states separated by political frontiers because any recomposition on the 
model of the 'league of nations' or a sovereign state was likely to produce national 
71 1 Projet de D6claration des R6sistances Europ6ennes', in Centre d'Action pour de F6d6ration 
Europ6enne (1945) LEurope de Demain (NeuchAtel). pp. 68-75. Published in July 1945 as part of 
this collection of documents relating to the Declaration of European Resistance Movements. As 
Cd 
7pote and cited 
in Tassin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. P. 182. 
Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 
Ibid. 
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conflicts, totalitarianism, and war. In particular, the idea of a federal Europe was 
grounded upon resistance to Nazi and then Stalinist totalitarianism. Totalitarianism 
was itself understood by the Resistance as an expression of the dogma of 
absolute state sovereignty - it was the direct offspring of the nation-state, pushing 
its principle to its extreme consequences. This position was held by Denis de 
Rougemont, who was a founder of Personalism and the most acute theorist of a 
federal Europe . 
75 'The nation-state' he proclaims, I was one of Europe's creations 
and must inevitably, by its inner logic, become totalitarian'. 76 Evolving in its 
modern form with the French Revolution and Empire, the nation-state derived from 
a combination of two social and political realities: first, the nation, as a cultural, 
spiritual and ethical reality autonomous from any specific political structure. 
Second, the state, as a centralized administrative apparatus built upon the 
principle of 'absolute sovereignty'. 
For de Rougemont, Europe could not become a community until the totalitarian 
logic of nationalism that had led the states into the destruction of the Europe of 
nations was overcome. Only through this ordeal could Europe hope to find a new 
basis. This new Europe could only be a federate community grounded on regions 
rather than states. The region, in reproducing the human scale of the ancient 
Greek cities, offered a community framework favourable to the exercise of 
genuine citizenship within elective rather than natural, or native, communities. 
Following de Rougemont, we must recognise that beyond the nation-state 
framework that brought Europe to catastrophe, the basic political unit has to be 
redefined. De Rougemont argues that this redefined unit cannot be the commune, 
75 Along with Dandieu and Mounier, De Rougemont developed Personalism in the 1930s for which 
federalism was the corresponding politics. 
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but it must be the region federating the communes. In the dialectic of the particular 
(commune) and the universal (state), the federation of regions involves a 
reconciliation of communal interests raised to the higher power of Europe. It is a 
77 reconciliation and not a transcendence, a measure and not a middle term. This 
is because the federal principle maintains the human scale of active political 
citizenship within a local community, while raising it beyond the national 
framework and allowing a genuine European community to be constituted. He 
proposes that Europe must be built in Proudhonian style from the 'bottom up' - not 
in order to destroy the state, as Proudhon imagined, but to redistribute it. 
78 
Returning to the personalism of De Rougemont, and with regard to the dilemma of 
the universal and the particular, a federative regime would optimally combine the 
tension between collective power and individual liberties that reflects the 
Rousseaurian tension within each person between responsibility to the community 
and individual autonomy. Indeed, for De Rougemont, federalism is the only 
remedy for the twin evils of modern politics: collectivism, which denies individual 
liberties, and individualism, which denies responsibility to the community. It is by 
expressing this tension at the level of European institutions that De Rougemont 
argues that federalism can uphold the two contradictory principles of the universal 
and the particular: the unity of the whole and the autonomy of the parts, 
respectively. It is in this sense that Europe must be a federation of federations, 
where the region is recognised as its true socio-economic un it., 791-lowever, as will 
now be examined, other approaches reject any reference to the universal and 
advance a pure particularism. 
76 de Rougemont, D. (1988) Inddits, Neuch5tel. p. 82. As quoted and cited in Tassin, E. (1992) Op. 
Cit. p. 183. 77 assin, E. (1992) Op. Cit. p. 185. 78 de Rougemont, D. (1988) Op. Cit. p. 174. As cited and quoted in Tassin, E. Op. Cit. p. 185. 
79 Ibid. p. 195. 
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5.0. The critique of the privileginq of the universal 
Certain multiculturalist and postmodern theorists have criticized the metaphysical 
privileging of the universal over the particular. 80 Similar to arguments outlined 
above in Section 3.2, multiculturalists have claimed that universal values are an 
ethnocentric preserve of western imperialism. In addition, as also argued above, 
postmodernists have argued that universal values are a totalitarian remnant of the 
foundationalist ontology of the Enlightenment. In the most radical multiculturalist 
and postmodernist theories, a 'pure particularism' is advanced; a monadic 
81 
particularism that rejects any appeal or reference to universal values . Ironically, 
these theories have much in common with the nationalist discourses of modernity 
that they vehemently reject, and thus, with the discourses which have obstructed 
supranational European integration. 
5.1. The multiculturalist rejection of universal values 
Traditionally, idealizing descriptions of societies with a high degree of cultural 
diversity used the metaphor of the 'melting pot'. Different cultural groups should 
blend with each other to become a larger community. Similarly, at the European 
level, proponents of neo-functionalism and su pra nationalism have argued that the 
different nations of Europe should integrate with each other in this way. However, 
the metaphor of a melting pot no longer seems to offer an adequate description of 
the multicultural society, and similarly, supranationalism no longer seems to offer 
an accurate description of the EU. Rather, it seems that the metaphor of the 'fruit 
bowl' provides a better description of the lack of integration and community of 
multicultural societies in the same way that intergovernmental ism provides a better 
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description of the lack of integration and community of the member states of the 
EU. 
A growing number of multiculturalist theorists seem to conceive the harnessing of 
separate cultural identities as a normative good. Segregation and cultural 
autonomy are celebrated values, and it is emphasized that the assertion of one's 
own particular cultural identity is a necessary step in the struggle for a more 
equitable society. However, this is rather similar to the way in which nationalists 
and Eurosceptics have traditionally harnessed and celebrated national cultural 
autonomy. To a lesser extent, both neo-realist and domestic politics approaches 
have advanced an intergovernmental conception of European cooperation (as 
opposed to supranational integration) where national autonomy is not so much 
celebrated, but is assumed to be the central concern of the nation state in 
international action. 
As well as being a potentially nationalistic obstruction to the development of a 
European community, it can also be argued that the celebration of radically 
autonomous national-cultural identities is both theoretically and politically self- 
defeating. It is theoretically self-defeating because the constitution of a separate 
differential identity must necessarily include relations to other identities within the 
system of differences as part of its own identity. These relations will be regulated 
by rules and norms that transcend the singularity of any particular identity. Thus, a 
Pure particularism is not theoretically sustainable. 82 
80 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 170. 81 Ibid. 
82 See: Laclau, E. (1995) 'Subject of Politics, Politics of the Subject', Differences, Volume 7, No. 1, 
147. 
347 
In addition, it is politically self-defeating in two different situations. The first 
situation is where a national-cultural identity withdraws from public debate and 
policy-making in the pursuit of the purity of its own particular identity. This is the 
route to self-aparthied and it is sometimes accompanied by the Eurocentric claim 
that Western values and institutions are the preserve of Europeans and have 
nothing to do with the identity of other groups living in the same territory. This is 
similar to the British Eurosceptic position that the institutions of the EU embody 
the values and interests of Continental Europe, and thus, that they should not be 
allowed to interfere with our separate and different way of life. In political terms, 
such a withdrawal will serve to maintain the balance of power between the various 
groups in society or between the various member states of the EU. As John Major 
argued against the Eurosceptics of his government, Britain must be at the heart of 
Europe so that it can influence the policies that will inevitably affect its national 
interests. 
The second situation is where a national-cultural identity seeks to manifest itself 
politically in terms of its own particularity. The problem is that the attempt of a 
national-cultural minority to assert itself politically in the public realm will lead to 
political marginalization, and thus, to the erosion of the identity that was to be 
asserted. Therefore, a particular identity cannot represent itself, or advance its 
particular interests, without making reference to universal values. Hence, if Britain 
wants to maintain its particular identity as well as participate in EU negotiations, it 
follows that Britain must make reference to some common universal values. 
Here, as reflected in British Euroscepticism, the dilemma for the defenders of 
extreme particularism is that their political action is anchored in a perpetual 
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incoherence. On the one hand, Eurosceptics are defending the right to difference 
as a universal right, and this difference involves their engagement in struggles for 
the negotiation of legislation. That is, they are engaged in a struggle for the 
internal reform of the present institutional setting of the EU. On the other hand, 
however, as they simultaneously assert both that this setting is necessarily rooted 
in the political-cultural values of the traditional dominant sectors of Continental 
Europe, and that they have nothing to do with that tradition, their demands cannot 
be articulated into any wider hegemonic operation to reform that system. 
Therefore, this position would condemn Britain to an ambiguous peripheral 
relationship with existing institutions of the EU that could only have paralyzing 
political effects. 
83 
However, if reference to universal values is the condition of possibility for the 
advancement of the interests of a particular group or nation, it is also 
simultaneously the condition of impossibility for the maintenance of its 
particularity. The inscription of the interests of a particular nation within a 
European communitarian space of universal values will inevitably contribute to the 
'hybridization' of the particularistic identity of that nation. Whether the particularity 
of British identity will be entirely lost, or only slightly modified, as a result of its 
insertion into a European communitarian space that has been ideologically and 
culturally moulded by the dominant nations of Continental Europe, is an open 
question which will be decided in and through political struggles for hegemony. 
Thus, we cannot assert a differential identity without distinguishing it from a 
context, and, in the process of making that distinction, we are asserting the 
context at the same time. The opposite is also true: we cannot destroy a context 
83 See: Laclau, E. (1996) [1992] Op. Cit. p. 33. 
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without, at the same time, destroying the particular Subject who carries out that 
84 
destruction. As Laclau observes: 
It is a very well known historical fact that an oppositionist force whose 
identity is constructed within a certain system of power is ambiguous 
vis-ý-vis that system, because the latter is what prevents the 
constitution of the identity and it is, at the same time, its condition of 
existence. And any victory against the system also destabilizes the 
identity of the victorious force. 85 
An important upshot of this argument is that if a fully achieved difference 
eliminates the antagonistic dimension as constitutive of any identity, the possibility 
of maintaining this dimension depends upon that very failure in the full constitution 
of a differential identity. It is here that the universal enters the argument. For 
example, let us take the constitution of the British identity. If this differential 
identity is fully achieved, it can only do so within a broader context - for instance, 
the EU - and the price to be paid for total victory within the context is total 
integration with it. That is, Britain's differential identity can only be perceived as 
such within a broader context that provides its constitutive outside, for example, 
the EU. However, the full achievement of such a British differential identity would 
prevent a fully integrated Europe, which in turn would prevent the achievement of 
the differential British identity by making its constitutive outside ambiguous. Thus, 
if total integration does not take place, it is because the British identity is not fully 
achieved - for example, there are unsatisfied economic, social and political 
demands. These demands cannot be made in terms of difference, but only in 
terms of some universal values that Britain shares with the rest of the EU. 
This suggests that the universal is part of identity as far as it is penetrated by a 
constitutive lack - that is, as far as the differential identity has failed in its process 
of constitution. The universal emerges out of the particular not as some principle 
84 
Ibid. p. 27.350 
underlying and explaining the particular, but as an incomplete horizon suturing a 
dislocated particular identity. This points to a new way of conceiving the relations 
between the universal and the particular: 
... the universal is the symbol of a missing fullness and the particular 
exists only in the contradictory movement of asserting at the same time 
a differential identity and cancelling it through its subsumption in the 
non-differential medium. 86 
5.2. The postmodern rejection of universal values 
As aforementioned, certain postmodern arguments seem to lead to the rejection 
of the idea of universal values as ethnocentric/Eurocentric and ultimately 
totalitarian. Thus, by simply replacing the universalism of modernity with that of 
the ancient'Europe of the Mind', they would argue that Tassin does not overcome 
the problem of Eurocentrism or the threat of totalitarianism. Such postmodernists 
claim that cultural pluralism must be defended since all values are contextual, and 
all contexts are incommensurable due to the absence of a common ontological 
ground. 87 Although Laclau accepts this argument, he believes that it is problematic 
to simply conclude that the presence of a multiplicity of incommensurable contexts 
and identities renders the reference to universal values obsolete. 
Here we are again faced with two situations, both of which assume that the 
absence of universal values will lead to some kind of Hobbesian 'state of nature I 
within which the incommensurable identities will destroy each other in antagonistic 
clashes. As this research has emphasized, in the absence of a universal 
European identity and universal European values, there is a concern that Europe 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. P. 28. 87 Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 151. 
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could once again be destroyed by national antagonisms. In this context, the first 
situation is one in which the mutual destruction of the plurality of separate 
identities is prevented by the construction of a stable system of differences. 88 
However, from this Hobbesian solution, we arrive back at the theoretical argument 
against the multiculturalist appraisal of a system of pure particularisms, which has 
been exposed as a contradiction of terms because every system of differences 
relies upon universal values. 
By contrast, the second situation is one in which the mutual destruction of the 
plurality of separate identities engaged in antagonistic clashes is prevented by a 
pre-established harmony of purely differential identities, which are related in and 
through their separations and exclusions, but which do not form part of a system 
of differences in the sense of an internally differential total ity. 
89 Here, however, we 
need to account for the total ground that constitutes the differences as such. 90 
However, even assertion of the presence of purely differential identities ultimately 
requires a reference to some kind of universalism. 91 Thus, it can be concluded 
that even the most extreme multiculturalist and/or postmodern assault upon the 
notion of universal values seems to presuppose what it excludes. 
As Laclau explains, pure particularism invokes a paradox: 
I can defend the right of sexual, racial and national minorities in the 
name of particularism; but if particularism is the only valid principle, I 
have to also accept the rights to self-determination of all kinds of 92 
reactionary groups involved in antisocial practices . 
88 
orfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 172. 89 Ibid. p. 173. 90 Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 157. 91 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 173. 
92 Laclau, E. (1996) [1992] Op. Cit. p. 26. 
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Moreover: 
... as the 
demands of various groups will necessarily clash with each 
other, we have to appeal - short of postulating some kind of pre- 
established harmony - to some more general principles in order to 
regulate such clashes. In actual fact, there is no particularism which 
does not make appeal to such principles in the construction of its own 
identity. 93 
Similarly, during the process of European integration, as the demands of various 
member states will also conflict with each other, we have to appeal to some more 
universal principles in order to regulate such clashes. As Chapter 7 illustrates, 
Laclau and Mouffe propose an appeal to the principles of 'freedom and equality 
for all' in the pursuit of a radical plural democracy and citizenship. Hence, it will be 
assessed whether this pursuit could help overcome the conflict between the 
various identities of the EU. 
6.0. A discourse-theoretical approach to the question of a European identity 
Similar to the other interpretations examined above, the discourse-theoretical 
approach advanced by this thesis accepts that there is a chasm between the 
universal and the particular. However, it challenges the idea that a radical choice 
must be made between them. By cleconstructing the notions of the universal and 
the particular, it is proposed that we can account for their mutual conditioning. 
That is, by the tension between the universal and the particular can be resolved by 
problematizing the underlying assumptions that makes them contradictory. It then 
becomes possible to inscribe them within a Derridean undecidable logic that 
incorporates both without privileging one or the other. As a consequence, the 
93 Ibid. 
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privileging of either are conceived as political attempts to arrest the undecidable 
game between the universal and the particular. 94 
To elucidate, Laclau provides an alternative way of conceiving the relations 
between the universal and the particular: 
... 
the universal is the symbol of a missing fullness and the particular 
exists only in the contradictory movement of asserting at the same time 
a differential identity and cancelling it through its subsumption in the 
non-differential med iUM. 95 
As identified above, the discourse-theoretical approach rejects the pursuit of a 
pure particularism as politically and theoretically dangerous, as well as ineffectual 
in relation to the pursuit of a supranational European identity. Moreover, in order 
to meet the challenge presented by the retreat and return of the universal, the 
relation between particularity and universality is rethought in such a way that 
prevents reduction of the particular to the universal (as evident in classical ancient 
philosophy, the discourse of modernity, and in the federal and neo-functional 
theories of supranational European integration), as well as the reduction of the 
universal to the particular (as evident in multiculturalism, some versions of 
postmodernism, and neo-realist and domestic politics approaches to 
intergovernmental European cooperation). 
This rethinking begins with the proposition that all systems - whether or not they 
have the form of an internally differentiated totality of separate identities - must 
establish some more or less stable limits. Without boundaries, there can be no 
system. The limits of a system are constitutive of its systematic character. 96 As 
explained in Chapters 3, Sections 4.2-3., the limits of a system cannot be 
94 orfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 168. 95 Laclau E. (1996) [1992] Op. Cit. p. 28. 
96 Torfing', J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 173. 
354 
established in reference to an underlying positive essence. Neither can the limits 
of a system be established in terms of its differential relation with identities outside 
the system: since all identity is differential, it would be impossible to identify which 
differential identities were internal or external to the system. Thus, the only 
possibility is that the limits of a system are established in terms of the exclusion of 
a radical (and threatening) otherness (or constitutive outside) that does not 
present itself as yet another difference, but rather involves the expansion of a 
chain of equivalence. That is, construction of the limits of a system involves the 
construction of a social antagon iSM. 
97 
This proposition is significant because it makes it possible to rethink the 
relationship between the universal and the particular. It is proposed that, 
whenever a system is constructed through the exclusion of a radical otherness, a 
universal chain of equivalence will be established between the particular identities 
that are part of the system. 98 The universal will emerge out of the particular as an 
irreducible dimension of the chain of equivalence expands as a result of the 
negation of the particular identities. Hence, to overcome antagonisms and develop 
a universal European identity, a universal chain of equivalence must be 
established between the particular identities of the EU through the exclusion of a 
common radical otherness. That is, the construction of a universal European 
identity must involve the construction of a social antagonism with something 
outside its limits. 
Thus, the dimension of universality reached will not take the form of an 
unconditional a priori principle nor a regulative idea in the sense of an empirically 
97 See: Laclau, E. (1994) 'Why Do Empty Signifiers Matter to PoliticsT, in J. Weeks (ed. ) The 
Lesser Evil and the Greater Good. (London: Rivers Oram Press). pp. 168-9, Laclau, E. (1995) Op. 
Cit. p. 151. 
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unreachable telos that consistently guides our actions, as with Tassin's 'Europe of 
the Mind'. It cannot exist prior to, and independently of, the system of 
equivalences from which it proceeds. 99 Hence, this is a universality that will only 
exist as a dimension of the chain of equivalences that links the particular 
identities. Similar to the 'Europe of the Mind 17 it may have its roots in the 
experience of a common destiny, and it may be invoked by the idea of a common 
cause. Unfortunately, the existing commonality is the pursuit of a European 
trading bloc that can successfully compete in the global capitalist market. As this 
thesis argues, a broader political and supranational commonality is required if a 
new European identity is to be constructed. In sum, we need a common cause 
that will overcome the democratic deficits and national antagonisms that have 
plagued Europe's past. As indicated, the following chapter will explore whether 
Laclau and Mouffe's radical democratic pursuit of 'freedom and liberty for all' could 
provide such a commonality for Europe. 
As the universal chain of equivalence expands to include all the various demands, 
struggles and groupings, it will become evident that it does not possess a positive 
content of its own. The dimension of universality is just an 'empty place' that 
unifies a set of equivalential demands. 100 Hence, the universal is the very principle 
of positivity, a pure Being in which all the particularities are reflected. The content 
of this empty place is partially fixed in and through political struggles between the 
particular identities caught up in the chain of equivalence. The various identities of 
the EU have aimed to hegemonize the empty place of the universal, as is evident 
in the process of European integration; the conflict between Britain and 
Continental Europe reflects a struggle to hegemonize this empty place. The 
98 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 174. 
99 Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 154. 
100 Ibid. p. 155. 
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particular identity that succeeds in filling this empty place of the universal will have 
achieved hegemony in Europe. As a consequence, with regard to Chapter 4, it will 
be their particular ideas and meanings that will be signified by the floating 
signifiers of Europe. However, since Continental European member states 
represent the largest consensus in the EU, it is likely that their ideas and 
meanings will remain hegemonic in Europe, and this would merely reinforce the 
existing antagonism between Britain and Continental Europe. As has been 
evident, a German-Franco consensus has been a particularly powerful alliance in 
the Council of Ministers. 
Thus, to overcome such national antagonisms between member states, we must 
identify non-national hegemonic agents that can hegemonize, this empty space. 
Moreover, as examined below and developed further in Chapter 7, such non- 
national hegemonic agents would represent the proliferation of new political 
struggles that has emerged in Europe and which reflects an increasing diversity in 
identifications and subject positions in Europe. Furthermore, these new political 
struggles could hegemonize a more democratic content for the European 
universal. 
However, any hegemony involves the construction of a 'common will' in the 
Gramscian sense of a political project that is shaped in and through the political 
struggles for hegemony. 101 The unevenness of the structural positions in Europe 
means that not hegemonic agents are equally capable of becoming hegemonic. 
This unevenness constrains and facilitates the formulation and realization of the 
political strategies of those forces. 102 Hence, it can be concluded that there is a 
circular relationship between the universal and the particular: the universal 
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emerges out of the negation of the particular (national) identities, but its content is 
fixed in and through political struggles for hegemony, in which particular demands 
are universalized and others are marginalized. 
103 
6.1. Hegemony and empty signifiers 
The dimension of universality refers to a community that is empty because it is 
denied by an antagonistic force that is the constitutive outside of the system. 104 
The empty place of the universal can only be signified by an empty signifier, that 
is, a signifier that is not attached to any signified due to the incessant sliding of the 
signifieds under the signifier. For example, 'European union' is an empty signifier 
that signifies the absence of a community of fully achieved identities. Therefore, 
empty signifiers (or nodal points) - such as 'order', 'unity' or'democracy' - function 
to signify the absent communitarian fullness. Why particular signifiers assume this 
function is determined in and through political struggles for hegemony. But how 
does a particular political force manage to hegemonize the empty place of the 
universal? 
Here, a new political force in Europe cannot simply fill the empty place of the 
universal by asserting its unmediated particularity and advancing its own particular 
interests. To become hegemonic, it must successfully present its particularity as 
the incarnation of the empty signifier that refers to the empty communitarian 
fullness. ' 05 That is, it must turn the particular content of its demands into an 
embodiment of the signifier of the empty universality. For example, if unity and 
101 
aclau, E. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 175-6. 102 
Ibid. pp. 174-5. 103 
ee: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 175. 104 
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democracy are the empty signifiers that signify the absent communitarian fullness 
in Europe, a new hegemonic project will be successful if it presents itself as the 
credible response to these demands. In other words, shifting the point of 
enunciation implies a transformation of the content of the enunciation. This is the 
major aim of hegemonic operations. In sum, the presence of empty signifiers is 
the very condition of hegemony. 
106 
6.2. The constitutive split of the hegernonic agent 
There are important consequences of the successful attempt of a political force to 
present its particular project and demands as an embodiment of the empty 
signifier (or nodal point) that signifies the empty universal. Hegemonic victory is 
achieved only at the expense of a loss of identity. Such is the direct result of the 
universalization of the particular content of the project and demands of the 
hegernonic agent. Thus, the hegernonic agent is constitutively split between the 
particularity of its project and demands and the universal function of the latter, 
which requires the transformation of this very particularity into a surface of 
inscription through which all political struggles will be expressed. 107 
In sum, the universal is an empty place and the hegemonic forces that aim to fill 
that place are constitutively split between the concrete politics that they advocate 
and the ability of those politics to fill the empty place'. 108 This 'constitutive split' is 
acknowledged by western philosophy, which has examined the split between the 
universal and the particular in and through the construction of different images of 
106 
bid. p. 175. 107 Ibid. P. 177. 108 
Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 159. 
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the ruler. 109 This is illustrated by Plato's 'philosopher-king', Hobbes' 'sovereign', 
Hegel's 'hereditary monarch', and Gramsci's 'hegemonic class'. As will now be 
examined, the Anglo-philosophy of Hobbes differs in this respect to the Platonic 
philosophy upheld by the 'Europe of the Mind', which was explored above by 
Tassin. This conflict is significant to this thesis because the English possessive 
individualism of Hobbes had a significant impact upon the development of the 
British hegemonic discourse that obstructs the possibility of a return of the 
Platonic conception of the European mind, and thus, Tassin's vision of a new 
European political community. 
6.3. Plato versus Hobbes 
Hobbes and Plato represent two polar extremes in the sense that Plato believes 
that the universal is the only place of fullness, whilst Hobbes argues that it is an 
absolutely empty place. For Plato, the universal is the fullness of being that fully 
absorbs the particular, but for Hobbes, the universal is an empty place that is 
ultimately reduced to the particular order imposed by the Leviathan. 110 According 
to Hobbes, faced with the threat of radical disorder in the state of nature, the 
universal need for order is more important that the actual order which fulfils it. 
Indifference to the content of the social order gives way to an exclusive 
concentration on the ordering function of the latter-"' This is precisely what 
legitimizes the sovereign, the mortal God who has 'ex hypothesis' the function of 
ensuring order. No other force can guarantee order because power in the 'state of 
nature' is equally distributed among the members of society, thus preventing the 
109 
ee: Ibid. pp. 160-4. 110 Laclau, E. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 177-8. ill See: Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. p. 161. 
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generation of effects of domination that could lead to the construction of partial 
and competing orders around the different power centres. 
In all, this Hobbesian conception, reflected in British hegemonic discourse, 
obstructs the return of the Platonic conception of the European Mind advanced by 
Tassin. However, although Hobbes and Plato disagree with regard to the nature of 
the universal and its relation to the particular, they agree not to allow the particular 
any dynamics of its own vis-6-vis the full/empty place of the universal. ' 12 For Plato, 
the particular actualizes a universality that transcends it, for Hobbes, the particular 
order imposed by Leviathan becomes the unchangeable Law of the community. In 
both cases, it is this failure to account for the transient forms of the particular filling 
of the universal that prevents the development of a theory of hegernony. ' 13 As will 
now be explained, the concept of hegemony is crucial to the discourse-theoretical 
approach to constructing a European universal identity. 
6.4. The limits of hegemony 
Both Gramsci and Hegel have advances conceptions of social crises as partial 
dislocations of the social order-' 14 Following these theorists, Laclau concludes that 
the hegemonic operation is a constitutive political act that is made possible by 
dislocation, but must always consider and aim to hegemonize the sedimented 
social relations. Thus: 
... the succession of hegemonic regimes can 
be seen as a series of 
, partial covenantsy - partial because, as society is more structured than 
in Hobbes, people have more conditions to enter into the political 
112 Ibid. 
113 
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covenant; but partial also because, as the result of that, they also have 
more reason to substitute the sovereign. ' 15 
This conception of hegemonic regimes as 'partial covenants' relates to the 
question of the limits of the attempt to hegemonize the empty place of the 
universal. 
In contrast to theoretical trends in modernity and the ancient Platonic philosophy 
of Tassin, discourse theory holds that it is not possible for a particular content to 
fully suture the empty place of the universal. The content of the universal cannot 
be constructed in a way that eliminates all opposition and rule without further 
discussion. Particular embodiments of the universal will always fail to deliver the 
goods. As Laclau explains, there is a paradox implicit in the formulation of 
universal principles, and thus, in the hegemonic attempt to fill the empty place of 
the universal: universal principles have to present themselves as valid without 
exception, although, even in its own terms, this universality can easily be 
questioned and never actually maintained. ' 16 Such principles express a 
universality that transcends the particularity of the context of their emergence, and 
it is precisely this claim to universal validity that makes possible a chain of 
equivalential effects: different people of different nations in different situations can 
claim to have the same rights. There are many contexts in which these universal 
rights will be perfectly valid. However, as these universal rights are applied to still 
more contexts, problems will eventually arise as the particularity of new contexts 
will not allow the application of universal rights formulated in another and entirely 
different context. At some point, these rights will become entangled in their own 
115 Laclau, E. (1995) Op. Cit. P. 163. 116 Ibid. p. 155. 
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I contextual particularism' and will be incapable of continuing their universal 
function. 
117 
6.5. Constitutive representation 
The role of representation is important to the discussion of the universal and the 
particular because it is the process through which hegemonic agents attempt to 
inscribe particular identities within a universal context. However, a discourse- 
theoretical approach rejects the orthodox modernist conceptions of perfect 
representation that have pursued the transparent transmission of a preconstituted 
will of the represented by a neutral representative. By contrast, this thesis 
emphasizes the constitutive impurity of representation. To elucidate, the very logic 
inherent in the process of representation means that the conditions of a perfect 
representation are not obtained on the part of the represented nor on that of the 
representative. The problem for the represented is that if they need to be 
represented, it is because their basic identity is established in a place A (for 
example, Britain), which is different from the place B where important decisions 
affecting this basic identity are to be taken (for example, the Council of Ministers). 
The absence of a full presence at the decisive level of political decision-making 
can be conceived as a flaw in the identity of the represented and thus, the role of 
representation is to provide the supplement necessary for achieving the fully 
constituted identity of the represented. ' 18 
Thus, the function of the representative is to inscribe the interests of the 
represented in a complex reality different from the one in which these interests 
117 Ibid. p. 156. 118 
Ibid. p. 184. 
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were originally formulated. That is, in order to present the interests of the 
represented, the representative will have to reconstruct and transform the 
interests and identities that they represent. Hence, the supplementary act of 
representation will ultimately lead to the hybridization of the identities of the 
represented. 
119 
In sum, relations of representation are constitutive of what they represent, and 
thus, they always transform the particular identities that are represented by the 
hegemonic agent. 120 Moreover, following Laclau, there is an important implication 
of this constitutive impossibility of representation: 
... the problem of democratic control is not one of making the relation 
of representation transparent, so that it fully expresses the will of the 
represented, because that will was not there in the first place. Rather it 
consists in making the represented participate as much as possible in 
the formation of a new will, to ensure as much as possible their 
complicity in all the impurities and uneveness that the process of 
representation presupposes. 121 
Thus, with regard to the British Eurosceptic claim that the EU fails to represent the 
British people, this argument fails to acknowledge that any act of representation, 
including that of British parliament, must necessarily negotiate and rearticulate the 
interests of the represented. Second, in relation to the democratic and identity 
deficits of the EU, Laclau's insights suggest that we should abandon the pursuit of 
'perfect representation' in Europe and focus instead upon improving the 
participation of the people of Europe in the formation of their own common 
European destiny. As argued above, the identity deficit of the EU represents a 
failure to produce a will that can challenge 'nationhood', and thus, improving 
119 See: Laclau, E. (1 993a) 'Power and Representation', in Foster (ed -) Politics, Theory and Contemporary Culture. (New York: Columbia University Press). pp. 290-1. 
120 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. P. 183. 
121 Laclau, E. (1 993b) 'The Signifiers of Democracy', in J. H. Carens (ed. ) Democracy and 
Possessive Individualism: The Intellectual Legacy of C. B. Macpherson. (New York: State University 
of New York Press). p. 230. 
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participation would help overcome this problem, as has been exemplified by the 
phenomenon of British Euroscepticism. 
6.6. Representing multiple identities in Europe 
It is also possible to observe the constructed character of what is represented 
from the perspective of the hegemonic agent that claims to represent the absent 
communitarian space of unachieved social identities. In Europe, national 
hegemonic agents have tended to authorize their dominant position by referring to 
their embodiment of the will of the people. Similarly, the institutions of the EU must 
be able to authorize their dominant position over national governments by 
referring to their embodiment of the will of the European people. At both national 
and supranational levels, the hegemonic agent will aim to present itself as the true 
and only incarnation of popular sovereignty. Here, there is an observable problem 
for representation in Europe in the sense that national and supranational 
hegemonic agents cannot both claim to be the true and only incarnation of the will 
of the people. There is a tension between supranational and national 
representation that can only be resolved by the withdrawal or subordination of one 
or the other. 
Moreover, in contrast to essentialist modernist approaches, a discourse- 
theoretical approach can elucidate how the existence of a plurality of unachieved 
particular identities exposes the representation of these in terms of a popular will 
as a constitutive representation. The will of the people must be constructed from 
the manifold interests of the particular groups that are interpellated in the name of 
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122 the people . According to the postmodern theorizing of Laclau and Mouffe, the 
constitutive role of political representatives is currently becoming more visible as 
j 123 the particular social agents increasingly become 'multiple selves . Therefore, it 
is becoming less and less possible for the people of Europe to refer to a single or 
primary ground (such as the nation) upon which their identity depends. Thus, 
supranational non-national hegemonic agents may successfully become 
hegemonic if they appeal to, and represent, the plurality of non-national 
identifications of contemporary Europe. 
Following Laclau and Mouffe, such a proliferation of points of identification in the 
postmodern world have tended to produce loosely integrated and highly unstable 
identities. The process of representation can no longer be seen as merely a 
supplement to relatively well-defined identities, but rather becomes a primary 
terrain for the construction of such identities. Hence, at the European level, there 
is a risk that such loosely integrated and highly unstable identities will become 
represented (and thus, rearticulated) by political forces that celebrate a harnessing 
of separate and differential identities (national or otherwise) within a 'thin' 
European community. Indeed, the predominantly economic and intergovernmental 
basis of the EU represents such a 'thin' conception. 
In Europe, such a celebration of a harnessing of separate and differential 
identities can be viewed as problematic because a dual structure may develop, 
consisting of a private European sphere of law-protected segregation and a public 
European sphere governed by a quasi-omnipotent technocracy. In this sense, 
Europe would return to the Middle Ages. As argued above by Tassin, an 
alternative is for Europe to return to the 'Europe of the Mind' in pursuit of a 'thick' 
122 Torfing, J. (1999) OP. Cit. P. 185. 
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community that represents a political and supranational unity. However, as 
explored in Chapter 7, Laclau and Mouffe provide another possible path: to take 
difference, particularity and the lack of well-defined identities as the starting point, 
and inscribe this plurality in equivalential logics by emphasizing common values, 
goals, and experiences. Such a chain of equivalence could open the way to a 
relative universalization of a collective will that could be the basis for a new 
popular hegemony in Europe. 
124 
Conclusion 
In sum, difficult questions are invoked by the premise that any particular identity in 
Europe involves the affirmation of the right to a separate existence. The 
separation or 'right of difference' has to be asserted within the European 
community - that is, within a space in which that particular identity has to coexist 
with other identities. How could such a coexistence be possible without some 
shared universal values, without a sense of belonging to a community larger than 
each of the particular identities in question? So far, agreements between the 
different national identities in Europe have been made through negotiation. As 
neo-realism assumes, this negotiation is a process of mutual pressures and 
concessions whose outcome depends only on the balance of power between 
antagonistic nation states. It is obvious that no sense of community can be 
constructed through this type of negotiation. Similar to Tassin, Laclau emphasizes 
that this type of negotiation can only be one of potential war. 125 
123 Laclau, E. (1993a) Op. Cit. p. 291. 
124 See: Ibid. p. 164. 
125 Laclau, E. (1996) [1992] Op. Cit. p. 32. 
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Thus, for a successful European unity, it must be recognised that the existing 
universal values of European are problematic, and thus, that they must be 
modified. But how can this modification be achieved? In addition, can any agents 
for such change be identified? As indicated above, the dilemma is that the political 
action of particularist struggles is anchored in a perpetual incoherence. However, 
this dilemma can be avoided by negating the universal dimension of the existing 
modernist discourse, and this requires an acceptance of its contingency. It must 
be affirmed that the historical link between the universal values of the West and 
the traditional dominant groups that they serve is a contingent and unacceptable 
element that can be modified through political struggles. Thus, it could be these 
struggles that will modify the existing hegemony discourse of Europe. 
As was argued above, such modification is required because the universal ideas 
and values of Western modernity are limited and no longer pertain to the 
contemporary world. As modernist theory and practice were originally developed 
for national and homogeneous societies, they obstruct democratic representation 
of supranational and multicultural communities. Moreover, as Tassin argued, such 
modernist ideas and values are potentially totalitarian. Thus, as argued by Laclau 
and Mouffe in the following chapter, we need to develop a new concept of 
democracy that is fully adaptable to these present circumstances. 
The unresolved tension (or constitutive split) between universalism and 
particularism makes it possible to move away from the Eurocentrism of modernity 
, 126 through a 'systematic decentring of the West . Such Eurocentrism resulted from 
the failure of modernity to differentiate between its universal values and the 
concrete social agents that were incarnating them. However, as Laclau explains, 
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discourse-theoretical insights make it possible to proceed to a separation of these 
two aspects: 
If social struggles of new social actors show that the concrete practices 
of our society restrict the universalism of our political ideals to limited 
sectors of the population, it becomes possible to retain the universal 
dimension while widening the spheres of its application - which, in turn, 
will define the concrete contents of such universality. 127 
Through this process, universalism as a horizon is expanded at the same time as 
its necessary attachment to any particular content, such as that of modernity, is 
broken. As explained above, the opposite pursuit - that of rejecting universalism in 
toto as the particular content of the ethnia of Western Europe - can only lead to a 
blind alley. 
This preferred pursuit still leaves us with a paradox: as argued above, the 
universal does not have a concrete content of its own, but is an always receding 
horizon resulting from the expansion of an indefinite chain of equivalent demands. 
Therefore, the universal is incommensurable with the particular, but cannot exist 
without the latter. This paradox cannot be resolved, and it is precisely its non- 
solution that is the very condition Of PolitiCS. 
128 Its solution would imply that a 
particular body had been identified as the true body of the universal. In that case, 
the universal would have found its necessary location and thus, democracy would 
be impossible. Hence, if democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no 
necessary or fixed content. As evident in the process of European integration, 
member states compete to give their particularisms a temporary function of 
universal representation. This process has generated a whole vocabulary of 
empty signifiers whose temporal signifieds are the result of a political competition 
126 Ibid. p. 34. 127 Ibid. 
128 See: Laclau, E. and L. Zac (1994)'Minding the Gap: The Subject of Politics', in E. Laclau (ed. ) 
The making of Political Identities. (London: Verso). p. 37. 
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between these member states, as demonstrated in Chapter 4. It is this final failure 
of the EU to constitute itself as a community that makes the distance between the 
universal and particular unbridgeable, and thus, burdens concrete social agents 
with the impossible task of making democratic interaction achievable. 
In all, it must be recognised that the existing universal discourse of modernity is 
problematic and contingent, and thus, that it must and can be modified. The 
essentialist and Eurocentric foundation of modernity has limited the possibility of 
progressive change because its ideas are advanced as the necessary and true 
body of the universal. By contrast, it is precisely the unresolved tension (or 
constitutive split) between universalism and particularism that makes it possible to 
break the necessary attachment of the universal with the particular content of 
modernity. That is, by breaking the political attempt by modernity to privilege its 
essentialist universal discourse, it becomes possible to identify alternative and 
more credible discourses for a new democratic European identity. 
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Chapter 7 
Radical Plural Democracy: A New 
European Social Imaginary? 
Introduction 
As the previous chapter illustrated, there are significant problems specific to the 
discourse of modernity that have obstructed the development of a democratic 
European identity. Moreover, the supranational political changes that may be 
invoked in the future by the neo-functional logic of spill-over, and by the external 
dynamics of global change predicted by Preston, may only be those necessary for 
effective competition in the global economic market. It is a major concern of this 
thesis that such integration would not resemble the development of a democratic 
European social imaginary. Thus, this final chapter will explore whether a 
discourse-theoretical approach can provide a way of developing a more 
democratic universal discourse for Europe. 
As explained in the introduction of this thesis, although discourse theory itself is 
politically indeterminate, Laclau and Mouffe aim to provide an anti-essentialist 
solution to the 'crisis of the left' and the advancement of a new post-Marxist' 
strategy of radical plural democracy. In broader terms, Laclau and Mouffe believe 
that the possibility of a democratic 'postmodern' politics is underscored by the 
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proposition that postmodernity is a crisis of the self-foundation of modernity and 
not a crisis of its political project. This thesis shares the aim of Laclau and Mouffe 
to disentangle political liberalism from the rationalism of the Enlightenment, and 
also to free it from its association with capitalism and its correlate of economic 
liberaliSM. 2 Similar to Lawrence Wilde, this research also believes that the process 
of European integration has given the Left an opportunity to abandon flawed and 
outdated pursuits of 'national roads' to socialism and renew its commitment to 
international ism. 3 
Significant to these pursuits, Mouffe4 has developed a concept of democratic 
citizenship that goes beyond liberalism and communitarianism and which can be 
realized through the conception of radical plural democracy. For Mouffe, 
'democratic citizenship' and 'radical plural democracy' are nodal points in a social 
imaginary that should replace the Jacobin imaginary of the Left. Thus, the aim is 
to help overcome the crisis of the Left by developing a new hegemonic project 
that articulates liberal and communitarian values with traditional socialist goals. 
This chapter will examine whether such a hegemonic project could provide a 
democratic and universal identity for Europe. Section 1 explores the possibility of 
a radical plural democracy in Europe, and Section 2 considers the possibility of a 
radical plural democratic citizenship. In Section 3, the credibility of these initiatives 
will be discussed in relation to the possibility of a democratic and universal 
1 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. ' Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. (London: Verso). pp. 4-5, and Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1987)'Post-Marxism 
without Apologies', New Left Review, Volume 166, pp. 79-106. 
2 Mouffe, C. (1987) 'Rawls: Political Philosophy without Politics', Philosophy and Social Criticism, 
Volume 13, No. 2. pp. 105-6; Mouffe, C. (1992a) Preface: Democratic Politics Today', in C. Mouffe 
(ed. ) Dimensions of Radical Democracy. Pluralism, Citizenship, Community. (London: Verso). pp. 
2-3. 
3 See: Wilde, L. (1994) Modem European Socialism. (Aldershot, Brookfield: Dartmouth). pp. 171- 
86. 
4 Although both Laclau and Mouffe have shared a common commitment to a radical plural 
democracy, Mouffe has developed much of the work on this subject. It is also evident that most of 
the work on the theoretical propositions of discourse theory have been developed by Laclau. 
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European identity that includes Britain within its constitutive limits. Finally, 
Section 4 will examine the practical implications of the theoretical arguments for a 
radical plural democracy in Europe. 
1.0. A radical p! ural democracy for Europe? 
Mouffe argues that 'the objective of the Left should be the extension and 
deepening of the Democratic Revolution initiated two hundred years ago'. 5 The 
Left must learn from the tragic experience of totalitarianism, and seek to advance 
a 'radical plural democracy'. Liberal democracy should not be rejected as a sham, 
but should be radicalized through an immanent critique of its limitations. For 
Laclau and Mouffe, there is much progressive potential in extending and 
deepening liberal democracy since it upholds the most radical principle for 
organizing society, namely that all humans are free and equal. Also, by 
radicalizing liberal democracy in relation to the inherent tension between individual 
hreedom and collective rights, a radical solution may be uncovered for the 
research-specific tension between individual national interests and a collective 
Europe. 
1.1. A radical plural democracy 
The prefix of 'radical' to 'plural democracy' has three interrelated meanings that 
are constructive in relation to this research focus. First, in contrast to essentialist 
modernist conceptions, plural democracy should be 'radical' in the sense that the 
plurality of different identities is not grounded in any transcendent or underlying 
positive ground. It will involve the struggle for a maximum autonornization of 
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spheres of struggle on the basis of the generalization of the equivalential- 
egalitarian logiC. 6 
Second, plural democracy, and the struggles for freedom and equality it 
engenders, should be deepened and extended to all areas of society. 7 It involves 
the pluralization of democracy and the displacement of the Democratic Revolution 
to more fields of the social. 8With regard to this point, the struggle for a radical 
plural democracy aims to displace the quest for 'freedom and equality for all' to 
the economic sphere. Thus, it undermines the traditional liberal democratic line of 
demarcation between the public sphere of democratic politics and the private 
sphere of economic liberalism. This displacement is crucial because it makes it 
possible to conceive the intrinsic link between the struggle for radical plural 
democracy and the struggle for a socialist project in Europe. As Laclau and 
Mouffe propose: 
... every project for radical democracy implies a socialist dimension, as it is necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production, which 
are the root of numerous relations of subordination; but socialism is one 
of the components of radical democracy, not vice versa. 9 
The struggle for a radical plural democracy in Europe would involve the 
socialization of the means of production, and this would mean true participation by 
all subjects. 101n different terms, this displacement of the line between the public 
democratic sphere and the private economic liberal sphere also allows us to 
conceive a European union that represents a democratic unity rather than merely 
a liberal economic strategy. 
5 Mouffe, C. (1 992a) Op. Cit. P. 1- 
6 Laclau, E and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 167. 
7 Mouffe, C. (1990) 'Radical Democracy or Liberal Democracy? ', Socialist Review, May, p. 57. 
8 Torfing, J. (11999) New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe, andb2ek. (Oxford, 
Massachusetts: Blackwell). p. 256. 
9 Laclau, E and C. Mouffe (1985) Ibid. p. 178. 
10 Ibid. 
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Third, plural democracy is 'radical' because the basic tension between its liberal 
and democratic aspects implies that the condition of possibility of a further 
democratization of society is also the condition of impossibility. It can only be an 
incomplete and conflictual project because the pursuit of a fully democratic 
society would necessarily involve the creation of a totally transparent society in 
which all tensions and all forms of repression are themselves repressed, and this 
would be a totalitarian nightmare. " As 2i2ek explains: 
They (Laclau and Mouffe) emphasize that we must not be 'radical' in 
the sense of aiming at a radical solution: we always live in an 
interspace and in borrowed time; every solution is provisional and 
temporary, a kind of postponing of a fundamental impossibility. Their 
term 'radical democracy' is thus to be taken somehow paradoxically: it 
is precisely not'radical' in the sense of pure, true democracy; its radical 
character implies, on the contrary, that we can save democracy only by 
taking into account its own radical impossibility. 12 
It is the very impossibility of a fully achieved democracy that prevents radical 
plural democracy from providing a perfectly realizable telos, as advanced by 
Tassin. In this sense, radical plural democracy takes the form of a 'promise' of a 
democracy to come, in the Derridian sense of the term. 13Moreover, significant to 
this thesis, the tension between the liberal and democratic aspects of plural 
democracy reflects the tension between British parliamentary liberalism and 
Continental European republican democracy in the process of European 
integration, as examined in Chapter 5. 
11 Torfing, J (1999) Op. Cit. p. 258. 
12 2i2ek, S (1989) The Sublime Object of Ideology. (London: Verso). p. 6. 
13 MoUffe, C. (1994) 'For a Politics of a Nomadic Identity', in Robertson et al (eds) Traveller's Tales. 
(London: Routledge). pp. 111- 12. 
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1.2. Radical plural democracy 
Mouffe asserts that any democratic project must also accommodate pluralism: 
Pluralism, understood as the principle that individuals should have the 
possibility to organize their lives as they wish, to choose their own ends, 
and to realize them as they think best, is the great contribution of 
liberalism to modern society. 14 
Hence, 'pluralism' necessitates the abandonment of 'the dangerous dream of a 
perfect consensus, of a harmonious collective will' and consequently, the 
acceptance of 'the permanence of conflicts and antagonisms'. 15By asserting that 
democracy should be plural, Mouffe upholds the traditional liberal notion that: 
... the logic of democracy alone does not guarantee the defence of individual freedom and a respect for individual rights. It is only through 
the articulation with political liberalism that the logic of popular 
sovereignty can avoid becoming tyrannical; then one cannot speak of 
the people as if it was one homogenous and unified entity with a single 
generalWill. 16 
However, for Mouffe, liberalism ignores the intrinsic link between pluralism and 
social antagonism. This view is congruent with the 'democratic anti-liberalism' of 
Schmitt that describes liberal pluralism as characterized by endless conflicts 
between different opinions. Still, in Schmitt's terms, 'every religious, moral, ethical 
or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group 
human beings effectively according to friend and enemy'. 17 
Hence, pluralism entails politics and social antagonism, as disagreement between 
different concepts of the 'good will' divide people into friends and enemies. 18This 
is overlooked by liberalism because its individualist conception of politics as the 
14 Mouffe, C (1990) Op. Cit. p. 58. 
15 Ibid. p. 59. 
16 Ibid. p. 60. 
17 Schmitt, C. (1976) [1927] The Concept of the PoliticaL (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press). p. 37. 
18 Mouffe, C. (1996)'Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of Democracy', in C. Mouffe 
(ed. ) Deconstruction and Pragmatism. (New York: Routledge). pp. 8-9. 
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rational pursuit of private interests 'annihilates the political as a domain of 
conquering power and repression'. 19 To accept the collective character of the 
political struggles facilitated by that pluralism, it is deemed necessary to abandon 
the ontological individualism of the liberal tradition, as predominant in Britain. 
1.3. The anti-democratic offensive and the new social movements 
Following Laclau and Mouffe, by articulating a new egalitarian ideal that is 
sensitive to present political struggles, a radical democratic interpretation of 
democratic citizenship could extend the principles of radical plural democracy to 
all spheres of European society. However, to become hegemonic, this project 
must successfully challenge the anti-democratic offensive that was initially formed 
in opposition to social democratic welfare statism. In direct contrast to Laclau and 
Mouffe's attempt to broaden plural democracy in pursuit of freedom and equality 
for all, the anti-democratic offensive has argued for the narrowing of plural 
democracy in defence of neo-liberal values such as individualism and free market 
economiCS. 20 As examined in Chapter 5, this anti-democratic offensive became 
particularly strong in Britain following the hegemonic success of the neo-liberal 
project of Thatcherism, and it was evidenced in its opposition to European political 
integration. However, as will now be illustrated, Laclau and Mouffe believe that 
liberal democracy has the necessary conditions for the development of 
democratic struggles that can combat such anti-democratic resistance. 
Laclau and Mouffe's conception of a 'radical' and 'plural' democracy does not 
involve a rejection of the liberal democratic regime: 
19 Ibid. p. 71. 
20 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. pp. 171-5. 
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The aim is not to create a completely different kind of society, but to 
use the symbolic resources of the liberal democratic tradition to 
struggle against relations of subordination not only in the economy but 
also those linked to gender, race, or sexual orientation, for example. 21 
Here, we arrive at the crucial aspect of radical plural democracy: its capacity to 
engender political struggles and unify them into a new hegemonic project for the 
European Left. This argument follows from the observation that hierarchical 
relations of subordination provide the necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
rise of political struggles against oppression. Relations of subordination are only 
transformed into sites of democratic antagonism when they are confronted with 
the liberal democratic quest for freedom and equality. 22 
Laclau and Mouffe observe that a proliferation of new social movements in the 
1970s and 1980s was the result of the negation of the liberal-democratic ideology 
by new forms of subordination produced by the increasing commodification, 
bureaucratization and increasing homogenization of social life: 
One cannot understand the present expansion of the field of social 
conflictuality and the consequent emergence of new political subjects 
without situating both in the context of the commodification and 
bureaucratization (and homogenization) of social relations on the one 
hand, and the reformulation of liberal-democratic ideology - resulting 
from the expansion of struggles for equality - on the other. For this 
reason we have proposed that this proliferation of antagonisms and 
questioning of the relations of subordination should be considered as a 
moment of deepening of the democratic revolution. 23 
As argued in Chapter 6, we need to identity non-national hegemonic agents that 
can construct a European universal that does not reflect the particularism of any 
single member state. These new social movements could be such progressive 
agents because they represent struggles that transcend national boundaries and 
21 Mouffe, C (1990) Op. Cit. pp. 57-8. 
22 MoUffe, C. (11 988a) 'Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Towards a New Concept of 
Democracy', in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds) Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan Education). pp. 94-5. 
23 Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 163. 
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antagonisms. Moreover, they would provide a more democratic content for the 
European universal. Furthermore, in contrast to the present hegemony, they could 
be successful hegemonic agents because they represent struggles that reflect the 
growing proliferation of identifications and subject positions of contemporary 
Europe. 
1.4. Democratic antagonisms 
Laclau and Mouffe propose that the extension of the Democratic Revolution to still 
new areas of society will provide sufficient condition for the creation of democratic 
antagonism. However, it is emphasized that it does not predetermine how these 
democratic antagonisms are to be articulated. That is, they do not necessarily 
lead to democratic struggles. For example, they can be articulated with anti- 
democratic right-wing discourses. 
Nevertheless, the project for a radical plural democracy provides a way of turning 
democratic antagonisms into a wide-ranging democratization of social life. 24The 
primary task of the Left is to unify the different kinds of democratic struggles 
against sexism, racism, and new forms of subordination in the name of radical 
plural democracy. The problem is that these struggles do not spontaneously 
converge. To establish democratic equivalences, a new 'common sense' is 
necessary, which would 'transform the identity of different groups so that the 
demands of each group could be articulated with those of others according to the 
principle of democratic equivalence'. 25 The task is not to establish an alliance 
between dominant and subordinate agencies, but rather to produce a new 
24 MoUffe, C. (1988a) Op. Cit. p. 96. 
25 MoUffe, C. (1989) 'Radical Democracy: Modern or Postmodern? ', in Ross (ed. ) Universal 
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collective will that ensures that the interests of one group are not pursued at the 
expense of the interests of others. 
Thus, the development of radical plural democracy in Europe requires the creation 
of a collective form of identification that constructs a 'we/us' through the 
expansion of a universal chain of equivalence between all those who struggle 
against 'illegitimate' forms of subordination. 26 Following Laclau and Mouffe, this 
collective will would represent the pursuit of the liberal democratic principles of 
'freedom and equality for all'. By constructing such a democratic equivalence, a 
radical plural democracy could unify the broad range of new democratic struggles 
that transcend the national antagonisms of Europe. As will now be discussed, this 
pursuit of democracy without national antagonisms could be aided by the 
development of 'agonistic' democracy. 
1.5. Agonistic pluralism 
Mouffe argues that the liberal notion of a 'deliberative democracy' based upon 
political consensus is challenged by a surge in political confliCtS. 27 For example, 
the forces that overthrew the Communist regimes in Russia and East Central 
Europe have become divided by ethnic, regional and religious antagonisms, and 
similar antagonisms have been surfacing in Western Europe since the loss of its 
,I Eastern 'radical otherness. 
At the same time, however, this growing plurality of antagonisms has not been 
reflected in an increase in plural democratic representation. Rather, in direct 
Abandon? (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press). p. 42. 
26 Mouffe, C. (1992b). 'Citizenship and Political Identity', October, Volume 61, p. 31. 
27 See: Mouffe, C. (1994) Op. Cit. pp-105-7. 
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contrast, Mouffe observes that plural democracy has been threatened by a 
'consensus at the centre' produced by the celebration of the 'end of the ideology', 
the 'demise of the Left' , and the 'end of politics '. Moreover, as evident in 
contemporary Europe, this consensus has created a political vacuum that has 
facilitated the growth of the extreme right, such as Le Penn in France, who 
oppose the more plural and democratic interpretations of liberal democracy. The 
people of Europe feel that they can no longer tell the difference between the 
political parties who all claim to inhabit the centre. This is a frustrating experience 
in the light of such growing problems as unemployment and poor public services, 
and it is this frustration that fuels the popularity of the extreme right. 
For Mouffe, in response to these observations, the belief in a consensus without 
conflicts must be abandoned: 
The prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions, nor to 
relegate them to the private sphere in order to render rational 
consensus possible, but to mobilize these passions, and give them a 
democratic outlet. 28 
Following Mouffe, contemporary threats to plural democracy in Europe demand 
such a new confrontational politics. As Mouffe asserts, political forces with new 
political vocabularies are required which can construct new political frontiers in 
their attempt to solve the political problems of today: 
A healthy democratic process calls for a vibrant clash of political 
positions and an open conflict of interests. If such is missing, it can too 
easily be replaced by a confrontation between non-negotiable moral 
values and essentialist identities. 29 
For Mouffe, this threat is best challenged by an agonistic democracy rather than a 
deliberative democracy. As she explains, a deliberative democracy seeks a 
28 Ibid. p. 109. 
29 Mouffe, C. (1 993a) 'Introduction: For an Agonistic Pluralism', in C. Mouffe (ed. ) The Retum of the 
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consensus through free and unrestrained public discussion, but agonistic 
democracy allows us to make room for a confrontation between adversaries who 
agree upon the 'liberal-democratic rules of the game' while disagreeing not only 
about substantial, political and moral issues but also about the precise 
interpretation of the rules of the game. 30 
Hence, in the process of European integration, we should not attempt to dissolve 
political conflicts and antagonisms between member states within a framework of 
a consensual, deliberative democracy. Rather, Europe should find a way for 
making such national antagonisms compatible with pluralist democracy by turning 
antagonism into agonism. As Torfing describes, this would be achieved by 
securing a political consensus on 'basic democratic values and procedures' while 
allowing dissent over the interpretation of the precise meaning of these values 
and procedures and their implications for our political choice between different 
ways of organizing society. 31 
For agonistic democracy, enemies would not be destroyed but turned into 
9 adversaries' whose politics we might disagree with, but whose existence would be 
legitimate and should be tolerated. Here, the limit for the agonistic inclusion of 
enemies as 'legitimate adversaries' would be those who apply 'anti-democratic' 
means in their attack on the basic democratic values and procedures. 32As will 
now be examined, agonistic democracy could be combined with a 'nomadization I 
Political. (London: Verso). p. 6. 
30 Mouffe, C. (1995) 'The End of Politics and the Rise of the Radical Right', Dissent, Fall, p. 502. 
31 Torfing, J. (1999). Op. Cit. p. 255. 
32 See: Mouffe, C. (1991 a) 'Pluralism and Modern Democracy: Around Carl Schmitt', New 
Formations, Volume 14, Summer, pp. 1-16; Mouffe, C. (1993a) Op. Cit. pp. 1-8; Mouffe, C. (1996) 
Op. Cit; Schmitt, C. (1976) [1972] The Concept of the Political. (New Brunswick: Rutgers University 
Press), and Schmitt, C. (1985) [1923] The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy. (Baskerville: MIT 
Press). 
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and 'hybridization' of identity33 that would contribute to the dissolution of 
antagonistic frontiers. 
1.6. The nomadization and hybridization of identity 
'Nomadization' is the attempt to undercut the allegiance of a particular identity to a 
certain nation, place or property, and thereby to show that all identities are 
constructed in and through hegemonic struggle. This will tend to naturalize social 
and political identities and make them more negotiable. Therefore, it could help 
dissolve the British public allegiance to national parliamentary sovereignty that 
has impeded British-European integration. In broader terms, it could undercut the 
ontological essential ization of the relation between being and a place that is a 
constitutive feature of the nationalism that has obstructed European supranational 
integration, as examined in Chapter 5. 
'Hybridization' is the attempt to make people realize that their identity is multiple in 
the sense of constituting an 'overdetermined ensemble of identifications'. 34 For 
instance, as soon as British people perceive that they are not only 'British' but 
also women, gay, black, poor, 'Europeans', and/or rural dwellers, and so forth, 
their loyalties - and consequent passions - will be divided. Thus, hybridization can 
help us develop a supranational European identity because it helps dissolve the 
ontological essential ization between the subject and the nation by exposing that 
the national subject position is only one of many other equal positions. 
33 MoUffe, C. (1994) Op. Cit. pp. 110- 11. 
34 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 255. 
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1.7. Associational democracy 
The concept of democracy as 'agonistic pluralism' could help Europe overcome 
the dilemma about whether to advance a substantial definition of liberal 
democracy, and accept the implicit dangers implied by such a definition, or 
whether to opt for a strictly procedural definition of liberal democracy, and risk 
impoverishing the very concept of democraCy. 35 A more substantial homogeneity 
is required in the EU because its democratic procedures are not sufficient for 
creating a political unity of its member states. For Mouffe, such procedures would 
have to be in strict accordance with the constitutive principles of liberal 
democracy. 
The 'undecidability and indeterminacy' of these principles would provide plenty of 
room for disagreement over the precise form of the procedural forms of liberal 
democracy, and this is precisely what would stimulate the search for appropriate 
European democratic institutions. Following Mouffe, the importance of 
representative democracy rather than the illusions of direct democracy would 
guide this search. 36 However, as Mouffe argues, liberal democracy must be 
renewed to combat the shortcomings of representative democracy as evident, for 
example, at the national level in Britain and at the supranational level in Europe. 
To this end, Europe could implement the notion of an 'associational democracy' 
developed by Paul Hirst. 37 
35 See: Mouffe, C. (1991 a) Op. Cit. pp. 11 -12. 
36 MoUffe, C. (1993c)'On the Articulation Between Liberalism and Democracy', in C. Mouffe (ed. ) 
The Return of the Political. (London: Verso). pp. 102-5. 
37 See, for example: Hirst, P. Q. (1994) Associative Democracy. ' New Forms of Economic and 
Social Governance. (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
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For Hirst, associational democracy is the only challenge to corporate capitalism 
that respects the principles of liberal democraCy. 38 As he emphasizes, 
associational democracy should be advanced only to renew traditional forms of 
liberal democracy. Following Hirst, representative democracy in Europe would not 
be abandoned, but supplemented by new forms of democratic institutions. 
Political parties would still have an important role in giving expression to cross- 
cutting forms of social division and political conflict. However, as Mouffe indicates, 
if these political parties did not successfully fulfil this role, a whole range of ethnic, 
religious, and nationalist movements could take over and possibly threaten the 
democratic creed of the community. 39 
The basic principle of associational democracy is the cooperative ownership of 
economic units under democratic management. In Europe, similar to Tassin's 
conception of a European political community, Mouffe argues that an associative 
democracy may help overcome national antagonisms and democratic deficits 
because it encourages the organization of social life in small unities and 
challenges hierarchy and administrative centralization. Indeed, both Tassin's 
European political community and Laclau and Mouffe's project of radical plural 
democracy support the federal politics of personalism that was developed by 
Dandieu, De Rougemont, and Mounier. As illustrated in Chapter 4, this federal 
approach is reflected in the Christian Democratic conception of subsidiarity. 
The principles of decentralized, democratic governance upheld by associational 
democracy would imply the democratization of the public bodies that provide 
education, health, welfare and community services. In all, associational 
38 MoUffe, C. (1993c) Op. Cit. p. 98. 
39 See: Mouffe, C. (1 993a) Op. Cit. p. 5. 
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democracy provides an important model for the democratization of both the 
private and public sphere, one which demands allowance of a multiplicity of 
democratically managed associations and communities. Thus, associational 
democracy does require a state. However, because it is involved in many forms of 
'meta-governance', such a state should not be perceived as merely one 
association among others. Accordingly, a reflexive pluralist state is required 
whose legal task is to ensure equity between associations, police their conduct 
and protect the rights of both individuals and associations. 40 
In contrast to the British liberal-individualist conception, a crucial condition for 
associational democracy is the abandonment of the conception of the individual 
as an 'unencumbered self' that exists prior to, and independently of, social 
communities. Consequently, the conception of individuals as encumbered, 
multiple selves leads to a new understanding of social rights that does not 
perceive them as a property of the individual. Hence, 'it is through her inscription 
in specific social relations, rather than as an individual outside society, that a 
social agent is granted rights'. 41 Here, neither the individual nor the community 
possesses universal rights. Similar to the personalism and federalist politics of De 
Rougemont advanced by Tassin in Chapter 6, the individual has rights in and 
through the constitutive membership of a community. It is in this sense that social 
rights must be understood as collective rather than individual rights in Europe. 
40 MoUffe, C. (1 993c) Op. Cit. p. 99. 
41 Ibid. p. 97. 
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2.0. A radical plural democratic citizenship for Europe? 
Following Mouffe, there are three important reasons for examining the possibility 
of a radical (plural) democratic citizenship for Europe. First, the demand for the 
extension of rights, based upon an egalitarian notion of citizenship, would help the 
European left recover the 'radical impetus' that once brought down the ancient 
regime. Second, it would help defeat neo-liberalism and the anti-democratic 
offensive by reinvoking notions of community, civic virtue and active participation. 
Third, it provides a vital means in the struggle for a radical plural democraCy. 42 
Here, the first two reasons follow directly from the liberal and communitarian 
conceptions of democratic citizenship, but the third reason requires a 
reformulation of the notion of democratic citizenship that takes it beyond both 
liberalism and communitarianism. This reformulation provides another reason for 
a radical democratic citizenship: it would help us overcome the conflict between 
British liberal-ind ivid ual ism and Continental European communitarianism that has 
obstructed the process of European integration. Thus, our final task is to assess 
whether a radical democratic citizenship holds the key to the development of a 
universal and democratic European notion of citizenship. 
2.2. The critique of the liberal conception of democratic citizenship 
The liberal conception of democratic citizenship can mediate the tension between 
individualism and communitarian collectivism because it invokes a reference to 
both the individual and the community, and takes the rights of the individual to be 
dependent upon the community. 43 Although the individual is not constituted by the 
42 See: Mouffe, C. (1 992a) Op. Cit. pp. 3-4. 
43 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 263. 
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community, he/she can only be a free and autonomous individual because of the 
presence of an instrumental community that can protect and extend his/her rights. 
This liberal conception tends to privilege normatively 'rights' over 'obligations'. In 
all, the citizen is conceived as an individual bearer of universal rights. The law that 
is enforced by the state protects these rights. The constitutional rights of the 
individual are dependent upon the collective defence of these rights by the 
community. 441-lowever, although the individual is dependent upon the community, 
the latter is not conceived to be dependent upon the individual. Hence, in contrast 
to the ancient Greek conception explored by Tassin, there is no concern for the 
active participation of citizen in the development of civic virtues and common 
values. Thus, liberalism reduces democratic citizenship to a question of the legal 
status of the individual, and it conceives social cooperation only as a means of 
enhancing productive capacities and increasing individual prosperity. The 
absence of a common political obligation fosters a gradual weakening and 
impoverishment of the political community, which in turn may result in failure to 
secure the rights of the citizens and uphold the liberal democratic regime. 45 
Therefore, the problem of the liberal conception (which affirms that there is no 
common good and that each individual should be able to define and seek to 
realize his/her own conception of the good) is that it runs the risk of sacrificing the 
citizen to the individual. 46 
44 Ibid. p. 264. 
45 Ibid. p. 265. 
46 MoUffe, j. (1 992b) Op. Cit. p. 29. 
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2.3. The critique of the communitarian 
citizenship 
conception of democratic 
Mouffe believes that communitarian critics, such as Maclntyre, are right to 
emphasize the growing phenomenon of 'anomie' which seems to accompany the 
hegemonic forms of liberal individualism that are particularly evident in Britain. 47 It 
is acknowledged that we need to counter the atomistic individualism of the liberal 
tradition by emphasizing the active participation of the citizen in the development 
and defence of common norms and values. However, unlike Tassin, Mouffe 
rejects the communitarian conception of the common good associated with the 
republican communities in ancient Greece and medieval Europe. The problem is 
not so much that these European republican communities were highly 
undemocratic, but rather that the idea of a substantive community, based upon a 
comprehensive conception of the common good, creates an organic 
('Gemeinschaft') community that is incompatible with the pluralism which should 
be a constitutive component of European democracy. Therefore, in contrast to the 
liberal conception, the communitarian critique of liberal theory tends to sacrifice 
the individual to the citizen. 48 
2.4. A radical reformulation of liberalism and communitarianism 
Hence, the crucial question for Europe is how to conceptualize a democratic 
citizenship that does not sacrifice the citizen to the individual or vice versa. 
Following Mouffe, the attempt to answer this question must begin by seeking to 
develop a conception of a European political community that is compatible with 
47 See: MacIntyre, A. (1981) After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theoryý (London: Duckworth). 
48 Mouffe, J. (1992b) Op. Cit. p. 29. 
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the plural democracy. That is, we should aim to envisage a form of communality 
that respects diversity and makes room for different forms of individuality. 49 Thus, 
we must create a synthesis of liberal individualism and republican 
communitarianism. Moreover, as argued above, such a synthesis would help us 
resolve the conflict between British and Continental European (political and 
governmental hegemonic) discourse that obstructs the possibility of a universal 
European identity. 
Unlike Berlin50, Mouffe holds that the liberal celebration of the negative freedom of 
individuals is compatible with the existence of a political community that is more 
than a protective shell of individual rights. Here, Mouffe looks to Skinner5l who 
rediscovers the Machiavellian classical republican proposition that reconciles 
virtuous public service with negative freedom. 52 Machiavelli argues that a free 
state is the primary condition for ensuring the negative freedom of the citizen. A 
state can only be free if it avoids external servitude and governs itself according to 
its own will. In terms of constitution, such a free state must have the form of a 'res 
publica'. 
In accordance with neo-realism and intergovern mentalism, such a Machiavellian 
conception reflects the British opposition to European integration in its defence of 
the freedom of the British state to govern itself according to its own national 
interest. Britain as a 'free state' is the primary condition for ensuring the negative 
freedom of the individual Subject. However, it could provide the basis of a new 
49 Ibid. p. 30. 
50 See: Berlin, 1. (11975) [1969] Four Essays on Liberty. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
51 See: Skinner, Q. (1991) 'The Paradoxes of Political Liberty', in Miller (ed. ) Liberty. (Oxford 
University Press). pp. 183-205. 
52 Ibid. pp. 194-5. 
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European identity if was developed at the supranational rather than the national 
level. 
Although Machiavelli proposes that free states are the primary condition for 
ensuring the negative freedom of the individual, he emphasizes that self- 
governing republics can only be maintained if their citizens cultivate civic virtue 
through active participation in government and in the common norms and 
values. 53 Hence, to ensure liberty, and avoid the servitude that makes it 
impossible, Europe would have to commit itself to the pursuit of the 'common 
good'. 54That is, common political obligation is perfectly compatible with individual 
liberty in the negative sense of the absence of constraint and thus, of freedom to 
pursue one's own chosen endS. 55 
2.5. Beyond liberalism and comm unitarianism 
A synthesis of liberal pluralism and the communitarian emphasis upon the 
constitutive character of the political community requires a substantial reworking 
of both liberal and communitarian/civic republican traditions. 56With regard to 
liberalism, it must be affirmed that individual rights can be defended within a 
politically constructed European political community. In relation to 
communitarianism, it must be affirmed that the European political community can 
be redefined in terms of 'what we can call, following Wittgenstein, a "grammar of 
conduct" that coincides with the allegiance to the constitutive ethico-political 
53 Ibid. pp. 197. 
54 See also: Mouffe, C- (1 988b) 'The Civics Lesson', New Statesman and Society, No. 7. p. 30. 
55 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 266. 
56 Ibid. 
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principles of modern democracy. 57 This move beyond both liberalism and 
communitananism will now be examined in so far as it is significant to the 
development of a universal radical democratic citizenship in Europe. 
2.5.1. Beyond liberalism 
Although RawIS58challenges the propositions of more extreme libertarians, such 
as Hayek and Nozick, he maintains the liberal priority of the right over any 
conception of the common good. 59 Following Sandel's communitarian critique of 
Rawls, Mouffe argues that he fails to convincingly justify this priority. 60 As Mouffe 
explains, this priority cannot be justified independently of a particular political 
community since it is 'only through our participation in a community that defines 
the good that we can have a sense of the right and a conception of justice'. 61 
Yet Mouffe argues that this critique of Rawls does not affirm the communitarian 
priority of the common good over the liberal priority of defending rights. As 
Mouffe explains, rather than rejecting the conception of justice as the primary 
virtue of society, we should accept that the right over the good is only possible 
within a particular community which is defined by the constitutive political common 
good it puts to work, such as the principles of 'freedom and equality for all'. 62 
In all, we should accept Rawl's defence of pluralism and individual rights, but we 
should reject his proposition that such requires the abandonment of any notion of 
57 MoUffe, C. (1 992b) Op. Cit. p. 30. 
58 See: Rawls, J. (1971) A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University). 
59 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 267. 
60 MoUffe, C. (1988c)'American Liberalism and its Critics: Rawls, Taylor, Sandel and Waltzer', 
Praxis Intemational, Volume 8, No. 3, p. 199. 
61 Ibid. 
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a common good. A clear distinction must be made between the 'political 
common good', which justifies the priority of rights, and the 'common moral good% 
which is claimed to be secondary to pluralism and the defence of rights. 63 Here, 
the 'political common good' is defined by a 'collective will' at the level of the 
regime, whereas the 'common moral good' is defined by a multiplicity of singular 
WillS. 64 
Although Rawls later moves in this direction65, he fails to provide an adequate 
explanation of the political in the sense of 'politeia', and he does not account for 
the role of politics in the form of hegemony and social antagonism. 66 Rawls 
accepts that the formulation of the principles of justice must start from the basic 
values of freedom and equality, but he tends to conceive these values as self- 
evident and uncontroversial. By contrast, a discourse-theoretical approach 
emphasizes that freedom and equality are sedimented values, which in the last 
instance are the result of a political decision taken in the undecidable terrain. 
Thus, these values are contingent and invariably involve the exclusion of the 
I alternative values of both the 'adversaries, who are tolerated, and the 'enemies', 
who are not. 
The reworking of the liberal conception of democratic citizenship requires an 
emphatic insistence on the role of a particular hegemonic form of political 
community for sustaining the rights of individuals. 67 It is because the political 
62 MoUffe, C. (1987) Op. Cit. pp. 110-11 
63 Mouffe, C. (11 988c) Op. Cit. p. 199. 
64 Torfing, J. (11999) Op. Cit. p. 267. 
65 See: Rawls, J. (11985) 'Justice as Fairness: Political and Metaphysical', Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Volume 14, No. 3, Summer, pp. 223-51; Rawls, J. (1987) 'The Idea of an Overlapping 
Consensus', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Volume 7, No. 1, Spring, pp. 1-25; Rawls, J. (1993) 
Political Liberalism. (New York: Columbia University Press), 
66 See: Mouffe, C. (1987) Op. Cit. p. 113. 
67 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 268. 
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community is founded on a particular 'political common good' that democratic 
citizens have the rights that they have. For the people of Europe to enjoy these 
rights, they must actively engage in European-wide communal activities and 
political struggles that re-enact the political common good. For example, they 
could participate in European public forums for political debate, as well as NGOs, 
civil associations, interests groups and social movements that transcend national 
boundaries and represent their non-national interests, rights and concerns. 68They 
could also become actively involved in European-wide public demonstrations, 
petitioning and lobbying. 69 
2.5.2. Beyond comm unitarianism 
Communitarians claim that the problem with the liberal conception of democratic 
citizenship is that it only allows for an instrumental community. It is held that such 
a 'thin' conception of community will lead to an impoverishment of the notion of 
citizenship. In contrast, a 'thick' ('Gemeinschaft') community is proposed that 
constitutes individuals as active members of an organic community around a 
substantive conception of the common good. 70 
The problem with such a 'thick' conception of a European political community 
would be that its pre-modern ideal of an all-embracing substantive unity is 
potentially totalitarian and incompatible with liberal pluralism. However, Mouffe 
proposes that the totalitarian implications of the communitarian conception of 
68 See: Tilly, C. (1986) Contentious France. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press). 
69 See: Kohler-Kochm, B. (1997) 'Organizing Interests in European Integration: The Evolution of a 
New Type of Governance? ', in: H. Wallace and R. A. Young (eds) Participation and Policy-Making 
in the European Union. (Oxford: Clarendon). pp. 42-68. 
70 Mouffe, C. (1991 b) 'Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community', in The Miami Theory 
Collective (ed. ) Community at Loose Ends. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). p. 71. 
394 
community can be removed without losing the emphasis upon the constitutive 
character of the community. This is made possible if the different member states 
of the EU adopt the universal notion that'what makes us fellow citizens in a liberal 
democratic regime is not a substantive idea of the good but a set of political 
principles specific to such a tradition: the principles of freedom and equality for 
all'. 71 Following Wittgenstein, such principles constitute a 'grammar of conduct', 
and it is the acceptance of the ethico-political principles embodied in this grammar 
of conduct that can constitute the people of the different member states of the EU 
as fellow European citizens with both universal European rights and obligations. 
However, this thesis has emphasized that British-European integration has been 
obstructed precisely because Britain and Continental Europe have different 
'grammars of conduct'. The political principles of 'freedom and equality for all' are 
specific to the Continental European discourse of liberal democracy that conflicts 
with the British discourse of liberal individualism. Again, this discourse-theoretical 
approach claims that such a universal grammar of conduct can be achieved 
through hegemonic struggle and the construction of a new universal constitutive 
outside. 
Furthermore, the conceptual ization of a European political community in terms of 
a certain grammar of conduct would re-establish the lost connection between 
ethics and politiCS. 72 Such a reconnection would be good for Europe because it 
would help overcome the moral vacuum of liberal politics that tends to undermine 
the social cohesion of democratic societies. It would also be particularly good for 
Britain because its hegemonic discourse of parliamentary liberalism has deprived 
71 Ibid. p. 75. 
72 Ibid. pp. 75-6. 
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it of an ethical tradition. Furthermore, it would help British-European integration 
because the moral vacuum of Britain's liberal discourse is reflected in its fierce 
resistance to the social dimension of European integration. 
Indeed, as particularly evident in Britain, liberalism deprives politics of its ethical 
components because it relegates normative concerns to the private sphere of 
morals and religion, and because the instrumental community of mutual interests 
does not foster any principles for the ethical guidance of civic activities. However, 
the attempt to re-establish the connection between politics and ethics should not 
aim to revive the pre-modern fusion of politics and ethics. That is, the solution to 
the problem of how to reconnect ethics and politics seems to rest upon the 
distinction between a 'moral common good' and a 'ethical-political common good, 
in that the EU should not aim to subordinate politics to the moral values specified 
by the common good. Rather, it should emphasize the role of the grammar of 
conduct whose ethical-political principles cannot be derived from any 
comprehensive moral values. 73 
The notion of a ethic-political grammar of conduct is provided by the British 
conservative philosophy of Oakeshott. 74 His conception of 'societas' (or Tes 
publica') as a constitutive community of ethico-political principles goes beyond 
both the liberal conception of an instrumental community defined by the rule of 
law and the communitarian conception of a substantive community defined by the 
common good. 751-lowever, two interrelated problems still remain. The first reflects 
the aforementioned problem relating to the content of a grammar of conduct. The 
conservative content of Oakeshott's res publica is compatible with British liberal 
73 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 269. 
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individualism but it is incompatible with the liberal democratic discourse of 
Continental Europe, and thus, with the political initiatives for European integration. 
Following Mouffe, this problem can be resolved by redefining the content of the 
res publica with the ethico-political and liberal democratic principles of 'freedom 
and equality for all'. The people of Europe may be engaged in different purposive 
enterprises and hold different conceptions of the good, but what could bind them 
together as citizens within the res publica could be their submission to a radical 
interpretation of the principles of freedom and equality. In this interpretation, 
citizenship becomes neither one identity among others (reflecting the British, 
liberal and neo-realist conceptions of European intergovern mentalism), nor the 
dominant overriding identity (reflecting the Continental European, communitarian 
and neo-functional conceptions of European su pra nationalism). Rather, 
citizenship is a social imaginary that affects all the different subject positions of 
social and political agents. 76 
The second problem concerns the conception of politics employed by 
Oakeshott. 77 For Oakeshott, politics takes place within the shared language of 
civility, which defines the 'we/us' of the res publica. He has no conception of 
politics as hegemonic struggles over the constitution of the political community, 
which involves the construction of a 'we/us' and the positing of a 'they/them/the 
Other', whether in the form of an adversary or an enemy. Hence, he cannot 
account for the above attempt to redefine the content of the res publica through 
hegemonic struggles. 
74 See: Oakeshott, M. (11975) On Human Conduct. (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Mouffe, C. (1991 b) 
Op. Cit. pp. 70-82; Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. pp. 269-71. 
75 Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 270. 
76 Mouffe, C. (11991 b) Op. Cit. p. 79. 
77 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 270. 
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Hence, the second problem introduces the significance of hegemony. It is 
through hegemonic struggle that the EU would submit to a radical interpretation of 
the principles of freedom and equality, and thus, be introduced to a new social 
imaginary of citizenship. Yet, this second problem also introduces the significance 
of social antagonism. As indicated by Moufffe, the constitution of a European 
political community or res publica that includes both Britain and Continental 
Europe would involve the construction of a new 'we/us' and the positing of a new 
'they/them/the Other' (whether in the form of an adversary or an enemy). The 
content of this new and universal European res publica would have to be defined 
through hegemonic struggles at the supranational level. 
In sum, by introducing hegemony and social antagonism into the arguments of 
Oakeshott, and thereby changing the content of the ethico-political principles of 
his res publica, a conception of European democratic citizenship can be 
developed in which citizenship becomes a matter of adhering to ethico-political 
principles defined by a politically constructed European political community. It can 
thus be concluded that the European community is constitutive of European 
citizenship. 
Such a discourse-theoretical conception of a European community would not 
represent a liberal-instru mental nor a communitarian-substantive conception. 
Rather, it would be a social imaginary that defines a European political common 
good, shaped in and through exclusionary hegemonic struggles. In other words, 
the European political community should not be conceived as an empirical 
referent, that is, as a group of people unified by the presence of a mechanical or 
organic community. Rather, it should be conceived as a discursive surface of 
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inscription that permits the construction of a universal political identification by 
advancing a particular conceptual ization of the empty signifier (or nodal point) of 
the political common good. 78 Here, European democratic citizens would neither 
be mere bearers of universal European rights, nor servants of a European state 
governed by a substantive conception of the common good. Rather, the 
European democratic citizenship would be a: 
... common political identity of persons who might be involved in many different communities and who have differing conceptions of the good, 
but who accept submission to certain authoritative rules of condU Ct. 79 
These European democratic citizens would take an active role in the interpretation 
and constant re-enactment of the universal rules of conduct and correlative 
ethico-principles which, rather than prescribing a substantive consensus, would 
function as a kind of 'vanishing point' around which a radical plural democracy in 
Europe would be organized. 80 
2.6. The tension between public and private spheres 
As explained above, a radical democratic citizenship would challenge illegitimate 
subordination in all social spheres of Europe. However, this would not mean that 
the private sphere would be eradicated because it is invaded by public concerns 
of freedom and equality. The distinction between private and public can be 
maintained as a distinction between individual and citizen. 81 Our wants, choices 
and decisions are private because they are our own individual responsibility, but 
our performances are public because they must subscribe to the conditions and 
principles specified by our European democratic citizenship: 
78 Mouffe, C. (1 992b) Op. Cit. p. 30. 
79 Ibid. pp. 30-1. 
80 See: Torfing, J. (1999) Op. Cit. p. 271. 
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The identities qua individual and qua citizen are preserved, and non is 
sacrificed to the other; they coexist in a permanent tension that can be 
never be reconciled. 82 
Thus, the project of a radical plural democracy and citizenship aims to 
reformulate, rather than reject, the distinction between the public and private. It 
follows that, in Europe, we would all live in a state of permanent tension between 
our private identity as different individuals and our public identity as equivalential 
European citizens. Here, it would be only when our acts and values had direct 
consequences for our common social hopes and living conditions that we could 
be held responsible as radical democratic citizens. 83 
3.0. The credibility of a radical plural democracy for Europe 
As will now be discussed, there are various limitations for the application of 
radical plural democracy to the question of developing a democratic and universal 
European identity. 84 First, there is the problem posed by Mouffe's plural 
democratic proposition that we should preserve the different interpretations of the 
same principles, that is, the different signifieds of signifiers. As explained above, 
democracy as agonistic pluralism would give a democratic outlet to political 
81 Mouffe, C. (1992b). Op. Cit. p. 32. 
82 Ibid. 
83 See: Mouffe, C. (1991 b) Op. Cit. p. 81. 
84 For a broader discussion of the theoretical problems for discourse theory invoked by the pursuit 
of a radical plural democracy, as well as their possible resolution, see for example: Critchley, S. 
(11998) 'Metaphysics in the Dark', Political Theory, Volume 26, No. 6, pp. 803-17; Critchley, S. 
(1992) The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. (Oxford: Blackwell); Howarth, D. (1996) 
'Ideology, Hegemony and Political Subjectivity, in 1. Hampsher-Monk and J. Stanyer (eds) 
Contemporary Political Studies 1996, Volume 2, pp. 951-4; Norval, A. J. (2000) 'Trajectories of 
Future Research in Discourse Theory' in Howarth, D., A. J. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (eds) 
Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. (Manchester, 
New York: Manchester University Press). p. 231; Townsend, J. (2003) 'Discourse Theory and 
Political Analysis: A New Paradigm from the Essex School? ', British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, Volume 5, No. 1, February, pp. 137-41, and Butler, J., E. Laclau and S. 
Zi2ek (2000) Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left. (London: 
Verso). pp. 80-1,295. 
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conflicts rather than seeking to eliminate them. 85 This would be achieved by 
securing a political consensus on basic democratic values and procedures while 
allowing dissent over the intepretation of their precise meaning and their 
implications for our political choice between different ways of organizing society. 
The limit for the agonistic inclusion of 'enemies' as 'legitimate adversaries' would 
be those who apply 'anti-democratic' means in their attack on these democratic 
values and procedures. 
However, in contrast to Mouffe's propositions, this thesis argues that it is not 
enough to simply secure this consensus. That is, we cannot allow dissent over the 
precise intepretation of these basic democratic values and procedures. If there is 
such disagreement, then there is no basic political consensus. As Chapter 4 
illustrated, it is precisely such different interpretations of the same principles that 
obstructs the possibility of political consensus and progress towards a common 
identity and citizenship. Indeed, such a conception of democracy as agonistic 
pluralism seems to reflect the status quo in Europe. At present, the EU represents 
intergovernmental cooperation between conflicting nation states with a common 
commitment to subsidiarity and 'an ever closer union. However, as Chapter 4 
emphasized, if there is disagreement over the precise meaning of such key 
principles, then there is no agreement or progress towards an integrated Europe. 
As was argued in Chapter 4, what Europe requires is a common political 
vocabulary so that agreement signifies agreement. The existing multitude of 
floating signifiers need to be structured into a unified European discourse through 
the intervention of a 'nodal point' which stops their sliding and fixes their 
85 Mouffe, C. (1994) Op. Cit. p. 109. 
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meaning. 86As Chapter 4 of this thesis illustrates, 'subsidiarityl, 'federalism' and 
'European Union' are floating signifiers, because they are overflowed with meaning 
as they are articulated differently within the different discourses of the member 
states of the EU. Similar to these principles, concepts of 'liberty' and 'democracy', 
and thus, 'freedom and equality', are floating signifiers because they are also 
articulated differently within these conflicting discursive systems of identity. Thus, 
what is needed is a nodal point, an 'empty signifier' that can fix the content of 
these key floating signifiers by articulating them within a universal chain of 
equivalence. 87 Following Mouffe's own propositions, by quilting floating signifiers 
(such as, European union, democracy, subsidiarity, freedom and equality, and so) 
through the nodal points of 'radical democratic citizenship' and 'radical plural 
democracy', we can determine a radical democratic chain of meaning, and thus, a 
universal content for a European constitutive common good. Hence, we arrive at 
the conception of a politically defined and universal European community that is 
constitutive of a European citizenship. 
As Chapter 4 also illustrated, the process of European integration reflects a 
hegemonic struggle over the meaning of these key floating signifiers. There is a 
political battle between British liberal-individualism and Continental European 
liberal democracy' over which shall determine their meaning. By moving beyond 
both liberalism and communitarianism, a radical democratic citizenship could help 
overcome this conflict. Until then, the conflict over the meaning of these key 
principles raises the question of who will, or who should, decide upon which 
interpretation is implemented in practice? 
86 See: Laclau, E. and C. Mouffe (1985) Op. Cit. p. 112; Zi2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 87. 
87 2i2ek, S. (1989) Op. Cit. p. 97. 
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Moreover, it is clearly unhelpful to simply demand that what are perceived 'anti- 
democratic' movements should stick to democratic rules of the game and commit 
themselves to such basic democratic values. Indeed, who decides what values 
and procedures are democratic in the first place, and thus, who is to be perceived 
as a legitimate adversary or an anti-democratic enemy? Such demands and 
decisions could lead to the totalitarian nightmare that we are trying to avoid, and 
they raise the question of who has the authority to make them? As examined 
below, the concept of hegemony may help answer these questions, but it does 
not ensure the prevention of what may be perceived as 'undemocratic' means in 
enforcing these 'democratic' rules of the game and their interpretation. If these 
decisions are decided by hegemonic struggle, then it is also likely that the ruling 
values of Western European capitalism will survive. Thus, no genuine progress 
towards 'an ever closer union' would be achieved because any alternative values 
and procedures may be perceived by the ruling hegemony force as 'anti- 
democratic' and thus, subordinate potential agents of change may be constructed 
as 'enemies' rather than 'legitimate adversaries' - and treated as such. 
It is ethnocentric and undemocratic to demand that others should stick to Mouffe's 
democratic rules and values. Indeed, despite her own anti-essentialist critique of 
the ethnoscentrism of modernity, it can be argued that her'rules of the game' are 
Eurocentric because they privilege a Western European interpretation of liberal 
democracy. Such Eurocentrism is particularly unhelpful in the pursuit of British- 
European integration because Britain is outside this Western European tradition. 
As emphasized in Chapter 5, Britain opposes this liberal democratic tradition 
because it represents its constitutive outside. To elucidate, Continental Europe 
(and thus, the EU) has been consistently constructed as an 'antagonistic enemy' 
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rather than a 'legitimate adversary' of Britain. That is, for the British (discursive 
system of) identity, Continental Europe is outside the limit for the inclusion of 
'enemies' as 'legitimate adversaries'. Indeed, as we have seen, the limits of the 
British identity have been constructed in opposition to Continental Europe (and 
thus, the EU) as its radical (and threatening) otherness (or constitutive outside). 
That is, it involved the construction of a social antagonism. 
As Chapter 5 also illustrated, this antagonism reflects a difference in discourse 
between Britain and Continental Europe, which is reflected in the different 
interpretations of basic democratic values and procedures, as was demonstrated 
in Chapter 4. Therefore, rather than helping us find new ways of achieving 
universal agreement or consensus, Mouffe's conception of an agonistic 
democracy would only reinforce existing antagonisms between Britain and 
Continental Europe, and the problems this creates for supranational decision- 
making. Indeed, as indicated by Parts /-// of this thesis, it can be safely assumed 
that Britain would oppose these conflicting and 'alien' democratic authoritative 
rules of conduct, and thus, the question still remains of how to invoke such radical 
democratic change in Britain. Moreover, although the nomadization and 
hybridization of identity may contribute to the dissolution of antagonistic frontiers 
without invoking these problems, there is still the difficulty of how to implement 
them in practice. 
There are similar problems with Mouffe's conception of a radical plural democratic 
citizenship. For example, to challenge the anti-democratic offensive, a radical 
democratic citizenship would create a collective identity between all those 
struggling against 'illegitimate' forms of subordination. Following Mouffe, this 
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citizenship would be constructed by a universal submission to a radical 
interpretation of the principles of 'freedom and equality for all' that would be 
embodied in a ethico-political grammar of conduct. As Mouffe claims, this radical 
democratic citizenship would challenge all illegitimate subordination because it is 
a fact that no sphere is immune from the principles of freedom and equality. 
However, in accordance with Mouffe's own propositions, what is considered to be 
'illegitimate subordination' will vary between different discursive systems of 
identities. Similarly, different interpretations of Mouffe's grammar of conduct would 
equal no progress towards a common European identity. The constitutive 
principles of 'freedom and equality for all' can be interpreted in many different 
ways, and they are interpreted differently by the conflicting discourses of Britain 
and Continental Europe. Indeed, the principles of 'freedom and equality for all' are 
particular to the Continental European discourse of liberal democracy that 
conflicts with the British discourse of liberal individualism. In this sense, Mouffe's 
propositions can be considered as Eurocentric because they privilege Western 
European principles and interpretations. Indeed, although no system may be 
immune to a radical interpretation of these principles, on what grounds can they 
be advanced as superior to others, such as those supported in Britain? How can 
British agents be persuaded to submit to these different rather than superior 
principles? As was argued, the relative success of the anti-democratic offensive in 
Britain has meant that it does not have the required democratic struggles to 
invoke such political change from within. With this in mind, can a hegemonic 
struggle at the supranational level really invoke such a significant change in 
British discourse? 
405 
Therefore, Mouffe's a democratic grammar of conduct produces exactly the 
same problems as the intepretation of the 'liberal-democratic rules of the game' in 
Mouffe's agonistic democracy. As this thesis emphasized in Chapter 4, British- 
European integration has been obstructed precisely because Britain and 
Continental Europe have different 'grammars of conduct' and different 
interpretations of the same principles. Hence, without a universal grammar of 
conduct, there can be no genuine progress towards an 'ever closer union. 
Furthermore, as for the modernist approaches to British-European integration 
examined by this thesis, as well as Tassin's Europe of the Mind', the second 
problem is that a radical plural democracy and citizenship reinforces the problems 
caused by Eurocentrism. Similar to Tassin, Laclau and Mouffe are critical of the 
national basis of Western European modernist discourse that limits its 
conceptions of democracy, community and citizenship. However, in contrast to 
Tassin's exploration of an ancient Platonic discourse that is outside the discourse 
of modernity, Laclau and Mouffe propose a radical deepening and expanding of 
the democratic revolution that was initiated within the existing discourse of 
modernity. Yet, although these projects represent different theoretical discourses, 
they are similar in the sense that they both represent Western European 
theoretical traditions. Moreover, similar to Tassin's 'Europe of the Mind', and 
despite their own critique of the ethnocentric universalism of modernity, Laclau 
and Mouffe's project of radical plural democracy is Eurocentric because it also 
privileges Western European ideas and values. It privileges 'democratic rules of 
the game and ethico-political principles that are specific to the Western European 
discourse of liberal democracy. As argued in Chapter 6, Section 3.1, in the 
absence of universal truths, there is no reason why others should accept this 
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position. Indeed, it is unhelpful to argue that the Britain Government should 
accept the privileged status of Continental European ideas and values. In direct 
contrast, British Eurosceptics have argued that we should oppose European 
integration to protect our superior British traditions. 
Crucial to the hypotheses of this thesis, Britain is not only outside the limits of 
Western European discourses, but they represent the radical otherness for its 
discursive system of identity. Indeed, it is precisely the British resistance to these 
Western European discourses that is reflected in its contemporary opposition to 
European political integration. With regard to the project of radical plural 
democracy, for example, Chapter 5 observed that the political principles 
embodied in Continental European initiatives for European integration can be 
traced back to the Democratic Revolution tradition that was initiated within the 
Continental European discourse of modernity. 
In all, the Eurocentric projects of Tassin and Laclau and Mouffe would certainly be 
conceived as credible for the development of an exclusively Continental European 
political community: Tassin would re-establish the'Europe of the Mind'and Laclau 
and Mouffe advance a radical interpretation of the liberal democratic principles 
that were initiated within the Continental European discourse of modernity. 
Moreover, these federal and 'bottom-up' democratic principles are congruent with 
a conception of a process of supranational integration. However, such projects 
would not help an integration process that included Britain. Since these projects 
reflect Continental European political traditions that represent Britain's radical 
otherness, Britain would remain outside the constitutive limits of the European 
system of identity. Indeed, as for the modernist approaches to British-European 
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integration examined by this thesis, these projects would be part of the problem 
rather than part of the solution because they would reinforce rather than resolve 
the existing British antagonism with Continental Europe. 
The third problem concerns Mouffe's conception of an 'associational democracy'. 
This concept of democracy requires the rejection of the individual as an 
I unencumbered self'that exists prior to, and independently of, social communities. 
Rather, individual rights would be established in and through the constitutive 
membership of a community. However, as for the projects of De Rougemont and 
Tassin in Chapter 6, it is such a British abstract conception of the individual as an 
i uncumbered self' that conflicts with the Continental European 'collectivist 5 
conception of the 9 social located' individual, as developed by Locke and 
Rousseau respectively (and explained in Chapter 4, Section 1.6.1). It is precisely 
this abstract liberal conception which explains why Britain cannot comprehend the 
notion of 'collective social rights I, and thus, that prevents it from understanding or 
accepting 'constitutive membership' of a European community. Thus, the crucial 
question still remains of how to dissolve this obstructing British hegemonic 
conception of liberalism. 
Finally, there is the practical problem of how to invoke such radical plural 
democratic changes in Britain. Indeed, despite Preston's conclusion that we need 
to search for extemal agents of democratic change, it seems unlikely that Britain 
will allow any such change to emanate from Europe. As argued in Chapter 5, it 
was precisely because Continental Europe was identified as a predominant 
external force of interference that led to its construction as Britain's radical 
otherness in the first place. As reflected in their resistance to the Democratic 
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Revolution and the current process of European political integration, British 
hegemonic forces have successfully opposed such interference by constructing 
Europe (and thus, the EU) as a threat to order and stability, and therefore, as an 
enemy of the British nation. Moreover, as argued in Chapter 5 and by Preston et 
al in Chapter 2, it is apparent that Britain has successfully obstructed democratic 
change from non-European external forces. 
This is a pesisimistic picture, especially if we consider that Preston's search for 
external agents was guided by his initial conclusion that Britain lacked any 
potential intemal agents that could invoke democratic change from within. Indeed, 
as Chapter 5 observed, British hegemonic forces have resisted the development 
of effective internal democratic struggles. In accordance with Laclau and Mouffe's 
observations, Britain has experienced the commodification, bureaucratization and 
homogenization of social relations, but not the described reformulation of liberal- 
democratic ideology resulting from an expansion of struggles for equality. As 
indicated in Chapter 5, such a 'questioning of the relations of subordination' is 
absent in Britain because hegemonic forces have created a largely passive 
population which either (at least tacitly) accepts that British government 
represents the public interest, or is little motivated to actively challenge that 
notion. Hence, such struggles can only exist within parliament but not outside it at 
the level of the social. In sum, similar to Preston et al, this thesis observes that 
Britain has successfully resisted both internal and external forces of democratic 
change. 
Furthermore, it is precisely because Britain has constructed the Continental 
European democratic tradition as its constitutive outside that explains why it does 
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not have the necessary internal agents for democratic change, and thus, the 
necessary conditions for a radical plural democracy. As illustrated, Laclau and 
Mouffe argue that the extension of the Democratic Revolution will provide 
sufficient condition for the creation of democratic antagonisms, and radical plural 
democracy provides a way of turning these democratic antagonisms into 
democratic struggles directed towards a wide-ranging democratization of social 
life. A proliferation of new social movements are identified as such potential 
agents of democratic change. However, the relative success of the British anti- 
democratic offensive has prevented the development of the democratic 
antagonisms that could become such democratic struggles. Indeed, the success 
of the British anti-democratic offensive is precisely what has prevented such a 
proliferation of new social movements. Consequently, Britain would remain 
outside the constitutive limits of the European discursive system of identity that 
would be constructed by a democratic equivalence between these new social 
movements in pursuit of a radical plural democracy and citizenship. 
The British anti-democratic offensive has obstructed the development of the 
Democratic Revolution, and thus, the democratic rules and procedures, and the 
ethico-political principles of 'freedom and equality for all I, in the same way (and for 
the same reasons) as they have obstructed the process of European political 
integration. It is this same anti-democratic resistance that has obstructed these 
external democratic forces that has obstructed the emergence of internal 
democratic principles and struggles. 
Of course, and as emphasized by a discourse-theoretical approach, it is certainly 
possible that new internal or external agents of change will develop. The electoral 
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defeat of the Conservative Party by New Labour may pave the way to such 
internal change from the 'top down'. For example, at the European Council 
meeting on 19-20 June 2003, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, expressed his 
support for a European constitution88, and he has also argued that 
Euroscepticism was an 'out of date delusion'. 89 Similarly, the Foreign Secretary, 
Jack Straw, said it was a matter of 'positive patriotism'that Britain should pursue a 
strong relationship with its European partners by taking a full part in the creation 
of this constitution. 90 In addition, the Liberal Democrats have demonstrated a 
positive commitment to European integration in consecutive manifestos. 91 
However, as this thesis has demonstrated in relation to John Major's attempt to 
put Britain in the 'heart of Europe, the Europhile position by the present British 
leadership does not necessarily reflect the majority position of British Government 
and Parliament, and thus, it will not necessarily lead to a more positive approach 
to European integration. Moreover, reflecting Britain traditional intergovernmental 
position, Jack Straw predicted that the final document would further entrench the 
role of nation states as the driving force behind the EU. 92 Furthermore, reflecting 
John Major's self-declared victory over of TEU, as examined in Chapter 4, the 
publication of this draft constitution on Monday 26 May was spun by the Labour 
88 See, for example: Blair, T. (2003a) 'Anti- European ism is an Out of Date Delusion', Speech by 
Prime Minister Tony Blair on the future of the European Union, Warsaw, Poland, Friday 30 May, 
http: //www. labour. org. uk/warsaweurope; Blair, T. (2003b) Prime Minister's Statement on European 
Council Meeting in Greece on 19 and 20 June, Monday 23 June, 
http: //www. labour. org. uk/pmtbeuropeancouncil. ) 
89 Blair, T. (2003a) Op. Cit. 
90 See, for example: The Guardian (2003b) EU Constitution 'No Threat to UK Identity, Press 
Association, Wednesday 18 June, http: //politics. guardian. co. uk/eu/story/0,9061,980035,00. html 
91 See, for example, the Liberal Democrat federal manifesto for the 2001 General Election. Britain's 
Role in the European Union: Your say in Europe. Uploaded 9 August 2001, 
http: //www. Iibdems. org. uk/index. cfm/page. folders/section. policy/folder. manifestos 
92 The Guardian (2003b) Op Cit. 
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Government as a victory for omitting the word 'federal'. 93 In addition, similar to 
the Conservative Government's rejection of the Social Charter and the Social 
Chapter of the TEU, proposals within this draft constitution include a legally 
binding charter of fundamental rights that has been opposed by the British 
leadership. 94 Also, with regard to the Liberal Democrats, the British plural electoral 
system and the two-party system of government have undermined their position of 
power. 
Nevertheless, in the absence of hegemonic agents of democratic change, it is still 
remains possible for a new European universal identity to be constructed by 
identifying a new universal radical otherness. As observed in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 5, such a universal chain of equivalence was invoked by the discursive 
effects of the external threat of Nazism that confronted the allied powers during 
the Second World War. Faced with a common enemy, the allied British and 
European national governments emphasized their common commitment to 
peace, freedom and democracy. However, these common values were emptied to 
the degree that they became empty signifiers; merely symbolizing a European 
communitarian space deprived of its fullness due to the presence of the evil 
forces of Nazism. Similarly, the excluded elements that were considered to 
represent Nazism were emptied to the point that could only be defined as a threat 
to Europe. That is, they represented 'anti-Europe'. Thus, it may take such a large 
external threat to develop a universal European identity and a universal 
commitment to democratic principles. In the absence of such a threat, it is 
probable that Britain will continue to obstruct the development of anything more 
than only a thin European identity in pursuit of a commonality that represents a 
93 The Guardian (2003a) EU Convention to unveil Charter of Rights, Matthew Tempest and 
agencies, 10-45arn update Tuesday, 27 May. 
http: //politics. guardian. co. uk/eu/story/0,9061,964182,00. html 
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global capitalist economic interests. That is, unless the British obstruction is 
removed, it is unlikely that economic integration will lead to the constitution of a 
thick European Community, as predicted by Preston and the 'spill-over logic of 
neo-functionalism. 
4.0. Practical implications 
Finally, we now turn to the practical implications of the theoretical arguments for a 
radical plural democracy. This chapter has argued that the development of a 
European political community requires the construction of a constitutive 
supranational citizenship that requires the active participation of its citizens. As 
citizens of this community, they must participate in the development of a 
supranational political-ethico common good that provides and defends their 
common civic rights. They must also be able to actively engage in the constant re- 
enactments of this common good. It is only through such active and constant 
participation that citizens will achieve a sense of the right, a conception of justice, 
and a feeling of belonging. 
However, as Chapter 6 observed, such active participation has not been 
successfully encouraged from the top-down and it has not evolved from the 
bottom-up. To help encourage such citizen participation, there are four demands 
on European identity formation that must be met. First, the EU must make the 
people feel that voting in European elections is a citizen obligation and not just a 
cost-benefit calculation. Second, it must encourage people to vote in such 
contests with European and not national priorities in mind. Third, it must support a 
94 See: Ibid. See also: http: //politics. guardian-co. uk/eu/story/0,9061,981152,00. html). 
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European public forum of shared communication and debate. Fourth, it must 
produce widespread acceptance of supranationally defined democratic outcomes. 
In terms of education, the EU must also address the problem that a significant 
number of citizens do not feel informed about European issues and do not 
understand its political system. 95 The EU must also challenge the Eurosceptic 
perceptions of a non-democratic bureaucratic superstate that is far removed from 
the lives and interests of its citizens that it imposes upon. For example, it could 
advertise that the EP is freerer than its national counterparts of executive 
domination. 96 Indeed, it could publicly compare itself to the more centralized 
system of government that exists in Britain. This could improve public support by 
exposing the contradictions within the pragmatic British Eurosceptic concern for 
the undemocratic accountability of the EU. However, the EU still requires a more 
positive image to promote. It must address the democratic deficits that have 
alienated the citizenry from the process. Citizens will not feel part of the European 
political community if they feel that they cannot play an active role in the decisions 
that shape its development. 
Of course, the existing intergovernmental shape of the EU does not provide a 
basis for such a supranational political community. This form serves to dampen 
public participation in the process because the citizenry know that the EU merely 
reflects a collection of their already-expressed and exacted national interests 
rather than a new collective supranational interest. To improve its supranational 
democratic accountability, the executive power of the EU (that is, the Council of 
95 See: Magnette, P. (2003)'European Governance and Civic Participation: Beyond Elitist 
CitizenshipT, Political Studies, Volume 51, No. 1, p. 148. See also: Hix, S. (1999) The Political 
system of the European Union. (London: Macmillan). 
96 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. (London, New York: 
Longman). p. 83. For a discussion of the performance of the EU, see: Ibid. pp. 94-122. 
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Ministers and the Commission) must become politically responsible to a more 
powerful EP that is, in turn, answerable to a European-wide electorate. The EP 
could be given a final say in the making of new laws. It could also be given a fuller 
role in the formation and political survival of the Commission. The participation of 
a supranational citizenry could also be improved by giving them the power to elect 
the Commission and its Presidency. 97 Pan-European referenda could be held on 
major issues, possibly at the same time as elections to the EP. 98 
In sum, effective supranational democratic legitimation requires four components. 
First, openness and transparency of process, so that the public, its European 
representatives can view, understand and receive justifications for executive 
decisions. Second, EU leadership must be obliged to give explanations and 
answer questions to a publicly visible EP that would need, in turn, to be endowed 
with sanctions to publicly identify and remove office holders. Third, a strong and 
publicly accessible Court of justice to sustain and defend citizen rights. Fourth, the 
scope to use European elections to remove political leadership or to 'guard the 
guardians' by sanctioning members of a EP who have been insufficiently vigilant 
on their behalf. 99 
Moreover, this chapter has emphasized that the European political community 
must be constructed from a shared commitment to common civic rights and 
values. Such 'constitutional patriotism' demands a European written constitution 
that reflects the liberal democratic principle of popular sovereignty that confirms 
97 Bogdanor, V. (1986) 'The Future of the EC: Two Models of Democracy', Government and 
Opposition, Volume 21, No. 2, pp. 161-76, and Bogdanor, V. (1996)'The European Union, the 
Political Class and the People', in: J. Hayward (ed. ) Elitism, Populism and European Politics. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press). 
98 Weiler, J. H. H. (1997) 'Legitimacy and Democracy of Union Governance', in: G. Edwards and A. 
Pijpers (eds) The Politics of European Treaty Reform. (London: Pinter). 
99 Beetham, D. and C. Lord (1998) Op. Cit. p. 82-3. 
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that political authority in Europe lies with its citizenry. The draft European 
Constitutional Treaty (2003), which includes a legally binding charter of 
fundamental rights, is a positive move in this direction. 
In all, the development of a European identity requires the construction of a 
common European citizenship that requires public participation in a shared 
political future. In practice, this requires the guarantee of rights as well as equality 
of respect and opportunity. Such guarantees would also give citizens the 
confidence that their basic interests would not be infringed by any electoral defeat 
at the European level, and would serve to limit what was at stake in the electoral 
contest. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined Laclau and Mouffe's project for a radical plural 
democracy and citizenship to see whether it could provide the means for 
developing a new universal and democratic European identity. That is, it was 
assessed whether it could provide a new credible social imaginary for Europe that 
could dissolve the existing national antagonisms and capitalist focus upon 
effective global economic competition. 
Relatedly, by articulating a new egalitarian ideal that is sensitive to the 
contemporary proliferation of democratic struggles, this chapter considered 
whether a radical plural democracy and citizenship could challenge the neo-liberal 
'anti-democratic offensive' that has been particularly strong in Britain, as reflected 
in the resistance to European political integration. These particularist struggles 
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could be unified to develop a new universal hegemonic project for the European 
Left, and such a democratic equivalence could be established by developing a 
collective will that represents the liberal democratic pursuit of 'freedom and 
equality for all'. In the aim of developing a supranational European identity, these 
new social movements would be progressive agents of change because they 
would represent democratic struggles that transcend national subject positions. 
Moreover, as argued in Chapter 6, such non-national hegemonic agents could 
help us construct a universal that does not reflect the particularisms of any single 
member state. In addition, rather than attempting to dissolve political conflicts 
between member states, Mouffe argues that we should make such national 
antagonisms compatible with pluralist democracy by turning 'antagonism' into 
lagonism'. By pursing an agonistic democracy, we could make room for a new 
confrontational politics between member states who agree upon the 'democratic 
rules of the game' while disagreeing about the precise interpretation of these 
rules. 
In all, this chapter has shown how a European radical plural democracy and 
citizenship could be constituted by a universal commitment to democratic rules 
and procedures and a grammar of content that embodies its corresponding 
ethico-political principles of 'freedom and equality for all'. This thesis accepts that 
radical plural democracy would provide a progressive social imaginary for Europe. 
The pursuit of an 'ever closer union' would reflect a common commitment to 
democracy rather than to just economic competitiveness in the global capitalist 
market. However, as was discussed above and will now be summarized, there are 
various problems and limitations. 
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First, a radical plural democracy and citizenship would not overcome the problem 
posed by different interpretations of the same key principles, as currently exists 
between the different discourses of Europe. Second, there is also the problem of 
identifying potential agents of change for Britain. Third, the Eurocentric conditions 
of a radical plural democracy and citizenship suggest that Britain would remain 
outside its constitutive limits, and thus, it would reinforce rather than resolve the 
existing antagonism between Britain and Continental Europe that has obstructed 
the process of European integration. Fourth, as for Tassin's conception of a 
federal European political community, Mouffe's 'associational democracy' would 
be obstructed by Britain's aberrant liberal conception of the abstract individual. 
However, for both these projects, although their proposed federal and 'bottom-up' 
democratic principles are Eurocentric, it is precisely these principles that make 
them amenable to a process of supranational integration. In all, the problem is 
that these projects do not provide an effective means of invoking such 
progressive principles in discourses that do not already have the necessary 
political conditions, as evidenced by Britain. Nevertheless, with the problems of 
radical plural democracy aside, Laclau and Mouffe's concept of social antagonism 
can still elucidate upon how such progressive political change can be invoked in 
Britain, and how its antagonism with Europe can be dissolved, by developing a 
new universal constitutive outside in a confrontation with a common enemy or 
adversary that resides outside the constitutive limits of the EU. 
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Conclusion 
Summary of research finding 
, 
This thesis had two interrelated research aims: to make the phenomenon of 
British Euroscepticism intelligible in order to identify possible solutions to it, and to 
examine the possibility of a universal and democratic European identity. Part /I of 
this thesis applied the discourse-theoretical approach to the first aim and Part /// 
applied it to the second. 
Chapter 4 illustrated how the process of European (political) integration had been 
obstructed because Britain and Continental Europe had different (hegemonic) 
political and governmental discourses, and thus, conflicting interpretations of the 
same concepts and principles, such as 'federalism I, 'subsidiarity' and 'European 
union'. Such different interpretations of the same key principles had obstructed 
effective debate upon European integration. These principles were 'floating 
signifiers' because they had liberal democratic signifieds in Continental Europe 
and liberal-individualist signifieds in Britain. Consequently, they were ambiguous in 
the sense that agreement upon them did not represent any progress towards 'an 
ever closer union' because they signified different things to different member 
states. Therefore, agreement upon what is signified by such key signifiers is the 
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crucial starting point for the development of a European union. As for the 
theoretical analysis of the European process, there has to be a universal 
discourse -a common set of ideas and meanings - before judgements and 
decisions can be meaningful and commonly applied. 
It was observed that the British political discourse of liberal-individualism informed 
a plural conception of international relations as a sphere of competing individual 
member states (that is, 'liberal-individualism writ large'). By contrast, the 
Continental European political discourse of liberal democracy privileged a 
conception of a supranational European community that reflected the republican 
democratic rationale of unity and a common good. In terms of governmental 
discourse, the 'bottom up' Continental European conceptions of popular 
sovereignty and participatory responsive government allowed for supranational 
government, but the British upper national limits of absolute parliamentary 
sovereignty and representative responsible government did not. In sum, British 
political and governmental discourse reflected a liberal-individualist or realist 
conception of intergovernmental cooperation and Continental European discourse 
reflected a neo-functionalist conception of European supranational integration. 
The aim of Chapter 5 was to explain why British discourse had developed in 
opposition to Continental European discourse, and why Britain opposed European 
integration as a consequence. To this end, the discourse-theoretical concept of 
social antagonism was applied to explain how this conflict in discourse reflected a 
British antagonism with Continental Europe. It was demonstrated that the 
construction of the British (discursive system of) identity involved the construction 
of this antagonism, and thus, that British-European integration was obstructed 
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because Continental Europe and its hegemonic discourse represented its 
'constitutive outside' (or its 'radical and threatening otherness'). In sum, British 
Euroscepticism represented a British antagonism with Continental Europe, and 
thus, with the EU. 
This antagonism was a discursive response to dislocation. The British identity was 
disrupted by dislocations that were harnessed through the construction of this 
antagonism. These dislocations opened gaps in the British discursive structure 
that were sutured by myths constructed by hegemonic projects. That is, these 
hegemonic projects responded to the desire for order and stability invoked by 
dislocation. Significant to our understanding of Euroscepticism, the myths of 
'parliamentary liberalism' and the 'British nation' were constructed in opposition to 
Continental Europe and its hegemonic discourse because it was identified as a 
cause of dislocation. Thus, Continental Europe and its hegemonic discourse 
represented their constitutive outside. These Eurosceptic myths were discursively 
articulated as 'national parliamentary liberalism', and as a consequence of their 
hegemonic success, they became articulated moments of the British discursive 
system of identity. 
In Part ///, Chapter 6 observed that orthodox approaches to European integration 
have failed to resolve the tension between the two contradictory choices of 
supranationalism and intergovernmental ism, which reflects the problem posed by 
the universal and the particular. It was explained that we can overcome the pivotal 
dilemmas invoked by such conceptual dyads by deconstructing their contradictory 
principles and inscribing them within a Derridean undecidable logic that 
incorporated both without privileging one or the other. 
421 
It was also argued that orthodox modernist approaches to European integration 
have failed to resolve the identity and democratic deficits of the EU. Such 
approaches have reflected the same nationalist and capitalist foundations of 
modernity that have prevented the possibility of a universal and democratic 
European identity. Moreover, the discourse of modernity no longer pertains to the 
contemporary world. As modernist approaches were originally developed for 
national and homogeneous societies, they obstruct democratic representation of 
supranational and multicultural communities such as Europe. Furthermore, the 
essentialist and Eurocentric foundation of modernity has limited the possibility of 
progressive change because its ideas are advanced as the necessary and true 
body of the universal. 
In response to these problems, it was revealed how the unresolvable tension 
between universalism and particularism makes it possible to break the attachment 
of the European universal with the particular content of modernity. In all, it must be 
recognised that the existing universal discourse of modernity is problematic and 
contingent, and thus, that it must and can be modified. 
To complete this thesis, Chapter 7 assessed whether Laclau and Mouffe's project 
for a radical plural democracy and citizenship could provide a more credible 
content for the European universal. To overcome national antagonisms, I argued 
that we need to identity non-national hegemonic agents that can construct a 
European universal that does not reflect the particularisms of any single member 
state. Following Laclau and Mouffe, such agents could be the proliferation of new 
social movements. These social movements would be progressive because they 
represent struggles that transcend national boundaries and antagonisms. 
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Moreover, they would hegemonize a more democratic content for the European 
universal. They could also be successful hegemonic agents because they 
represent political struggles that reflect the increasing diversity in identifications 
and subject positions in contemporary Europe. Additionally, the hybridization and 
nomadization of identity could contribute to the dissolution of antagonistic 
frontiers. We could also make existing national antagonisms compatible with 
plural democracy by turning antagonism into agonism. 
Section 2 of this chapter considered the possibility of developing Mouffe's 
conception of a radical plural democratic citizenship in Europe. It was proposed 
that this radical reworking of liberal and communitarian traditions would provide a 
progressive citizenship for Europe. Moreover, since it represents a move beyond 
both liberalism and communitarianism, it would help resolve the conflict between 
British liberal-individualism and Continental European republican (and social) 
democracy that has obstructed the construction of a universal European 
community. 
The implications of the discourse-theoretical approach 
In Part // of this thesis, social antagonism proved to be a very effective concept for 
explaining the problem of British Euroscepticism as well as providing a solution. In 
Part /1, it was explained how this antagonism could be dissolved by constructing a 
new social antagonism with an enemy or adversary outside the constitutive limits 
of a universal European identity. That is, the dissolution of one antagonism 
requires the construction of another. Thus, in broader terms, the concept of social 
antagonism provides a valuable means for conceiving how progressive change in 
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both Britain and Europe is possible. It explains how both discursive systems of 
identity can be reconstructed, and antagonisms between them dissolved, by 
developing a new universal constitutive outside. Thus, there is a danger that the 
dissolution of existing antagonisms may result from the identification of a new 
radical otherness that has greater costs. For instance, similar to the unifying 
effects of World War 11, contemporary political events suggest that Europe may 
become unified in a war with the Middle East. 
The concept of hegemony was also instructive to our understanding of how to 
resolve the British obstruction to European integration. It explains how 
deconstruction and reconstitution of identity is achieved in and through new 
hegemonic struggles. Thus, it makes it possible to conceive how we can 
deconstruct the British national identity and constitute a new universal European 
identity. The content of a new universal European political community would be 
defined through hegemonic struggles at a supranational level. 
Following Laclau and Mouffe, it is through such hegemonic struggle that Europe 
could be introduced to a new radical democratic social imaginary. Moreover, it 
would be through this supranational hegemonic struggle that Britain would submit 
to these radical democratic rules and principles, and as a consequence, become 
part of this new universal European discursive system of identity. By identifying 
non-national hegemonic agents for this project, the new social imaginary would 
dissolve the national antagonisms that have obstructed supranational integration 
in the past. 
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Most crucially, it is the anti-essentialism of discourse theory that can provide the 
impetus for such progressive change. Once we accept that the precarious unity of 
multiple selves is not determined by any essentialist identity, we can begin to 
construct a new universal European community that dissolves existing national 
antagonisms. With regard to changes in discourse, the anti-essentialist 
perspective provides an effective way of questioning existing hegemonic projects 
by undermining their claim to truth. It is such questioning that makes progressive 
change possible. As discourse theory emphasizes, discourses are not determined 
or privileged by any essence or foundation. Rather than being self-evident and 
uncontroversial, discourses are contingent and are the result of political decisions 
taken by hegemonic agents in the undecidable terrain. Although they may become 
sedimented and instutionalized over time, their political and controversial status 
can be re-activated when they are put into question. Therefore, with regard to 
European integration, any 'awkward' discursive moments are open to dispute and 
change. 
Moreover, in accordance with its anti-essentialist propositions, discourse theory 
rejects structural determinism and advances a concept of structural dislocation 
that widens the field of the possible. Dislocation deprives the structure of its 
determining capacity, and thus, reveals the limit, incapacity, and contingency of 
any discursive structure. As dislocation is the concept of the impossibility of 
structural determination, it is the very form of temporality, possibility and freedom. 
In political terms, Part I// of this thesis emphasized that an increase in participation 
is crucial to the future development of the EU. Four observations pointed to this 
conclusion. First, participation would provide the sense of belonging at the 
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European level that is required to overcome the sense of nationhood that has 
obstructed supranational integration process. Second, there has been a steady 
decline in participation in European elections, and combined with the 'second- 
order' problem, this low electoral turnout is undermining the existing democratic 
procedures of the EU. Third, the significance of participation is emphasized when 
we accept the constitutive impurity of representation and abandon the pursuit of 
perfect representation. Finally, a European political community is constitutive of a 
European citizenship that requires citizens to participate in the construction of their 
shared political future by actively engaging in the constant re-enactment of the 
political common good. It is only through such active and constant participation 
that citizens will achieve a sense of the right, a conception of justice, and a feeling 
of belonging. 
The problem is how to invoke such an increase in participation. Here, there is a 
vicious cycle in the sense that, although participation rather than representation 
may be the key, an improvement in democratic representation and accountability 
is required to give the people of Europe a reason to participate. Thus, the EU 
must address the democratic deficits that have alienated the citizenry from the 
process of European integration. Citizens will not feel part of the European 
political community if they feel that they cannot play an active role in the decisions 
that shape its development. To overcome the apathy that is evident within 
previous European elections, people must feel that their vote in elections counts 
for something and that it has an impact upon the future shape of Europe as well 
as their own lives. In particular, participation is dampened by the knowledge that 
elections do not give the people the power to elect or de-select their leadership or 
even choose between different manifestos. 
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Additionally, combined with a strong and publicly accessible Court of Justice, a 
written constitution would help provide the guarantee of rights that is necessary to 
give citizens the confidence that their basic interests would be protected against 
infringement by electoral outcomes at the European level. The draft European 
Constitutional Treaty (2003), which includes a legally binding charter of 
fundamental rights, is a positive move in this direction. 
In terms of education, the EU must address the problem that a significant number 
of citizens do not feel informed about European issues and do not understand its 
political system. The EU must also challenge the Eurosceptic perception of a non- 
democratic bureaucratic superstate that is far removed from the lives and interests 
of the citizens that it imposes upon. For example, it could advertise that the EP 
suffers from less executive domination than its national counterparts. Indeed, it 
could publicly compare itself to the more centralized system of government that 
exists in Britain. This would also improve public support by exposing the 
contradictions within the pragmatic British Eurosceptic concern for the 
undemocratic accountability of the EU. However, the EU still requires a more 
posi ive mage to promote. The episodes of fraud and budget mismanagement 
only serve to reinforce negative Eurosceptic images of a corrupt European 
superstate. 
Discourse theory as a methodological framework for political analysis 
With regard to political research, essentialist and reductionist theoretical 
methodologies can be limited by their failure to consider the valuable insights that 
other theoretical paradigms may contribute. In contrast, discourse theory openly 
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endorses methodological flexibility and pluralism, and warns against any totalising 
master methodology. Following Derrida, we must be methodological bricoleurs, 
always ready to adapt our methodology to new challenges and circumstances. We 
must refrain from the misguided pursuit of an all-purpose technique for political 
analysis. The methodology applied may vary from study, and the development of 
a totalizing master methodology will only serve to repress new forms of analysis 
that may improve our knowledge. 
Thus, congruent with the anti-essentialism of discourse theory, methodology 
should be flexible and open-minded. In terms of flexibility, it must be as fluid as 
the discourses it analyses. Since the discourses we study are constantly 
changing, we cannot solve the methodological question once and for all. A 
particular articulation of methodological paradigms will be effective for a particular 
study at a particular moment in time. In terms of openness, effective political 
analysis requires us to be ready to identify and embrace the strengths of other 
theoretical paradigms. 
Such an anti-essentialist approach to methodology allows discourse theory to 
circumvent difficulties in theoreticist, positivist and empirical forms of research. 
While acknowledging the importance of theoretical frameworks in forming the 
objects of research, its flexibility and openness allows it to be restructured in 
application. Such qualities make it possible to articulate and modify a plurality of 
concepts and theoretical frameworks to suit particular research foci. 
Similarly, to improve our understanding of Euroscepticism, we can explore and 
integrate other theories. For example, the contemporary social psychological 
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analyses of nationalism by Michael Billig', Susan Condoý, and Stephen Reicher 
and Nick HopkinS3 , could be articulated with a discourse-theoretical approach to 
this subject. Following the move in discourse theory itself, further application of the 
work of ZiZ'ek may also offer new valuable insights. We could also look to other 
post-structuralist theories, such as the analysis of sociolinguistics and symbolic 
power provided by Pierre Bourdieu. 
Future research possibilities 
This thesis focussed upon the British obstruction to the process of European 
integration that culminated in the ratification crisis of the TEU in 1992-3. To update 
this study, we could examine the impact of 'New Labour' upon previous obstructive 
positions. For example, we could compare the Labour Government's response to 
the new European constitution with previous British government reactions to 
EU/EC initiatives, such as the TEU. As this research focussed predominantly upon 
British govemmental discourse, we could also assess changes in attitude within all 
major political parties. 
Since 1992, it is apparent that there have been political changes in Britain that 
give good reason for optimism about the future development of British-European 
relations. For example, although the Conservative Party has remained 
predominantly Eurosceptic, the Labour Party has extracted itself from its former 
commitment to a British withdrawal from Europe since this position was perceived 
1 See, for example: Billig, M. (1995) Banal Nationalism. (London: Sage). 
2 See, for example: Condor, S. (2000)'Pride and Prejudice: Identity Management in English 
People's Talk about'this Country", Discourse and Society, Volume 11, No. 2, pp. 175-206. 
3 See, for example: Reicher, S. and N. Hopkins (2001) Seff and Nation. (London: Sage). 
4 See, for example: Bourdieu, P. (1991) Language and Symbolic Power. (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
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to be a major contributing factor to its large defeat in the 1983 General Election. 
With regard to the Labour Party, we could also examine whether the declared 
abandonment of its socialist heritage has been reflected in a consequent 
abandonment of the national parliamentary road to this end, and thus, to the left- 
wing rejection of European supranational integration. Moreover, Scottish and 
Welsh devolution in 1997 represented a significant blow to the traditional doctrine 
of national parliamentary sovereignty that had obstructed European supranational 
integration. Therefore, further research could examine the impact of devolution 
upon the process of British-European integration. 
We could also broaden our understanding of Euroscepticism by examining the 
particularisms of other member states that have also obstructed the process of 
European integration. As argued within the domestic politics approach of George 
et al, a comparative analysis is necessary because we need to examine the 
particularity of each member state in order to produce a more comprehensive 
understanding of the process of European integration. Indeed, although Britain 
has been a relatively awkward partner of the EU, other member states, such as 
Belgium, have also opposed particular aspects or issues of this process. The 
development of a comparative analysis would also help prevent the false 
particularisation of Britain that occurs when Continental Europe is lumped together 
as a single homogeneous identity in order to emphasize the particularity of Britain. 
In addition, future studies could explore the cultural 'spill-over' invoked by the 
process of European integration, as well as the impact of the growing 
communication and travel possibilities upon the development of a new 
5 See: Edwards, G. (11992) 'Central Government', in S. George (ed. ) (1992) Britain and the 
European Community. - The Politics of Semi-Detachment. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). p. 128- 
9. 
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supranational European identity. Such studies could attempt to assess the degree 
of hybridization and nomadization in identity that has been produced by these 
factors. 
New research could also analyse the impact of enlargement upon the EU. The 
new European constitution will increase the number of member states from fifteen 
to twenty-five and produce a citizenship of approximately 450 million. 6 As the 
number of members continues to grow, the influence of major Continental Europe 
member states, such as Germany and France, is being diluted. Moreover, as the 
diversity of membership broadens, is it becoming increasingly impossible to define 
or develop any notion of a universal European identity? Indeed, increases in 
membership are exacerbating the problem of achieving universal agreement upon 
the future shape of Europe. Thus, we could assess whether enlargement is only 
leading to a broadening, rather than a deepening, of the EU. To this end, we could 
examine the impact of changes in decision-making procedures upon the process 
of European political integration. For example, will 'weighted' qualified majority 
voting lead to a more supranational union? Will it help overcome the emphasized 
democratic deficits? 
Indeed, we must continue to critically assess the democratic progress of the EU. 
We can only argue that Euroscepticism is a negative phenomenon if the project of 
European integration proves itself to be a credible option. Moreover, to help 
overcome Euroscepticism, research must promote the advantages of more a 
positive approach to European integration. It must also play an active role in the 
development of a more progressive democratic discourse in Europe. As this thesis 
6 See: Black, 1. (2003)'Budget Clash Hits Talks on EU Constitution', The Guardian, 29 November, 
p. 18. 
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has argued, it is our responsibility as citizens to actively participate in the process 
that is shaping our common European future. 
432 
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